Donald Trump has vowed to deport millions and jail his enemies. To carry out that agenda, his administration will exploit America’s digital surveillance machine. Here are some steps you can take to evade it.

The WIRED Guide to Protecting Yourself From Government Surveillance

Plus: Hot Topic confirms a customer data breach, Germany arrests a US citizen for allegedly passing military secrets to Chinese intelligence, and more.

Maybe you already heard, but Donald Trump will be president of the United States again. The far-right is celebrating by calling for mass executions. The left is responding with their own election conspiracy theories. Convicted January 6 rioters are banking on a pardon. And women who oppose Trump have frankly had enough.

Ahead of Election Day, WIRED found that an “election integrity” app made by True the Vote, a right-wing group that helped popularize election denialism around the 2020 election, was leaking the emails of its users. In one instance it revealed an election officer in California who appeared to be engaged in illegal voter suppression.

Disinformation and other forms of election interference have been a major issue since Russia’s hack of the Democratic National Committee in the lead-up to the 2016 election. But 2024 appears to have been the worst yet, with US officials warning that Russia had amplified its efforts to unprecedented levels.

In non-election news, Canadian authorities arrested Alexander “Connor” Moucka, who is accused of hacking a slew of Snowflake cloud storage customers earlier this year. Security experts who’ve long followed the exploits of a hacker who went by the handle Waifu—whom authorities say is Moucka—believe him to be “one of the most consequential threat actors of 2024.”

A federal judge in Michigan sentenced Richard Densmore to 30 years in prison after he pleaded guilty to sexually exploiting a child. Densmore was highly active in 764, an online criminal network that the FBI now considers to be a “tier one” terrorism threat.

Finally, in WIRED’s first story published in partnership with 404 Media, reporter (and 404 co-owner) Joseph Cox took a deep dive into the world of infostealer malware—the same kind used in all those Snowflake account breaches Moucka is accused of committing.

And that’s not all. Each week, we round up the security and privacy news we didn’t cover in depth ourselves. Click the headlines to read the full stories. And stay safe out there.

Some iPhones that police have in their possession for forensic examination are suddenly rebooting themselves, making it more difficult for investigators to access their contents, reports 404 Media. Police use tools like Cellebrite to essentially hack into phones, but this is typically done when a device is in the so-called After First Unlock (AFU) state. Once they reboot, iPhones are put into Before First Unlock (BFU), which makes them much harder to access with forensic tools.

According to a document obtained by 404, police believed the sudden reboots stemmed from the fact that the devices run iOS 18, Apple’s new mobile operating system. The police suspected that iOS 18 contains a secret feature that allowed the impacted devices, all of which were in airplane mode, to communicate with other nearby iPhones, which sent “a signal to devices to reboot after so much time had transpired since device activity or being off network,” the document reads.

They're half right. 404 reported Friday evening that multiple experts have discovered a new feature in iOS 18 called “inactivity reboot,” which appears to force iPhones to reboot on the fourth day after being locked—no secret signal-sending required. While the feature could help prevent robbers from using stolen iPhones, it's clearly giving the cops a headache, too.

Bad news, kids. The retail chain Hot Topic confirmed this week that it suffered a data breach that exposed the personal information of some 54 million customers. The stolen data includes email addresses for all 54 million people, 25 million “lightly encrypted” credit card numbers, the names, phone numbers, and birthdays of 20 million customers, and even the home addresses of 10 million people. While the hackers behind the breach claimed to have data on far more people than the dataset contains—350 million customers—the exposed data could still be used for identity theft and other malicious activities. Not cool!

Authorities in Germany this week arrested a US citizen for allegedly giving American military secrets to the Chinese government. Identified only as Martin D. due to German privacy laws, prosecutors say he recently “worked for the US armed forces in Germany” and “obtained the information in question during his work with the US armed forces,” according to NBC News. Prosecutors claim that Martin D. “contacted Chinese government agencies and offered to provide them with sensitive US military information for forwarding to a Chinese intelligence service.” Martin D.’s arrest comes just a month after German authorities arrested a woman on suspicion of passing information about arms deliveries to Chinese intelligence.

The FBI is investigating whether Chinese state-backed hackers breached the iPhones of senior staff members in either the Kamala Harris or Donald Trump presidential campaigns, Forbes reports. The CEO of security firm iVerify, Rocky Cole, tells Forbes that his company’s software identified strange changes to the settings on the iPhones of campaign staff “in patterns that are not observed on healthy devices.” (Cole declined to identify which campaign’s staff was impacted.) The FBI told Cole that the affected iPhones belonged to known targets of Chinese hacker group Salt Typhoon, which reportedly breached several US telecom networks including AT&T and Verizon.

Auto-Rebooting iPhones Are Causing Chaos for Cops

Direct cyberattacks on vehicles are all but unheard of. In theory though, the opportunity is there to cause real damage — data extraction, full system compromise, even gaining access to safety-critical systems.

Source: Marin Tomas via Alamy Stock Photo

Six unpatched vulnerabilities in a Mazda in-vehicle infotainment (IVI) system could be exploited with a simple USB in a moments' time, and one of them has legitimate consequences to vehicle safety.

These days, cars are just computers on wheels, and IVIs are their user interface. The IVI in most Mazda vehicles of recent years — like the Mazda3 and CX-3, 5, and 9 — are built with the Mazda Connect Connectivity Master Unit (CMU), developed by the Michigan-based Visteon Corporation. The CMU is a core hardware component that enables various connectivity services: smartphone integration, a Wi-Fi hotspot, and various remote monitoring and control features.

Recent research through Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative (ZDI) has surfaced half a dozen vulnerabilities in the Mazda IVI. A few of them enable full system compromise, and access to various sensitive data. One of particular note could enable an attacker to pivot to the vehicle's Controller Area Network (CAN) bus — the central nervous system connecting its various component parts.

None of the vulnerabilities have been assigned a value according to the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) yet. All of them remain unpatched as of this writing. On the plus side: They all require that an attacker physically insert a malicious USB into the center console. Such a scenario — carried out by a carjacker, or possibly a valet or dealer — is essentially unheard of in the real world to date.

