Buffer Overflow vulnerability in function LoadPixelDataRLE8 in PluginBMP.cpp in FreeImage 3.18.0 allows remote attackers to run arbitrary code and cause other impacts via crafted image file.

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Milestone: None

Status: pending

Labels: None

Priority: 5

Updated: 2021-04-04

Created: 2019-12-03

Private: No

There is a heap-buffer-overflow in function LoadPixelDataRLE8 of PluginBMP.cpp whick may cause a code execution or denial of service.  
The asan log as below:

\=================================================================
\==28346\==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap\-buffer\-overflow on address 0xf4b02ca0 at pc 0x081595db bp 0xff8e4b28 sp 0xff8e4b20
WRITE of size 1 at 0xf4b02ca0 thread T0
    #0 0x81595da in LoadPixelDataRLE8(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, int, FIBITMAP\*) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:445:22
    #1 0x8153442 in LoadWindowsBMP(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, unsigned int, int) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:555:11
    #2 0x8153442 in Load(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, int, void\*) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:1135:12
    #3 0x814d00b in FreeImage\_LoadFromHandle /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/Plugin.cpp:388:24
    #4 0x814d00b in FreeImage\_Load /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/Plugin.cpp:408:22
    #5 0x811a7a0 in main /home/FreeImage/test.cpp:115:8
    #6 0xf7290fb8 in \_\_libc\_start\_main /build/glibc\-jYPHgv/glibc\-2.30/csu/../csu/libc\-start.c:308:16
    #7 0x806f8f5 in \_start (/home/FreeImage/test+0x806f8f5)

0xf4b02ca0 is located 0 bytes to the right of 544\-byte region \[0xf4b02a80,0xf4b02ca0)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x80e6675 in malloc (/home/FreeImage/TestAPI/testAPI+0x80e6675)
    #1 0x812aa32 in FreeImage\_Aligned\_Malloc(unsigned int, unsigned int) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/BitmapAccess.cpp:183:19
    #2 0x812aa32 in FreeImage\_AllocateBitmap(int, unsigned char\*, unsigned int, FREE\_IMAGE\_TYPE, int, int, int, unsigned int, unsigned int, unsigned int) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/BitmapAccess.cpp:390:26
    #3 0x812b600 in FreeImage\_AllocateHeader /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/BitmapAccess.cpp:482:9
    #4 0x8152bf1 in LoadWindowsBMP(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, unsigned int, int) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:494:11
    #5 0x8152bf1 in Load(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, int, void\*) /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:1135:12
    #6 0x814d00b in FreeImage\_LoadFromHandle /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/Plugin.cpp:388:24
    #7 0x814d00b in FreeImage\_Load /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/Plugin.cpp:408:22
    #8 0x811a7a0 in main /home/FreeImage/test.cpp:115:8
    #9 0xf7290fb8 in \_\_libc\_start\_main /build/glibc\-jYPHgv/glibc\-2.30/csu/../csu/libc\-start.c:308:16

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap\-buffer\-overflow /home/FreeImage/Source/FreeImage/PluginBMP.cpp:445:22 in LoadPixelDataRLE8(FreeImageIO\*, void\*, int, int, FIBITMAP\*)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x3e960540: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3e960550: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e960560: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e960570: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e960580: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
\=>0x3e960590: 00 00 00 00\[fa\]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3e9605a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x3e9605b0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e9605c0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e9605d0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x3e9605e0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
  Shadow gap:              cc
\==28346\==ABORTING

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CVE-2020-21427: FreeImage / Bugs / #298 heap-buffer-overflow in function LoadPixelDataRLE8 of PluginBMP.cpp

Buffer overflow vulnerability in c-ares before 1_16_1 thru 1_17_0 via function ares_parse_soa_reply in ares_parse_soa_reply.c.

If this is, indeed, an OOB read, then NVD scored incorrectly in this case. That said, I am not defending NVD as they frequently do not score correctly. That said, I want to point out that one part of CVSS specs says to "Score for the worst". That is one thing that leads to many v2 10 / v3 9.8 scores, especially when a vendor says e.g. "Vulnerability fixed". Without details orgs are forced to score like that, which may be artificially high of course.

