A new side-channel attack dubbed PIXHELL could be abused to target air-gapped computers by breaching the "audio gap" and exfiltrating sensitive information by taking advantage of the noise generated by the pixels on the screen.
"Malware in the air-gap and audio-gap computers generates crafted pixel patterns that produce noise in the frequency range of 0 - 22 kHz," Dr. Mordechai Guri, the head of

A new side-channel attack dubbed **PIXHELL** could be abused to target air-gapped computers by breaching the "audio gap" and exfiltrating sensitive information by taking advantage of the noise generated by the pixels on the screen.

"Malware in the air-gap and audio-gap computers generates crafted pixel patterns that produce noise in the frequency range of 0 - 22 kHz," Dr. Mordechai Guri, the head of the Offensive Cyber Research Lab in the Department of Software and Information Systems Engineering at the Ben Gurion University of the Negev in Israel, said in newly published paper.

"The malicious code exploits the sound generated by coils and capacitors to control the frequencies emanating from the screen. Acoustic signals can encode and transmit sensitive information."

The attack is notable in that it doesn't require any specialized audio hardware, loudspeaker, or internal speaker on the compromised computer, instead relying on the LCD screen to generate acoustic signals.

Air-gapping is a crucial security measure that's designed to safeguard mission-critical environments against potentially security threats by physically and logically isolating them from external networks (i.e., internet). This is typically accomplished by disconnecting network cables, disabling wireless interfaces, and disabling USB connections.

That said, such defenses could be circumvented by means of rogue insider or a compromise of the hardware or software supply chain. Another scenario could involve an unsuspecting employee plugging in an infected USB drive to deploy malware capable of triggering a covert data exfiltration channel.

"Phishing, malicious insiders, or other social engineering techniques may be employed to trick individuals with access to the air-gapped system into taking actions that compromise security, such as clicking on malicious links or downloading infected files," Dr. Guri said.

"Attackers may also use software supply chain attacks by targeting software application dependencies or third-party libraries. By compromising these dependencies, they can introduce vulnerabilities or malicious code that may go unnoticed during development and testing."

Like the recently demonstrated RAMBO attack, PIXHELL makes use of the malware deployed on the compromised host to create an acoustic channel for leaking information from audio-gapped systems.

This is made possible by the fact that LCD screens contain inductors and capacitors as part of their internal components and power supply, causing them to vibrate at an audible frequency that produces a high-pitched noise when electricity is passed through the coils, a phenomenon called coil whine.

Specifically, changes in power consumption can induce mechanical vibrations or piezoelectric effects in capacitors, producing audible noise. A crucial aspect that affects the consumption pattern is the number of pixels that are lit and their distribution across the screen, as white pixels require more power to display than dark pixels.

"Also, when alternating current (AC) passes through the screen capacitors, they vibrate at specific frequencies," Dr. Guri said. "The acoustic emanates are generated by the internal electric part of the LCD screen. Its characteristics are affected by the actual bitmap, pattern, and intensity of pixels projected on the screen."

"By carefully controlling the pixel patterns shown on our screen, our technique generates certain acoustic waves at specific frequencies from LCD screens."

An attacker could therefore leverage the technique to exfiltrate the data in the form of acoustic signals that are then modulated and transmitted to a nearby Windows or Android device, which can subsequently demodulate the packets and extract the information.

That having said, it bears noting that the power and quality of the emanated acoustic signal depends on the specific screen structure, its internal power supply, and coil and capacitor locations, among other factors.

Another important thing to highlight is that the PIXHELL attack, by default, is visible to users looking at the LCD screen, given that it involves displaying a bitmap pattern comprising alternate black-and-white rows.

"To remain covert, attackers may use a strategy that transmits while the user is absent," Dr. Guri said. "For example, a so-called 'overnight attack' on the covert channels is maintained during the off-hours, reducing the risk of being revealed and exposed."

The attack, however, could be transformed into a stealthy one during working hours by reducing the pixel colors to very low values prior to transmission -- i.e., using RGB levels of (1,1,1), (3,3,3), (7,7,7), and (15,15,15) -- thereby giving the impression to the user that the screen is black.

But doing so has the side effect of "significantly" bringing down the sound production levels. Nor is the approach foolproof, as a user can still make out anomalous patterns if they look "carefully" at the screen.

This is not the first time audio-gap restrictions have been surmounted in an experimental setup. Prior studies undertaken by Dr. Guri have employed sounds generated by computer fans (Fansmitter), hard disk drives (Diskfiltration), CD/DVD drives (CD-LEAK), power supply units (POWER-SUPPLaY), and inkjet printers (Inkfiltration).

As countermeasures, it's recommended to use an acoustic jammer to neutralize the transmission, monitor the audio spectrum for unusual or uncommon signals, limit physical access to authorized personnel, prohibit the use of smartphones, and use an external camera for detecting unusual modulated screen patterns.

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

New PIXHELL Attack Exploits Screen Noise to Exfiltrates Data from Air-Gapped Computers

Endpoint security has been around for decades, but changes in device use and the quick evolution of new attacks have triggered the development of new security techniques.

Source: Dzmitry Skazau via Alamy Stock Photo

Because of their large attack surface made up of different sets — including laptops, desktops, mobile devices, and servers — endpoints are becoming the primary targets of increasingly sophisticated attacks. This diversity is further complicated by the variety of operating systems (OSs) being run on those devices. In addition, the location of these devices is often no longer tied only to company networks, due to the increase in hybrid and remote work, and more server workloads moving to the cloud.

To meet the growing needs of security teams, the endpoint security market is constantly evolving, albeit at an incremental rate recently. Endpoint security has been around for decades, but changes in device use and the quick evolution of new attacks have triggered the development of new security techniques.

Below are four areas for security professionals to focus on to establish and enhance their endpoint security. While not a comprehensive list, this should help security experts, both new and established, understand the core concepts around endpoint security.

**Baseline Security**

Endpoint protection starts with strong baseline security. Organizations must make optimal use of all of the features their OSes and applications provide that can help with endpoint protection. To do this, security experts should:

*   Use consistent application deployment methods: Restrict application deployments to known sources. Layer on a workflow for updating and maintaining approved applications.
    
*   Perform configuration management: Configure OSes and applications for security. For example, use hardening guidelines and manage browser add-ons and client applications' security capabilities.
    
*   Use auditing and logging: Understanding events on an endpoint starts with auditing and logging the right security events, and with having a process in place to monitor for security events. Aim to establish a single source of truth for endpoint status.
    

While providing a foundation for baseline security, this list is not exhaustive. Security leaders should also look into actions that include managing vulnerabilities for all OSs and managing backups.

**Endpoint Detection and Response**

Endpoint detection and response (EDR) tools store and monitor endpoint events to detect and hunt for suspicious behaviors, and also provide response capabilities to those events. Common events that are monitored include, but are not limited to, execution events, registry events, file events, and network events.

EDR, in its purest form, does not interrupt running processes; instead, it analyzes the resulting events to search for known indicators of compromise or patterns that indicate malicious behavior.

