A hacker has leaked 12,000 alleged Twilio call records, including phone numbers and audio recordings. The breach exposes…

A hacker has leaked 12,000 alleged Twilio call records, including phone numbers and audio recordings. The breach exposes personal data, creating significant privacy risks for businesses and individuals using the service.

A hacker, who has been **quite active recently** and goes by the alias ‘grep,’ has leaked over 12,000 (11,802) call records with audio, which they claim belong to Twilio customers. The leak’s timestamp ranges from 2019-06-14 to 2024-09-23.

The hacker published the data on Breach Forums (Screenshot credit: Hackread.com)

Twilio is a San Francisco, California-based cloud communications platform that enables developers to integrate voice, messaging, video, and authentication features directly into applications using its API. As of 2024, the company has over 350,000 active customer accounts, which means the latest alleged leak is approximately 3.37% of the total accounts.

According to the hacker, the alleged breach took place in September; however, they did not specify whether this was a third-party breach or if the records were accessed directly from Twilio’s systems.

The Hackread.com research team managed to analyze the full leaked data. The leaked records are divided into two TXT files. The first file appears to be a log of calls, likely extracted from a telecommunications system.

Both files track calls, likely in the context of a telecommunication and interpretation service. File 1 is a basic call log, while File 2 has additional details specific to interpretation services, including languages, rates, and session details. Here’s a breakdown of the fields and the data it contains:

****File 1****

**Start_time & End_time:**

*   These fields store the timestamps indicating when the call started and ended.
*   Example: '2019-06-14 05:40:49.924214' to '2019-06-14 05:42:19.907792'.

**Called_from & Called_to:**

*   The phone numbers of the caller (called_from) and the recipient (called_to).
*   Example: +165******** is calling +144********.

**Status:**

*   Indicates the call’s status, such as whether it was ‘completed’, ‘failed’, or ‘no answer’.
*   Example: 'completed'.

**Duration:**

*   The duration of the call is in seconds.
*   Example: 90 seconds.

**Notes:**

*   It appears to be a placeholder for any additional comments or notes related to the call.
*   In most cases, this field is empty.

**Agent_id, interpretation_session_id, Call_sid, direction, Call_type, interpreter_id:** ID for the interpreter handling the call and seems to be metadata.

**Agent_id:** ID of the agent handling the call.

**Interpretation_session_id:** ID related to an interpretation session (suggests this may involve translation services).

**Call_sid:** Unique identifier for the call.

**Direction:** Whether the call was ‘inbound’ or ‘outbound’.

**Call_type:** Describes the type of call, such as ‘incoming’ or ‘interpreter outbound’.

****File 2****

The second file seems to contain more detailed records for calls, potentially involving interpretation or translation services. It includes a variety of additional fields for tracking various aspects of the call. Here’s a breakdown:

**Start_time & end_time:**

*   Same as in File 1, showing the start and end time of the call.

**Called_from & called_to:**

*   Phone numbers of the caller and recipient, just like in File 1.

**Status:**

*   Expanded statuses, such as ‘interpretation completed’ or ‘no answer’.
*   Example: 'interpretation completed'.

**Incoming_call_sid:**

*   The identifier for the incoming call. This could help map calls to their corresponding logs from File 1.

**Duration:**

*   Duration of the call in seconds, similar to File 1.

**Language:**

*   Specifies the language being interpreted during the call.
*   Example: 'English', 'Arabic'.

**Rate:**

*   Possible charge rate or interpreter cost rate for the call.
*   Example: '1.00'.

**Interpretation_start_time:**

*   Indicates when the actual interpretation session started.
*   Example: '2019-06-14 05:42:02.498291'.

**Recording_url:**

*   This field may store the URL for accessing a recording of the call (although it is often NULL in the sample data).

**Agent_answered_time, payout, total_cost:**

*   Metadata that tracks when the agent answered, and the financial details (e.g., payout for the interpreter and total cost of the call).
*   Twilio links with actual recording audio calls of customers

The screenshot shows the Twilio API link containing call recordings, phone numbers and the timestamp of the leaked records (Screenshot credit: Hackread.com)

**Conference_name, sms_callback, client_hold_time, department_code:**

*   More metadata fields related to conferences, callbacks, and department tracking.

**Queued_count:**

*   Tracks how many times the call has been queued.

**Is_video:**

*   Indicates whether the call was a video call.
*   Example: 0 (No video).