CVE-2020-22217: read-heap-buffer-overflow in ares_parse_soa_reply() · Issue #333 · c-ares/c-ares

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in function bitwriter_grow_ in flac before 1.4.0 allows remote attackers to run arbitrary code via crafted input to the encoder.

we found wild-addr-write by fuzzing flac-master:

    ==217==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0xb6029a2c (pc 0x0822a2ae bp 0xffeb31e8 sp 0xffeb30a0 T0)
    ==217==The signal is caused by a WRITE memory access.
    SCARINESS: 30 (wild-addr-write)
        #0 0x822a2ad in FLAC__bitwriter_write_raw_uint32_nocheck /src/flac/src/libFLAC/bitwriter.c
        #1 0x8229a42 in FLAC__bitwriter_write_raw_uint32 /src/flac/src/libFLAC/bitwriter.c:369:9
        #2 0x8218ec3 in FLAC__frame_add_header /src/flac/src/libFLAC/stream_encoder_framing.c:227:6
        #3 0x820557b in process_subframes_ /src/flac/src/libFLAC/stream_encoder.c:3365:7
        #4 0x81d940f in process_frame_ /src/flac/src/libFLAC/stream_encoder.c:3096:6
        #5 0x81f3770 in FLAC__stream_encoder_process_interleaved /src/flac/src/libFLAC/stream_encoder.c:2298:9
        #6 0x81bfa80 in FLAC::Encoder::Stream::process_interleaved(int const*, unsigned int) /src/flac/src/libFLAC++/stream_encoder.cpp:370:29
        #7 0x81ac167 in LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput /src/flac-fuzzers/fuzzer_encoder.cpp:141:46
        #8 0x80ac766 in fuzzer::Fuzzer::ExecuteCallback(unsigned char const*, unsigned int) /src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerLoop.cpp:556:15
        #9 0x8098c13 in fuzzer::RunOneTest(fuzzer::Fuzzer*, char const*, unsigned int) /src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:292:6
        #10 0x809e318 in fuzzer::FuzzerDriver(int*, char***, int (*)(unsigned char const*, unsigned int)) /src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerDriver.cpp:774:9
        #11 0x80c3167 in main /src/llvm/projects/compiler-rt/lib/fuzzer/FuzzerMain.cpp:19:10
        #12 0xf7539636 in __libc_start_main (/lib32/libc.so.6+0x18636)
        #13 0x8073c38 in _start (/out/flac/fuzzer_encoder+0x8073c38)
    

here is my debug info:  
bw->buffer was realloc here

    bitwriter_grow_ (bw=0xf5a00a90, bits_to_add=62914562) at bitwriter.c:128
    128		if(new_buffer == 0)
    (gdb) n
    130		bw->buffer = new_buffer;
    (gdb) l
    125		FLAC__ASSERT(new_capacity >= bw->words + ((bw->bits + bits_to_add + FLAC__BITS_PER_WORD - 1) / FLAC__BITS_PER_WORD));
    126
    127		new_buffer = safe_realloc_mul_2op_(bw->buffer, sizeof(bwword), /*times*/new_capacity);
    128		if(new_buffer == 0)
    129			return false;
    130		bw->buffer = new_buffer;
    131		bw->capacity = new_capacity;
    132		return true;
    133	}
    134
    (gdb) p new_buffer
    $1 = (bwword *) 0x7abd7800
    (gdb) p new_capacity
    $2 = 250956800
    

later, bw->buffer was freed but it's value NOT set to 0

    156	static inline void *safe_realloc_(void *ptr, size_t size)
    157	{
    158		void *oldptr = ptr;
    159		void *newptr = realloc(ptr, size);
    160		if(size > 0 && newptr == 0)
    161			free(oldptr);
    162		return newptr;
    (gdb) n
    159		void *newptr = realloc(ptr, size);
    (gdb) n
    160		if(size > 0 && newptr == 0)
    (gdb) p newptr
    $4 = (void *) 0x0
    (gdb) p size
    $5 = 1006448640
    (gdb) n
    161			free(oldptr);
    (gdb) p oldptr
    $6 = (void *) 0x7abd7800
    (gdb) n
    162		return newptr;
    (gdb) n
    safe_realloc_mul_2op_ (ptr=0x7abd7800, size1=4, size2=251612160) at ../../include/share/alloc.h:206
    206	}
    (gdb) n
    bitwriter_grow_ (bw=0xf5a00a90, bits_to_add=20971521) at bitwriter.c:128
    128		if(new_buffer == 0)
    (gdb) l
    123		FLAC__ASSERT(0 == (new_capacity - bw->capacity) % FLAC__BITWRITER_DEFAULT_INCREMENT);
    124		FLAC__ASSERT(new_capacity > bw->capacity);
    125		FLAC__ASSERT(new_capacity >= bw->words + ((bw->bits + bits_to_add + FLAC__BITS_PER_WORD - 1) / FLAC__BITS_PER_WORD));
    126
    127		new_buffer = safe_realloc_mul_2op_(bw->buffer, sizeof(bwword), /*times*/new_capacity);
    128		if(new_buffer == 0)
    129			return false;
    130		bw->buffer = new_buffer;
    131		bw->capacity = new_capacity;
    132		return true;
    (gdb) p bw->buffer
    $7 = (bwword *) 0x7abd7800
    (gdb) p bw->capacity
    $8 = 250956800
    (gdb) n
    129			return false