Dark Reading has reached out to Visteon for further comment on this story.

**6 Mazda IVI Security Bugs**

Three of the vulnerabilities — CVE-2024-8358, CVE-2024-8359, and CVE-2024-8360 — target functions used to locate and extract specific files during software updates. Because the provided file path is not sanitized, an attacker can step in with their own malicious injection, which gets executed at the root level of the system. With a specially crafted command, this one-step hack could facilitate a full system takeover.

Another way to skin this cat would be to take advantage of CVE-2024-8357, affecting the CMU's System on Chip (SoC) running Linux. The SoC's boot process has no authentication in place, so an attacker with the ability to execute code can take advantage to manipulate files, establish persistence through reboots, and establish control over the system even before it boots up.

The Mazda IVI; Source: Trend Micro's ZDI

CVE-2024-8355 might seem at first a bit different from the rest but, in reality, it's caused by the same underlying problem: lack of sanitization of input data.

To establish a connection with an Apple device, the CMU will request the device's serial number. Because it doesn't apply scrutiny to that value, a spoofed device can send specially crafted SQL code instead. The system's DeviceManager will run that code at the root level, enabling all kinds of malicious outcomes: database exposure, arbitrary file creation, etc.

Last, but certainly not least, is CVE-2024-8356, a missing verification during the CMU software update process. This one, however, affects the unit's other processor, the Verification IP Microcontroller Unit (VIP MCU). The VIP MCU is designed to be separate from the SoC for security purposes, because instead of running the operating system, it connects to the vehicle's CAN bus. The CAN bus, in turn, connects the rest of the vehicle: everything from climate control to the engine and airbags. With a tampered firmware image, ZDI demonstrated that one can jump the SoC to manipulate the VIP MCU, and from there reach the CAN bus.

**Serious, But Unlikely Consequences**

"In truth, it's hard to predict what an attacker could do once they have access to a CAN bus," says Dustin Childs, head of threat awareness at ZDI. "Since the CAN bus serves as the nervous system of the vehicle, a threat actor could potentially impact whatever electronic control units (ECUs) or components that interact with the CAN bus." Translation: Attackers can subvert just about any conceivable part of the vehicle.

"The worst case scenario would be an attacker impacting the driving characteristic of the car, rendering it unsafe to operate," he adds.

Still, the threat is immaterial. For all of the exploits demonstrated by researchers, actual criminals still consistently stick to those older tried-and-true methods of compromise: a stolen set of keys; an unfurled clothes hanger slipped artfully in between a window and a door frame; or a rock, a window, and a good baseball toss.

"At this point, there isn't a lot of real-world impact," Childs admits. "However, as cars become more connected, remote exploitation becomes more realistic. In the last Pwn2Own Automotive, the team from Synacktiv exploited the modem of the Tesla Model 3 over-the-air to reach and interact with the onboard systems of the vehicle. It's just a matter of time until a complete, remote vehicle takeover becomes a real possibility."

He adds, "That's why manufacturers should build in security to each component and not rely on the defenses of other modules. A vehicle should have a multilayered protective system that assumes every message may be from a compromised source. The more we get ahead of the problem now, the easier it will be to react to it in the future."

**About the Author**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

6 Infotainment Bugs Allow Mazdas to Be Hacked With USBs

Hackers can exploit critical vulnerabilities in Mazda’s infotainment system, including one that enables code execution via USB, compromising…

Hackers can exploit critical vulnerabilities in Mazda’s infotainment system, including one that enables code execution via USB, compromising your car’s security and putting you at risk.

Cybersecurity researchers at ZDI (Zero Day Initiative) have identified several critical vulnerabilities in Mazda‘s infotainment systems, specifically in the Connectivity Master Unit (CMU) installed in multiple Mazda car models, including the Mazda 3 from the years 2014 to 2021.

These vulnerabilities, caused by “insufficient sanitization” when handling attacker-supplied input, could allow a physically present attacker to exploit them by connecting a specially crafted USB device to the target system. Successful exploitation could result in arbitrary code execution with root privileges.

****The Target****

The CMU unit, manufactured by Visteon Corporation, an anutomotive technology company, and initially developed by Johnson Controls Inc (JCI), runs on the latest available software version (74.00.324A). However, earlier software versions down to at least 70.x may also be affected by these vulnerabilities. The CMU is part of an active “modding scene” where users release software tweaks to alter the unit’s operation, often exploiting such vulnerabilities.

****The Vulnerabilities****

There are multiple vulnerabilities identified in the CMU system. The details of each are as follows:

*   **SQL Injection (CVE-2024-8355/ZDI-24-1208)**: An attacker can inject malicious SQL code by spoofing the iAP serial number of an Apple device. This allows the attacker to manipulate the database, disclose information, create arbitrary files, and potentially execute code.
*   **OS Command Injection (CVE-2024-8359/ZDI-24-1191)**: The REFLASH\_DDU\_FindFile function in the libjcireflashua.so shared object fails to sanitize user input, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary OS commands that can be executed by the head unit OS shell.
*   **OS Command Injection (CVE-2024-8360/ZDI-24-1192)**: The REFLASH\_DDU\_ExtractFile function in the libjcireflashua. so shared object also fails to sanitize user input, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary OS commands that can be executed by the head unit OS shell.
*   **Missing Root of Trust in Hardware (CVE-2024-8357/ZDI-24-1189)**: The application SoC is missing any authentication of the bootstrap code, allowing an attacker to manipulate the root filesystem, configuration data, and potentially the bootstrap code itself.
*   **Unsigned Code (CVE-2024-8356/ZDI-24-1188)**: The VIP MCU can be updated with unsigned code, allowing an attacker to pivot from a compromised application SoC running Linux to the VIP MCU and gain direct access to the connected CAN busses of the vehicle.

****Exploitation****

An attacker can exploit these vulnerabilities by creating a file on a FAT32-formatted USB mass storage device with a name that contains the OS commands to be executed. The filename must end with .up for it to be recognized by the software update handling code.