**Remarks, disposition_response_agent:**

*   These fields may capture agent responses, call dispositions, or other follow-up actions.

****Audio Call Recodings and Cybersecurity Risks****

Although the leaked data by number is minimal, the presence of actual call recordings seriously increases the severity of the breach, as it exposes not just metadata but the contents of conversations.

This can lead to serious privacy violations, especially if the calls involve sensitive personal or business information. Attackers could exploit these recordings for blackmail, fraud, or impersonation. Businesses could face legal consequences under **regulations like GDPR** or CCPA for failing to protect this data.

The leaked phone numbers are also vulnerable to smishing (**SMS phishing**) and vishing (**voice call phishing**) scams. Both methods of attack are popular among cybercriminals and threat actors, particularly those supported by organized groups. A recent example is **last month’s attack** on businesses in the United States, where hackers were found calling employees to obtain their company’s VPN credentials.

Nevertheless, the situation may require immediate actions including notifying affected parties, securing the leaked recordings, and consulting legal experts. Organizations should also review access controls, implement encryption, and involve an incident response team to manage the breach.

1.  **ShinyHunters Leak 33 Million Twilio Authy Phone Numbers**
2.  **Phone numbers of 42 million Iranians sold on a hacking forum**
3.  **Database of 176 million Pakistani mobile phone users sold online**
4.  **AT&T Data Breach: Hackers Steal Call, Text Records for All Users**
5.  **Names & Phone numbers of 267 million Facebook users exposed**

Hacker Leaks 12,000 Alleged Twilio Call Records with Audio Recordings

The $2.65B buy validates the growing importance of threat intelligence to enterprise security strategies.

Source: incamerastock via Alamy Stock Photo

Mastercard's $2.65 billion acquisition of Recorded Future has focused attention on the increasing value of cyber-threat intelligence (CTI) to enterprise security strategies.

Security experts in the space perceive the deal as validating the business criticality of CTI and accelerating its mainstream adoption.

**A Multibillion-Dollar Bet**

Mastercard on Sept. 12 announced it had agreed to acquire Recorded Future for $2.65 billion — nearly equivalent to the cumulative amount it paid in nine previous purchases of cybersecurity vendors. Mastercard has said it will leverage Recorded Future's threat intelligence capabilities to bolster its own anti-fraud capabilities and to strengthen the third-party services it delivers via previous acquisitions such as RiskRecon.

The deal is expected to close in Q1 of 2025.

Fernando Montenegro, an analyst with Omdia, says Mastercard's acquisition aligns with the financial firm's efforts to integrate multiple capabilities around its suite of anti-fraud services. "One of the key components of successful anti-fraud initiatives is accurate threat intelligence, so it makes sense for Mastercard to improve their capabilities there," Montenegro says. "I think the deal shows that threat intelligence can be immensely valuable not only to pure-play cybersecurity efforts, but to broader anti-fraud initiatives as well."

The Business Research Company expects demand for cyber-threat intelligence services to hit some $11.5 billion in revenue in 2024, and to more than double to $25.68 billion in 2028, at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 21.7%. The analyst firm identified the primary growth drivers as an increase in the volume and sophistication of cyberattacks, cloud adoption, a constantly expanding attack surface, and increasing regulatory pressures. Others, like Statista think the market is currently even larger — $14.59 billion in 2023 — but have a more modest annual growth rate expectation of 14.7% between now and 2030.

**Validation for CTI?**

Beenu Arora, CEO and co-founder of Cyble, sees the pending transaction as further cementing the role of threat intelligence in business strategies. The rapidly changing and increasingly sophisticated threat landscape has increased the importance of intelligence on emerging threats, threat groups, and their tactics, techniques, and procedures, Arora says. Now perceived as a highly technical component of SecOps, CTI has moved to front and center of security strategy at a growing number of organizations.

"If you speak to any seasoned CTO, CISO, or chief executive, there’s always concern about how they can make the right decisions" around what assets to protect, how, and against whom, Arora says. "Over the last 10 to 15 years, I think there has been much greater awareness with regard to how threat intelligence can sit at the center of day-to-day decision making for the business, whether that’s managing risk, safeguarding assets, or using external intelligence to help guide business decisions."

