#java

LavaLite CMS versions up to and including 10.1.0 contain a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the package creation and search functionality. Authenticated users can supply crafted HTML or JavaScript in the package Name or Description fields that is stored and later rendered without proper output encoding in package search results. When other users view search results that include the malicious package, the injected script executes in their browsers, potentially enabling session hijacking, credential theft, and unauthorized actions in the context of the victim.

The fix applied in CVE-2025-22228 inadvertently broke the timing attack mitigation implemented in DaoAuthenticationProvider. This can allow attackers to infer valid usernames or other authentication behavior via response-time differences under certain configurations.

I am reporting a code injection vulnerability in Orval’s mock generation pipeline affecting @orval/mock in both the 7.x and 8.x series. This issue is related in impact to the previously reported enum x-enumDescriptions (https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-h526-wf6g-67jv), but it affects a different code path in the faker-based mock generator rather than @orval/core. The vulnerability allows untrusted OpenAPI specifications to inject arbitrary TypeScript/JavaScript into generated mock files via the const keyword on schema properties. These const values are interpolated into the mock scalar generator (getMockScalar in packages/mock/src/faker/getters/scalar.ts) without proper escaping or type-safe serialization, which results in attacker-controlled code being emitted into both interface definitions and faker/MSW handlers. I have confirmed that this occurs on orval@7.19.0 and orval@8.0.2 with mock: true, and that the generated mocks contain executable payloads such as require('child_proces...

### Summary Client-side script execution in Typebot allows stealing all stored credentials from any user. When a victim previews a malicious typebot by clicking "Run", JavaScript executes in their browser and exfiltrates their OpenAI keys, Google Sheets tokens, and SMTP passwords. The `/api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials` endpoint returns plaintext API keys without verifying credential ownership --- ### Details The Script block with "Execute on client" enabled runs arbitrary JavaScript in the victim's browser with their authenticated session. This allows API calls on their behalf. The `/api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials` endpoint returns plaintext credentials: ```http GET /api/trpc/credentials.getCredentials?input={"json":{"scope":"user","credentialsId":"cm6sofgv200085ms9d2qyvgwc"}} Response: { "result": { "data": { "json": { "name": "My OpenAI Key", "data": { "apiKey": "sk-proj-abc123...xyz789" } } } } } ``` The endpoint only checks i...

Most of this week’s threats didn’t rely on new tricks. They relied on familiar systems behaving exactly as designed, just in the wrong hands. Ordinary files, routine services, and trusted workflows were enough to open doors without forcing them. What stands out is how little friction attackers now need. Some activity focused on quiet reach and coverage, others on timing and reuse. The emphasis

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Discovery & Research team recently disclosed three vulnerabilities in Foxit PDF Editor, one in the Epic Games Store, and twenty-one in MedDream PACS.. The vulnerabilities mentioned in this blog post have been patched by their respective vendors, all in adherence to Cisco’s third-party vulnerability

ACE vulnerability in configuration file processing by QOS.CH logback-core up to and including version 1.5.24 in Java applications, allows an attacker to instantiate classes already present on the class path by compromising an existing logback configuration file. The instantiation of a potentially malicious Java class requires that said class is present on the user's class-path. In addition, the attacker must have write access to a configuration file. However, after successful instantiation, the instance is very likely to be discarded with no further ado.

### Summary Stored XSS in the artifact directory listing allows any workflow author to execute arbitrary JavaScript in another user’s browser under the Argo Server origin, enabling API actions with the victim’s privileges. ### Details The directory listing response in `server/artifacts/artifact_server.go` renders object names directly into HTML via `fmt.Fprintf` without escaping. Object names come from `driver.ListObjects(...)` and are attacker‑controlled when a workflow writes files into an output artifact directory. https://github.com/argoproj/argo-workflows/blob/9872c296d29dcc5e9c78493054961ede9fc30797/server/artifacts/artifact_server.go#L194-L244 ### PoC 1. Deploy Argo Workflows: ``` kubectl create ns argo kubectl apply --server-side -f manifests/base/crds/full kubectl apply --server-side -k manifests/quick-start/postgres ``` 2. Port‑forward Argo Server: ``` kubectl -n argo port-forward deploy/argo-server 2746:2746 ``` 3. Create the PoC workflow: ```yml cat > /tmp/argo-xss.yaml ...

As many as 3,136 individual IP addresses linked to likely targets of the Contagious Interview activity have been identified, with the campaign claiming 20 potential victim organizations spanning artificial intelligence (AI), cryptocurrency, financial services, IT services, marketing, and software development sectors in Europe, South Asia, the Middle East, and Central America. The new findings

Overriding RegExp serialization with extremely large patterns can **exhaust JavaScript runtime memory** during deserialization. Additionally, overriding RegExp serialization with patterns that trigger **catastrophic backtracking** can lead to ReDoS (Regular Expression Denial of Service). **Mitigation**: `Seroval` introduces `disabledFeatures` (a bitmask) in serialization/deserialization methods, with `Feature.RegExp` as a dedicated flag. **Users are recommended to configure `disabledFeatures` to disable RegExp serialization entirely.**