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Software supply chain security has become more relevant in the last decade as more and more organizations consume, develop and deploy containerized workloads. Software is inherently complex so an analogy concerning an area of life that we can all relate to should help. Here's a conversation about cooking lasagna!“Do you need any help?”“No, it's fine. I have done this a thousand times, thanks.”“That meat packaging is unusual. It’s just a thin plastic bag. Where did you get that?”“It was a bargain. A young chap knocked the door earlier and said he was selling meat. He had a coole

Incorrect access control in the /admin/** API of brcc v1.2.0 allows attackers to gain access to Admin rights via a crafted request.

Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Mezzanine CMS 6.0.0 in the "View Entries" feature within the Forms module.

The communications app TeleMessage, which was spotted on former US national security adviser Mike Waltz's phone, has suspended “all services” as it investigates reports of at least one breach.

TM SGNL, a chat app by US-Israeli firm TeleMessage used by Trump officials, halts operations after a breach…

### Summary A LLM application leveraging `XMLToolMessage` class may be exposed to untrusted XML input that could result in DoS and/or exposing local files with sensitive information. ### Details `XMLToolMessage` uses `lxml` without safeguards: https://github.com/langroid/langroid/blob/df6227e6c079ec22bb2768498423148d6685acff/langroid/agent/xml_tool_message.py#L51-L52 `lxml` is vulnerable to quadratic blowup attacks and processes external entity declarations for local files by default. Check here: https://pypi.org/project/defusedxml/#python-xml-libraries ### PoC A typical Quadratic blowup XML payload looks like this: ```xml <!DOCTYPE bomb [ <!ENTITY a "aaaaaaaaaa"> <!ENTITY b "&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;&a;"> <!ENTITY c "&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;&b;"> ]> <bomb>&c;</bomb> ``` Here, &a; expands to 10 characters, &b; expands to 100, and &c; expands to 1000, causing exponential memory usage and potentially crashing the application. ### Fix Langroid 0.53.4 initializes `XMLParser` with...

### Summary Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the [Attributes extension](https://commonmark.thephpleague.com/extensions/attributes/) of the league/commonmark library (versions 1.5.0 through 2.6.x) allows remote attackers to insert malicious JavaScript calls into HTML. ### Details The league/commonmark library provides configuration options such as `html_input: 'strip'` and `allow_unsafe_links: false` to mitigate cross-site scripting (XSS) attacks by stripping raw HTML and disallowing unsafe links. However, when the Attributes Extension is enabled, it introduces a way for users to inject arbitrary HTML attributes into elements via Markdown syntax using curly braces. As a result, even with the secure configuration shown above, an attacker can inject dangerous attributes into applications using this extension via a payload such as: ```md ![](){onerror=alert(1)} ``` Which results in the following HTML: ```html <p><img onerror="alert(1)" src="" alt="" /></p> ``` Which cause...

The fix to https://cantina.xyz/code/c486d600-bed0-4fc6-aed1-de759fd29fa2/findings/21 has a typo that still results in the highest limb of `pc` being range checked to 8-bits instead of 6-bits. In the AIR, we do https://github.com/openvm-org/openvm/blob/0f94c8a3dfa7536c1231465d1bdee5fc607a5993/extensions/rv32im/circuit/src/auipc/core.rs#L135 ``` for (i, limb) in pc_limbs.iter().skip(1).enumerate() { if i == pc_limbs.len() - 1 { ``` It should be ``` for (i, limb) in pc_limbs.iter().enumerate().skip(1) { ``` Right now the if statement is never triggered because the enumeration gives `i=0,1,2` when we instead want `i=1,2,3`. What this means is that `pc_limbs[3]` is range checked to 8-bits instead of 6-bits. This leads to a vulnerability where the `pc_limbs` decomposition differs from the true `pc`, which means a malicious prover can make the destination register take a different value than the AUIPC instruction dictates, by making the decomposition overflow t...

Craft CMS contains a potential remote code execution vulnerability via Twig SSTI. You must have administrator access and `ALLOW_ADMIN_CHANGES` must be enabled for this to work. https://craftcms.com/knowledge-base/securing-craft#set-allowAdminChanges-to-false-in-production Note: This is a follow-up to https://github.com/craftcms/cms/security/advisories/GHSA-f3cw-hg6r-chfv Users should update to the patched versions (4.14.13 and 5.6.15) to mitigate the issue. ### References https://github.com/craftcms/cms/pull/17026

**Vulnerable MobSF Versions:** <= v4.3.2 **Details:** MobSF is a widely adopted mobile application security testing tool used by security teams across numerous organizations. Typically, MobSF is deployed on centralized internal or cloud-based servers that also host other security tools and web applications. Access to the MobSF web interface is often granted to internal security teams, audit teams, and external vendors. MobSF provides a feature that allows users to upload ZIP files for static analysis. Upon upload, these ZIP files are automatically extracted and stored within the MobSF directory. However, this functionality lacks a check on the total uncompressed size of the ZIP file, making it vulnerable to a ZIP of Death (zip bomb) attack. Due to the absence of safeguards against oversized extractions, an attacker can craft a specially prepared ZIP file that is small in compressed form but expands to a massive size upon extraction. Exploiting this, an attacker can exhaust the serv...