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Microsoft kicked off 2025 with a new set of patches for a total of 161 security vulnerabilities across its software portfolio, including three zero-days that have been actively exploited in attacks. Of the 161 flaws, 11 are rated Critical, and 149 are rated Important in severity. One other flaw, a non-Microsoft CVE related to a Windows Secure Boot bypass (CVE-2024-7344), has not been assigned
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed multiple security flaws in SimpleHelp remote access software that could lead to information disclosure, privilege escalation, and remote code execution. Horizon3.ai researcher Naveen Sunkavally, in a technical report detailing the findings, said the "vulnerabilities are trivial to reverse and exploit." The list of identified flaws is as follows -
In 2024, the Taiwanese government saw the daily average of attempted attacks by China double to 2.4 million, with a focus on government targets and telecommunications firms.
January Microsoft Patch Tuesday. 170 CVEs, 10 of them were added since December MSPT. 3 exploited in the wild: 🔻 EoP – Windows Hyper-V NT Kernel Integration VSP (CVE-2025-21333, CVE-2025-21334, CVE-2025-21335). No details yet. No vulnerabilities have public exploits. 5 have private ones: 🔸 Security Feature Bypass – Microsoft Update Catalog (CVE-2024-49147), MapUrlToZone (CVE-2025-21268, CVE-2025-21189)🔸 […]
Company has issued patches for an unprecedented 159 CVEs, including eight zero-days, three of which attackers are already exploiting.
Microsoft today unleashed updates to plug a whopping 161 security vulnerabilities in Windows and related software, including three "zero-day" weaknesses that are already under active attack. Redmond's inaugural Patch Tuesday of 2025 bundles more fixes than the company has shipped in one go since 2017.
> [!IMPORTANT] > This vulnerability only affects sites which are in the "dev" environment mode. If your production website is in "dev" mode, it has been misconfigured, and you should immediately swap it to "live" mode. > See https://docs.silverstripe.org/en/developer_guides/debugging/environment_types/ for more information. If a website has been set to the "dev" environment mode, a URL can be provided which includes an XSS payload which will be executed in the resulting error message. ## References - https://www.silverstripe.org/download/security-releases/ss-2024-002 ## Reported by Gaurav Nayak from [Chaleit](https://chaleit.com/)
In some cases, form messages can contain HTML markup. This is an intentional feature, allowing links and other relevant HTML markup for the given message. Some form messages include content that the user can provide. There are scenarios in the CMS where that content doesn't get correctly sanitised prior to being included in the form message, resulting in an XSS vulnerability. ### References - https://www.silverstripe.org/download/security-releases/cve-2024-53277 ## Reported by Leo Diamat from [Bastion Security Group](http://www.bastionsecurity.co.nz/)
### Impact When using the "insert media" functionality, the linked oEmbed JSON includes an HTML attribute which will replace the embed shortcode. The HTML is not sanitized before replacing the shortcode, allowing a script payload to be executed on both the CMS and the front-end of the website. ## References - https://www.silverstripe.org/download/security-releases/cve-2024-47605 ## Reported by James Nicoll from [Fujitsu Cyber Security Services](https://www.fujitsu.com/nz/services/security/)
### Impact Unintended permanent chain split affecting greater than or equal to 25% of the network, requiring hard fork (network partition requiring hard fork) Lodestar does not verify checksum in snappy framing uncompressed chunks. ### Vulnerability Details In Req/Resp protocol the messages are encoded by using ssz_snappy encoding, which is a snappy framing compression over ssz encoded message. In snappy framing format there are uncompressed chunks, each such chunk is prefixed with a checksum. Let's see how golang implementation parses such chunks - https://github.com/golang/snappy/blob/master/decode.go#L176 ``` case chunkTypeUncompressedData: // Section 4.3. Uncompressed data (chunk type 0x01). if chunkLen < checksumSize { r.err = ErrCorrupt return r.err } buf := r.buf[:checksumSize] if !r.readFull(buf, false) { return r.err } checksum := uint32(buf[0]) | uint32(buf[1])<<8 | uint32(buf[2])<<16 | uint32(buf[3])<<24 // Read directly into r.decod...