Analyst firm IT-Harvest, which maintains a dashboard tracking the performance of more than 4,050 cybersecurity vendors globally, counts 123 vendors as currently engaged in the cyber-threat intelligence space. Of that number, 63 have experienced headcount growth this year. Mastercard's recent acquisition underscores the value these vendors can bring to enterprise security strategies, says Richard Stiennon, chief research analyst at IT-Harvest.

"I think the acquisition is good for the 122 other threat intelligence vendors whose prospects will improve in the eyes of investors," Stiennon says.

The $2.65 billion that Mastercard has agreed to pay for Recorded Future is roughly 6.5 times the latter's annual revenue run rate. While that valuation is less than the 10-times valuations that cybersecurity firms garnered back in 2021 and 2022, it still is a healthy number, Stiennon says.

Many of the organizations that deliver CTI services, such as Recorded Future, Group-IB Flashpoint, and Digital Shadows, are what might be regarded as pure-play vendors in the space. Others, such as Mandiant, CrowdStrike, Kaspersky, IBM X-Force, Cisco Talos, and Palo Alto Networks, deliver threat intelligence as part of a broader portfolio of security services. All these vendors use a combination of open source intelligence (OSINT) and information from proprietary sources to deliver their CTI feeds.

"The acquisition validates the widespread, growing recognition that threat intelligence is no longer a complement to an organization's security posture," says Josh Lefkowitz, founder and CEO of Flashpoint. Organizations and government agencies are using threat intelligence to combat ransomware, protect data, lock down supply chains, prioritize critical vulnerabilities, and protect their people and assets.

"I’m constantly speaking with security leaders at organizations that consider these applications of threat intelligence critical to their daily operations," Lefkowitz notes.

He adds that Mastercard's Recorded Future purchase is bringing attention to the board level of the business criticality of CTI.

Don't miss the latest Dark Reading Confidential podcast, where we talk to two cybersecurity professionals who were arrested in Dallas County, Iowa, and forced to spend the night in jail — just for doing their pen-testing jobs. Listen now!

**About the Author**

Jai Vijayan is a seasoned technology reporter with over 20 years of experience in IT trade journalism. He was most recently a Senior Editor at Computerworld, where he covered information security and data privacy issues for the publication. Over the course of his 20-year career at Computerworld, Jai also covered a variety of other technology topics, including big data, Hadoop, Internet of Things, e-voting, and data analytics. Prior to Computerworld, Jai covered technology issues for The Economic Times in Bangalore, India. Jai has a Master's degree in Statistics and lives in Naperville, Ill.

Mastercard's Bet on Recorded Future a Win for Cyber-Threat Intel

This week on the Lock and Code podcast, we speak with San Francisco City Attorney David Chiu about his team's fight against deepfake porn.

_This week on the Lock and Code podcast…_

On August 15, the city of San Francisco launched an entirely new fight against the world of deepfake porn—it sued the websites that make the abusive material so easy to create.

“Deepfakes,” as they’re often called, are fake images and videos that utilize artificial intelligence to swap the face of one person onto the body of another. The technology went viral in the late 2010s, as independent film editors would swap the actors of one film for another—replacing, say, Michael J. Fox in Back to the Future with Tom Holland.

But very soon into the technology’s debut, it began being used to create pornographic images of actresses, celebrities, and, more recently, everyday high schoolers and college students. Similar to the threat of “revenge porn,” in which abusive exes extort their past partners with the potential release of sexually explicit photos and videos, “deepfake porn” is sometimes used to tarnish someone’s reputation or to embarrass them amongst friends and family.

But deepfake porn is slightly different from the traditional understanding of “revenge porn” in that it can be created without any real relationship to the victim. Entire groups of strangers can take the image of one person and put it onto the body of a sex worker, or an adult film star, or another person who was filmed having sex or posing nude.

  
The technology to create deepfake porn is more accessible than ever, and it’s led to a global crisis for teenage girls.

In October of 2023, a reported group of more than 30 girls at a high school in New Jersey had their likenesses used by classmates to make sexually explicit and pornographic deepfakes. In March of this year, two teenage boys were arrested in Miami, Florida for allegedly creating deepfake nudes of male and female classmates who were between the ages of 12 and 13. And at the start of September, this month, the BBC reported that police in South Korea were investigating deepfake pornography rings at two major universities.

While individual schools and local police departments in the United States are tackling deepfake porn harassment as it arises—with suspensions, expulsions, and arrests—the process is slow and reactive.