CVE-2020-22219: wild-addr-write found by fuzz · Issue #215 · xiph/flac

A heap buffer overflow in r_read_le32 function in radare25.4.2 and 5.4.0.

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Fix oobread crash in RAnal.hexagon (tests\_64900) ##crash

Reported by giantbranch of NSFOCUS TIANJI Lab

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Showing **1 changed file** with **4 additions** and **1 deletion**.

5 changes: 4 additions & 1 deletion libr/anal/p/anal\_hexagon.c

Expand Up

@@ -10,8 +10,11 @@

#include "hexagon\_anal.h"

  

static int hexagon\_v6\_op(RAnal \*anal, RAnalOp \*op, ut64 addr, const ut8 \*buf, int len, RAnalOpMask mask) {

HexInsn hi \= {0};;

HexInsn hi \= {0};

ut32 data \= 0;

if (len < 4) {

return 0;

}

data \= r\_read\_le32 (buf);

int size \= hexagon\_disasm\_instruction (data, &hi, (ut32) addr);

op\->size \= size;

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CVE-2022-28072: Fix oobread crash in RAnal.hexagon (tests_64900) ##crash · radareorg/radare2@027cd9b

A heap buffer overflow in vax_opfunction in radare2 5.4.2 and 5.4.0.

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Fix oobread in VAX disassembler (tests\_64920) ##crash

Reported by giantbranch of NSFOCUS TIANJI Lab

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Showing **1 changed file** with **1 addition** and **1 deletion**.

2 changes: 1 addition & 1 deletion libr/anal/p/anal\_vax.c

Expand Up

@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ static int vax\_op(RAnal \*anal, RAnalOp \*op, ut64 addr, const ut8 \*buf, int len,

case 0xfb: // calls

op\->type \= R\_ANAL\_OP\_TYPE\_CALL;

op\->size \= 7;

{

if (len \> 6) {

int oa \= 3;

ut32 delta \= buf\[oa\];

delta |= (ut32)(buf\[oa + 1\]) << 8;

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CVE-2022-28069: Fix oobread in VAX disassembler (tests_64920) ##crash · radareorg/radare2@49b0ceb

A heap buffer overflow in r_sleb128 function in radare2 5.4.2 and 5.4.0.

