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### Summary A client-side path traversal vulnerability in Nuxt's Island payload revival mechanism allowed attackers to manipulate client-side requests to different endpoints within the same application domain when specific prerendering conditions are met. ### Technical Details The vulnerability occurs in the client-side payload revival process (revive-payload.client.ts) where Nuxt Islands are automatically fetched when encountering serialized `__nuxt_island` objects. The issue affects the following flow: 1. During prerendering, if an API endpoint returns user-controlled data containing a crafted `__nuxt_island` object 2. This data gets serialized with `devalue.stringify` and stored in the prerendered page 3. When a client navigates to the prerendered page, `devalue.parse` deserializes the payload 4. The Island reviver attempts to fetch `/__nuxt_island/${key}.json` where `key` could contain path traversal sequences ### Prerequisites for Exploitation This vulnerability requires **a...

Special characters used during e-mail registration may perform SMTP Injection and unexpectedly send short unwanted e-mails. The email is limited to 64 characters (limited local part of the email), so the attack is limited to very shorts emails (subject and little data, the example is 60 chars). This flaw's only direct consequence is an unsolicited email being sent from the Keycloak server. However, this action could be a precursor for more sophisticated attacks.

### Impact The code in the scheduler for downloading a tiny file is hard coded to use the HTTP protocol, rather than HTTPS. This means that an attacker could perform a Man-in-the-Middle attack, changing the network request so that a different piece of data gets downloaded. Due to the use of weak integrity checks (TOB-DF2-15), this modification of the data may go unnoticed. ```golang // DownloadTinyFile downloads tiny file from peer without range. func (p *Peer) DownloadTinyFile() ([]byte, error) { ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), downloadTinyFileContextTimeout) defer cancel() // Download url: http://${host}:${port}/download/${taskIndex}/${taskID}?peerId=${peerID} targetURL := url.URL{ Scheme: } "http", fmt.Sprintf("%s:%d", p.Host.IP, p.Host.DownloadPort), fmt.Sprintf("download/%s/%s", p.Task.ID[:3], p.Task.ID), Host: Path: RawQuery: fmt.Sprintf("peerId=%s", p.ID), ``` A network-level attacker who cannot join a peer-to-peer network p...

### Impact The DragonFly2 uses a variety of hash functions, including the MD5 hash. This algorithm does not provide collision resistance; it is secure only against preimage attacks. While these security guarantees may be enough for the DragonFly2 system, it is not completely clear if there are any scenarios where lack of the collision resistance would compromise the system. There are no clear benefits to keeping the MD5 hash function in the system. ```golang var pieceDigests []string for i := int32(0); i < t.TotalPieces; i++ { pieceDigests = append(pieceDigests, t.Pieces[i].Md5) } digest := digest.SHA256FromStrings(pieceDigests...) if digest != t.PieceMd5Sign { t.Errorf("invalid digest, desired: %s, actual: %s", t.PieceMd5Sign, digest) t.invalid.Store(true) return ErrInvalidDigest } ``` Alice, a peer in the DragonFly2 system, creates two images: an innocent one, and one with malicious code. Both images consist of two pieces, and Alice generates the pieces ...

### Impact A peer can obtain a valid TLS certificate for arbitrary IP addresses, effectively rendering the mTLS authentication useless. The issue is that the Manager’s Certificate gRPC service does not validate if the requested IP addresses “belong to” the peer requesting the certificate—that is, if the peer connects from the same IP address as the one provided in the certificate request. ```golang if addr, ok := p.Addr.(*net.TCPAddr); ok { ip = addr.IP.String() } else { ip, _, err = net.SplitHostPort(p.Addr.String()) if err != nil { return nil, err } } // Parse csr. [skipped] // Check csr signature. // TODO check csr common name and so on. if err = csr.CheckSignature(); err != nil { return nil, err } [skipped] // TODO only valid for peer ip // BTW we need support both of ipv4 and ipv6. ips := csr.IPAddresses if len(ips) == 0 { // Add default connected ip. ips = []net.IP{net.ParseIP(ip)} } ``` ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0...

### Impact A peer exposes the gRPC API and HTTP API for consumption by other peers. These APIs allow peers to send requests that force the recipient peer to create files in arbitrary file system locations, and to read arbitrary files. This allows peers to steal other peers’ secret data and to gain remote code execution (RCE) capabilities on the peer’s machine. ```golang file, err := os.OpenFile(t.DataFilePath, os.O_RDWR, defaultFileMode) if err != nil { return 0, err } defer file.Close() if _, err = file.Seek(req.Range.Start, io.SeekStart); err != nil { return 0, err } n, err := io.Copy(file, io.LimitReader(req.Reader, req.Range.Length)) ``` ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/main/docs/security/dragonfly-comprehensive-report-2023.pdf). If ...

### Impact We found two instances in the DragonFly codebase where the first return value of a function is dereferenced even when the function returns an error (figures 9.1 and 9.2). This can result in a nil dereference, and cause code to panic. The codebase may contain additional instances of the bug. ```golang request, err := source.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, parentReq.Url, parentReq.UrlMeta.Header) if err != nil { log.Errorf("generate url [%v] request error: %v", request.URL, err) span.RecordError(err) return err } ``` Eve is a malicious actor operating a peer machine. She sends a dfdaemonv1.DownRequest request to her peer Alice. Alice’s machine receives the request, resolves a nil variable in the server.Download method, and panics. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://g...

### Impact The access control mechanism for the Proxy feature uses simple string comparisons and is therefore vulnerable to timing attacks. An attacker may try to guess the password one character at a time by sending all possible characters to a vulnerable mechanism and measuring the comparison instruction’s execution times. The vulnerability is shown in figure 8.1, where both the username and password are compared with a short-circuiting equality operation. ```golang if user != proxy.basicAuth.Username || pass != proxy.basicAuth.Password { ``` It is currently undetermined what an attacker may be able to do with access to the proxy password. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/main/docs/security/dragonfly-comprehensive-report-2023.pdf). If you have any ...

### Summary jinjava’s current sandbox restrictions prevent direct access to dangerous methods such as `getClass()`, and block instantiation of Class objects. However, these protections can be bypassed. By using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). ### Details jinjava templates expose a built-in variable `____int3rpr3t3r____`, which provides direct access to the jinjavaInterpreter instance. This variable was previously abused (see [Add interpreter to blacklist](https:/...

### Impact DragonFly2 uses the os.MkdirAll function to create certain directory paths with specific access permissions. This function does not perform any permission checks when a given directory path already exists. This allows a local attacker to create a directory to be used later by DragonFly2 with broad permissions before DragonFly2 does so, potentially allowing the attacker to tamper with the files. Eve has unprivileged access to the machine where Alice uses DragonFly2. Eve watches the commands executed by Alice and introduces new directories/paths with 0777 permissions before DragonFly2 does so. Eve can then delete and forge files in that directory to change the results of further commands executed by Alice. ### Patches - Dragonfy v2.1.0 and above. ### Workarounds There are no effective workarounds, beyond upgrading. ### References A third party security audit was performed by Trail of Bits, you can see the [full report](https://github.com/dragonflyoss/dragonfly/blob/mai...