Which is partly why San Francisco City Attorney David Chiu and his team took aim at not the individuals who create and spread deepfake porn, but at the websites that make it so easy to do so.

Today, on the Lock and Code podcast with host David Ruiz, we speak with San Francisco City Attorney David Chiu about his team’s lawsuit against 16 deepfake porn websites, the city’s history in protecting Californians, and the severity of abuse that these websites offer as a paid service.

> “At least one of these websites specifically promotes the non-consensual nature of this. I’ll just quote: ‘Imagine wasting time taking her out on dates when you can just use website X to get her nudes.’”
> 
> David Chiu, San Francisco City Attorney

Tune in today for the full conversation.

_Show notes and credits:_

Intro Music: “Spellbound” by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)  
Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 License  
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/  
Outro Music: “Good God” by Wowa (unminus.com)

**Listen up—Malwarebytes doesn’t just talk cybersecurity, we provide it.**

Protect yourself from online attacks that threaten your identity, your files, your system, and your financial well-being with our exclusive offer for Malwarebytes Premium for Lock and Code listeners.

 San Francisco’s fight against deepfake porn, with City Attorney David Chiu (Lock and Code S05E20) 

Taskhub version 3.0.3 suffers from an ignored default credential vulnerability.

**Taskhub 3.0.3 Insecure Settings**

Posted Sep 20, 2024

Authored by indoushka

Taskhub version 3.0.3 suffers from an ignored default credential vulnerability.

tags | exploit

SHA-256 | 7505071b9896db1b7f4f5cd911d9d07b06247bd94dbf46777a4481d4b83f1ddd

Download | Favorite | View

**Taskhub 3.0.3 Insecure Settings**

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Taskhub v3.0.3 Insecure Settings Vulnerability                                                                              || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 125.0.1 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://codecanyon.net/item/taskhub-project-management-finance-crm-tool/25685874                                            |=============================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] Insecure Settings : appears to leave a default administrative account in place post installation.[+] use payload : user =  admin@gmail.com & pass = 12345678[+] https://www/127.0.0.1/tasks.octalfoxcom/auth/Greetings to :==================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R |================================================================

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Taskhub 3.0.3 Insecure Settings

An Iranian advanced persistent threat (APT) threat actor likely affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is now acting as an initial access facilitator that provides remote access to target networks.
Google-owned Mandiant is tracking the activity cluster under the moniker UNC1860, which it said shares similarities with intrusion sets tracked by Microsoft, Cisco Talos, and

An Iranian advanced persistent threat (APT) threat actor likely affiliated with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) is now acting as an initial access facilitator that provides remote access to target networks.

Google-owned Mandiant is tracking the activity cluster under the moniker **UNC1860**, which it said shares similarities with intrusion sets tracked by Microsoft, Cisco Talos, and Check Point as Storm-0861 (formerly DEV-0861), ShroudedSnooper, and Scarred Manticore, respectively.

"A key feature of UNC1860 is its collection of specialized tooling and passive backdoors that \[...\] supports several objectives, including its role as a probable initial access provider and its ability to gain persistent access to high-priority networks, such as those in the government and telecommunications space throughout the Middle East," the company said.

The group first came to light in July 2022 in connection with destructive cyber attacks targeting Albania with a ransomware strain called ROADSWEEP, the CHIMNEYSWEEP backdoor, and a ZEROCLEAR wiper variant (aka Cl Wiper), with subsequent intrusions in Albania and Israel leveraging new wipers dubbed No-Justice and BiBi (aka BABYWIPER).

Mandiant described UNC1860 as a "formidable threat actor" that maintains an arsenal of passive backdoors that are designed to obtain footholds into victim networks and set up long-term access without attracting attention.

Among the tools includes two GUI-operated malware controllers tracked as TEMPLEPLAY and VIROGREEN, which are said to provide other MOIS-associated threat actors with remote access to victim environments using remote desktop protocol (RDP).

Specifically, these controllers are designed to provide third-party operators an interface that offers instructions on the ways custom payloads could be deployed and post-exploitation activities such as internal scanning could be carried out within the target network.

Mandiant said it identified overlaps between UNC1860 and APT34 (aka Hazel Sandstorm, Helix Kitten, and OilRig) in that organizations compromised by the latter in 2019 and 2020 were previously infiltrated by UNC1860, and vice versa. Furthermore, both the clusters have been observed pivoting to Iraq-based targets, as recently highlighted by Check Point.

