ghsa

### Impact Historically, wlc supported providing unscoped API keys in the setting. This practice was discouraged for years, but the code was never removed. This might cause the API key to be used against different server. ### Patches * https://github.com/WeblateOrg/wlc/pull/1098 ### Workarounds Remove unscoped `key` from wlc configuration. Only use URL-scoped keys in the `[keys]` sections. ### References This issue was reported to us by [wh1zee](https://hackerone.com/wh1zee) via HackerOne.

### Impact The SSL verification would be skipped for some crafted URLs. ### Patches * https://github.com/WeblateOrg/wlc/pull/1097 ### Workarounds Avoid using untrusted wlc configurations, as that might cause insecure connections. ### References This issue was reported to us by [wh1zee](https://hackerone.com/wh1zee) via HackerOne.

### Prologue These vulnerabilities have been found and chained by DCODX-AI. Validation of the exploit chain has been confirmed manually. ### Summary A persistent stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in the custom_hotkeys functionality of the application. An authenticated attacker (or one who can trick a user/administrator into updating their custom_hotkeys) can inject JavaScript code that executes in other users’ browsers when those users load any page using the `templates/base.html` template. Because the application exposes an API token endpoint (`/api/current-user/token`) to the browser and lacks robust CSRF protection on some API endpoints, the injected script may fetch the victim’s API token or call token reset endpoints — enabling full account takeover and unauthorized API access. This vulnerability is of critical severity due to the broad impact, minimal requirements for exploitation (authenticated user), and the ability to escalate privileges to full accoun...

### Summary An unauthenticated path traversal in the file upload API lets any caller read arbitrary files from the server filesystem and move them into MindsDB’s storage, exposing sensitive data. Severity: High. ### Details The PUT handler in file.py directly joins user-controlled data into a filesystem path when the request body is JSON and `source_type` is not `"url"`: - `data = request.json` (line ~104) accepts attacker input without validation. - `file_path = os.path.join(temp_dir_path, data["file"])` (line ~178) creates the path inside a temporary directory, but if `data["file"]` is absolute (e.g., `/home/secret.csv`), `os.path.join` ignores `temp_dir_path` and targets the attacker-specified location. - The resulting path is handed to `ca.file_controller.save_file(...)`, which wraps `FileReader(path=source_path)` (`mindsdb/interfaces/file/file_controller.py:66`), causing the application to read the contents of that arbitrary file. The subsequent `shutil.move(file_path, ...)` cal...

### Summary A denial-of-service vulnerability exists in the SM2 PKE decryption path where an invalid elliptic-curve point (C1) is decoded and the resulting value is unwrapped without checking. Specifically, `AffinePoint::from_encoded_point(&encoded_c1)` may return a `None`/`CtOption::None` when the supplied coordinates are syntactically valid but do not lie on the SM2 curve. The calling code previously used `.unwrap()`, causing a panic when presented with such input. ### Affected Component / Versions - File: `src/pke/decrypting.rs` - Function: internal `decrypt()` (invoked by `DecryptingKey::decrypt*` methods) - Affected releases: - sm2 0.14.0-rc.0 (https://crates.io/crates/sm2/0.14.0-rc.0) - sm2 0.14.0-pre.0 (https://crates.io/crates/sm2/0.14.0-pre.0) ### Details The library decodes the C1 field (an EC point) as an `EncodedPoint` and then converts it to an `AffinePoint` using `AffinePoint::from_encoded_point(&encoded_c1)`. That conversion returns a `CtOption<Affin...

#Fickling's assessment Fickling started emitting AST nodes for builtins imports in order to match them during analysis (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9f309ab834797f280cb5143a2f6f987579fa7cdf). # Original report ### Summary Fickling works by Pickle bytecode --> AST --> Security analysis However while going from bytecode to AST, some import nodes are removed which blinds the security analysis fickling/fickling/fickle.py ```python def run(self, interpreter: Interpreter): module, attr = self.module, self.attr if module in ("__builtin__", "__builtins__", "builtins"): # no need to emit an import for builtins! pass else: alias = ast.alias(attr) interpreter.module_body.append(ast.ImportFrom(module=module, names=[alias], level=0)) interpreter.stack.append(ast.Name(attr, ast.Load())) def encode(self) -> bytes: return f"c{self.module}\n{self.attr}\n".encode() ``` Here we see that...

