Headline
GHSA-qvr7-7g55-69xj: Pimcore Has an Incomplete Patch for CVE-2023-30848
Summary
An incomplete SQL injection patch in the Admin Search Find API allows an authenticated attacker to perform blind SQL injection. Although CVE-2023-30848 attempted to mitigate SQL injection by removing SQL comments (–) and catching syntax errors, the fix is insufficient. Attackers can still inject SQL payloads that do not rely on comments and infer database information via blind techniques. This vulnerability affects the admin interface and can lead to database information disclosure.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the Admin Search Find API endpoint:
/admin/search/search/find
In CVE-2023-30848, the following patch was applied:
- SQL comments are removed by replacing
-- - SQL syntax errors are caught and replaced with a generic exception
Relevant commit:
https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore/commit/25ad8674886f2b938243cbe13e33e204a2e35cc3
Key changes include:
// remove sql comments
$fields = str_replace('--', '', $fields);
try {
$hits = $searcherList->load();
} catch (SyntaxErrorException $syntaxErrorException) {
throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Check your arguments.');
}
However, this mitigation is incomplete for the following reasons:
1. Only -- is filtered
SQL injection does not require SQL comments. Payloads using boolean conditions, SQL functions, or time-based expressions remain effective.
2. Exception handling only suppresses error output
While syntax errors no longer produce detailed error messages, the underlying SQL query is still executed. This allows attackers to perform blind SQL injection.
3. User-controlled input is still used in SQL query construction
The fields[] parameter is attacker-controlled and can be abused to inject SQL expressions into the generated query.
As a result, attackers can craft payloads that do not trigger syntax errors and still influence SQL execution.
PoC
The following request demonstrates a blind SQL injection via the fields[] parameter.
Boolean-based Blind Injection
GET /admin/search/search/find?query=2&
fields[]=field1 AND (SELECT CASE WHEN (1=1) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END)=1~field2&
filter=[{"property":"value"}]&
class=classname
Time-based Blind Injection
GET /admin/search/search/find?query=2&
fields[]=field1 AND IF(1=1,SLEEP(5),0)~field2&
filter=[{"property":"value"}]&
class=classname
Observed behavior:
When the condition is true, the response is delayed (e.g., ~5 seconds)
When the condition is false, the response is returned immediately
This confirms that injected SQL expressions are executed successfully.
Impact
This is a Blind SQL Injection vulnerability.
Affected users: Systems exposing the Admin Search Find API to authenticated users
Attack requirements: Authenticated access to the admin interface
Potential impact:
Database schema enumeration
Extraction of sensitive data via blind SQL injection
Potential full database compromise depending on database privileges
This issue demonstrates that the fix for CVE-2023-30848 is incomplete.
Summary
An incomplete SQL injection patch in the Admin Search Find API allows an authenticated attacker to perform blind SQL injection.
Although CVE-2023-30848 attempted to mitigate SQL injection by removing SQL comments (–) and catching syntax errors, the fix is insufficient. Attackers can still inject SQL payloads that do not rely on comments and infer database information via blind techniques. This vulnerability affects the admin interface and can lead to database information disclosure.
Details
The vulnerability exists in the Admin Search Find API endpoint:
/admin/search/search/find
In CVE-2023-30848, the following patch was applied:
- SQL comments are removed by replacing –
- SQL syntax errors are caught and replaced with a generic exception
Relevant commit:
pimcore/pimcore@25ad867
Key changes include:
// remove sql comments
$fields = str_replace('--', '', $fields);
try {
$hits = $searcherList->load();
} catch (SyntaxErrorException $syntaxErrorException) {
throw new \InvalidArgumentException('Check your arguments.');
}
However, this mitigation is incomplete for the following reasons:
1. Only – is filtered
SQL injection does not require SQL comments. Payloads using boolean conditions, SQL functions, or time-based expressions remain effective.
2. Exception handling only suppresses error output
While syntax errors no longer produce detailed error messages, the underlying SQL query is still executed. This allows attackers to perform blind SQL injection.
3. User-controlled input is still used in SQL query construction
The fields[] parameter is attacker-controlled and can be abused to inject SQL expressions into the generated query.
As a result, attackers can craft payloads that do not trigger syntax errors and still influence SQL execution.
PoC
The following request demonstrates a blind SQL injection via the fields[] parameter.
Boolean-based Blind Injection
GET /admin/search/search/find?query=2&
fields[]=field1 AND (SELECT CASE WHEN (1=1) THEN 1 ELSE 0 END)=1~field2&
filter=[{"property":"value"}]&
class=classname
Time-based Blind Injection
GET /admin/search/search/find?query=2&
fields[]=field1 AND IF(1=1,SLEEP(5),0)~field2&
filter=[{"property":"value"}]&
class=classname
Observed behavior:
When the condition is true, the response is delayed (e.g., ~5 seconds)
When the condition is false, the response is returned immediately
This confirms that injected SQL expressions are executed successfully.
Impact
This is a Blind SQL Injection vulnerability.
Affected users: Systems exposing the Admin Search Find API to authenticated users
Attack requirements: Authenticated access to the admin interface
Potential impact:
Database schema enumeration
Extraction of sensitive data via blind SQL injection
Potential full database compromise depending on database privileges
This issue demonstrates that the fix for CVE-2023-30848 is incomplete.
References
- GHSA-qvr7-7g55-69xj
- pimcore/pimcore@25ad867
- GHSA-6mhm-gcpf-5gr8