Once the initial compromise is achieved, the attacker can gain persistence through manipulation of the root file system or install a specially crafted VIP microcontroller software allowing unrestricted access to vehicle networks.

****Associated Risks****

According to ZDI’s blog post, the attack chain can be completed in a few minutes in a lab environment, and there is no reason to believe it will take significantly more time against a unit installed in a car.

This means that the vehicle can be compromised while being handled by a valet, during a rideshare, or via USB malware. The CMU can then be compromised and “enhanced” to attempt to compromise any connected device in targeted attacks that can result in DoS, bricking, ransomware, safety compromise, etc. The worst part of it is that these security vulnerabilities remain unpatched.

> _“This research effort and its output highlighted the fact that high-impact vulnerabilities can be found even in a very mature automotive product that has been on the market for a number of years and with a long history of security fixes. To date, these vulnerabilities remain unpatched by the vendor.”_
> 
> ZDI analyst Dmitry Janushkevich 

****Conclusion****

The discovery of these vulnerabilities shows the importance of considering the whole system’s security and security-testing complete production systems in all their operational modes. The use of memory-safe languages or other security tools does not guarantee that deployed systems are secure. It is important to ensure system integrity at all runtime stages and for all components to guarantee downstream security properties of languages and their compilers.

1.  Cybercriminals Exploit CAN Injection Hack to Steal Cars
2.  App Flaw Let Honda and Nissan Cars Hack by Knowing VIN
3.  Tesla cars can be remotely hacked using drone, WIFI dongle
4.  Hackers Remotely Control Kia Cars by Exploiting License Plates
5.  High severity Intel chip flaw left cars and IoT devices vulnerable

Hackers Can Access Mazda Vehicle Controls Via System Vulnerabilities

Questions remain over what a corporate ban will achieve, since Canadians will still be able to use the app.

Source: SOPA Images Limited via Alamy Stock Photo

ByteDance is being exiled from Canada, though the TikTok app is not.

Following the US's example, Canada has spent recent years rubbing up against the world's most popular Chinese app. In February 2023, TikTok was banned from all government devices, citing security concerns. Later that year, the government called for a broader national security review under the 1985 Investment Canada Act, which empowers the government to scrutinize foreign investments.

In concluding that review, the minister of Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada (ISED) — a federal agency responsible for regulating and supporting various aspects of the country's economy, industry, and scientific endeavors — unveiled a significant, though not comprehensive, development in his country's approach.

To address "specific national security risks," the minister said yesterday, the offices of TikTok Technology Canada Inc. — the Canadian subsidiary of ByteDance, TikTok's parent company — must now be shuttered. However, he noted, the government will not actually block any Canadians from using the app, as "the decision to use a social media application or platform is a personal choice."

**TikTok vs. Governments**

Ever since TikTok blew up during the COVID-19 pandemic, governments worldwide have struggled with how to administer: Ban it, to the chagrin of millions, or don't, and risk consequences to mass privacy and national security.

Concern is widespread that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could conduct data gathering and spying through TikTok, since it wields potentially unlimited authority over Chinese companies. And "The CCP has long been known for having an enormous capability to gather otherwise benign-looking datasets, and to process them to produce intelligence to further its national interests," notes Casey Ellis, founder and adviser at Bugcrowd. "While it can easily be argued that Western governments and companies are capable of the same, the CCP's national interests are at best competitive, and at worst disruptive to the national interests of the West."

Blocking the app to prevent CCP data gathering is controversial, however, since it's massively popular, and there is no definitive, significant proof of such malicious activity to date. A few scattered countries have done so (for varying reasons), most notably India in 2020, but most have taken up solutions somewhere in the middle.

In 2020, President Trump signed executive orders effectively forcing ByteDance to sell TikTok to an American company, or else face a national ban. President Biden's No TikTok on Government Devices Act banned the app in government settings, and his Protecting Americans from Foreign Adversary Controlled Applications Act carried the forced sale idea from the Trump administration. US policy is likely to subside now that Trump has been elected again. "Trump has made strong moves against ByteDance in the past," Ellis notes. "He has a reputation for being tough on China, and for operating on the assumption that China is competitive to the US as a great power. I think we'll see more activity around addressing 'creeping threats' from ByteDance and other Chinese companies, particularly those with a larger and established presence, both in the US and amongst its allies, over the coming year."

Meanwhile, in 2023, the Canadian government took parallel actions. And just as it had in the US, TikTok says it will challenge Canada's latest ruling in court.

**What Would Actually Solve TikTok Privacy?**

Debate has now begun over whether banning the corporate half of the TikTok operation will be helpful, if not abjectly harmful to Canada's national security aims.

As Canadian academic Michael Geist argued in a blog post, "banning the company rather than the app may actually make matters worse since the risks associated with the app will remain but the ability to hold the company accountable will be weakened," since it will no longer have a domestic presence. "It is hard to envision it prioritizing (or perhaps even complying) with Canadian regulatory processes if it is banned from formally operating in the jurisdiction."

Dark Reading has asked the ISED for its view of how the ban will benefit Canadian national security. This article will be updated when ISED's response is received.

A separate development poised to directly affect TikTok data collection in Canada is the legislation C-27, which would supersede the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, Canada's primary privacy legislation since 2000.

C-27 packages three separate Acts: the Consumer Privacy Protection Act, the bit most relevant for TikTok user privacy; the Electronic Documents Act; and the Artificial Intelligence and Data Act. Though it may be viewed as efficient and ambitious to address so many issues at once, ongoing debates primarily around the artificial intelligence component are currently holding up the passage of the other two along with it.

**About the Author**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

Canada Closes TikTok Offices, Citing National Security

North Korean hackers are targeting cryptocurrency businesses with a sophisticated new malware campaign, dubbed “Hidden Risk.” Learn how…

North Korean hackers are targeting cryptocurrency businesses with a sophisticated new malware campaign, dubbed “Hidden Risk.” Learn how this stealthy attack works, the techniques used, and how to protect yourself from this growing threat.

North Korean state-sponsored APT group ‘**BlueNoroff**‘ is targeting crypto-related businesses in a campaign dubbed ‘Hidden Risk’, according to SentinelOne’s findings shared with Hackread.com. 