Expand Up @@ -383,21 +383,18 @@ static inline ut64 dwarf\_read\_offset(bool is\_64bit, const ut8 \*\*buf, const ut8 \* if (is\_64bit) { result \= READ64 (\*buf); } else { result \= READ32 (\*buf); result \= (ut64)READ32 (\*buf); } return result; }  
static inline ut64 dwarf\_read\_address(size\_t size, const ut8 \*\*buf, const ut8 \*buf\_end) { ut64 result; switch (size) { case 2: result \= READ16 (\*buf); break; case 4: result \= READ32 (\*buf); break; case 8: result \= READ64 (\*buf); break; default: case 2: result \= READ16 (\*buf); break; case 4: result \= READ32 (\*buf); break; case 8: result \= READ64 (\*buf); break; default: result \= 0; \*buf += size; eprintf ("Weird dwarf address size: %zu.", size); Expand Down Expand Up @@ -1857,8 +1854,7 @@ static const ut8 \*parse\_attr\_value(const ut8 \*obuf, int obuf\_len, \* @param sdb \* @return const ut8\* Updated buffer \*/ static const ut8 \*parse\_die(const ut8 \*buf, const ut8 \*buf\_end, RBinDwarfAbbrevDecl \*abbrev, RBinDwarfCompUnitHdr \*hdr, RBinDwarfDie \*die, const ut8 \*debug\_str, size\_t debug\_str\_len, Sdb \*sdb) { static const ut8 \*parse\_die(const ut8 \*buf, const ut8 \*buf\_end, RBinDwarfAbbrevDecl \*abbrev, RBinDwarfCompUnitHdr \*hdr, RBinDwarfDie \*die, const ut8 \*debug\_str, size\_t debug\_str\_len, Sdb \*sdb) { size\_t i; for (i \= 0; i < abbrev\->count \- 1; i++) { memset (&die\->attr\_values\[i\], 0, sizeof (die\->attr\_values\[i\])); Expand All @@ -1868,9 +1864,8 @@ static const ut8 \*parse\_die(const ut8 \*buf, const ut8 \*buf\_end, RBinDwarfAbbrevD  
RBinDwarfAttrValue \*attribute \= &die\->attr\_values\[i\];  
bool is\_valid\_string\_form \= (attribute\->attr\_form \== DW\_FORM\_strp || attribute\->attr\_form \== DW\_FORM\_string) && attribute\->string.content; bool is\_string \= (attribute\->attr\_form \== DW\_FORM\_strp || attribute\->attr\_form \== DW\_FORM\_string); bool is\_valid\_string\_form \= is\_string && attribute\->string.content; // TODO does this have a purpose anymore? // Or atleast it needs to rework becase there will be // more comp units -> more comp dirs and only the last one will be kept Expand All @@ -1880,7 +1875,6 @@ static const ut8 \*parse\_die(const ut8 \*buf, const ut8 \*buf\_end, RBinDwarfAbbrevD } die\->count++; }  
return buf; }  
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CVE-2022-28068: Fix oobread crash in DWARF parser (tests_64924) ##crash · radareorg/radare2@637f4bd

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in ExtractorInformation function in streamExtractor.cpp in oggvideotools 0.9.1 allows remaote attackers to run arbitrary code via opening of crafted ogg file.

I use AddressSanitizer to build oggvideotools 0.9.1 and get segment fault as below. I use the command:  
oggLength <testcase>  
The testcase I used is put in the attachment.  
This software can also be installed by command apt install oggvideotools but the version is 0.8a-7, which can also get segment fault with the same testcase.</testcase>

MediaConverter::setAvailable(): decoder is not configured or has ended  
MediaConverter::setAvailable(): decoder is not configured or has ended  
MediaConverter::setAvailable(): decoder is not configured or has ended  
\=================================================================  
\==32390==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60600000e4b8 at pc 0x00000046e493 bp 0x7ffe9af99060 sp 0x7ffe9af99050  
WRITE of size 4 at 0x60600000e4b8 thread T0  
#0 0x46e492 in ExtractorInformation::operator=(ExtractorInformation const&) /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/oggvideotools-0.9.1/src/base/streamExtractor.cpp:17  
#1 0x4407e2 in StreamConfig::operator=(StreamConfig const&) /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/oggvideotools-0.9.1/src/base/streamConfig.h:12  
#2 0x43ea66 in StreamSerializer::getStreamConfig(std::vector<streamconfig, std::allocator<streamconfig=""> >&) /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/oggvideotools-0.9.1/src/main/streamSerializer.cpp:210  
#3 0x43b0c4 in oggLengthCmd(int, char\*\*) /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/oggvideotools-0.9.1/src/binaries/oggLength.cpp:93  
#4 0x43b4e5 in main /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/oggvideotools-0.9.1/src/binaries/oggLength.cpp:136  
#5 0x7f13e016782f in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)  
#6 0x43aa78 in \_start (/home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/install/bin/oggLength+0x43aa78)</streamconfig,>