EDR tools can be likened to a data recorder, or "black box," for the endpoint devices on which they are installed. These tools gather telemetry data about the activity happening on those devices and make it available for examination later. Of course, storing the recorded data is not nearly enough — an EDR tool must also be able to present the data to an administrator in a way that enables further analysis using both automated and human-driven means.

**Automated Moving Target Defense**

Automated moving target defense (AMTD) is an emerging technology that focuses on constantly changing the attack surface of a system or network. AMTD makes it harder for attackers to identify and exploit vulnerabilities by dynamically modifying the process structure, memory space, system configurations, software stack, or network characteristics. This proactive approach helps to improve cyber defense and mitigate the risk of successful attacks.

Endpoint defense with AMTD can include:

*   Enhancing memory defense through morphing or enhanced randomization
    
*   Augmenting confidential computing enclaves with AMTD proactive defense
    
*   Enhancing runtime software hardening (polymorphism of code or inputs)
    
*   Automatic endpoint self-healing from known good files storage
    
*   Applying AMTD to file storage or storage access channels (command and storage polymorphing)
    

AMTD for endpoints and endpoint software is a set of technologies that make it harder for attackers to reverse engineer and exploit endpoint OSes and software technologies. AMTD works by introducing unpredictable and frequent changes in the attack surface of the applications and OSs on which it is used.

**Mobile Threat Defense**

The mobile attack landscape has continued to grow and change with the increase of smartphone and tablet sales, and with the proliferation of bring-your-own-device arrangements in enterprises. Every year, we see new statistics claiming hundreds of percentage points of growth in mobile malware.

The MTD market includes vendors that use some combination of the following mobile protection methods for Android and iOS:

*   Behavioral anomaly and configuration detection
    

*   Protection against device attacks, network attacks, and malicious and leaky apps
    
*   Mobile anti-phishing protection
    
*   OS-, hardware- and application-based vulnerability assessment, monitoring, and compliance
    
*   Crowdsourced threat intelligence
    

Baseline security, EDR, AMTD, and MTD are just a few crucial tools security leaders can use to improve their endpoints' resilience against attacks. There continue to be many other layers of security designed to contribute to the protection of endpoints, and security leaders must take a holistic approach, as this topic is foundational for enterprises who will need to adjust their strategy for changing and increased variation in devices, agile work environments, and increasingly sophisticated security threats.

**About the Author**

Director Analyst, Gartner

Eric Grenier is a Director Analyst at Gartner working in the Technical Professionals Security Technology and Infrastructure team, focusing on Endpoint Security including endpoint protection and endpoint detection and response.

How to Establish &amp; Enhance Endpoint Security

Android device users in South Korea have emerged as a target of a new mobile malware campaign that delivers a new type of threat dubbed SpyAgent.
The malware "targets mnemonic keys by scanning for images on your device that might contain them," McAfee Labs researcher SangRyol Ryu said in an analysis, adding the targeting footprint has broadened in scope to include the U.K.
The campaign makes use

Mobile Security / Cryptocurrency

Android device users in South Korea have emerged as a target of a new mobile malware campaign that delivers a new type of threat dubbed **SpyAgent**.

The malware "targets mnemonic keys by scanning for images on your device that might contain them," McAfee Labs researcher SangRyol Ryu said in an analysis, adding the targeting footprint has broadened in scope to include the U.K.

The campaign makes use of bogus Android apps that are disguised as seemingly legitimate banking, government facilities, streaming, and utility apps in an attempt to trick users into installing them. As many as 280 fake applications have been detected since the start of the year.

It all starts with SMS messages bearing booby-trapped links that urge users to download the apps in question in the form of APK files hosted on deceptive sites. Once installed, they are designed to request intrusive permissions to collect data from the devices.

This includes contacts, SMS messages, photos, and other device information, all of which is then exfiltrated to an external server under the threat actor's control.

The most notable feature is its ability to leverage optical character recognition (OCR) to steal mnemonic keys, which refer to a recovery or seed phrase that allows users to regain access to their cryptocurrency wallets.

Unauthorized access to the mnemonic keys could, therefore, allow threat actors to take control of the victims' wallets and siphon all the funds stored in them.

McAfee Labs said the command-and-control (C2) infrastructure suffered from serious security lapses that not only allowed navigating to the site's root directory without authentication, but also left exposed the gathered data from victims.

The server also hosts an administrator panel that acts as a one-stop shop to remotely commandeer the infected devices. The presence of an Apple iPhone device running iOS 15.8.2 with system language set to Simplified Chinese ("zh") in the panel is a sign that it may also be targeting iOS users.

"Originally, the malware communicated with its command-and-control (C2) server via simple HTTP requests," Ryu said. "While this method was effective, it was also relatively easy for security tools to track and block."

"In a significant tactical shift, the malware has now adopted WebSocket connections for its communications. This upgrade allows for more efficient, real-time, two-way interactions with the C2 server and helps it avoid detection by traditional HTTP-based network monitoring tools."

The development comes a little over a month after Group-IB exposed another Android remote access trojan (RAT) referred to as CraxsRAT targeting banking users in Malaysia since at least February 2024 using phishing websites. It's worth pointing out that CraxsRAT campaigns have also been previously found to have targeted Singapore no later than April 2023.

"CraxsRAT is a notorious malware family of Android Remote Administration Tools (RAT) that features remote device control and spyware capabilities, including keylogging, performing gestures, recording cameras, screens, and calls," the Singaporean company said.

"Victims that downloaded the apps containing CraxsRAT android malware will experience credentials leakage and their funds withdrawal illegitimately."

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

New Android SpyAgent Malware Uses OCR to Steal Crypto Wallet Recovery Keys

Plus: Kaspersky’s US business sold, Nigerian sextortion scammers jailed, and Europe’s controversial encryption plans return.

Your devices may be revealing a lot more about your life than you realize.

During the Democratic National Convention in Chicago last month, we set out to find just how much data is floating around in the digital ether all around us. Armed with a fanny pack filled with radios—including a hot spot loaded with custom code developed by the digital rights nonprofit the Electronic Frontier Foundation and an Android phone armed with the data-revealing app Wiggle—WIRED reporters collected signals from nearly 300,000 devices in and around the DNC. This included more than 2,500 police body cameras, which effectively revealed how the Chicago Police Department deployed its officers at the protests. It also exposed new ways everyone—police and activists alike—can be surveilled via our gadgets.

Thanks to a legal dispute over content moderation, Elon Musk’s X has been blocked in Brazil for a week—mostly, away. The South American nation has some 20,000 internet service providers and lacks the centralized stranglehold over internet infrastructure that authoritarian countries like Iran have built. So when it comes to blocking an entire social network in Brazil, the whole thing is a bit of a mess.

Speaking of Musk-run companies, SpaceX is getting a big new customer for its Starlink satellite internet service: the United States Navy. In addition to providing sailors with a way to stay connected to friends and family while out at sea, Starlink is part of a large project to connect US warships wherever they are in the world.