SentinelLabs’ threat researchers reportedly discovered that BlueNoroff, a subgroup of the larger North Korean state-backed **Lazarus Group**, is targeting cryptocurrency and DeFi businesses using use email and PDF-based lures with fake news headlines/crypto-related stories in a campaign that began in July 2024.

Examples of fake news, posts and announcements used in the attack (Via SentinelOne)

****Analyzing the Attack****

Researchers noted that attackers have employed unique tactics to evade detection and compromise victim systems. The attack begins with a **well-crafted phishing email** that lures unsuspecting victims into clicking on a malicious link that leads to a seemingly legitimate PDF document, which is actually hiding a malicious Swift-language-based Mac application cleverly disguised as a PDF reader (signed/notarized on 19 October 2024).

“The application is disguised as a link to a PDF document relating to a cryptocurrency topic such as “Hidden Risk Behind New Surge of Bitcoin Price”, “Altcoin Season 2.0-The Hidden Gems to Watch” and “New Era for Stablecoins and DeFi, CeFi”,” researchers **explained**.

Once executed, this application discreetly downloads a decoy PDF (Hidden Risk) and then downloads/executes a malicious x86-64 binary (“growth”) on both Intel and Apple silicon machines. 

Growth installs itself persistently and acts as a backdoor. It gathers sensitive information about the infected system, communicates with a remote server controlled by the attackers, and can potentially receive and execute commands.

****Persistence Mechanism****

To ensure persistence, the attackers have opted for a unique method of modifying the Zsh configuration file (zshenv) by adding malicious code to ensure its continued presence. This is a critical file used by the Zsh shell and is sourced during every Zsh session, allowing the backdoor to automatically execute upon system startup, even after a reboot.

****The BlueNoroff Connection****

SentinelLabs’ researchers have linked this campaign with BlueNoroff because it resembles techniques from their past campaigns, including parsing server commands and saving them in hidden files. The campaign’s network infrastructure analysis also reveals connections to domains used in previous campaigns using services like **NameCheap** and Quickpacket for hosting.

Furthermore, the malware uses a User-Agent string previously linked to BlueNoroff’s “**RustBucket**” malware and exploits a developer account to get their malware notarized by Apple, bypassing security measures like **Gatekeeper**.

****Staying Protected****

BlueNoroff has a history of targeting cryptocurrency exchanges, venture capital firms, and banks and poses a constant threat to the industry. They prefer using PDF-based lures mainly because PDF documents are widely used and trusted, making them ideal for malicious payloads.

Hackread recently **reported** BlueNoroff-linked malware, TodoSwift, disguised as a legitimate PDF viewer and ObjCShellz malware **targeting macOS** to run remote shell commands on Intel and Arm Macs.

Therefore, it is important to double-check email addresses, watch out for emails from anonymous sources, and avoid clicking on links in unknown emails, especially if they ask for downloading applications/PDFs. MacOS users must remain aware of risks given the sudden rise in **macOS-oriented attacks**.

1.  **Fake North Korean IT Workers Infiltrate Western Firms**
2.  **North Korean Hackers Team Up with Play Ransomware**
3.  **N Korean hackers stole $1.7 billion from crypto exchanges**
4.  **North Korean Hackers Drop Linux Malware for ATM Cashouts**
5.  **SnatchCrypto attack hits DeFi, Blockchain Firms with backdoor**

North Korean Hackers Use Fake News to Spread ‘Hidden Risk’ Malware

A threat actor with ties to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been observed targeting cryptocurrency-related businesses with a multi-stage malware capable of infecting Apple macOS devices.
Cybersecurity company SentinelOne, which dubbed the campaign Hidden Risk, attributed it with high confidence to BlueNoroff, which has been previously linked to malware families such as

A threat actor with ties to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been observed targeting cryptocurrency-related businesses with a multi-stage malware capable of infecting Apple macOS devices.

Cybersecurity company SentinelOne, which dubbed the campaign **Hidden Risk**, attributed it with high confidence to BlueNoroff, which has been previously linked to malware families such as RustBucket, KANDYKORN, ObjCShellz, RustDoor (aka Thiefbucket), and TodoSwift.

The activity "uses emails propagating fake news about cryptocurrency trends to infect targets via a malicious application disguised as a PDF file," researchers Raffaele Sabato, Phil Stokes, and Tom Hegel said in a report shared with The Hacker News.

"The campaign likely began as early as July 2024 and uses email and PDF lures with fake news headlines or stories about crypto-related topics."

As revealed by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in a September 2024 advisory, these campaigns are part of "highly tailored, difficult-to-detect social engineering" attacks aimed at employees working in the decentralized finance (DeFi) and cryptocurrency sectors.

The attacks take the form of bogus job opportunities or corporate investment, engaging with their targets for extended periods of time to build trust before delivering malware.

SentinelOne said it observed an email phishing attempt on a crypto-related industry in late October 2024 that delivered a dropper application mimicking a PDF file ("Hidden Risk Behind New Surge of Bitcoin Price.app") hosted on delphidigital\[.\]org.

The application, written in the Swift programming language, has been found to be signed and notarized on October 19, 2024, with the Apple developer ID "Avantis Regtech Private Limited (2S8XHJ7948)." The signature has since been revoked by the iPhone maker.

Upon launch, the application downloads and displays to the victim a decoy PDF file retrieved from Google Drive, while covertly retrieving a second-stage executable from a remote server and executing it. A Mach-O x86-64 executable, the C++-based unsigned binary acts as a backdoor to execute remote commands.

The backdoor also incorporates a novel persistence mechanism that abuses the zshenv configuration file, marking the first time the technique has been abused in the wild by malware authors.

"It has particular value on modern versions of macOS since Apple introduced user notifications for background Login Items as of macOS 13 Ventura," the researchers said.

"Apple's notification aims to warn users when a persistence method is installed, particularly oft-abused LaunchAgents and LaunchDaemons. Abusing Zshenv, however, does not trigger such a notification in current versions of macOS."