0x60600000e4b8 is located 0 bytes to the right of 56-byte region \[0x60600000e480,0x60600000e4b8)  
allocated by thread T0 here:  
#0 0x7f13e0b42532 in operator new(unsigned long) (/usr/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.2+0x99532)  
#1 0x4468b4 in \_\_gnu\_cxx::new\_allocator<streamconfig>::allocate(unsigned long, void const_) /usr/include/c++/5/ext/new\_allocator.h:104  
#2 0x4460b3 in std::allocator\_traits<std::allocator<streamconfig> >::allocate(std::allocator<streamconfig>&, unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/5/bits/alloc\_traits.h:491  
#3 0x4451fd in std::\_Vector\_base<streamconfig, std::allocator<streamconfig=""> >::\_M\_allocate(unsigned long) /usr/include/c++/5/bits/stl\_vector.h:170  
#4 0x443257 in std::vector<streamconfig, std::allocator<streamconfig=""> >::\_M\_default\_append(unsigned long) (/home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/install/bin/oggLength+0x443257)  
#5 0x441d5e in std::vector<streamconfig, std::allocator<streamconfig=""> >::resize(unsigned long) (/home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/install/bin/oggLength+0x441d5e)  
#6 0x43e9a5 in StreamSerializer::getStreamConfig(std::vector<streamconfig, std::allocator<streamconfig=""> >&) /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/oggvideotools-0.9.1/src/main/streamSerializer.cpp:206  
#7 0x43b0c4 in oggLengthCmd(int, char</streamconfig,></streamconfig,></streamconfig,></streamconfig,></streamconfig></std::allocator<streamconfig>_\*) /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/oggvideotools-0.9.1/src/binaries/oggLength.cpp:93  
#8 0x43b4e5 in main /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/oggvideotools-0.9.1/src/binaries/oggLength.cpp:136  
#9 0x7f13e016782f in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x2082f)</streamconfig>

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/wws/Music/Fuzz/target\_progs/target\_oggvideotools\_addresssanitizer/oggvideotools-0.9.1/src/base/streamExtractor.cpp:17 ExtractorInformation::operator=(ExtractorInformation const&)  
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:  
0x0c0c7fff9c40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa  
0x0c0c7fff9c50: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa  
0x0c0c7fff9c60: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa  
0x0c0c7fff9c70: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa  
0x0c0c7fff9c80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa  
\=>0x0c0c7fff9c90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00\[fa\]fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00  
0x0c0c7fff9ca0: 00 00 05 fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa  
0x0c0c7fff9cb0: fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 07 fa fa fa fa fa  
0x0c0c7fff9cc0: fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd  
0x0c0c7fff9cd0: fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 fa  
0x0c0c7fff9ce0: fa fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fd fd fd fa fa fa fa fa  
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):  
Addressable: 00  
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07  
Heap left redzone: fa  
Heap right redzone: fb  
Freed heap region: fd  
Stack left redzone: f1  
Stack mid redzone: f2  
Stack right redzone: f3  
Stack partial redzone: f4  
Stack after return: f5  
Stack use after scope: f8  
Global redzone: f9  
Global init order: f6  
Poisoned by user: f7  
Container overflow: fc  
Array cookie: ac  
Intra object redzone: bb  
ASan internal: fe  
\==32390==ABORTING

My system is:  
Description: Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS  
Release: 16.04

The software information:  
oggvideotools:  
Installed: 0.8a-7  
Candidate: 0.8a-7  
Version table:  
\*\*\* 0.8a-7 500  
500 https://mirrors.tuna.tsinghua.edu.cn/ubuntu xenial/universe amd64 Packages  
500 http://archive.ubuntu.com/ubuntu xenial/universe amd64 Packages  
100 /var/lib/dpkg/status

ProblemType: Bug  
DistroRelease: Ubuntu 16.04  
Package: oggvideotools 0.8a-7  
ProcVersionSignature: Ubuntu 4.15.0-66.75~16.04.1-generic 4.15.18  
Uname: Linux 4.15.0-66-generic x86\_64  
ApportVersion: 2.20.1-0ubuntu2.21  
Architecture: amd64  
CurrentDesktop: Unity  
Date: Thu Nov 14 19:56:47 2019  
InstallationDate: Installed on 2019-01-24 (293 days ago)  
InstallationMedia: Ubuntu 16.04.5 LTS "Xenial Xerus" - Release amd64 (20180731)  
SourcePackage: oggvideotools  
UpgradeStatus: No upgrade log present (probably fresh install)

**1 Attachments**

CVE-2020-21724: Ogg Video Tools / Bugs

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in WritePCXImage function in pcx.c in GraphicsMagick 1.4 allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service via converting of crafted image file to pcx format.