Russia’s military intelligence agency, GRU, is known for having some of the most aggressive hacking teams on the planet. Now, it’s added a new one: GRU Unit 29155—a unit notorious for coup attempts, bombings, and other physical attacks—has a cyber warfare team of its own, according to the US and other Western governments. Dubbed Cadet Blizzard, the hacking team is said to have carried out attacks against Ukraine using destructive Whispergate malware, defaced Ukrainian government websites, and leaked information while posing as a hacktivist group. It all adds up to more evidence of the increasingly blurry lines between cyber and kinetic warfare.

Activists in Japan have been waging a pressure campaign against a company many people don’t know exists. The FANUC Corporation makes industrial robots, which are used for a wide variety of purposes. The activists claim this includes weapons manufacturing—specifically weapons used by Israel in its war in Gaza—and believe the company is violating export laws and its own policies. (FANUC denies both accusations.) Whatever the case, the controversy reveals how difficult it can be to untangle ethical issues from a global supply chain.

Health care companies are among the biggest targets for criminal hackers. But sometimes, the security issues come from the inside. Therapy sessions and other sensitive patient records were recently left exposed in a misconfigured database operated by Confidant Health, which provides addiction recovery care and other mental health services. The company says it secured the database immediately after a researcher alerted them to the fact that it was publicly accessible online, but it’s still a reminder of just how many of our deepest secrets can find their way into the open by accident.

Even those of you who do everything you can to secure those secrets can find yourself vulnerable—especially if you’re using a YubiKey 5 authentication token. The multifactor authentication devices can be cloned thanks to a cryptographic flaw that can’t be patched. The company has rolled out some mitigation measures—and the attack itself is relatively difficult to pull off. But it may be time to invest in a new dongle.

That’s not all, folks. Each week, we round up the privacy and security news we didn’t cover in depth ourselves. Click the headlines to read the full stories. And stay safe out there.

At the end of August, cybercriminals from the ransomware group RansomHub appear to have hacked into the systems of Planned Parenthood’s Montana branch. The organization this week confirmed it had suffered from a “cybersecurity incident” on August 28 and said its staff immediately took parts of its network offline, reporting the incident to law enforcement.

Days after the incident took place, RansomHub claimed to be behind the attack, posting Planned Parenthood on its leak website. The criminal group said it would publish 93 GB of data. It is unclear what, if anything, the ransomware group has obtained, but Planned Parenthood clinics can hold a huge array of highly sensitive data about patients, including information on abortion appointments. (Around 400,000 Planned Parenthood patients in Los Angeles were impacted following a similar ransomware incident in 2021.)

In recent months, RansomHub has emerged as one of the most active ransomware-as-a-service groups, following the law enforcement disruption of LockBit. According to an FBI and Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency alert at the end of August, the group is “efficient and successful” and has stolen data from at least 210 victims since it formed in February. “The affiliates leverage a double-extortion model by encrypting systems and exfiltrating data to extort victims,” the alert said.

**Nigerian Sextortion Scammers Sentenced to 17 Years After Teen Death**

The Nigeria-based scammers known as the Yahoo Boys run almost every scam in the playbook—from romance scams to pretending to be FBI agents. Yet there's little-more devious than the increase in sextortion cases linked to the West African scammers. This week, Nigerian brothers Samuel Ogoshi and Samson Ogoshi were sentenced to more than 17 years in US jail for running sextortion scams, following their extradition earlier this year. It is the first time Nigerian scammers have been prosecuted for sextortion in the US, the BBC reported.

The Ogoshi brothers, who pleaded guilty in April, have been linked to the death of 17-year-old Jordan DeMay, who took his life six hours after he started talking to the scammers, who posed as a girl, on Instagram. The teenager had been duped into sending the brothers explicit images, and after he had done so, they threatened to post the images online unless he paid them hundreds of dollars. US prosecutors said the brothers sexually exploited and extorted more than 100 victims, with at least 11 of them being minors. There has been a huge spike in sextortion cases in recent years.

**Kaspersky’s Banned US Business Sold**

In June, the US Commerce Department banned the sale of Kaspersky’s antivirus tools over national security concerns about its links to the Russian government. (Kaspersky has, for years, denied connections). The firm later fired its workers and said it was closing its US business. This week, cybersecurity company Pango Group announced it is purchasing Kaspersky Lab’s US antivirus customers, according to Axios. This equates to around 1 million customers, who will be transitioned to Pango’s antivirus software Ultra AV. Ahead of the Kaspersky deal, parent company Aura also announced it was spinning out Pango Group into its own business. Pango’s president said customers would not need to take any action and that it would allow subscribers to continue to receive updates after September 29, when Kaspersky updates will stop.

**Europe’s Encryption-Busting “Chat Control” Plans Return**

For years, the EU has been trying to introduce new child protection laws that would require private chats to be scanned for child sexual abuse material—something that would potentially undermine encrypted messaging apps that provide everyday privacy to billions of people. The plans have been highly controversial and were shelved earlier this year. However, the proposed law, which has been dubbed “chat control,” reappeared in legislators’ in-trays this week. The Council of the EU, which is currently chaired by Hungary, wants to pass legislation by October, but reports say strong resistance to the plans still remain.

Hackers Threaten to Leak Planned Parenthood Data

While this issue was disclosed and patched in the V8 engine in June 2023, the WeChat Webview component was not updated, and still remained vulnerable when Talos reported it to the vendor.

Friday, September 6, 2024 06:00

*   Certain versions of WeChat, a popular messaging app created by tech giant Tencent, contain a type confusion vulnerability that could allow an adversary to execute remote code. 
*   While this issue, CVE-2023-3420, was disclosed and patched in the V8 engine in June 2023, the WeChat Webview component was not updated, and still remained vulnerable when Talos reported to the vendor in April 2024.  
*   Cisco Talos researchers have confirmed that WeChat versions up to 8.0.42 (the latest version on the Google Play store for Android devices before June 14, 2024) were vulnerable to this issue. However, due to the dynamic WebView loading mechanism, Talos cannot confirm if it’s patched on all versions. 
*   Talos reported the vulnerability to Tencent WeChat on April 30, 2024, and continued our investigation in the following weeks and months. 

**Vulnerability overview **

WeChat is an instant messenger application with a large user base in China. It also offers users the ability to pay for certain products through the app and includes several functionalities similar to other social media platforms like Facebook and X. 

During Cisco Talos’ research of WeChat, we uncovered that it employs a custom WebView component instead of relying on the built-in Android WebView. This component is a custom version of XWalk, maintained by Tencent, which consists of an embedded Chromium browser with V8 version 8.6.365.13 released on Oct. 12, 2020, supporting the rendering of HTML and the execution of JavaScript. 

The custom WebView component is dynamically downloaded onto the phone after the user logs into the app for the first time, allowing Tencent to deploy dynamic updates. When downloaded, XWalk webview is located at the path \`/data/data/com.tencent.mm/app\_xwalk\_4433/apk/base.apk\`. The library at /data/data/com.tencent.mm/app_xwalk_4433/extracted_xwalkcore/libxwebcore.so contains an embedded browser environment with an outdated version of V8.  