The threat actor has also been observed using domain registrar Namecheap to establish an infrastructure that's centered around themes related to cryptocurrency, Web3, and investments to give it a veneer of legitimacy. Quickpacket, Routerhosting, and Hostwinds are among the most commonly used hosting providers.

It's worth noting that the attack chain shares some level of overlap with a previous campaign that Kandji highlighted in August 2024, which also employed a similarly named macOS dropper app "Risk factors for Bitcoin's price decline are emerging(2024).app" to deploy TodoSwift.

It's not clear what prompted the threat actors to shift their tactics, and if it's in response to public reporting. "North Korean actors are known for their creativity, adaptability, and awareness of reports on their activities, so it's entirely possible that we're simply seeing different successful methods emerge from their offensive cyber program," Stokes told The Hacker News.

Another concerning aspect of the campaign is BlueNoroff's ability to acquire or hijack valid Apple developer accounts and use them to have their malware notarized by Apple.

"Over the last 12 months or so, North Korean cyber actors have engaged in a series of campaigns against crypto-related industries, many of which involved extensive 'grooming' of targets via social media," the researchers said.

"The Hidden Risk campaign diverts from this strategy taking a more traditional and cruder, though not necessarily any less effective, email phishing approach. Despite the bluntness of the initial infection method, other hallmarks of previous DPRK-backed campaigns are evident."

The development also comes amid other campaigns orchestrated by North Korean hackers to seek employment at various companies in the West and deliver malware using booby-trapped codebases and conferencing tools to prospective job seekers under the guise of a hiring challenge or an assignment.

The two intrusion sets, dubbed Wagemole (aka UNC5267) and Contagious Interview, have been attributed to a threat group tracked as Famous Chollima (aka CL-STA-0240 and Tenacious Pungsan).

ESET, which has given Contagious Interview the moniker DeceptiveDevelopment, has classified it as a new Lazarus Group activity cluster that's focused on targeting freelance developers around the world with the aim of cryptocurrency theft.

"The Contagious Interview and Wagemole campaigns showcase the evolving tactics of North Korean threat actors as they continue to steal data, land remote jobs in Western countries, and bypass financial sanctions," Zscaler ThreatLabz researcher Seongsu Park said earlier this week.

"With refined obfuscation techniques, multi-platform compatibility, and widespread data theft, these campaigns represent a growing threat to businesses and individuals alike."

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

North Korean Hackers Target Crypto Firms with Hidden Risk Malware on macOS

Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) recently observed an attacker conducting big-game hunting and double extortion attacks using the relatively new Interlock ransomware.

Thursday, November 7, 2024 06:00

*   Cisco Talos Incident Response (Talos IR) recently observed an attacker conducting big-game hunting and double extortion attacks using the relatively new Interlock ransomware.  
*   Our analysis uncovered that the attacker used multiple components in the delivery chain including a Remote Access Tool (RAT) masquerading as a fake browser updater, PowerShell scripts, a credential stealer, and a keylogger before deploying and enabling the ransomware encryptor binary. 
*   We also observed that the attacker primarily used remote desktop protocol (RDP) to move laterally within the victim’s network, as well as other tools such as AnyDesk and PuTTY. 
*   The attacker used Azure Storage Explorer, which leverages the utility AZCopy, to exfiltrate the victim’s data to an attacker-controlled Azure storage blob.  
*   The timeline of the attacker’s activity, from the initial compromise stage until the deployment of ransomware encryptor binary, indicates their dwelling time in the victim’s environment was about 17 days.  
*   Talos assesses with low confidence that Interlock ransomware is likely a new diversified group that emerged from Rhysida ransomware operators or developers, based on some similarities in the operators’ tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and in the ransomware encryptor binaries. 

**Who is Interlock? **

Interlock first appeared in public reporting in September 2024 and has been observed launching big-game hunting and double extortion attacks. The group has notably targeted businesses in a wide range of sectors, which at the time of reporting includes healthcare, technology, government in the U.S. and manufacturing in Europe, according to the data leak site disclosure, indicating their targeting is opportunistic. 

Like other ransomware players in the big-game hunting space, Interlock also operates a data leak site called “Worldwide Secrets Blog,” providing links to victims’ leaked data, chat support for victims' communications, and the email address, “interlock@2mail\[.\]co”.   

In their blog, Interlock claims to target organizations’ infrastructure by exploiting unaddressed vulnerabilities and claims their actions are in part motivated by a desire to hold companies’ accountable for poor cybersecurity, in addition to monetary gain. 

**Recent attack methodologies **

Throughout the investigation into the Interlock ransomware attack, Talos observed several notable TTPs used by the attacker in each stage of the delivery chain. Talos assesses that the attacker was present in the victim’s environment for approximately 17 days, from the initial compromise until deployment and execution of the Interlock ransomware. 

**Initial access **

The attacker gained access to the victim machine via a fake Google Chrome browser updater executable that the victim was prompted to download from a compromised legitimate news website.  When clicked, the fake browser updater executable “upd\_2327991.exe” was downloaded onto the victim machine from a second compromised URL of a legitimate retailer. 

**Execution **

Talos IR discovered the fake browser updater executable is a Remote Access Tool (RAT) that automatically executes an embedded PowerShell script when downloaded and run. The script initially downloads a legitimate Chrome setup executable “ChromeSetup.exe” to the victim machine’s applications temporary folder and established persistence by dropping a Windows shortcut file in the Windows StartUp folder with the file name “fahhs.lnk” configured to run the RAT every time the victim logs in, establishing persistence.  

Sample PowerShell command that downloads the RAT. 

The RAT executes the command “cmd.exe /c systeminfo" and collects information from victim machine, listed below:

Host Name

Time Zone

OS Name

Total Physical Memory

OS Version

Available Physical Memory

OS Manufacturer

Virtual Memory

OS Configuration

Max Size

OS Build Type

Virtual Memory: Available

Registered Owner

Virtual Memory: In Use

Registered Organization

Page File Location(s)

Product ID

Domain

Original Install Date

Logon Server

System Boot Time

Hotfix(s)

System Manufacturer

Network Card(s)

System Model

Connection Name

System Type

Status

Processor(s)

DHCP Enabled

BIOS Version

DHCP Server

Windows Directory

IP address(es)

System Directory

Hyper-V Requirements

Boot Device

System Locale

Then, the RAT encrypts the collected information in the memory stream. It establishes a secured socket to the command and control (C2) server hidden behind the attacker-controlled Cloudflare domain “apple-online\[.\]shop”, sends the encrypted data stream of victim machine information to the C2 server, and waits to receive the response.  