The attack chains involve leveraging initial access gained by opportunistic exploitation of vulnerable internet-facing servers to drop web shells and droppers like STAYSHANTE and SASHEYAWAY, with the latter leading to the execution of implants, such as TEMPLEDOOR, FACEFACE, and SPARKLOAD, that are embedded within it.

"VIROGREEN is a custom framework used to exploit vulnerable SharePoint servers with CVE-2019-0604," the researchers said, adding that it controls STAYSHANTE, along with a backdoor referred to as BASEWALK.

"The framework provides post-exploitation capabilities including \[...\] controlling post-exploitation payloads, backdoors (including the STAYSHANTE web shell and the BASEWALK backdoor) and tasking; controlling a compatible agent regardless of how the agent has been implanted; and executing commands and uploading/downloading files.

TEMPLEPLAY (internally named Client Http), for its part, serves as the .NET-based controller for TEMPLEDOOR. It supports backdoor instructions for executing commands via cmd.exe, upload/download files from and to the infected host, and proxy connection to a target server.

It's believed that the adversary has in its possession a diverse collection of passive tools and main-stage backdoors that align with its initial access, lateral movement, and information gathering goals.

Some of the other tools of note documented by Mandiant are listed below -

*   OATBOAT, a loader that loads and executes shellcode payloads
*   TOFUDRV, a malicious Windows driver that overlaps with WINTAPIX
*   TOFULOAD, a passive implant that employs undocumented Input/Output Control (IOCTL) commands for communication
*   TEMPLEDROP, a repurposed version of an Iranian antivirus software Windows file system filter driver named Sheed AV that's used to protect the files it deploys from modification
*   TEMPLELOCK, a .NET defense evasion utility that's capable of killing the Windows Event Log service
*   TUNNELBOI, a network controller capable of establishing a connection with a remote host and managing RDP connections

"As tensions continue to ebb and flow in the Middle East, we believe this actor's adeptness in gaining initial access to target environments represents a valuable asset for the Iranian cyber ecosystem that can be exploited to answer evolving objectives as needs shift," researchers Stav Shulman, Matan Mimran, Sarah Bock, and Mark Lechtik said.

The development comes as the U.S. government revealed Iranian threat actors' ongoing attempts to influence and undermine the upcoming U.S. elections by stealing non-public material from former President Donald Trump's campaign.

"Iranian malicious cyber actors in late June and early July sent unsolicited emails to individuals then associated with President Biden's campaign that contained an excerpt taken from stolen, non-public material from former President Trump's campaign as text in the emails," the government said.

"There is currently no information indicating those recipients replied. Furthermore, Iranian malicious cyber actors have continued their efforts since June to send stolen, non-public material associated with former President Trump's campaign to U.S. media organizations."

Iran's ramping up of its cyber operations against its perceived rivals also comes at a time when the country has become increasingly active in the Middle East region.

Late last month, the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) warned that the Iranian APT Lemon Sandstorm (aka Fox Kitten) has carried out ransomware attacks by clandestinely partnering with NoEscape, RansomHouse, and BlackCat (aka ALPHV) groups.

Censys' analysis of the hacking group's attack infrastructure has since uncovered other, currently active hosts that are likely part of it based on commonalities based on geolocation, Autonomous System Numbers (ASNs), and identical patterns of ports and digital certificates.

"Despite attempts at obfuscation, diversion, and randomness, humans still must instantiate, operate, and decommission digital infrastructure," Censys' Matt Lembright said.

"Those humans, even if they rely upon technology to create randomization, almost always will follow some sort of pattern whether it be similar Autonomous Systems, geolocations, hosting providers, software, port distributions or certificate characteristics."

Found this article interesting? Follow us on Twitter __ and LinkedIn to read more exclusive content we post.