### Summary A critical vulnerability exists in the SM2 Public Key Encryption (PKE) implementation where the ephemeral nonce `k` is generated with severely reduced entropy. A unit mismatch error causes the nonce generation function to request only 32 bits of randomness instead of the expected 256 bits. This reduces the security of the encryption from a 128-bit level to a trivial 16-bit level, allowing a practical attack to recover the nonce `k` and decrypt any ciphertext **given only the public key and ciphertext**. ### Affected Versions - sm2 0.14.0-rc.0 (https://crates.io/crates/sm2/0.14.0-rc.0) - sm2 0.14.0-pre.0 (https://crates.io/crates/sm2/0.14.0-pre.0) This vulnerability is introduced in commit: [Commit 4781762](https://github.com/RustCrypto/elliptic-curves/commit/4781762f23ff22ab34763410f648128055c93731) on Sep 6, 2024, which is over a year ago. ### Details The root cause of this vulnerability is a unit mismatch in the `encrypt` function located in `sm2/src/pke/encrypt...

#Fickling's assessment `ctypes`, `importlib`, `runpy`, `code` and `multiprocessing` were added the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/9a2b3f89bd0598b528d62c10a64c1986fcb09f66, https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/eb299b453342f1931c787bcb3bc33f3a03a173f9, https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/29d5545e74b07766892c1f0461b801afccee4f91, https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/b793563e60a5e039c5837b09d7f4f6b92e6040d1, https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/b793563e60a5e039c5837b09d7f4f6b92e6040d1). # Original report ## Summary The `unsafe_imports()` method in Fickling's static analyzer fails to flag several high-risk Python modules that can be used for arbitrary code execution. Malicious pickles importing these modules will not be detected as unsafe, allowing attackers to bypass Fickling's primary static safety checks. ## Details In `fickling/fickle.py` lines 866-884, the `unsafe_imports()` method checks imported m...

# Fickling's assessment `pydoc` and `ctypes` were added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/b793563e60a5e039c5837b09d7f4f6b92e6040d1). # Original report ### Summary Both ctypes and pydoc modules arent explictly blocked. Even other existing pickle scanning tools (like picklescan) do not block pydoc.locate. Chaining these two together can achieve RCE while the scanner still reports the file as LIKELY_SAFE ### Details Import: GLOBAL pydoc locate (Allowed). Resolution: Call locate('ctypes.windll.kernel32.WinExec'). Execution: Call the result with (b'calc.exe', 1). To bypass the unused variable check an exception object is used, on the assumption that Exception would not be blocked in the future as it is a benign builtin ### PoC ```python import os GLOBAL = b'c' STRING = b'S' BININT = b'K' TUPLE1 = b'\x85' TUPLE2 = b'\x86' EMPTY_TUPLE = b')' REDUCE = b'R' PUT = b'p' GET = b'g' POP = b'0' E...

# Fickling's assessment `cProfile` was added to the list of unsafe imports (https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/dc8ae12966edee27a78fe05c5745171a2b138d43). # Original report ## Description ### Summary Fickling versions up to and including 0.1.6 do not treat Python's `cProfile` module as unsafe. Because of this, a malicious pickle that uses `cProfile.run()` is classified as SUSPICIOUS instead of OVERTLY_MALICIOUS. If a user relies on Fickling's output to decide whether a pickle is safe to deserialize, this misclassification can lead them to execute attacker-controlled code on their system. This affects any workflow or product that uses Fickling as a security gate for pickle deserialization. ### Details The `cProfile` module is missing from fickling's block list of unsafe module imports in `fickling/analysis.py`. This is the same root cause as CVE-2025-67748 (pty) and CVE-2025-67747 (marshal/types). Incriminated source code: - File: `fickling/analysis.py` - Class: `U...