The RAT also allowed the attacker to execute two other PowerShell commands on the victim machine, which downloads the encrypted data blobs of a credential stealer “cht.exe” and a keylogger binary “klg.dll”, decrypts them with the passwords “jgSkhg934@kjv#1vkfg2S” and runs them. We observed that the keylogger is a DLL file that is run using the LOLBin “rundll32.exe”.  

A sample PowerShell command that downloads and runs the Keylogger. 

**Defense Evasion **

Talos IR observed that EDR was disabled on some of the compromised servers in the victim environment during the investigation. According to the indicators seen, Talos IR believes that the attacker could have either leveraged an EDR uninstaller tool or instrumented a vulnerable device driver Sysmon.sys (TfSysMon.sys) to disable the EDR on the victim machine. We also observed the attacker’s attempts to delete contents of the Event logs on some of the compromised systems.  

**Credential Access **

The credential stealer discovered in this campaign is compiled in Golang. It enumerates the installed browser profiles on the victim machine and copies the Login data, Login State, key4.db, browser history and bookmarks files to the victim’s application profile temporary folder. The stealer then processes the data and uses SQL queries to collect the login information of victims’ online accounts along with the associated account URLs. Finally, the data is written to a file “chrgetpdsi.txt” in the user profile temporary folder.  

The keylogger DLL running on the victim machine is a tiny executable, which hooks to the victim machine keyboard and logs keystrokes in a file called “conhost.txt”, the same folder where the Keylogger was downloaded.  

**Discovery **

The attacker ran PowerShell commands that are known indicators of pre-kerberoasting reconnaissance, a method used to obtain domain admin credentials. We assess with moderate confidence that a Kerberoasting attack was used to obtain accounts with higher privileges. 

(('AD\_Computers: {0}' -f (\[adsiSearcher\]'(ObjectClass=computer)').FindAll().count)  
(\[adsisearcher\]'(&(objectCategory=user)(servicePrincipalName=\*))').FindAll() 

**Lateral Movement **

Talos IR observed that the attacker primarily used Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) and several compromised credentials to move between systems.  Further analysis showed that the attacker has also used AnyDesk and possibly LogMeIn to allow remote connectivity. We also spotted the installation of PuTTY on the compromised machines, which was likely used to move laterally to Linux hosts. We are not clear how these tools were dropped and executed on the infected machines. 

Sample RDP command executions observed during our analysis and with the redacted IP address details are shown below. 

mstsc /v 10.\*.\*.\* 
.\\conhost.exe -d \\10.\*.\*.\*\\e$ 

**Collection and Exfiltration  **

The attacker executed storage-explorer, a tool that allows users to manage and interact with Azure Storage, and AzCopy, which allows users to copy files to a remote Azure storage, in the victim’s machine. We believe that the attacker used storage-explorer to navigate and identify sensitive information in the victim network and executed AzCopy to upload the data to the Azure storage blob according to network artifacts analysis. We were not able to confirm how the storage-explorer and AzCopy were delivered to the victim machine. 

**Impact **

The attacker deployed the Interlock ransomware encryptor binary with the file name “conhost.exe”, masquerading as a legitimate file, onto the victim machine and stored it in a folder named with a single digit number (example: “3” or “4”) in the user profile application data temporary folder. When run, the ransomware encrypts the targeted files on the victim machine with the file extension “.Interlock” and drops the ransom note “!\_\_README\_\_!.txt” file in every folder containing files that the encryptor has attempted to encrypt. Talos IR also observed that the attacker configured the ransom note to display during interactive login, was pushed using Group Policy Objects (GPOs), a Windows utility that allows users to manage Windows operating systems and applications.  

In the ransom note, the attacker warns against attempting to recover the encrypted files and rebooting the affected machines. They also demand a response within 96 hours or else they threaten to release the victim's data on their leak site and notify the media outlets, which could lead to financial and reputational damage.  

The ransom note includes the URL for an onion site where the affected victims can contact the operator to discuss the ransom demand and purchase the decryption keys using a unique company ID of sixty alphanumeric characters generated for each victim. 

**Interlock ransomware analysis **

Talos observed that Interlock ransomware has both Windows Portable Executable (EXE) and the Linux executable (ELF) variants, indicating that the attacker is targeting both Windows and Linux machines.   

The Interlock ransomware encryption binary is a 64-bit executable, compiled on October 2, 2024. The ransomware appears on the victim’s machines in a packed executable format with the custom unpacker code located in its Thread Local Storage and several obfuscated stack strings in the binary which are decrypted during the runtime of the ransomware. 

When the ransomware runs on the victim machine it initializes the binary by loading custom structures, strings, and Application programming interface (API) functions. After the initialization, it enumerates the logical disk drives that are available on the victim machine. Initially, the ransomware checks for the drive letters “A” through “Z” and excludes the “C drive”. It picks the available logical drives and enumerates all the folders and files in them, encrypting the targeted files on the victim machine and appending the file extension “.interlock” on encrypted files. Once the logical drives are enumerated, the ransomware then enumerates and encrypts the files in the folders of the “C drive”.  

During this enumeration process, the ransomware excludes specific folders and file extensions on the victim machine from being encrypted. The operator hardcoded the folder and files extension exclusion list, shown below, in the Interlock binary.

