#vulnerability

**According to the CVSS metric, the attack vector is physical (AV:P). What does that mean for this vulnerability?** To exploit this vulnerability, an unauthenticated attacker needs to physically connect a malicious USB device to the victim's machine

**According to the CVSS metric, the attack vector is physical (AV:P). What does that mean for this vulnerability?** To exploit this vulnerability, an unauthenticated attacker needs to physically connect a malicious USB device to the victim's machine

**According to the CVSS metric, the attack vector is physical (AV:P). What does that mean for this vulnerability?** To exploit this vulnerability, an unauthenticated attacker needs to physically connect a malicious USB device to the victim's machine

**What type of information could be disclosed by this vulnerability?** An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could view heap memory from a privileged process running on the server.

**What privileges could be gained by an attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability?** An attacker who successfully exploited this vulnerability could gain SYSTEM privileges.

**Why is this GitHub CVE included in the Security Update Guide?** The vulnerability assigned to this CVE is in MinGit software which is consumed by Microsoft Visual Studio. It is being documented in the Security Update Guide to announce that the latest builds of Visual Studio are no longer vulnerable. Please see Security Update Guide Supports CVEs Assigned by Industry Partners for more information.

### Impact A Nautobot user with admin privileges can modify the `BANNER_TOP`, `BANNER_BOTTOM`, and `BANNER_LOGIN` configuration settings via the `/admin/constance/config/` endpoint. Normally these settings are used to provide custom banner text at the top and bottom of all Nautobot web pages (or specifically on the login page in the case of `BANNER_LOGIN`) but it was reported that an admin user can make use of these settings to inject arbitrary HTML, potentially exposing Nautobot users to security issues such as cross-site scripting (stored XSS). ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ Patches will be released as part of Nautobot 1.6.22 and 2.2.4. ### Workarounds _Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_ As [described in the Nautobot documentation](https://docs.nautobot.com/projects/core/en/stable/user-guide/administration/configuration/optional-settings/#administratively-configurable-settings), t...

### Summary A stored cross-site scripting vulnerability exists within the Formula virtual cell comments functionality. ### Details The nc-gui/components/virtual-cell/Formula.vue displays a v-html tag with the value of "urls" whose contents are processed by the function replaceUrlsWithLink(). This function recognizes the pattern URI::(XXX) and creates a hyperlink tag <a> with href=XXX. However, it leaves all the other contents outside of the pattern URI::(XXX) unchanged, which makes the evil users can create a malicious table with a formula field whose payload is <img src=1 onerror="malicious javascripts"URI::(XXX). The evil users then can share this table with others by enabling public viewing and the victims who open the shared link can be attacked. ### PoC Step 1: Attacker login the nocodb and creates a table with two fields, "T" and "F". The type of field "T" is "SingleLineText", and the type of the "F" is "Fomula" with the formula content {T} Step 2: The attacker sets the content...

## Summary A user with permission to view any collection using redacted hashed fields can get access the raw stored version using the `alias` functionality on the API. Normally, these redacted fields will return `**********` however if we change the request to `?alias[workaround]=redacted` we can instead retrieve the plain text value for the field. ## Steps to reproduce - Set up a simple role with read-access to users. - Create a new user with the role from the previous step - Assign a password to the user The easiest way to confirm this vulnerability is by first visiting `/users/me`. You should be presented with a redacted JSON-object. Next, visit `/users/me?alias[hash]=password`. This time, the returned JSON object will included the raw password hash instead of the redacted value. ## Workaround This can be avoided by removing permission to view the sensitive fields entirely from users or roles that should not be able to see them.

By Waqas Millions of IoT and industrial devices at risk! Critical vulnerabilities in Cinterion cellular modems allow remote attackers to take control. This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Cinterion Modem Vulnerabilities Leave IoT and Industrial Networks Exposed