ghsa

The NATS official Rust clients are vulnerable to MitM when using TLS. A fix for the `nats` crate hasn't been released yet. Since the `nats` crate is going to be deprecated anyway, consider switching to `async-nats` `>= 0.29` which already fixed this vulnerability. The common name of the server's TLS certificate is validated against the `host`name provided by the server's plaintext `INFO` message during the initial connection setup phase. A MitM proxy can tamper with the `host` field's value by substituting it with the common name of a valid certificate it controls, fooling the client into accepting it. ## Reproduction steps 1. The NATS Rust client tries to establish a new connection 2. The connection is intercepted by a MitM proxy 3. The proxy makes a separate connection to the NATS server 4. The NATS server replies with an `INFO` message 5. The proxy reads the `INFO`, alters the `host` JSON field and passes the tampered `INFO` back to the client 6. The proxy upgrades the client co...

### Impact A malicious invalid input crashes a tensorflow model (Check Failed) and can be used to trigger a denial of service attack. To minimize the bug, we built a simple single-layer TensorFlow model containing a Convolution3DTranspose layer, which works well with expected inputs and can be deployed in real-world systems. However, if we call the model with a malicious input which has a zero dimension, it gives Check Failed failure and crashes. ```python import tensorflow as tf class MyModel(tf.keras.Model): def __init__(self): super().__init__() self.conv = tf.keras.layers.Convolution3DTranspose(2, [3,3,3], padding="same") def call(self, input): return self.conv(input) model = MyModel() # Defines a valid model. x = tf.random.uniform([1, 32, 32, 32, 3], minval=0, maxval=0, dtype=tf.float32) # This is a valid input. output = model.predict(x) print(output.shape) # (1, 32, 32, 32, 2) x = tf.random.uniform([1, 32, 32, 0, 3], dtype=tf.float32) #...

Apache InLong versions from 1.1.0 through 1.5.0 are vulnerable to Java Database Connectivity (JDBC) deserialization of untrusted data from the MySQL JDBC URL in MySQLDataNode. It could be triggered by authenticated users of InLong. This has been patched in version 1.6.0. Users are advised to upgrade to Apache InLong's latest version or cherry-pick the [patch](https://github.com/apache/inlong/pull/7422) to solve it.

In GraphQL Java (aka graphql-java) before 20.1, an attacker can send a crafted GraphQL query that causes stack consumption. The fixed versions are 20.1, 19.4, 18.4, 17.5, and 0.0.0-2023-03-20T01-49-44-80e3135.

The pullit package before 1.4.0 for Node.js allows OS Command Injection because `eval()` is used on an attacker-supplied Git branch name.

redis-py before 4.5.3, as used in ChatGPT and other products, leaves a connection open after canceling an async Redis command at an inopportune time (in the case of a pipeline operation), and can send response data to the client of an unrelated request in an off-by-one manner. The fixed versions for this CVE Record are 4.3.6, 4.4.3, and 4.5.3, but [are believed to be incomplete](https://github.com/redis/redis-py/issues/2665). CVE-2023-28859 has been assigned the issues caused by the incomplete fixes.

redis-py through 4.5.3 leaves a connection open after canceling an async Redis command at an inopportune time (in the case of a non-pipeline operation), and can send response data to the client of an unrelated request. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2023-28858.

### Summary Arbitrary program names without any ANSI filtering allows any malicious program to clear the first 2 lines of a `op_spawn_child` or `op_kill` prompt and replace it with any desired text. ### Details The main entry point comes down to the ability to override what the API control says ([40_process.js](https://github.com/denoland/deno/blob/7d13d65468c37022f003bb680dfbddd07ea72173/runtime/js/40_process.js#L175)). Because of ANSI code's ability to clear lines, a malicious program can clear the last 2 lines of the prompt and put their own header. This also works in `op_kill`. ### PoC This PoC works on 1.31.1, but modified versions of it work on older versions. Make a file, e.g. `index.ts`, that uses this vulnerability to spoof the `op_spawn_child` permission prompt ```ts const boldANSI = "\u001b[1m" // bold const unboldANSI = "\u001b[22m" // unbold const prompt = `┌ ⚠️ ${boldANSI}Deno requests run access to "echo"${unboldANSI} ├ Requested by \`Deno.Command().output()` co...

### Impact angular-server-side-configuration detects used environment variables in TypeScript (.ts) files during build time of an Angular CLI project. The detected environment variables are written to a ngssc.json file in the output directory. During deployment of an Angular based app, the environment variables based on the variables from ngssc.json are inserted into the apps index.html (or defined index file). With version 15 the environment variable detection was widened to the entire project, relative to the angular.json file from the Angular CLI. In a monorepo setup, this could lead to environment variables intended for a backend/service to be detected and written to the ngssc.json, which would then be populated and exposed via index.html. This has NO IMPACT, in a plain Angular project that has no backend component. ### Patches Vulnerability has been mitigated in 15.1.0, by adding an option `searchPattern` which restricts the detection file range by default. ```bash # Update vi...

### Summary The vulnerability resides on the Nginx config file: https://github.com/heartexlabs/label-studio/blob/53944e6bcede75ca5c102d655013f2e5238e85e6/deploy/default.conf#L119 The pattern on location /static indicates a popular misconfiguration on Nginx servers presented in 2018 originally by Orange Tsai. This vulnerability allows an attacker to use a single path traversal payload in the matched location to traverse one directory above. This vulnerability only happens due to the location /static directive not having a slash `/` at the end, the following code shows an example of a safe configuration: ```nginx location /static/ { [...] ``` The vulnerability works because Nginx will think that `/static../` is a directory that should also be aliased to the folder, allowing /static/../ to be reached. In Label Studio's case, this means all files on /label_studio/core/ are exposed. Of course, this means that only Label Studio instances that were deployed using the default nginx files int...