GitHub Security Labs published detailed analysis of this vulnerability, CVE-2023-3420, for V8 version 11.4.183.19 in June 2023.      

**How can the exploit be triggered? **

The exploit, which we have seen in the wild,  is triggered when the victim clicks a URL in a malicious WeChat message. Clicking a URL in WeChat causes the webpage with embedded JavaScript to be loaded inside XWalk, which triggers exploitation. A so called one-click exploit. 

**What is the impact of this vulnerability? **

The exploit allows the threat actor to gain control of the victim's device and execute arbitrary code. 

> CVSSv3 Score: 8.8 - CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H  

**How do I know if I’m impacted? **

Talos has confirmed the WeChat version 8.0.42 (the latest version available on the Play Store before June 14) is impacted. For WeChat using the impacted custom browser (MMWEBID/2247), the user agent of request includes the version information of the custom browser. For example: 

_Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; Android 14; Pixel 6 Build/UQ1A.240105.002; wv) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/86.0.4240.99 XWEB/4433 MMWEBSDK/20230805 Mobile Safari/537.36 MMWEBID/2247 MicroMessenger/8.0.42.2428(0x28002A48) WeChat/arm64 Weixin GPVersion/1 NetType/4G Language/en ABI/arm64_  

**What do I do if I’m impacted? **

Update to the latest version of WeChat and confirm XWalk is updated as well (in our testing, the app does not get updated to the latest version automatically right after the update is released). Alternatively, do not click on any links sent over WeChat if using the impacted versions. If you must read links, copy the link from the WeChat chat and open them on an updated web browser outside the application. We recommend WeChat users be aware of the URL links sent in WeChat. Before clicking the URL links, verify it’s from a trusted source.  

**Bug report Timeline **

*   April 30, 2024: Disclosed to vendor while research was ongoing. 
*   May 31, 2024: Tencent acknowledges report and confirms they know about the vulnerability and are working on patching it. 
*   June 14, 2024: New version of WeChat 8.0.48 released on Play Store. However, the app on our testing device did not get automatically updated.  
*   June 27, 2024: Notified Vendor of our intention to publish. 

**Credit **

Chi En Shen (Ashley Shen), Vitor Ventura, Michael Gentile and Aleksandar Nikolic of Cisco Talos.

Vulnerability in Tencent WeChat custom browser could lead to remote code execution

In my opinion, mandatory enrollment is best enrollment.

Thursday, September 5, 2024 14:00

As most quality thoughts go, my most recent musing on security came about because of fantasy football. 

I had to log into my Yahoo Sports account, which I admittedly only ever have to log in to, at most, three times a year for the one fantasy football draft I have on that platform each year and then the handful of other times my phone logs me out during the five months that I’m adjusting my lineups on a weekly basis.  

Admittedly, I’d never thought much about the security of my Yahoo Sports account because I don’t have any sensitive information tied to it, and if someone did want to break in, they could probably do a better job of managing my team in that league than I have the past few years. It’s the old “out of sight, out of mind” compared to something like my work email account where I’m logging in every morning, or online banking which I’m using several times a week, and the knowledge that my financial wellbeing is tied to those account credentials. 

But I have to give credit to Yahoo for how they handled my account being less secure. When I logged in, probably for the first time since January, this weekend, before it would even display my homepage or enter the fantasy draft, it took me to an account management page where it warned me that I was using a “less secure” password and still hadn’t enrolled in multi-factor authentication. It took me less than a minute to update my password to something more secure, and maybe another two minutes to enroll in passcode MFA. 

The account management page also had some helpful information, such as how long it had been since my last password change, offering the ability to manage my password through a third-party app, and multiple options to set up MFA, including using the Yahoo Sports app directly (this is always more appealing to me than having to download yet another MFA app on my phone). 

This also got me thinking about the ways in which I don’t like being asked or reminded to enroll in MFA. It never made any sense to me that sites would give users the option to click away from the screen when being asked to enroll in MFA — make it mandatory or don’t. Also, one of my biggest pet peeves in using the internet is when you confirm this is a personal device or “Remember Me” for the next time I log in and the site doesn’t, in fact, remember me, and I have to go through the same approval process multiple times in the same day. 

Our friends at Cisco Duo also have a few other great recommendations for getting people to enroll in MFA, but in my opinion, mandatory enrollment is best enrollment. If I had never displayed that screen on Yahoo’s login page, I wouldn’t have even thought twice about how secure my account was. And seeing a red “!” next to my password gave off an immediate sign that my password needed to be improved, which is something I wish other sites would start doing.  

It’s not like having my fantasy football login credentials compromised would be the end of the world, but when it comes to something more high stakes, there are a few small UI steps sites could take to help nudge us in the right direction. 

**The one big thing **

Threat actors are increasingly using a traditional Red Teaming tool called MacroPack to create new malware payloads. These malicious files deliver multiple payloads, including the Havoc and Brute Ratel post-exploitation frameworks and a new variant of the PhantomCore remote access trojan (RAT). Several different actors are using this tactic based on files uploaded to VirusTotal that Talos analyzed. They are written in different languages and rely on different themes centered on different geographies, which leads us to believe these are disparate campaigns.  

**Why do I care? **

The threat of VBA macros has diminished since Microsoft prevented the execution of macros in Microsoft Office documents downloaded from the internet, but not all users are using the latest up-to-date Office versions and can still be vulnerable. MacroPack can generate several types of payloads packaged into different file types, including popular Office-supported formats, scripting files and shortcuts. The code generated by the framework has the following characteristics, making it more difficult to detect using file content signatures. 

**So now what? **

Talos released a new Snort rule set and several ClamAV signatures to detect and block the malicious files Talos analyzed as part of this research. Our blog post also has an in-depth breakdown of the four major themes used across these malicious documents, information that could be crucial to informing potential targets about these threats.  

