#auth

The recently discovered sophisticated Linux malware framework known as VoidLink is assessed to have been developed by a single person with assistance from an artificial intelligence (AI) model. That's according to new findings from Check Point Research, which identified operational security blunders by malware's author that provided clues to its developmental origins. The latest insight makes

**TITLE**: Race Condition in node-tar Path Reservations via Unicode Sharp-S (ß) Collisions on macOS APFS **AUTHOR**: Tomás Illuminati ### Details A race condition vulnerability exists in `node-tar` (v7.5.3) this is to an incomplete handling of Unicode path collisions in the `path-reservations` system. On case-insensitive or normalization-insensitive filesystems (such as macOS APFS, In which it has been tested), the library fails to lock colliding paths (e.g., `ß` and `ss`), allowing them to be processed in parallel. This bypasses the library's internal concurrency safeguards and permits Symlink Poisoning attacks via race conditions. The library uses a `PathReservations` system to ensure that metadata checks and file operations for the same path are serialized. This prevents race conditions where one entry might clobber another concurrently. ```typescript // node-tar/src/path-reservations.ts (Lines 53-62) reserve(paths: string[], fn: Handler) { paths = isWindows ? ...

### Summary A vulnerability was discovered during a manual security audit of the AlchemyCMS source code. The application uses the Ruby `eval()` function to dynamically execute a string provided by the `resource_handler.engine_name` attribute in `Alchemy::ResourcesHelper#resource_url_proxy`. ### Details The vulnerability exists in `app/helpers/alchemy/resources_helper.rb` at line 28. The code explicitly bypasses security linting with `# rubocop:disable Security/Eval`, indicating that the use of a dangerous function was known but not properly mitigated. Since `engine_name` is sourced from module definitions that can be influenced by administrative configurations, it allows an authenticated attacker to escape the Ruby sandbox and execute arbitrary system commands on the host OS. But, for this attack to be possible local file access to the alchemy project or the source on a remote server is necessary in order to manipulate the module config file, though. ### PoC (Proof of Concept) The...

### Summary An integer overflow in the API component's protobuf decoder allows denial-of-service attacks when API encryption is not used. ### Details The bounds check `ptr + field_length > end` in `components/api/proto.cpp` can overflow when a malicious client sends a large `field_length` value. This affects all ESPHome device platforms (ESP32, ESP8266, RP2040, LibreTiny). The overflow bypasses the out-of-bounds check, causing the device to read invalid memory and crash. When using the plaintext API protocol, this attack can be performed without authentication. When noise encryption is enabled, knowledge of the encryption key is required. ### Affected Versions ESPHome 2025.9.0 through 2025.12.6 ### Mitigation - Upgrade to ESPHome 2025.12.7 or later (or 2026.1.0b3 or later) - [Enable API encryption](https://esphome.io/components/api.html#configuration-variables) with a unique key per device - Follow the [Security Best Practices](https://esphome.io/guides/security_best_practices/) #...

### Summary Swing Music's `list_folders()` function in the `/folder/dir-browser` endpoint is vulnerable to directory traversal attacks. Any authenticated user (including non-admin) can browse arbitrary directories on the server filesystem. ### Details The `@api.post("/dir-browser")` endpoint lacks proper path validation and authorization checks: - **No authorization requirement**: Any authenticated user can access the endpoint - **Improper path handling**: The code attempts to prepend "/" to non-existent paths but this doesn't prevent traversal: ```python req_dir = pathlib.Path("../../../../etc") # → PosixPath('../../../../etc') if not req_dir.exists(): # → False req_dir = "/" / req_dir # → PosixPath('/../../../../etc') ``` ### PoC 1. Create a non-admin user 2. Authenticate as a non-admin user 3. Send the following request: ``` POST /folder/dir-browser HTTP/1.1 Host: IP:1970 Content-Type: application/json Cookie: access_token_cookie=non-admin-a...

### Summary The JSONAuth.Auth function contains a logic flaw that allows unauthenticated attackers to enumerate valid usernames by measuring the response time of the /api/login endpoint. ### Details The vulnerability exists due to a "short-circuit" evaluation in the authentication logic. When a username is not found in the database, the function returns immediately. However, if the username does exist, the code proceeds to verify the password using bcrypt (users.CheckPwd), which is a computationally expensive operation designed to be slow. This difference in execution path creates a measurable timing discrepancy: Invalid User: ~1ms execution (Database lookup only). Valid User: ~50ms+ execution (Database lookup + Bcrypt hashing). In auth/json.go: ```go // auth/json.go line 54 u, err := usr.Get(srv.Root, cred.Username) // VULNERABILITY: // If 'err != nil' (User not found), the OR condition short-circuits. // The second part (!users.CheckPwd) is NEVER executed. // // If 'err == nil' (...

### Summary Markdown feature allows unrestricted server side html-rendering which allows arbitary file read (LFD) and fully SSRF access We in @0xL4ugh ( @abdoghazy2015, @xtromera, @A-z4ki, @ZeyadZonkorany and @KarimTantawey) During playing Null CTF 2025 that helps us solved a challenge with unintended way : ) Please note that we used the latest Version and deployed it via this dockerfile : Dockerfile: ``` FROM b3log/siyuan ENV TZ=America/New_York \ PUID=1000 \ PGID=1000 \ SIYUAN_ACCESS_AUTH_CODE=SuperSecretPassword RUN mkdir -p /siyuan/workspace COPY ./startup.sh /opt/siyuan/startup.sh RUN chmod +x /opt/siyuan/startup.sh EXPOSE 6806 ENTRYPOINT ["sh", "-c", "/opt/siyuan/startup.sh"] ``` startup.sh ```sh #!/bin/sh set -e echo "nullctf{secret}" > "/flag_random.txt" exec ./entrypoint.sh ``` docker-compose.yaml: ```yaml services: main: build: . ports: - 6806:6806 restart: unless-stopped environment: - TZ=America/New_York - PUID...

### Summary The SiYuan Note application (v3.5.3) contains a logic vulnerability in the /api/file/globalCopyFiles endpoint. The function allows authenticated users to copy files from any location on the server's filesystem into the application's workspace without proper path validation ### Details The vulnerability exists in the api/file.go source code. The function globalCopyFiles accepts a list of source paths (srcs) from the JSON request body. While the code checks if the source file exists using filelock.IsExist(src), it fails to validate whether the source path resides within the authorized workspace directory. ``` func globalCopyFiles(c *gin.Context) { // ... srcsArg := arg["srcs"].([]interface{}) for _, src := range srcs { if !filelock.IsExist(src) { ... } if err := filelock.Copy(src, dest); err != nil { ... } } } ``` ### PoC The following steps demonstrate how to exfiltrate the /etc/passwd file. 1. The attacker sends a request...

The notorious Everest ransomware group is claiming to have breached McDonald’s India, the Indian subsidiary of the American…

### Impact Fleet’s debug/pprof endpoints are accessible to any authenticated user regardless of role, including the lowest-privilege “Observer” role. This allows low-privilege users to access sensitive server internals, including runtime profiling data and in-memory application state, and to trigger CPU-intensive profiling operations that could lead to denial of service. ### Patches - 4.78.3 - 4.77.1 - 4.76.2 - 4.75.2 - 4.53.3 ### Workarounds If an immediate upgrade is not possible, users should put the debug/pprof endpoints behind an IP allowlist. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Email us at [security@fleetdm.com](mailto:security@fleetdm.com) Join #fleet in [osquery Slack](https://join.slack.com/t/osquery/shared_invite/zt-h29zm0gk-s2DBtGUTW4CFel0f0IjTEw)