Iranian APT UNC1860 Linked to MOIS Facilitates Cyber Intrusions in Middle East

PRESS RELEASE

AUSTIN, Texas and Fal.Con 2024, Las Vegas – September 16, 2024 — CrowdStrike (NASDAQ: CRWD) today announced the launch of its second annual Cybersecurity Startup Accelerator with Amazon Web Services (AWS). NVIDIA also joins in supporting the Accelerator program, powering the next generation of artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud security startups. Targeting cybersecurity’s next market-defining disruptors across the U.S. and EMEA, AWS and CrowdStrike with NVIDIA through its Inception program, will provide mentorship, technical expertise, funding and go-to-market opportunities.  
Applications for the AWS and CrowdStrike Cybersecurity Startup Accelerator with NVIDIA are open from September 16, 2024 to January 10, 2025. Selected startups will be enrolled in a free eight-week program developed by AWS, CrowdStrike and NVIDIA that offers mentorship and guidance from industry experts and executives. Startups will also have access to top-tier global cybersecurity investors, enablement sessions, and up to $25,000 in AWS Activate credits, among other exclusive benefits.

At the end of the program, participants can present their innovations at an in-person Demo Day at the AWS Startup Loft in San Francisco, which will take place during the RSA Conference in April 2025. Winning presentations may be eligible to receive funding from the CrowdStrike Falcon® Fund. 

“CrowdStrike and AWS created the Cybersecurity Startup Accelerator as a formative, value creation experience for innovative startups to learn, create and grow. Since participating in the Accelerator, last year’s cohort participants raised over $150 million from leading global VCs,” said Daniel Bernard, chief business officer, CrowdStrike. “We’re proud to welcome NVIDIA as a supporter of the Accelerator program – bringing together market-leading cybersecurity, cloud and AI expertise to cultivate tomorrow’s great innovators.”

“For startups seeking to tackle the most pressing security challenges, the Cybersecurity Startup Accelerator provides the AI technologies, accelerated computing resources and technical expertise they need,” said Bartley Richardson, director of cybersecurity engineering at NVIDIA.

To apply, visit this website. Startups are encouraged to review the terms and conditions here.

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CrowdStrike Expands Cybersecurity Startup Accelerator With AWS and NVIDIA

PRESS RELEASE

SAN FRANCISCO, Sept. 18, 2024 /PRNewswire/ -- Abstract Security, building the future of AI-enabled security operations, today announced it has added support for deployments within Google Cloud Platform (GCP).

The support for GCP follows Abstract Security's existing support for AWS and Azure. Abstract enables multi-cloud deployments of its SOC platform, deploying multiple instances of Abstract Security around the world to support data localization requirements and eliminate data transfer costs. Additionally, Abstract supports transactions through both AWS and Azure marketplaces with GCP coming soon.

"Abstract's ability to offer customers a true multi-cloud offering with three different cloud platforms in AWS, Azure and now GCP is something we're very proud of for this growing startup," said Colby DeRodeff, co-founder and CEO of Abstract Security. "Because we deploy directly into our customers' cloud environment, we enable those customers to truly own their own data, which separates us from most of our competitors."

Abstract Security's SOC platform offers:

*   Seamless integration with local GCP services - Ensuring strong security coverage and visibility into GCP services.
    
*   Abstract Intel Gallery - As part of Abstract's data fabric, organizations can leverage no-code ETL to enrich events with real-time threat intelligence, enhancing detection accuracy and relevancy.
    
*   Real-time streaming threat detection - Security analytics are powered by AI, enabling enterprises to stay ahead of rapidly evolving cyber threats.
    
*   Compliance and data sovereignty - Providing a single search and reporting view across regional deployments, enabling compliance with data localization requirements.
    

Abstract has seen growing demand since emerging from stealth and announcing its Seed funding in March 2024. In April, Abstract announced the opening of its first Middle East office. In May, the company announced the addition of Christopher Key to its Board of Directors and was selected as a "Pioneering Cybersecurity Startup" winner, as part of the 2024 Global Infosec Awards.

About Abstract Security

Abstract Security, founded in 2023, has built a revolutionary platform equipped with an AI-powered assistant to better centralize the management of security analytics. Crafted by category creators and industry veterans known for redefining the cybersecurity landscape, Abstract transcends next-gen SIEM solutions by correlating data in real time between data streams. As a result, compliance and security data can be leveraged separately to increase detection effectiveness and lower costs – an approach that does not currently exist in the market.

The leadership team of Colby DeRodeff, Ryan Clough, Aaron Shelmire, Chris Camacho, and Stefan Zier bring a unique set of experiences and backgrounds in product development and company-building expertise, at companies such as ArcSight (acq. by HP), Mandiant (acq. by Google), Palo Alto Networks and Sumo Logic. For more information about the company, please visit https://www.abstract.security/ and follow the journey @Get\_Abstracted.

