#php

**Overview** Session cookies of applications using the laravel-auth0 SDK configured with CookieStore have authentication tags that can be brute forced, which may result in unauthorized access. **Am I Affected?** You are affected by this vulnerability if you meet the following pre-conditions: 1. Applications using laravel-auth0 SDK with version <=7.16.0 2. laravel-auth0 SDK uses the Auth0-PHP SDK with version 8.0.0-BETA1 or higher and below 8.14.0. 3. Session storage configured with CookieStore. **Fix** Upgrade Auth0/laravel-auth0 to v7.17.0. As an additional precautionary measure, we recommend rotating your cookie encryption keys. Note that once updated, any previous session cookies will be rejected. **Acknowledgement** Okta would like to thank Félix Charette for discovering this vulnerability.

**Overview** Session cookies of applications using the Auth0 Wordpress plugin configured with CookieStore have authentication tags that can be brute forced, which may result in unauthorized access. **Am I Affected?** You are affected by this vulnerability if you meet the following pre-conditions: 1. Applications using the Auth0 WordPress Plugin with version <=5.2.1 2. Auth0 WordPress Plugin uses the Auth0-PHP SDK with version 8.0.0-BETA1 or higher and below 8.14.0. 3. Session storage configured with CookieStore. **Fix** Upgrade Auth0/wordpress plugin to v5.3.0. As an additional precautionary measure, we recommend rotating your cookie encryption keys. Note that once updated, any previous session cookies will be rejected. **Acknowledgement** Okta would like to thank Félix Charette for discovering this vulnerability.

**Overview** Session cookies of applications using the Auth0 symfony SDK configured with CookieStore have authentication tags that can be brute forced, which may result in unauthorized access. **Am I Affected?** You are affected by this vulnerability if you meet the following pre-conditions: 1. Applications using the Auth0 symfony SDK with version <=5.3.1 2. Auth0/Symfony SDK uses the Auth0-PHP SDK with version 8.0.0-BETA1 or higher and below 8.14.0. 3. Session storage configured with CookieStore. **Fix** Upgrade Auth0/symfony to v5.4.0. As an additional precautionary measure, we recommend rotating your cookie encryption keys. Note that once updated, any previous session cookies will be rejected. **Acknowledgement** Okta would like to thank Félix Charette for discovering this vulnerability.

**Overview** Session cookies of applications using the Auth0-PHP SDK configured with CookieStore have authentication tags that can be brute forced, which may result in unauthorized access. **Am I Affected?** You are affected by this vulnerability if you meet the following pre-conditions: 1. Applications using the Auth0-PHP SDK, or the following SDKs that rely on the Auth0-PHP SDK: a. Auth0/symfony, b. Auth0/laravel-auth0, c. Auth0/wordpress, 2. Session storage configured with CookieStore. **Fix** Upgrade Auth0/Auth0-PHP to v8.14.0. As an additional precautionary measure, we recommend rotating your cookie encryption keys. Note that once updated, any previous session cookies will be rejected. **Acknowledgement** Okta would like to thank Félix Charette for discovering this vulnerability.

### Impact A admin user can upload SVG which may load external data via XML DOM library, specially this can be used for eventually reference none secure XML External Entity References. ### Patches The problem has not been patched yet. Users should upgrade to patched versions once they become available. Currently affected versions are: - 2.6.9 - 2.5.25 - 3.0.0-alpha3 ### Workarounds Patch the effect file `src/Sulu/Bundle/MediaBundle/FileInspector/SvgFileInspector.php` in sulu with: ```diff -$dom->loadXML($svg, \LIBXML_NOENT | \LIBXML_DTDLOAD); +$dom->loadXML($data, LIBXML_NONET); ``` ### References - GitHub repository: https://github.com/sulu/sulu - Vulnerable code: https://github.com/sulu/sulu/blob/2.6/src/Sulu/Bundle/MediaBundle/FileInspector/SvgFileInspector.php

### TL;DR This vulnerability affects all Kirby sites that use the `snippet()` helper or `$kirby->snippet()` method with a dynamic snippet name (such as a snippet name that depends on request or user data). Sites that only use fixed calls to the `snippet()` helper/`$kirby->snippet()` method (i.e. calls with a simple string for the snippet name) are *not* affected. ---- ### Introduction Kirby's `snippet()` helper and `$kirby->snippet()` method (in the following abbreviated to the `snippet()` helper) allow to load PHP snippet files that are normally stored in the `site/snippets` folder or registered by plugins through the `snippets` plugin extension. If the `snippet()` helper is called with an arbitrary snippet name, Kirby first checks if a file with this name exists in the snippets root (which defaults to `site/snippets`). This logic was vulnerable against path traversal attacks. By using special elements such as `..` and `/` separators, attackers can escape outside of the restric...

### TL;DR This vulnerability affects all Kirby setups that use PHP's built-in server. Such setups are commonly only used during local development. Sites that use other server software (such as Apache, nginx or Caddy) are *not* affected. ---- ### Introduction For use with PHP's built-in web server, Kirby provides a `router.php` file. The router delegates requests to static files to PHP so that assets and other static files in the document root can be accessed by the browser. This logic was vulnerable against path traversal attacks. By using special elements such as `..` and `/` separators, attackers can escape outside of the restricted location to access files or directories that are elsewhere on the system. One of the most common special elements is the `../` sequence, which in most modern operating systems is interpreted as the parent directory of the current location. ### Impact The missing path traversal check allowed attackers to navigate all files on the server that were a...

### TL;DR This vulnerability affects all Kirby sites that use the `collection()` helper or `$kirby->collection()` method with a dynamic collection name (such as a collection name that depends on request or user data). Sites that only use fixed calls to the `collection()` helper/`$kirby->collection()` method (i.e. calls with a simple string for the collection name) are *not* affected. ---- ### Introduction Kirby's `collection()` helper and `$kirby->collection()` method (in the following abbreviated to the `collection()` helper) allow to load PHP logic files that are normally stored in the `site/collections` folder or registered by plugins through the `collections` plugin extension. If the `collection()` helper is called with an arbitrary collection name, Kirby first checks if a file with this name exists in the collections root (which defaults to `site/collections`). This logic was vulnerable against path traversal attacks. By using special elements such as `..` and `/` separator...

An issue was discovered in post.php in bootstrap-multiselect (aka Bootstrap Multiselect) 1.1.2. A PHP script in the source code echoes arbitrary POST data. If a developer adopts this structure wholesale in a live application, it could create a Reflective Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exploitable through Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF).

Craft CMS stores arbitrary content provided by unauthenticated users in session files. This content could be accessed and executed, possibly using an independent vulnerability. Craft CMS redirects requests that require authentication to the login page and generates a session file on the server at `/var/lib/php/sessions`. Such session files are named `sess_[session_value]`, where `[session_value]` is provided to the client in a `Set-Cookie` response header. Craft CMS stores the return URL requested by the client without sanitizing parameters. Consequently, an unauthenticated client can introduce arbitrary values, such as PHP code, to a known local file location on the server. Craft CMS versions 5.7.5 and 4.15.3 have been released to address this issue.