Headline
GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8: OpenPGP.js's message signature verification can be spoofed
Impact
A maliciously modified message can be passed to either openpgp.verify or openpgp.decrypt, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed.
This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using openpgp.verify) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using openpgp.decrypt with verificationKeys) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case.
In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker’s choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js.
In other words. any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker’s choice) together with that signature.
Both OpenPGP.js v6 and v5 are affected. OpenPGP.js v4 is not affected.
Patches
The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1.
Workarounds
- When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by
openpgp.readMessage, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created usingopenpgp.createMessage) toopenpgp.verify. - When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling
openpgp.decryptwithoutverificationKeys, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created usingopenpgp.createMessage) toopenpgp.verify.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank:
- Edoardo Geraci and Thomas Rinsma of Codean Labs for finding and reporting this vulnerability
- The Sovereign Tech Agency for sponsoring the OpenPGP.js bug bounty program
- YesWeHack for hosting the OpenPGP.js bug bounty program
- GitHub Advisory Database
- GitHub Reviewed
- CVE-2025-47934
OpenPGP.js’s message signature verification can be spoofed
High severity GitHub Reviewed Published May 19, 2025 in openpgpjs/openpgpjs • Updated May 19, 2025
Package
npm openpgp (npm)
Affected versions
>= 5.0.1, <= 5.11.2
>= 6.0.0-alpha.0, <= 6.1.0
Patched versions
5.11.3
6.1.1
Impact
A maliciously modified message can be passed to either openpgp.verify or openpgp.decrypt, causing these functions to return a valid signature verification result while returning data that was not actually signed.
This flaw allows signature verifications of inline (non-detached) signed messages (using openpgp.verify) and signed-and-encrypted messages (using openpgp.decrypt with verificationKeys) to be spoofed, since both functions return extracted data that may not match the data that was originally signed. Detached signature verifications are not affected, as no signed data is returned in that case.
In order to spoof a message, the attacker needs a single valid message signature (inline or detached) as well as the plaintext data that was legitimately signed, and can then construct an inline-signed message or signed-and-encrypted message with any data of the attacker’s choice, which will appear as legitimately signed by affected versions of OpenPGP.js.
In other words. any inline-signed message can be modified to return any other data (while still indicating that the signature was valid), and the same is true for signed+encrypted messages if the attacker can obtain a valid signature and encrypt a new message (of the attacker’s choice) together with that signature.
Both OpenPGP.js v6 and v5 are affected. OpenPGP.js v4 is not affected.
Patches
The issue has been patched in versions 5.11.3 and 6.1.1.
Workarounds
- When verifying inline-signed messages, extract the message and signature(s) from the message returned by openpgp.readMessage, and verify the(/each) signature as a detached signature by passing the signature and a new message containing only the data (created using openpgp.createMessage) to openpgp.verify.
- When decrypting and verifying signed+encrypted messages, decrypt and verify the message in two steps, by first calling openpgp.decrypt without verificationKeys, and then passing the returned signature(s) and a new message containing the decrypted data (created using openpgp.createMessage) to openpgp.verify.
Acknowledgements
We would like to thank:
- Edoardo Geraci and Thomas Rinsma of Codean Labs for finding and reporting this vulnerability
- The Sovereign Tech Agency for sponsoring the OpenPGP.js bug bounty program
- YesWeHack for hosting the OpenPGP.js bug bounty program
References
- GHSA-8qff-qr5q-5pr8
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47934
- openpgpjs/openpgpjs@43f5f4e
- openpgpjs/openpgpjs@843a69d
- openpgpjs/openpgpjs@bd54e85
- https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v5.11.3
- https://github.com/openpgpjs/openpgpjs/releases/tag/v6.1.1
Published to the GitHub Advisory Database
May 19, 2025
Last updated
May 19, 2025