**Top security headlines of the week **

**A new report from Google’s Threat Analysis Group found that Russia’s APT29 is exploiting some of the same vulnerabilities as two popular spyware vendors.** The analysis comes from watering hole attacks that researchers saw in the wild between November 2023 and July 2024 targeting Mongolian government websites. APT29, largely thought to be connected to Russia’s government, exploited the same vulnerabilities in Apple iOS WebKit and Google Chrome that two spyware vendors, Intellexa and NSO Group, are also known to use. The actor (also known as Cozy Bear and Midnight Blizzard) compromised the government-controlled websites to embed malicious payloads in hidden iframes on web pages. These iframes pointed users to attacker-controlled websites, where the exploits were deployed to steal user data from iOS and Android devices. Intellexa, which Cisco Talos has reported on several times, was recently blacklisted by the U.S. government for its role in creating and distributing the Predator spyware. And the Israeli NSO Group is infamous for its Pegasus spyware, commonly used to target at-risk individuals like journalists, politicians and activists. (Google TAG, The Record) 

**A North Korean state-sponsored actor known as Citrine Sleet is actively exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in the Google Chrome web browser to steal users’ cryptocurrency.** Microsoft wrote in an advisory regarding the vulnerability, identified as CVE-2024-7971, that users had been "targeted and compromised" by the zero-day attack. Google has since released a patch for the issue. CVE-2024-7971 is a type confusion vulnerability in the V8 JavaScript and WebAssembly engine that could allow an attacker to execute remote code on the targeted machine. Citrine Sleet is believed to be based in North Korea and primarily targets financial institutions, especially those that manage cryptocurrency accounts. Its social engineering techniques focus on the cryptocurrency industry and individuals believed to be associated with it. Exploitation of the vulnerability started by tricking a victim into visiting an attacker-controlled website. Then, because of a different vulnerability in the Windows kernel, Citrine Sleet could install a rootkit on the target’s computer, essentially giving them complete control of the machine. Cryptocurrency has long been a target for North Korean state-sponsored actors, who often use the stolen currency to fund the country’s military operations. (TechCrunch, Decipher) 

**The FBI released a new warning this week that North Korean actors could soon launch a wave of cyber attacks targeting "organizations with access to large quantities of cryptocurrency-related assets or products.”** A public service announcement released Tuesday said that actors had been carrying out reconnaissance-related social engineering campaigns for months targeting individuals believed to be involved in the cryptocurrency industry, or employees of financial institutions who handle virtual currency. Most of the potential targets are found by the actors by monitoring their social media activity, particularly on professional networking or employment-related platforms. These actors also are impersonating legitimate employees, looking to gain remote employment at these companies using fake names, identities and profiles. “Given the scale and persistence of this malicious activity, even those well versed in cybersecurity practices can be vulnerable to North Korea's determination to compromise networks connected to cryptocurrency assets,” the PSA reads. (Dark Reading, FBI) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Vulnerabilities in Microsoft apps for macOS allow stealing permissions 
*   BlackByte ransomware group targets VMware ESXi bug 
*   Cisco: BlackByte ransomware gang only posting 20% to 30% of successful attacks 
*   Bug Leaves Microsoft Apps for MacOS Open to Silent Takeovers 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

**LABScon** **(Sept. 18 - 21)**  

_Scottsdale, Arizona_ 

**VB2024** **(Oct. 2 - 4)** 

_Dublin, Ireland_ 

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256:** 0e2263d4f239a5c39960ffa6b6b688faa7fc3075e130fe0d4599d5b95ef20647   
**MD5:** bbcf7a68f4164a9f5f5cb2d9f30d9790   
**Typical Filename:** bbcf7a68f4164a9f5f5cb2d9f30d9790.vir   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Scar::1201 

**SHA 256:** 5e537dee6d7478cba56ebbcc7a695cae2609010a897d766ff578a4260c2ac9cf   
**MD5:** 2cfc15cb15acc1ff2b2da65c790d7551   
**Typical Filename:** rcx4d83.tmp   
**Claimed Product:** N/A     
**Detection Name:** Win.Dropper.Pykspa::tpd 

**SHA 256:** a31f222fc283227f5e7988d1ad9c0aecd66d58bb7b4d8518ae23e110308dbf91    
**MD5:** 7bdbd180c081fa63ca94f9c22c457376   
**Typical Filename:** c0dwjdi6a.dll   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Trojan.GenericKD.33515991 

**SHA 256**: c67b03c0a91eaefffd2f2c79b5c26a2648b8d3c19a22cadf35453455ff08ead0    
**MD5:** 8c69830a50fb85d8a794fa46643493b2    
**Typical Filename:** AAct.exe    
**Claimed Product:** N/A     
**Detection Name:** PUA.Win.Dropper.Generic::1201 

**SHA 256:** 161937ed1502c491748d055287898dd37af96405aeff48c2500b834f6739e72d   
**MD5:** fd743b55d530e0468805de0e83758fe9   
**Typical Filename:** KMSAuto Net.exe   
**Claimed Product:** KMSAuto Net   
**Detection Name:** W32.File.MalParent

The best and worst ways to get users to improve their account security

With 20,000 internet providers across the country, the technical challenges of blocking X in Brazil mean some connections are slipping through the cracks.

The social network X has been largely inaccessible in Brazil since Saturday, after the country's Supreme Court ordered all mobile and internet service providers to block the platform. The court order followed a months-long dispute between Judge Alexandre de Moraes and X CEO Elon Musk over the company's misinformation, hate speech, and moderation policies.

With Brazil's population of 215 million people, its mature democracy, its sprawling land mass, and more than 20,000 internet service providers, blocking a web platform in the South American nation isn't straightforward. And while the biggest ISPs have implemented the ban, many are still scrambling to comply with the order, leaving a patchwork of access to the site.

“Brazil has made headway blocking X on the main internet providers, but our telemetry indicates there’s a long tail of local and regional ISPs where the service is still available,” says Isik Mater, director of research at the internet censorship analysis group NetBlocks.

The Open Observatory of Network Interference reported that a similar progression played out when Brazil’s Federal Police obtained a court order in April 2023 for ISPs to block the communication platform Telegram because it would not fully share information about users involved in neo-Nazi group chats. Some large ISPs began blocking Telegram immediately. “However, the block was not implemented by all ISPs in Brazil, nor was it implemented in the same way,” the group wrote. “This suggests lack of coordination between providers, and that each ISP implemented the block autonomously.”

A similar progression has been playing out with the X ban. Brazil's 20,000 ISPs produce a notably competitive market, but only a few have infrastructure nationwide. About 40 percent are tiny regional providers with 5,000 customers or fewer. The human and digital rights watchdog Freedom House rates Brazil's internet freedom as “partly free” and trending to be more restrictive, because of the country's far-reaching efforts to crack down on political misinformation in recent years and its three-day ban on Telegram. Brazil also blocked the secure communication platform WhatsApp in December 2015 and again in May 2016 because it did not respond to similar data requests.

Brazil's National Telecommunications Agency did not respond to WIRED's multiple requests for comment.

Unlike in countries including Russia, Iran, and China, there is currently no legal apparatus or technical infrastructure by which the Brazilian government can systematically and comprehensively restrict access to particular websites or online platforms, or impose connectivity blackouts on its citizens.

Reports indicate many Brazilian ISPs that have implemented the ban are using the technique known as “DNS filtering” to block access to X. The domain name system is the internet's phonebook for looking up the IP addresses associated with URLs such as www.wired.com. DNS queries are sent to a DNS “resolver” that does the IP address lookups, and ISPs can configure their resolvers to filter or block requests for particular websites.

Mobile apps like X's Android and iOS apps don't rely on DNS, though, so DNS filtering alone is not enough to block all connections to a web platform. Some Brazilian ISPs seem to also be using IP address “sinkholing”—redirecting online traffic to a different server than the users intended to visit—as a way to send traffic meant for X into the abyss.

