#vulnerability

Versions of the package jsondiffpatch before 0.7.2 are vulnerable to Cross-site Scripting (XSS) via HtmlFormatter::nodeBegin. An attacker can inject malicious scripts into HTML payloads that may lead to code execution if untrusted payloads were used as source for the diff, and the result renderer using the built-in html formatter on a private website.

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The npm package `interactive-git-checkout` is an interactive command-line tool that allows users to checkout a git branch while it prompts for the branch name on the command-line. It is available as an npm package and can be installed via `npm install -g interactive-git-checkout`. Resources: * Project's npm package: https://www.npmjs.com/package/interactive-git-checkout ## Command Injection Vulnerability The `interactive-git-checkout` tool is vulnerable to a command injection vulnerability because it passes the branch name to the `git checkout` command using the Node.js child process module's `exec()` function without proper input validation or sanitization. The following vulnerable code snippets demonstrates the issue: ```js const { exec: execCb } = require('child_process'); const { promisify } = require('util'); const exec = promisify(execCb); module.exports = async (targetBranch) => { const { stdout, stderr } = await exec(`git checkout ${targetBranch}`); process.st...

Reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Liferay Portal 7.4.3.73 through 7.4.3.128, and Liferay DXP 2024.Q3.0 through 2024.Q3.1, 2024.Q2.0 through 2024.Q2.13, 2024.Q1.1 through 2024.Q1.12, 7.4 update 73 through update 92 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via the /c/portal/comment/discussion/get_editor path.

Improper Access Control vulnerability in Liferay Portal 7.4.0 through 7.4.3.124, and Liferay DXP 2024.Q2.0 through 2024.Q2.8, 2024.Q1.1 through 2024.Q1.12 and 7.4 GA through update 92 allows guest users to obtain object entry information via the API Builder.

### Impact A bug in the authentication logic will cause API tokens that were deleted and/or expired to be considered valid. This means that any API token that is associated with an active user account can authenticate successfully. ### Patches This issue is fixed in versions `1.3.9` and `1.4.5` ### Workarounds Users can delete or deactivate the account associated with a deleted API token to prevent that token from authenticating.

### Impact By exploiting XSS vulnerabilities, malicious actors can perform harmful actions in the user's web browser in the session context of the affected user. Some examples of this include, but are not limited to: - Obtaining user session tokens. - Performing administrative actions (when an administrative user is affected). These vulnerabilities pose a high security risk. Since a sensitive cookie is not configured with the HttpOnly attribute and administrator JWTs are stored in sessionStorage, any successful XSS attack could enable the theft of session cookies and administrative tokens. #### Description When an application uses input fields, it is important that user input is adequately filtered for malicious HTML and JavaScript characters. When adequate input validation is not applied, Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerabilities may arise. These allow malicious actors to inject malicious code into application pages. When a user visits the page, the code is executed in the user's...

### Impact When generating PDF files, this vulnerability allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem by injecting malicious link element into the prepped RFCXML. ### Workarounds Test untrusted input with `link` elements with `rel="attachment"` before processing. ### References This is related to [GHSA-cfmv-h8fx-85m7](https://github.com/ietf-tools/xml2rfc/security/advisories/GHSA-cfmv-h8fx-85m7).

### Impact Due to a special entry being appended to `sys.path` during the bootstrap process of a PyInstaller-frozen application, and due to the bootstrap script attempting to load an optional module for bytecode decryption while this entry is still present in `sys.path`, an application built with PyInstaller < 6.0.0 may be tricked by an unprivileged attacker into executing arbitrary python code when **all** of the following conditions are met: 1. Application is built with PyInstaller < 6.0.0; both onedir and onefile mode are affected. 2. Optional bytecode encryption code feature was **not** enabled during the application build. 3. The attacker can create files/directories in the same directory where the executable is located. 4. The filesystem supports creation of files/directories that contain `?` in their name (i.e., non-Windows systems). 5. The attacker is able to determine the offset at which the PYZ archive is embedded in the executable. The attacker can create a directory (or ...

### Impact There is a Cross-Site-Scripting vulnerability when rendering LaTeX math code in contribution or abstract descriptions. ### Patches You should to update to [Indico 3.3.8](https://github.com/indico/indico/releases/tag/v3.3.8) as soon as possible. See [the docs](https://docs.getindico.io/en/stable/installation/upgrade/) for instructions on how to update. ### Workarounds Only let trustworthy users create content on Indico. Note that a conference doing a Call for Abstracts actively invites external speakers (who the organizers may not know and thus cannot fully trust) to submit content, hence the need to update to a a fixed version ASAP in particular when using such workflows. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: - Open a thread in [our forum](https://talk.getindico.io/) - Email us privately at [indico-team@cern.ch](mailto:indico-team@cern.ch)