Headline
GHSA-625h-95r8-8xpm: Rack has an unsafe default in Rack::QueryParser allows params_limit bypass via semicolon-separated parameters
Summary
Rack::QueryParser
in version < 2.2.18
enforces its params_limit
only for parameters separated by &
, while still splitting on both &
and ;
. As a result, attackers could use ;
separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.
Details
The issue arises because Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string
counts only &
characters when determining the number of parameters, but the default separator regex DEFAULT_SEP = /[&;] */n
splits on both &
and ;
. This mismatch means that queries using ;
separators were not included in the parameter count, allowing params_limit
to be bypassed.
Other safeguards (bytesize_limit
and key_space_limit
) still applied, but did not prevent this particular bypass.
Impact
Applications or middleware that directly invoke Rack::QueryParser
with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector.
Rack::Request
, the primary entry point for typical Rack applications, uses QueryParser
in a safe way and does not appear vulnerable by default. As such, the severity is considered low, with the impact limited to edge cases where QueryParser
is used directly.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to a patched version of Rack where both
&
and;
are counted consistently towardparams_limit
. - If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure
QueryParser
with an explicit delimiter (e.g.,&
) to avoid the mismatch. - As a general precaution, enforce query string and request size limits at the web server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx, Apache, or a CDN) to mitigate excessive parsing overhead.
Summary
Rack::QueryParser in version < 2.2.18 enforces its params_limit only for parameters separated by &, while still splitting on both & and ;. As a result, attackers could use ; separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended.
Details
The issue arises because Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string counts only & characters when determining the number of parameters, but the default separator regex DEFAULT_SEP = /[&;] */n splits on both & and ;. This mismatch means that queries using ; separators were not included in the parameter count, allowing params_limit to be bypassed.
Other safeguards (bytesize_limit and key_space_limit) still applied, but did not prevent this particular bypass.
Impact
Applications or middleware that directly invoke Rack::QueryParser with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited denial-of-service vector.
Rack::Request, the primary entry point for typical Rack applications, uses QueryParser in a safe way and does not appear vulnerable by default. As such, the severity is considered low, with the impact limited to edge cases where QueryParser is used directly.
Mitigation
- Upgrade to a patched version of Rack where both & and ; are counted consistently toward params_limit.
- If upgrading is not immediately possible, configure QueryParser with an explicit delimiter (e.g., &) to avoid the mismatch.
- As a general precaution, enforce query string and request size limits at the web server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx, Apache, or a CDN) to mitigate excessive parsing overhead.
References
- GHSA-625h-95r8-8xpm
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-59830
- rack/rack@54e4ffd