Security
Headlines
HeadlinesLatestCVEs

Latest News

GHSA-qgjp-5g5x-vhq2: memos lacks file name validation or verification

A lack of file name validation or verification in the Attachment service of usememos memos v0.25.2 allows attackers to execute a path traversal.

ghsa
#vulnerability#auth
GHSA-99m2-qwx6-2w6f: memos vulnerability allows arbitrarily modification or deletion registered identity providers

Incorrect access control in the Identity Provider service of usememos memos v0.25.2 allows attackers with low-level privileges to arbitrarily modify or delete registered identity providers, leading to an account takeover or Denial of Service (DoS).

GHSA-8p44-g572-557h: memos vulnerability allows arbitrarily modification or deletion of attachments

Incorrect access control in usememos memos v0.25.2 allows attackers with low-level privileges to arbitrarily modify or delete attachments made by other users.

GHSA-8jcj-g9f4-qx42: memos vulnerability allows arbitrarily reactions deletion

Incorrect access control in usememos memos v0.25.2 allows attackers with low-level privileges to arbitrarily delete reactions made to other users' Memos.

New JS#SMUGGLER Campaign Drops NetSupport RAT Through Infected Sites

Securonix Threat Research details the complex JS#SMUGGLER campaign, a three-step web attack using obfuscated JavaScript and hidden HTA files to install the NetSupport RAT on user Windows desktops, granting hackers full remote control and persistent access.

GHSA-c4cc-x928-vjw9: robrichards/xmlseclibs has an Libxml2 Canonicalization error which can bypass Digest/Signature validation

### Summary An authentication bypass vulnerability exists due to a flaw in the libxml2 canonicalization process, which is used by [xmlseclibs](https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs) during document transformation. This weakness allows an attacker to generate a valid signature once and reuse it indefinitely. In practice, a signature created during a previous interaction - or through a misconfigured authentication flow - can be replayed to bypass authentication checks. ### Details When libxml2’s canonicalization is invoked on an invalid XML input, it may return an empty string rather than a canonicalized node. [xmlseclibs](https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs) then proceeds to compute the DigestValue over this empty string, treating it as if canonicalization succeeded. https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/f4131320c6dcd460f1b0c67f16f8bf24ce4b5c3e/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L296 ### Impact Digest bypass: By crafting input that causes canonicalization to yield an empty st...

GHSA-m98w-cqp3-qcqr: Fiber Utils UUIDv4 and UUID Silent Fallback to Predictable Values

## Summary Critical security vulnerabilities exist in both the `UUIDv4()` and `UUID()` functions of the `github.com/gofiber/utils` package. When the system's cryptographic random number generator (`crypto/rand`) fails, both functions silently fall back to returning predictable UUID values, including the zero UUID `"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"`. This compromises the security of all Fiber applications using these functions for security-critical operations. **Both functions are vulnerable to the same root cause (`crypto/rand` failure):** - `UUIDv4()`: Indirect vulnerability through `uuid.NewRandom()` → `crypto/rand.Read()` → fallback to `UUID()` - `UUID()`: Direct vulnerability through `crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:])` → silent zero UUID return ## Vulnerability Details ### Affected Functions - **Package**: `github.com/gofiber/utils` - **Functions**: `UUIDv4()` and `UUID()` - **Return Type**: `string` (both functions) - **Locations**: `common.go:93-99` (UUIDv4), `common.go:60-8...

GHSA-7cqv-qcq2-r765: 1Panel IP Access Control Bypass via Untrusted X-Forwarded-For Headers

### Summary The server trusts all reverse-proxy headers by default, so any remote client can spoof `X-Forwarded-For` to bypass IP-based protections (AllowIPs, API IP whitelist, “localhost-only” checks). All IP-based access control becomes ineffective. ### Details - Gin is created with defaults (`gin.Default()`), which sets `TrustedProxies = 0.0.0.0/0` and uses `X-Forwarded-For`/`X-Real-IP` to compute `ClientIP()`. - IP-based controls rely on `ClientIP()`: - AllowIPs / BindDomain (core/middleware/ip_limit.go, core/utils/security/security.go). - API IP whitelist (core/middleware/api_auth.go). - "localhost-only" checks that depend on `ClientIP()`. - Because no trusted-proxy range is enforced, any client can send `X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1` (or a whitelisted IP) and be treated as coming from that address. ### Impact All IP-based access control is rendered ineffective: remote clients can masquerade as localhost or any whitelisted IP, defeating AllowIPs, API IP whitelists, a...

GHSA-qmg5-v42x-qqhq: 1Panel – CAPTCHA Bypass via Client-Controlled Flag

### Summary A CAPTCHA bypass vulnerability in the 1Panel authentication API allows an unauthenticated attacker to disable CAPTCHA verification by abusing a client-controlled parameter. Because the server previously trusted this value without proper validation, CAPTCHA protections could be bypassed, enabling automated login attempts and significantly increasing the risk of account takeover (ATO). ### Details The /api/login endpoint accepts a boolean field named ignoreCaptcha directly from the client request body: `"ignoreCaptcha": true` The backend implementation uses this value to determine whether CAPTCHA validation should be performed: ``` if !req.IgnoreCaptcha { if errMsg := captcha.VerifyCode(req.CaptchaID, req.Captcha); errMsg != "" { helper.BadAuth(c, errMsg, nil) return } } ``` Because req.IgnoreCaptcha is taken directly from user input—with no server-side validation, no session binding, and no privilege checks—any unauthenticated attacker can fo...

Experts Confirm JS#SMUGGLER Uses Compromised Sites to Deploy NetSupport RAT

Cybersecurity researchers are calling attention to a new campaign dubbed JS#SMUGGLER that has been observed leveraging compromised websites as a distribution vector for a remote access trojan named NetSupport RAT. The attack chain, analyzed by Securonix, involves three main moving parts: An obfuscated JavaScript loader injected into a website, an HTML Application (HTA) that runs encrypted