Latest News

### Summary Using trace.Trace.run, which is a built-in python library function to execute remote pickle file. ### Details The attack payload executes in the following steps: First, the attacker craft the payload by calling to trace.Trace.run function in reduce method Then when the victim after checking whether the pickle file is safe by using Picklescan library and this library doesn't dectect any dangerous functions, decide to pickle.load() this malicious pickle file, thus lead to remote code execution. ### PoC ``` class EvilTraceRun: def __reduce__(self): from trace import Trace payload = "__import__('os').system('whoami')" return Trace.run, (Trace(), payload) ``` ### Impact Who is impacted? Any organization or individual relying on picklescan to detect malicious pickle files inside PyTorch models. What is the impact? Attackers can embed malicious code in pickle file that remains undetected but executes when the pickle file is loaded. Supply Chain ...

### Impact When generating PDF files, this vulnerability allows an attacker to read arbitrary files from the filesystem by injecting malicious link element into the XML. ### Workarounds Test untrusted input with `link` elements with `rel="attachment"` before processing. ### Credits This vulnerability was reported by Mohamed Ouad from [Doyensec](https://doyensec.com/).

New features to take over smartphones and monitor user activity demonstrate the continued evolution of the malware, which is now being spread on GitHub.

Citrix has released fixes to address three security flaws in NetScaler ADC and NetScaler Gateway, including one that it said has been actively exploited in the wild. The vulnerabilities in question are listed below - CVE-2025-7775 (CVSS score: 9.2) - Memory overflow vulnerability leading to Remote Code Execution and/or Denial-of-Service CVE-2025-7776 (CVSS score: 8.8) - Memory overflow

A team of academics has devised a novel attack that can be used to downgrade a 5G connection to a lower generation without relying on a rogue base station (gNB). The attack, per the ASSET (Automated Systems SEcuriTy) Research Group at the Singapore University of Technology and Design (SUTD), relies on a new open-source software toolkit named Sni5Gect (short for "Sniffing 5G Inject") that's

Zscaler reports 77 Android apps on Google Play with 19 million installs spread malware, hitting 831 banks and…

### Impact A vulnerability exists where sensitive information, such as OAuth tokens, is recorded in log files when an error occurs during the execution of an SQL query. An attacker could intentionally trigger an SQL error by methods such as placing a high load on the database. This could allow an attacker who has the authority to view the log files to illicitly acquire the recorded sensitive information. ### Patch This vulnerability has been fixed in the following pull request: https://github.com/traPtitech/traQ/pull/2787 It is possible that OAuth tokens issued before the patch was applied have already been recorded in the logs. To completely eliminate the security risk, server administrators are strongly recommended to revoke all existing OAuth tokens. ### Workaround If you cannot apply the update immediately, as a temporary workaround, please review access permissions for SQL error logs and strictly limit access to prevent unauthorized users from viewing them.

### Impact User control of the first argument of the addImage method results in CPU utilization and denial of service. If given the possibility to pass unsanitized image data or URLs to the addImage method, a user can provide a harmful PNG file that results in high CPU utilization and denial of service. Other affected methods are: `html`. Example payload: ```js import { jsPDF } from "jpsdf" const payload = new Uint8Array([117, 171, 90, 253, 166, 154, 105, 166, 154]) const doc = new jsPDF(); const startTime = performance.now(); try { doc.addImage(payload, "PNG", 10, 40, 180, 180, undefined, "SLOW"); } finally { const endTime = performance.now(); console.log(`Call to doc.addImage took ${endTime - startTime} milliseconds`); } ``` ### Patches The vulnerability was fixed in jsPDF 3.0.2. Upgrade to jspdf@>=3.0.2. In jspdf@>=3.0.2, invalid PNG files throw an Error instead of causing very long running loops. ### Workarounds Sanitize image data or URLs before passing it to the a...

## Summary A 32-bit integer overflow in the BMP encoder’s scanline-stride computation collapses `bytes_per_line` (stride) to a tiny value while the per-row writer still emits `3 × width` bytes for 24-bpp images. The row base pointer advances using the (overflowed) stride, so the first row immediately writes past its slot and into adjacent heap memory with attacker-controlled bytes. This is a classic, powerful primitive for heap corruption in common auto-convert pipelines. - **Impact:** Attacker-controlled heap out-of-bounds (OOB) write during conversion **to BMP**. - **Surface:** Typical upload → normalize/thumbnail → `magick ... out.bmp` workers. - **32-bit:** **Vulnerable** (reproduced with ASan). - **64-bit:** Safe from this specific integer overflow (IOF) by arithmetic, but still add product/size guards. - **Proposed severity:** **Critical 9.8** (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). --- ## Scope & Affected Builds - **Project:** ImageMagick (B...

## Summary A format string bug vulnerability exists in `InterpretImageFilename` function where user input is directly passed to `FormatLocaleString` without proper sanitization. An attacker can overwrite arbitrary memory regions, enabling a wide range of attacks from heap overflow to remote code execution. <br> ## Details ### root cause ``` MagickExport size_t InterpretImageFilename(const ImageInfo *image_info, Image *image,const char *format,int value,char *filename, ExceptionInfo *exception) { ... while ((cursor=strchr(cursor,'%')) != (const char *) NULL) { const char *q = cursor; ssize_t offset = (ssize_t) (cursor-format); cursor++; /* move past '%' */ if (*cursor == '%') { /* Escaped %%. */ cursor++; continue; } /* Skip padding digits like %03d. */ if (isdigit((int) ((unsigned char) *cursor)) != 0) (void) strtol(cursor,(char **) &cursor,10); switch (*cursor) ...