Hi, I found a heap-buffer-overflow in WritePCXImage at pcx.c:1255  
I tested it in GraphicsMagick 1.4  
how to reproduce :

ASAN LOG

\==14178\==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap\-buffer\-overflow on address 0x6030000000c0 at pc 0x0000028f29c0 bp 0x7ffec5056070 sp 0x7ffec5056068
WRITE of size 1 at 0x6030000000c0 thread T0
    #0 0x28f29bf in WritePCXImage /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/coders/pcx.c:1255:17
    #1 0x8e5c7e in WriteImage /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/magick/constitute.c:2245:14
    #2 0x8eac18 in WriteImages /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/magick/constitute.c:2404:21
    #3 0x615be6 in ConvertImageCommand /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/magick/command.c:6135:11
    #4 0x72e875 in MagickCommand /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/magick/command.c:8880:17
    #5 0x810c5c in GMCommandSingle /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/magick/command.c:17412:10
    #6 0x80ba1e in GMCommand /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/magick/command.c:17465:16
    #7 0x7ff6e5aa2b96 in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64\-linux\-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96)
    #8 0x424239 in \_start (/home/suhwan/project/fuzz\-input\-validate/test/bin/gm+0x424239)

0x6030000000c0 is located 0 bytes to the right of 32\-byte region \[0x6030000000a0,0x6030000000c0)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x4cc083 in \_\_interceptor\_malloc /tmp/final/llvm.src/projects/compiler\-rt/lib/asan/asan\_malloc\_linux.cc:146:3
    #1 0x28ddf2c in WritePCXImage /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/coders/pcx.c:1172:16
    #2 0x8e5c7e in WriteImage /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/magick/constitute.c:2245:14
    #3 0x8eac18 in WriteImages /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/magick/constitute.c:2404:21

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap\-buffer\-overflow /home/suhwan/project/graphicsmagick\-code/coders/pcx.c:1255:17 in WritePCXImage
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0c067fff7fc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c067fff7fd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c067fff7fe0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c067fff7ff0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0c067fff8000: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00
\=>0x0c067fff8010: 05 fa fa fa 00 00 00 00\[fa\]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c067fff8020: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c067fff8030: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c067fff8040: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c067fff8050: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0c067fff8060: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
  Shadow gap:              cc
\==14178\==ABORTING

GraphicsMagick 1.4 snapshot-20191225 Q8 http://www.GraphicsMagick.org/  
Copyright (C) 2002-2019 GraphicsMagick Group.  
Additional copyrights and licenses apply to this software.  
See http://www.GraphicsMagick.org/www/Copyright.html for details.

Feature Support:  
Native Thread Safe yes  
Large Files (> 32 bit) yes  
Large Memory (> 32 bit) yes  
BZIP yes  
DPS no  
FlashPix no  
FreeType yes  
Ghostscript (Library) no  
JBIG yes  
JPEG-2000 no  
JPEG yes  
Little CMS yes  
Loadable Modules no  
Solaris mtmalloc no  
OpenMP yes (201107 "3.1")  
PNG yes  
TIFF yes  
TRIO no  
Solaris umem no  
WebP no  
WMF no  
X11 yes  
XML yes  
ZLIB yes

Host type: x86\_64-pc-linux-gnu

CVE-2020-21679: GraphicsMagick / Bugs / #619 heap-buffer-overflow in WritePCXImage

Buffer Overflow vulnerability in Supermicro motherboard X12DPG-QR 1.4b allows local attackers to hijack control flow via manipulation of SmcSecurityEraseSetupVar variable.

Variable Modification Due to Stack Overflow

**Vulnerability Disclosure:**

The purpose of this vulnerability disclosure is to communicate the potential vulnerability affecting Supermicro products that was reported by an external researcher.

**Acknowledgement:**

Supermicro would like to acknowledge the work done by the researcher from Wuhan University, China for discovering a potential vulnerability in the X12DPG-QR motherboard.

**Findings:**

Possible stack overflow occurrence in the BIOS firmware may allow an attacker to exploit this vulnerability by manipulating a variable to potentially hijack the control flow, allowing attackers with the kernel level privileges to escalate their privileges and potentially leading to the execution of arbitrary code.

**CVE:**

*   CVE-2023-34853
*   **Severity**: High

**Affected products:**

Supermicro BIOS in X11, X12, X13, and H11, H12, H13 motherboards.

**Solution:**

All affected Supermicro motherboard SKUs will require a BIOS update to mitigate this potential vulnerability.

An updated BIOS firmware had been created to mitigate this potential vulnerability. Supermicro is currently testing and validating affected products. Please check Release Notes for the resolution.

CVE-2023-34853: Variable Modification Due to Stack Overflow | Supermicro

A buffer overflow can occur when calculating the quantile value using the Statistics Library of GSL (GNU Scientific Library), versions 2.5 and 2.6. Processing a maliciously crafted input data for gsl_stats_quantile_from_sorted_data of the library may lead to unexpected application termination or arbitrary code execution.

Tag

#buffer_overflow