Folder exclusion list of Windows Interlock variant:

$Recycle.Bin

Windows

Boot

$RECYCLE.BIN

Documents and Settings

AppData

PerfLogs

WindowsApps

ProgramData

Windows Defender

Recovery

WindowsPowerShell

System Volume Information

Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection

File extension exclusion list of Windows Interlock variant:

.bat

.bin

.cab

.cmd

.com

.cur

.diagcab

.diagcfg

.diagpkg

.drv

.hlp

.hta

.ico

.msi

.ocx

.psm1

.src

.sys

.ini

.url

.dll

.exe

.ps1

Thumbs.db

The Linux variant of the Interlock ransomware performs a similar enumeration of directories and files, starting from the root directory, and encrypts the files excluding those that are in the file extension exclusion list hardcoded in the binary.

File extension exclusion list of Linux Interlock variant:

boot

.cfg

.b00

.v00

.v01

.v02

.v03

.v04

.v05

.v06

.v07

.t00

Interlock ransomware uses LibTomCrypt library, an open-source comprehensive, modular and portable cryptographic library for encryption.  The Windows Interlock ransomware variant uses the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) encryption technique to encrypt the files on the victim machine whereas the Linux Interlock variant uses either CBC or RSA encryption technique. 

Encryption routine in Windows variant 

Encryption routine in ELF variant 

 

 

After encrypting each of the targeted files in the victim machine Interlock drops the ransom note “!\_\_README\_\_!.txt” file in each of the enumerated folders. 

Windows variant ransom note function 

ELF variant ransom note function 

 

 

We observed that the Windows Interlock variant creates a windows task name “TaskSystem” that runs at 8:00 PM daily on the victim machine as a SYSTEM user executing the configured command to run the ransomware, indicating the ransomware establishing the persistence.  

schtasks /create /sc DAILY /tn “TaskSystem” /tr “cmd /c cd "$Path of the Interlock binary" && "$command” /st 20:00 /ru system > nul

The ransomware has the capability to delete itself upon encrypting the targeted files, hiding the evidence of the encryption binary on the victim machine.  To delete the encryption binary in the Windows variant, Interlock ransomware has a tiny DLL binary embedded in the data section that is dropped into the user profile applications temporary folder with the file name “tmp41.wasd”.  

Then, “rundll32.exe” is used to execute the DLL’s export function, called “run”, which then executes the remove() function to delete the encryption binary.  

The Linux variant uses a similar technique to delete the encryptor binary from the victim machine, by executing the removeme function, which is an inline routine in the same encryptor binary.  

**Interlock TTPs overlap with Rhysida Ransomware **

Talos assesses with low confidence that Interlock ransomware is a new diversified group that emerged from Rhysida operators or developers, based on some similarities in TTPs, tools, and the ransomware encryptor binaries’ behaviors. 

We discovered code overlaps in the binaries of Interlock and Rhysida ransomware samples. Notably, the files and folders exclusion list hardcoded in the Windows variant of the Interlock ransomware has similarities with the exclusion list in Rhysida ransomware, reported by Talos in an August 2023 Threat Advisory. 

Additionally, the Interlock ransomware encryptor with the filename “conhost.exe” was earlier seen in Rhysida ransomware attacks, along with overlaps in TTPs and tools including PowerShell scripts, AnyDesk, and PuTTY, based on a CISA #StopRansomware advisory report on Rhysida Ransomware. Furthermore, both Rhysida and Interlock operators use AzCopy to exfiltrate the victim’s data to an attacker-controlled Azure storage blob, an old but uncommon technique. 

Finally, Interlock and Rhysida deliver ransom notes with a similar theme, where they portray themselves as a helpful partner notifying the victim of a breach and offering to help rectify it. This is in contrast to other prolific and sophisticated cyber groups, such a Black Basta and ALPHV, whose ransom notes demand payment, threaten, and attempt to intimidate the victim.  

Rhysida ransom note. 

Interlock ransom note. 

Interlock’s possible affiliation with Rhysida operators or developers would align with several broader trends in the cyber threat landscape, which Talos reported in our 2022 and 2023 Year in Review reports. We observed ransomware groups diversifying their capabilities to support more advanced and varied operations, and ransomware groups have been growing less siloed, as we observed operators increasingly working alongside multiple ransomware groups. 

****Coverage** **

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. 

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here. 

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. 

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products. 

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them. 

Additional protection with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center. 

Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. 

Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. Snort SIDs for this threat are 64114, 64113, 64189 and 301042. 

ClamAV detections are also available for this threat: 

Win.Ransomware.Interlock-10036524-0 

Unix.Ransomware.Interlock-10036662-0 

Win.Trojan.Kryptik-10036729-0 

Win.Downloader.Kryptik-10036730-0 

**Indicators of Compromise **

IOCs for this threat can be found in our GitHub repository here.

Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack

Attackers are triggering victims' deep-seated fear of getting in trouble in order to spread the sophisticated stealer across continents.

Source: Charles Walker Collection via Alamy Stock Photo

Hundreds of companies worldwide have been targeted with spear-phishing emails claiming copyright infringement that actually deliver an infostealer.

Starting in July, Check Point Research began to track the emails as they spread across the Americas, Europe, and Southeast Asia, coming from a new domain each time. Hundreds of its customers have been targeted, indicating that the real reach of the campaign may be far greater still.

The goal of the emails is to bait guilt-riddled victims into downloading Rhadamanthys, a sophisticated infostealer equally capable of pilfering nation-state intelligence or, in this case, cryptocurrency wallet passphrases.

**CopyR(ight)hadamantys**

No two emails in the campaign that researchers have dubbed "CopyR(ight)hadamantys" come from the same address, indicating that there must be some kind of automation behind their distribution. This automation proves awkward in some circumstances — like when an Israeli target receives an email almost entirely in Korean — and limits the emails' ability to realistically impersonate known brands.

Each one is made to seem as if it came from legal representatives of specific, known companies. Nearly 70% of those companies come from either technology — like Check Point itself — or from media and entertainment industries.

The profile of impersonated brands weaves in neatly with the story the attackers peddle: that recipients have posted some sort of content on social media that violated a copyright. "I assume everyone has done it to some degree in his life," says Sergey Shykevich, threat intelligence group manager at Check Point. "It just makes people hesitate and think, 'Oh, did I use some wrong image? Did I copy some text \[by accident\]?' Even if you didn't."