“We’re seeing variation by provider in Brazil, and right now it looks they’re each trying their own thing to see what works,” NetBlocks’ Mater says. “Brazil has a diverse network infrastructure with lots of ways for data to enter and leave the country, so there isn’t that centralized choke point and ‘kill switch’ we see in \[some\] authoritarian-leaning countries.”

VPN usage has surged in Brazil this week under the ban as a way around ISP attempts to block X, but the court order ban includes a provision stating people could be charged a fine of 50,000 reais—around $8,900—per day for using circumvention tools like VPNs.

Why It's So Hard to Fully Block X in Brazil

Using special software, WIRED investigated police surveillance at the DNC. We collected signals from nearly 300,000 devices, revealing vulnerabilities for both law enforcement and everyday citizens alike.

As thousands took to the streets during August’s Democratic National Convention in Chicago to protest Israel’s deadly assault on Gaza, a massive security operation was already underway. US Capitol Police, Secret Service, the Department of Homeland Security’s Homeland Security Investigations, sheriff’s deputies from nearby counties, and local officers from across the country had descended on Chicago and were all out in force, working to manage the crowds and ensure the event went off without any major disruptions.

Amid the headlines and the largely peaceful protests, WIRED was looking for something less visible. We were investigating reports of cell site simulators (CSS), also known as IMSI catchers or Stingrays, the name of one of the technology’s earliest devices, developed by Harris Corporation. These controversial surveillance tools mimic cell towers to trick phones into connecting with them. Activists have long worried that the devices, which can capture sensitive data such as location, call metadata, and app traffic, might be used against political activists and protesters.

Armed with a waist pack stuffed with two rooted Android phones and three Wi-Fi hot spots running CSS-detection software developed by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, a digital-rights nonprofit, we conducted a first-of-its-kind wireless survey of the signals around the DNC.

WIRED attended protests across the city, events at the United Center (where the DNC took place), and social gatherings with lobbyists, political figures, and influencers. We spent time walking the perimeter along march routes and through planned protest sites before, during, and after these events.

In the process we captured Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and cellular signals. We then analyzed those signals looking for specific hardware identifiers and other suspicious signs that could indicate the presence of a cell-site simulator. Ultimately, we did not find any evidence that cell-site simulators were deployed at the DNC. Nevertheless, when taken together, the hundreds of thousands of data points we accumulated in Chicago reveal how the invisible signals from our devices can create vulnerabilities for activists, police, and everyone in between. Our investigation revealed signals from as many as 297,337 devices, including as many as 2,568 associated with a major police body camera manufacturer, five associated with a law enforcement drone maker, and a massive array of consumer electronics like cameras, hearing aids, internet-of-things devices, and headphones.

WIRED often observed the same devices appearing in different locations, revealing their operators’ patterns of movement. For example, a Chevrolet Wi-Fi hotspot, initially located in the law-enforcement-only parking lot of the United Center, was later found parked on a side street next to a downtown Chicago demonstration. A Wi-Fi signal from a Skydio police drone that hovered above a massive anti-war protest was detected again the next day above the Israeli consulate. And Axon police body cameras with identical hardware identifiers were detected at various protests occurring days apart.

“Surveillance technologies leave traces that can be discovered in real time,” says Cooper Quintin, a senior staff technologist at the EFF. Regardless of the specific technologies WIRED detected, Quintin notes that the ability to identify police technology in real time is significant. “Many of our devices are beaconing in ways that make it possible to track us through wireless signals,” he says. While this makes it possible to track police, Quintin says, “this makes protesters similarly vulnerable to the same types of attacks.”

The signals we collected are a byproduct of our extremely networked world and demonstrate a pervasive and unsettling reality: Military, law enforcement, and consumer devices constantly emit signals that can be intercepted and tracked by anyone with the right tools. In the context of high-stakes scenarios such as election events, gatherings of high-profile politicians and other officials, and large-scale protests, the findings have implications for law enforcement and protesters alike.

WIRED initially focused on finding cell-site simulators due to the secrecy around their use, especially at protests. Cell-site simulators work by tricking nearby phones, cars, and other devices that use cellular infrastructure into connecting to them. They can be used on planes or retrofitted onto trucks.

The dragnet surveillance tool has largely been used by law enforcement to track a specific target’s location, but due to the indiscriminate way it functions, the devices will log the IMSI (international mobile subscriber identity) numbers, unique to each SIM card, of every single device that connects to it.

For years, protesters have suspected that the surveillance technology has been deployed against them during demonstrations. In 2014, following a wave of protests in Chicago over a grand jury's decision not to indict Ferguson, Missouri, police officer Darren Wilson for fatally shooting Michael Brown, a Black teenager, activists overheard a police officer on a scanner asking another officer if he was gathering information from the protest organizer’s phone. Protesters at the time believed this to be a sign that an IMSI-catcher was deployed.

In Illinois, local law enforcement is required to obtain a warrant to use cell-site simulators. However, according to the ACLU of Illinois, the public is not able to verify whether the Chicago Police Department complies with this law, as CPD lawyers have instructed technicians managing cell-site simulators not to keep a log of their use.

Similarly, federal agents, including those from Homeland Security at the DNC, are also required to secure warrants before deploying one of the devices, except in the in cases of immediate threats to national security. A 2023 DHS Inspector General report found, however, that both the Secret Service and Homeland Security Investigations did not always do so.

Given that some lawmakers have attempted to link American anti-war demonstrators to groups like Hamas, which is classified as a terrorist organization by the US government, demonstrators have been concerned that cell-site simulators will get deployed against them. “They think we are terrorists, so they treat us like terrorists,” an anti-war protester who declined to give their name told WIRED at a protest on the first day of the DNC. They say that they wouldn’t be surprised if any of the law enforcement agencies present at the DNC were using an IMSI-Catcher. “I feel my phone getting hot, and I know they are watching.”

For years, the EFF has been developing tools to detect cell-site simulators. In 2019, it released Crocodile Hunter, which uses software-defined radios to identify unusual activity from 4G towers in a specific area. More recently, Quintin, and Will Greenberg, another staff technologist at the EFF, started working on a cheaper and more user-friendly tool called Ray Hunter, designed to detect unusual cellular activity in a similar way.

WIRED worked with Quintin and Greenberg to install Ray Hunter on three wireless hots pots, which allowed reporters to walk around the DNC and related events in Chicago to attempt to detect whether the devices connected to cell-site simulators.

The Rayhunter software works by detecting three key indicators based on a review of academic literature about how cell-site simulators work. First, it checks if the network you're connected to tries to force a downgrade to 2G, which has less security than a 4G or 5G connection. Second, it detects if the network asks your device for an IMSI number. Finally, the software checks if the network requests a "null cipher," a technical term for asking your phone not to use encryption between the phone and the tower.

