ghsa

An issue was discovered where improper authorization controls affected certain queries that could allow a malicious actor to circumvent Document Level Security in Elasticsearch and get access to documents that their roles would normally not allow.

Databricks JDBC Driver before 2.6.40 could potentially allow remote code execution (RCE) by triggering a JNDI injection via a JDBC URL parameter. The vulnerability is rooted in the improper handling of the krbJAASFile parameter. An attacker could potentially exploit this vulnerability to achieve Remote Code Execution in the context of the driver by tricking a victim into using a crafted connection URL that uses the property krbJAASFile.

Time-of-check Time-of-use (TOCTOU) Race Condition vulnerability during JSP compilation in Apache Tomcat permits an RCE on case insensitive file systems when the default servlet is enabled for write (non-default configuration). This issue affects Apache Tomcat: from 11.0.0-M1 through 11.0.1, from 10.1.0-M1 through 10.1.33, from 9.0.0.M1 through 9.0.97. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.2, 10.1.34 or 9.0.98, which fixes the issue.

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in the examples web application provided with Apache Tomcat leads to denial of service. This issue affects Apache Tomcat: from 11.0.0-M1 through 11.0.1, from 10.1.0-M1 through 10.1.33, from 9.0.0.M1 through 9.9.97. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.2, 10.1.34 or 9.0.98, which fixes the issue.

There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing HTTP/3 connections. More details in the [CVE-2024-53259](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-53259). ## Patches - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.15 - https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.2.2 ## Workarounds No workaround ## For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).

### Impact If a Next.js application is performing authorization in middleware based on pathname, it was possible for this authorization to be bypassed for pages directly under the application's root directory. For example: * [Not affected] `https://example.com/` * [Affected] `https://example.com/foo` * [Not affected] `https://example.com/foo/bar` ### Patches This issue was patched in Next.js `14.2.15` and later. If your Next.js application is hosted on Vercel, this vulnerability has been automatically mitigated, regardless of Next.js version. ### Workarounds There are no official workarounds for this vulnerability. #### Credits We'd like to thank [tyage](http://github.com/tyage) (GMO CyberSecurity by IERAE) for responsible disclosure of this issue.

### Impact The welcome and about page includes version and revision information about the software in use (including library and components used). This information is sensitive from a security point of view because it allows software used by the server to be easily identified. ### Proof of Concept 1. Welcome page footer: <img width="432" alt="image" src="https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/assets/629681/a7fd5151-55d5-432b-9d5d-79136833609f"> 2. About page *build information*. <img width="401" alt="image" src="https://github.com/geoserver/geoserver/assets/629681/59fcd8dd-eaee-4bf8-9578-a2a94b2864db"> ### Patches No patch presently available. ### Workarounds No workaround available, although the ADMIN_CONSOLE can be disabled completely. ### References * [About GeoServer](https://docs.geoserver.org/latest/en/user/webadmin/about.html)

## Summary ### ASA-2024-0012 Name: ASA-2024-0012, Transaction decoding may result in a stack overflow Component: Cosmos SDK Criticality: High (Considerable Impact, and Possible Likelihood per [ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md)) Affected versions: cosmos-sdk versions <= v0.50.10, <= v0.47.14 Affected users: Chain Builders + Maintainers, Validators, node operators ### ASA-2024-0013 Name: ASA-2024-0013: CosmosSDK: Transaction decoding may result in resource exhaustion Component: Cosmos SDK Criticality: High (Considerable Impact, and Possible Likelihood per [ACMv1.2](https://github.com/interchainio/security/blob/main/resources/CLASSIFICATION_MATRIX.md)) Affected versions: cosmos-sdk versions <= v0.50.10, <= v0.47.14 Affected users: Chain Builders + Maintainers, Validators, node operators ### Impact ### ASA-2024-0012 When decoding a maliciously formed packet with a deeply-nested structure, it may be possible for a stac...

The `OVERWRITE` clause of the `DEFINE TABLE` statement would fail to overwrite data for tables that were defined with `TYPE RELATION`. Since table definitions include the `PERMISSIONS` clause, this failure would result in permissions not being overwritten as a result, which may potentially lead users to believe they have changed the table permissions when they have not. ### Impact If a user attempted to update table permissions of a table defined with `TYPE RELATION` using `DEFINE TABLE ... OVERWRITE`, permissions for the table would not be changed. This may allow a client that is authorized to run queries in a SurrealDB server to access certain data in that specific table that they were not intended to be able to access after the specified change in permissions. ### Patches The `DEFINE TABLE` statement has been updated to appropriately overwrite data for tables defined with `TYPE RELATION`. - Version 2.1.3 and later are not affected by this issue. ### Workarounds Users of table...

### Impact Privilege escalation in IAM import API, all users are impacted since MinIO commit 580d9db85e04f1b63cc2909af50f0ed08afa965f ### Patches ``` commit f246c9053f9603e610d98439799bdd2a6b293427 Author: Aditya Manthramurthy <donatello@users.noreply.github.com> Date: Wed Dec 11 18:09:40 2024 -0800 fix: Privilege escalation in IAM import API (#20756) This API had missing permissions checking, allowing a user to change their policy mapping by: 1. Craft iam-info.zip file: Update own user permission in user_mappings.json 2. Upload it via `mc admin cluster iam import nobody iam-info.zip` Here `nobody` can be a user with pretty much any kind of permission (but not anonymous) and this ends up working. Some more detailed steps - start from a fresh setup: ``` ./minio server /tmp/d{1...4} & mc alias set myminio http://localhost:9000 minioadmin minioadmin mc admin user add myminio nobody nobody123 mc admin poli...