Recipients are asked to remove specific images and videos, the details of which are contained in a password-protected file. The file is actually a link that redirects the user to download an archive from Dropbox or Discord. The archive contains a decoy document, a legitimate executable, and a malicious dynamic link library (DLL) containing the Rhadamanthys stealer.

**What to Know About Rhadamanthys**

Rhadamanthys is a popular and accomplished information stealer. As Shykevich explains, "It's without any doubt the most sophisticated of those infostealers which are sold as commodity malware in the Dark Web. It's more expensive than other infostealers: Mostly you'll rent other infostealers from between $100 to $200. Rhadamanthys is more, around $1,000. It's much more modular, more obfuscated, and more complicated in how it's built: The way it loads itself, hides itself, all this makes detection much more complicated."

Among other features, the newest Rhadamanthys version 0.7 sports a slightly archaic machine-learning-based optical character recognition (OCR) component. It's hardly advanced artificial intelligence (AI) — it struggles with text in mixed colors, can't read handwriting, and only interprets the most popular fonts. Nonetheless, it helps the malware read data from static documents (like PDFs) and images.

In CopyR(ight)hadamantys, the OCR module comes loaded with a dictionary of 2,048 words associated with Bitcoin wallet protection codes. This might suggest that the attackers are after cryptocurrencies, which, if true, would also align with the campaign's broad targeting, characteristic of financially motivated campaigns. In recent months, Rhadamanthys has also been associated with nation-state threat actors like Iran's Void Manticore, and the pro-Palestine group "Handala."

**One Strange Stealth Feature**

Organizations looking to defend against CopyR(ight)hadamantys should start with phishing protections, but there's another quirk of the campaign worth noting as well.

After making landfall, the malicious DLL writes a significantly larger version of itself to the victim computer's Documents folder, which masquerades as a component of Firefox. This version of the file is functionally equivalent to the first. What makes it so much heavier is an "overlay" — useless data that serves two meta-functions. First, it changes the file's hash value, a common means by which antivirus programs identify malware.

Some antivirus programs also avoid scanning extra large files. "For example, they don't want to run files associated with games, with a huge number of gigabytes, because it makes for an intense load," Shykevich explains. By this logic, an otherwise uselessly larger Rhadamanthys file might improve its chances of avoiding detection. Though, he adds, "It's not extremely common because it's also not convenient for the attackers to deal with huge files. With some email solutions, you can't attach files more than 20MB, so you need to send the victim to some external resource. So it's a tactic, but it's not some crazy tactic that always works."

Organizations might want to sniff out at any particularly large files that employees may be downloading from emails. "It's not easy, because there are many reasons why some legitimate files will be big," he says. "But I think it's possible to implement some \[effective\] rules for what you can download."

**About the Author**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

Fake Copyright Infringement Emails Spread Rhadamanthys

The mobile device maker continues to investigate IntelBroker's claims of another high-profile data breach, with the cybercriminal group posting on BreachForums internal data allegedly stolen from Nokia through a third-party contractor.

Source: Nico El Nino via Alamy Stock Photo

Nokia is investigating an alleged cyberattack in which threat actors claim to have stolen sensitive internal data. However, the company says that so far there is no evidence that either its data or systems were affected by a breach.

Known threat actor IntelBroker on Tuesday posted what it claimed is Nokia's online internal data — including SSH keys, source code, and internal credentials — putting it up for sale on the BreachForums cybercrime site for $20,000, according to a published report on HackRead.

The group claimed to have obtained the data through a breach of a third-party contractor linked to Nokia’s internal tool development, though no customer data seems to have been affected by the breach, according to the report.

"Nokia is aware of reports that an unauthorized actor has alleged to have gained access to certain third-party contractor data and possibly data of Nokia," a Nokia spokesperson tells Dark Reading. "Nokia takes this allegation seriously and we are investigating."

However, at this time, the company's investigation "has found no evidence that any of our systems or data being impacted," though Nokia continues "to closely monitor the situation," the spokesperson says.

**Group Known for High-Profile Data Heists**

Given that IntelBroker is a notorious threat actor that already has pulled off a series of high-profile data heists, the chance that Nokia eventually will find that its data has been stolen seems likely. The Serbian-based entity began operations in 2022 and is linked to data breaches that affected Apple, the US House of Representatives, Europol, General Electric, and DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency).

If IntelBroker's claim turns out to be true, data stolen in the heist and then sold to a malicious actor or actors potentially could be used to engage in other cybercriminal activity against Nokia. For example, stolen using credentials to gain unauthorized access to Nokia systems and breach other sensitive data or propagate malware. Depending on the nature of the data, other organizations also could be at risk.

The incident also demonstrates yet another example of how organizations are exposed to security risks through third-parties that contract with the company, observes Jim Routh, chief trust officer at cybersecurity firm Saviynt. However, that the breach itself occurred through a third party is not a huge surprise, he tells Dark Reading via email.

**Mitigating Third-Party Risk**

In fact, numerous high-profile cyberattacks at global multinational organizations have been the result of breaches through third parties, including incidents that occurred at credit card company American Express, Spanish banking institution Santander, and US-based financial organization Bank of America.

However, Routh says that the alleged Nokia breach "represents a bit of a head-scratcher" because it involves the compromise of "third-party credentials for access to the software supply chain."

"The head-scratching comes from why a third party has access to Nokia source code," he notes. However, it's possible that attackers gained access through a software engineer contributing to an internal project, Routh adds, speculating that hackers exploited "credential management for access to the software build process."

One potential way that organizations can protect themselves from a similar incident, he says, is to improve identity management for cloud accounts with access to the software supply chain to avoid inadvertently exposing sensitive data to threat actors.

**About the Author**

Elizabeth Montalbano is a freelance writer, journalist, and therapeutic writing mentor with more than 25 years of professional experience. Her areas of expertise include technology, business, and culture. Elizabeth previously lived and worked as a full-time journalist in Phoenix, San Francisco, and New York City; she currently resides in a village on the southwest coast of Portugal. In her free time, she enjoys surfing, hiking with her dogs, traveling, playing music, yoga, and cooking.

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