According to CSS documentation obtained through public records requests, some CSS allow users to connect via Bluetooth or Wi-Fi. So alongside Ray Hunter, WIRED used two rooted Android phones running an app called Wigle, which logs the GPS coordinates of Bluetooth, mobile, and Wi-Fi signals that the phone encounters. This setup enabled us to collect and store data on observed Wi-Fi and Bluetooth activity. Neither phone connected to any Wi-Fi or cellular network, nor did they upload any data to the cloud. We analyzed the data locally.

WIRED focused on identifying MAC addresses, which are unique identifiers assigned to network devices, and OUIs (organizationally unique identifiers), which are usually the first three bytes of a MAC address. We looked for any OUIs of known CSS manufacturers like Harris, KeyW, Jacobs, and Digital Receiver Technology.

One of our first stops in Chicago was at Union Park, where a coalition of political and community organizations had planned a march to call for an end of US aid to Israel.

On Monday afternoon, a smaller-than-expected but still massive crowd of thousands of protesters prepared to march toward the DNC to protest Israel’s deadly siege of Gaza. Hundreds of Chicago police on bicycles lined the approved route, ready to respond. Farther down the planned route, Secret Service agents and other DHS officers observed the demonstration. The march started off peacefully, but by 4:30 pm local time, tensions escalated.

A small group of protesters breached the first of two security fences around the United Center. As some tore down sections of the fence, others climbed over and faced off with law enforcement standing behind the second barrier. Police began photographing the protesters tearing down the barricades, and a CPD helicopter circled as low as 650 feet, according to publicly available flight data WIRED reviewed at the time. CBS later reported 13 arrests from the first day of the convention.

While Rayhunter didn’t pick up any suspicious cellular infrastructure, our other equipment detected three new cell towers that hadn’t been there the day before. According to Quintin, because Rayhunter did not detect any suspicious behaviors, these towers were likely “cell on wheels,” aka COWs, temporary cell towers that companies roll out to provide extra cellular coverage during large events.

Leaving the protest, our Android detected a Wi-Fi network named Skydio X10-c9z2 with a hardware identifier associated with Skydio, a California-based company that sells drones to law enforcement. Skydio equipment has been used as part of Drone as First Responder programs around the country for years. According to marketing material, the Skydio X10 is equipped with multiple high-resolution cameras, including thermal imaging, powerful zoom capabilities, and onboard AI. It’s unclear which agency the drone belongs to.

CPD did not respond to WIRED’s questions about the Skydio drone.

It wasn’t just American law enforcement we suspected may deploy cell-site simulators. In 2019, the FBI alleged that Israel had placed one near the White House—a claim Israel has denied. Similarly, in 2016, protesters opposing the Dakota Access Pipeline suspected that a private security firm, TigerSwan, had used one against them.

On Tuesday of the DNC, an unpermitted protest organized by a self-described militant anti-imperialist group called Behind Enemy Lines was scheduled to take place outside the Israeli Consulate at the Accenture Tower, located two miles east of the United Center. Hours before the planned demonstration, police had already saturated the area. CPD officers on bicycles lined both sides of Madison Street in front of the building’s entrance, while the surrounding plaza served as a staging area for additional officers, who mingled with Secret Service and other DHS personnel.

Data collected by our fanny pack detected a Skydio drone near the Israeli consulate matching the hardware identifiers we identified the previous day. WIRED detected no cell-site simulators near the Israeli consulate.

By 7 pm, approximately 200 protesters had gathered outside the consulate. After a few speeches, tensions escalated as some protesters attempted to continue marching, leading to confrontations with the officers. Outnumbered by both police and journalists, more than 50 people were arrested, including three reporters.

WIRED could not determine the exact number of officers deployed at the protest, and CPD has yet to respond to our request for comment. However, our analysis of Bluetooth signals collected from the Android devices detected hardware identifiers associated with Axon, formerly Taser International, from as many as 720 different devices. Axon develops technology for law enforcement, including Tasers, body cameras, evidence management systems, and other software. The signals we observed were most likely from body-worn cameras used by officers during the demonstration.

The trackability of Axon’s body cameras is a known vulnerability. Last year at the Defcon hacker conference, Alan “Nullagent” Meekins and Roger “RekcahDam” Hicks, cofounders of the Bluetooth tracking platform RFParty, demonstrated that their platform could decipher signals emitted by body cameras, allowing them to detect the presence and approximate position of police officers.

In an email, Axon spokesperson Victoria Keough said that some Axon products have wireless features that enable real-time monitoring of officers during patrols and critical incidents. “While BLE \[ Bluetooth Low Energy \] and other wireless communications can be susceptible to monitoring from other nearby devices, the benefits of BLE in ensuring incidents are captured with maximum visibility are crucial to public safety,” she wrote. Keough added that the current generation body-worn cameras offer the ability to be in “airplane mode” for specific tactical situations.

WIRED’s wireless survey appears to confirm Meekins and Hicks’ findings. Over the course of six days at the DNC, we detected signals from as many as 2,568 different Axon devices. Mapping these signals reveals information about where we encountered police and how they were deployed. For instance, the day after the incident at the Israeli consulate, we returned to the park where protesters had broken through barricades on Monday. Ahead of another planned protest, we found officers blocking entry to the park, designated a “free speech zone” by the city. On a map, a chain of closely clustered circles shows how tightly officers on bikes had formed a perimeter around the side of the park facing the expected protest route.

CPD did not respond to WIRED’s request for comment.

WIRED is not publishing the data collected for this story, partially because of how law enforcement could be able to use that data to identify devices at protests. “This is a known issue within the cybersecurity community,” Quintin of the EFF says. “I think police are starting to get wise to the fact that this is a technique they can use to find people. I wouldn’t be surprised if Bluetooth and wireless tracking is the next big wave of police technology.”

A company called Latent Wireless may be a pioneer in Wi-Fi signal tracking for law enforcement. Founded in 2019 by David Schwindt, a former police officer, Jeff Bromberger, and Peter Scott, both computer scientists, the company developed a Wi-Fi dongle that connects to patrol car computers. This device passively scans and analyzes metadata from Wi-Fi signals encountered by the car and matches detected MAC addresses against a list of stolen electronics or devices linked to criminals or missing persons. If a match is found, the system alerts officers, who can then use a directional antenna to locate the signal’s source.

In one instance that Schwindt and Bromberger shared with WIRED, local police used software from Latent Wireless to locate a suspect in an office building knowing only the MAC address of the employee’s device. In another case, a robber connected to a Wi-Fi network at a local coffee shop before committing a crime. Police identified the MAC address of his device through the coffee shop’s router logs and eventually tracked him down by detecting the signal from that device as they drove around.

Schwindt and Bromberger emphasize that privacy is a priority for the Latent Wireless. They avoid bulk data collection, do not attempt to decrypt traffic, and do not store the locations of observed MAC addresses unless they’re on the hot list.

On Wednesday evening, hundreds of protesters gathered for another march toward the United Center. Thirty minutes after the speakers began addressing the crowd, the thumping of a CPD helicopter's rotors overhead interrupted them. The aircraft, a Bell 206L-4 LongRanger IV or a similar model, circled low—at 500 feet, according to flight data. Its tail number, N911YY, was clearly visible. Something appeared to protrude from a window.

