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Digital forensics offers a challenging but rewarding career path for cybersecurity professionals willing to invest in specialized knowledge and continuous learning.

The cloud now acts as the connecting infrastructure for many companies' assets — from IoT devices to workstations to applications and workloads — exposing the edge to threats.

A vulnerability was detected in sequa-ai sequa-mcp up to 1.0.13. This affects the function redirectToAuthorization of the file src/helpers/node-oauth-client-provider.ts of the component OAuth Server Discovery. Performing manipulation results in os command injection. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit is now public and may be used. Upgrading to version 1.0.14 is able to mitigate this issue. The patch is named e569815854166db5f71c2e722408f8957fb9e804. It is recommended to upgrade the affected component. The vendor explains: "We only promote that mcp server with our own URLs that have a valid response, but yes if someone would use it with a non sequa url, this is a valid attack vector. We have released a new version (1.0.14) that fixes this and validates that only URLs can be opened."

npm parcel 2.0.0-alpha and before has an Origin Validation Error vulnerability. Malicious websites can send XMLHTTPRequests to the application's development server and read the response to steal source code when developers visit them.

Pingora deployments that include HTTP/2 server support may be affected by the vulnerability described in CVE-2025-8671. Under certain conditions, Pingora applications may allocate buffers before the HTTP/2 reset and resulting stream cancellation is processed by the server. Repeated resets can force excessive memory consumption and lead to denial-of-service. **Impact**: On affected versions, malicious clients could trigger unusually high memory consumption, which may result in service instability or process termination. **Credits**: Reported responsibly by security researcher [Gal Bar Nahum](https://github.com/galbarnahum) (@[galbarnahum](https://github.com/galbarnahum)) **Mitigation**: This issue is addressed by ensuring Pingora uses patched versions of HTTP/2 dependencies that include reset-handling safeguards to release connection resources before excessive memory buildup. Users should upgrade to the latest Pingora release, which incorporates the required fixes. - Users are reques...

### Summary A client-side path traversal vulnerability in Nuxt's Island payload revival mechanism allowed attackers to manipulate client-side requests to different endpoints within the same application domain when specific prerendering conditions are met. ### Technical Details The vulnerability occurs in the client-side payload revival process (revive-payload.client.ts) where Nuxt Islands are automatically fetched when encountering serialized `__nuxt_island` objects. The issue affects the following flow: 1. During prerendering, if an API endpoint returns user-controlled data containing a crafted `__nuxt_island` object 2. This data gets serialized with `devalue.stringify` and stored in the prerendered page 3. When a client navigates to the prerendered page, `devalue.parse` deserializes the payload 4. The Island reviver attempts to fetch `/__nuxt_island/${key}.json` where `key` could contain path traversal sequences ### Prerequisites for Exploitation This vulnerability requires **a...

Special characters used during e-mail registration may perform SMTP Injection and unexpectedly send short unwanted e-mails. The email is limited to 64 characters (limited local part of the email), so the attack is limited to very shorts emails (subject and little data, the example is 60 chars). This flaw's only direct consequence is an unsolicited email being sent from the Keycloak server. However, this action could be a precursor for more sophisticated attacks.

### Impact The code in the scheduler for downloading a tiny file is hard coded to use the HTTP protocol, rather than HTTPS. This means that an attacker could perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack, changing the network request so that a different piece of data gets downloaded. Due to the use of weak integrity checks (TOB-DF2-15), this modification of the data may go unnoticed. ```golang // DownloadTinyFile downloads tiny file from peer without range. func (p *Peer) DownloadTinyFile() ([]byte, error) { ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), downloadTinyFileContextTimeout) defer cancel() // Download url: http://${host}:${port}/download/${taskIndex}/${taskID}?peerId=${peerID} targetURL := url.URL{ Scheme: } "http", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", p.Host.IP, p.Host.DownloadPort), fmt.Sprintf("download/%s/%s", p.Task.ID[:3], p.Task.ID), Host: Path: RawQuery: fmt.Sprintf("peerId=%s", p.ID), ``` A network-level attacker who cannot join a peer-to-peer network p...

### Impact The DragonFly2 uses a variety of hash functions, including the MD5 hash. This algorithm does not provide collision resistance; it is secure only against preimage attacks. While these security guarantees may be enough for the DragonFly2 system, it is not completely clear if there are any scenarios where lack of the collision resistance would compromise the system. There are no clear benefits to keeping the MD5 hash function in the system. ```golang var pieceDigests []string for i := int32(0); i < t.TotalPieces; i++ { pieceDigests = append(pieceDigests, t.Pieces[i].Md5) } digest := digest.SHA256FromStrings(pieceDigests...) if digest != t.PieceMd5Sign { t.Errorf("invalid digest, desired: %s, actual: %s", t.PieceMd5Sign, digest) t.invalid.Store(true) return ErrInvalidDigest } ``` Alice, a peer in the DragonFly2 system, creates two images: an innocent one, and one with malicious code. Both images consist of two pieces, and Alice generates the pieces ...

### Impact A peer can obtain a valid TLS certificate for arbitrary IP addresses, effectively rendering the mTLS authentication useless. The issue is that the Manager’s Certificate gRPC service does not validate if the requested IP addresses “belong to” the peer requesting the certificate—that is, if the peer connects from the same IP address as the one provided in the certificate request. ```golang if addr, ok := p.Addr.(*net.TCPAddr); ok { ip = addr.IP.String() } else { ip, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(p.Addr.String()) if err != nil { return nil, err } } // Parse csr. [skipped] // Check csr signature. // TODO check csr common name and so on. if err = csr.CheckSignature(); err != nil { return nil, err } [skipped] // TODO only valid for peer ip // BTW we need support both of ipv4 and ipv6. ips := csr.IPAddresses if len(ips) == 0 { // Add default connected ip. ips = []net.IP{net.ParseIP(ip)} } ``` ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0...