Among the demonstrators, a man in a DHS vest weaved through the crowd, eyes scanning as he spoke into his phone. Curious about what the helicopter might be up to, I asked a freelance photographer, Wali Khan, to try to capture an image with his telephoto lens of whatever was sticking out of the door. Unfortunately, the helicopter was too far away to get a clear picture.

The helicopter circled for about half an hour. Despite my repeated attempts, the Chicago Police Department has yet to respond to my request for records regarding the helicopter’s mission that evening. What is clear, however, is the impact it had on those below. The hovering presence interrupted speeches, causing more than one protester I spoke with to wonder whether they were being singled out. Some people thought the officer was sticking a rifle out the window, while others assumed it was a camera.

None of WIRED’s devices picked up the hidden connections of cell-site simulators that day, or throughout the entire trip, but there were times like this when the surveillance was impossible to miss. “If what comes out of this is that activists spend less time worrying about protecting themselves from IMSI catchers and more time protecting themselves from drones, cameras, and things we know are being used,” Quintin says, “that’s a good outcome.”

_Additional reporting by Makena Kelly_

We Hunted Hidden Police Signals at the DNC

" Hello pervert"  sextortion mails keep adding new features to their email to increase credibility and urge victims to pay

After using passwords obtained from one of the countless breaches as a lure to trick victims into paying, the “Hello pervert” sextortion scammers have recently introduced two new pressure tactics: Name-dropping the infamous Pegasus spyware and adding pictures of your home environment.

They do this to add credibility to the false claims that the scammers have been watching your online behavior and caught you red-handed during activities that you would like to keep private amongst your friends and family.

The email usually starts with “Hello pervert” and then goes on to claim that the target has been watching pornographic content. The scammers often claim to have footage of what you were watching and what you were doing while watching.

To stop the sender from spreading the incriminating footage, the target will have to pay the scammer, or else they will send it to everyone in their email contacts list.

More recently, scammers have started increasing their threats by mentioning a powerful spyware called “Pegasus.” Several versions of these scam emails have included the following text:

> Have you heard of Pegasus? This is a spyware program that installs on computers and smartphones and allows hackers to monitor the activity of device owners. It provides access to your webcam, messengers, emails, call records, etc. It works well on Android, iOS, and Windows.

Though Pegasus is indeed a powerfully invasive spyware tool, the threat of its use, as included in these scam emails, is entirely empty. This is because Pegasus has never been observed outside of a surveillance campaign carried out, specifically, by governments. Time and time again, Pegasus has been used by oppressive government regimes to spy on political dissidents, human rights activists, and watchdog journalists. There is essentially no proof that such a closely-guarded spyware has ended up in the hands of everyday scammers.

But the pressure tactics don’t end with Pegasus, as many of these emails include an old (or active) password that a scam target has used in the past. Here, this isn’t some act of advanced hacking. Instead, it is likely that the scammers bought your password from other cybercriminals that obtained them during one of the countless data breaches that hit company after company every week.

When scammers have access to such data, it may also include your physical address. With that knowledge, scammers have increased their threats by simply adding a photograph of your personal neighborhood by looking it up online. For most places in inhabited areas, you can grab such pictures from Google Maps or similar apps.

A Reddit user demonstrated this by finding that such a scammer used an old PO box address. But it’s true that this adds a convincing argument to the claim that the sender has been spying on you.  

As an extra threat the email may include something like:

> “Or is visiting \[your physical address\] a more convenient way to contact if you don’t take action. Nice location btw.”

Implying that they know where you live and threatening to stop by and create a scene.

**How to recognize “Hello pervert” emails**

Once you know what’s going on it’s easy to recognize these emails. Remember that not all of the below characteristics have to be included in these emails, but all of them are red flags in their own right.

*   They often look as if they came from one of your own email addresses.
*   The scammer accuses you of inappropriate behavior and claims to have footage of that behavior.
*   In the email the scammer claims to have used Pegasus or some Trojan to spy on you through your own computer.
*   The scammer says they know “your password.”
*   You are urged to pay up quickly or the so-called footage will be spread to all your contacts. Often you’re only allowed one day to pay.
*   The actual message often arrives as an image or a pdf attachment. Scammers do this to bypass phishing filters.

**How to react to “Hello pervert” emails**

First and foremost, never reply to emails of this kind. It may tell the sender that someone is reading the emails sent to that address and they will repeatedly try new and other methods to defraud you.

*   If the email included a password, make sure you are not using it any more and if you are, change it as soon as possible.
*   If you are having trouble organizing your password, have a look at a password manager.
*   Don’t let yourself get rushed into action or decisions. Scammers rely on the fact that you will not take the time to think this through and subsequently make mistakes.
*   Do not open unsolicited attachments. Especially when the sender address is suspicious or even your own.
*   For your ease of mind, turn of your webcam or buy a webcam cover so you can cover it when you’re not using the webcam.

If you want to find out what personal data of yours has been exposed online, you can use our free Digital Footprint scan. Fill in the email address you’re curious about (it’s best to submit the one you most frequently use) and we’ll send you a free report.

**We don’t just report on threats – we help safeguard your entire digital identit**y

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your—and your family’s—personal information by using identity protection.

 “Hello pervert” sextortion scam includes new threat of Pegasus—and a picture of your home 

Google has released its monthly security updates for the Android operating system to address a known security flaw that it said has come under active exploitation in the wild.
The high-severity vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-32896 (CVSS score: 7.8), relates to a case of privilege escalation in the Android Framework component.
According to the description of the bug in the NIST National

Vulnerability / Mobile Security

Google has released its monthly security updates for the Android operating system to address a known security flaw that it said has come under active exploitation in the wild.

The high-severity vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2024-32896 (CVSS score: 7.8), relates to a case of privilege escalation in the Android Framework component.

According to the description of the bug in the NIST National Vulnerability Database (NVD), it concerns a logic error that could lead to local escalation of privileges without requiring any additional execution privileges.

"There are indications that CVE-2024-32896 may be under limited, targeted exploitation," Google said in its Android Security Bulletin for September 2024.

It's worth noting that CVE-2024-32896 was first disclosed in June 2024 as impacting only the Google-owned Pixel lineup.

There are currently no details on how the vulnerability is being exploited in the wild, although GrapheneOS maintainers revealed that CVE-2024-32896 plugs a partial solution for CVE-2024-29748, another Android flaw that has been weaponized by forensic companies.

Google later confirmed to The Hacker News that the impact of CVE-2024-32896 goes beyond Pixel devices to include the entire Android ecosystem and that it's working with original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) to apply the fixes where applicable.

"This vulnerability requires physical access to the device to exploit and interrupts the factory reset process," Google noted at the time. "Additional exploits would be needed to compromise the device."

"We are prioritizing applicable fixes for other Android OEM partners and will roll them out as soon as they are available. As a best security practice, users should always update their devices whenever there are new security updates available."

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Tag

#android