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Abstract Security Expands Multi-Cloud Security Operations

PRESS RELEASE

SAN FRANCISCO, Calif., September 16, 2024 – c/side, a cybersecurity company with tools for monitoring, optimizing, and securing vulnerable browser-side third-party scripts, today announced $6 million in seed funding. The round is led by Uncork Capital, with participation from Mantis VC, Scribble Ventures, Roar Ventures, and PrimeSet. c/side’s total funding is now $7.7 million, following a pre-seed round announced earlier this year. Scribble and Roar also participated in the pre-seed, along with strategic angel investors.

  
As headlines have continued to show since the infamous British Airways breach, the third-party code scripts that businesses add into their websites are often poorly monitored and undersecured. While these scripts are necessary for critical site functions such as analytics, chatbots, and error handling, the scripts change frequently without a business’ knowledge—posing significant risks. Malicious actors exploit vulnerabilities within the scripts to redirect website visitors, steal sensitive information, or manipulate website content. As a result of increased security awareness on the infrastructure and open source supply chain, malicious actors increasingly seek to weaponize the browser as the place of execution—yet most sites have nothing in place to monitor client-side behavior.

  
With an advanced proxy service and an AI-driven detection engine, c/side offers a comprehensive toolkit to identify and neutralize malicious scripts in real-time. The innovative solution not only bolsters website security, but also significantly enhances website performance. Beyond safeguarding organizations from cyberattacks, c/side’s technology also simplifies compliance with stringent industry regulations like PCI DSS 4.0, making it a critical and particularly timely tool for businesses accepting digital payments via their sites.

  
“Even in the few short months since we launched, major browser supply chain attacks like polyfill\[.\]io and regulatory breach incidents like the one at Kaiser Permanente have underscored just how significant and rapidly-escalating this attack vector has become,” said Simon Wijckmans, CEO and founder, c/side. “Security and IT teams cannot take a ‘set it and forget it’ approach to the third-party web scripts that run through their organization’s website. We understand what’s required to ensure ongoing visibility and protection, and offer an end-to-end solution that’s simple to deploy. We’re thrilled to bring on new investors with our seed funding, and look forward to our next stage.”

  
“c/side is addressing client-side app security, one of the most challenging threats to digital organizations and a problem that has been largely overlooked until now,” said Andy McLoughlin, Managing Partner at Uncork Capital. “Their AI-driven solution not only identifies these threats but acts swiftly to neutralize them, ensuring robust client-side web security. We’re thrilled to lead this round and support the c/side team as they develop solutions to protect businesses from costly and damaging browser-executed attacks."

  
“We’re impressed by c/side’s AI-driven approach and its potential to revolutionize client-side security at scale,” said Alex Pall, General Partner, Mantis VC. “This team has the expertise and vision to make a significant and lasting impact across the cybersecurity landscape, making web security more accessible to all. Whether you’re an early-stage grinding entrepreneur or a large established brand, c/side will grow to have your back. Simon and the team will make things rock!”

  
The seed funding will enable c/side to accelerate the development of its flagship product, the powerful proxy solution for securing third-party web scripts. The company will also deepen its vulnerability detection engine’s capabilities and grow its team to support customer service, sales, partnership, and marketing functions.

  
c/side’s free tier is now fully operational and available — anyone can sign up and begin securing their site in minutes. Business, Enterprise, and Partner tiers are in development; those interested can contact c/side here. 

  
About c/side  
c/side is a forward-thinking cybersecurity startup focused on browser-side detection and protection. Led by industry expert Simon Wijckmans, c/side is pioneering technologies to shield against sophisticated cyber threats, ensuring unparalleled security standards for users across the web.

c/side Lands $6M to Combat Rising Browser Supply Chain Attacks

This year, Congress only allocated $55 million in federal grant dollars to states for security and other election improvements.

Thursday, September 19, 2024 14:00

Last week, six Secretaries of State testified to U.S. Congress about the current state of election security ahead of November’s Presidential election. 

Some of the same topics came up as usual — disinformation campaigns, influence from foreign actors, and the physical protection of poll workers on election day. 

It’s good that these conversations are continuing after the various revelations that came out after the 2016 presidential election, and election security is an issue globally, especially this year when there are major elections taking place in hundreds of countries.  

As with many things in politics and life, though, there is still an issue of money. 

Talk of the importance of election security is positive, but at the end of the day, states and municipalities will need monetary and human resources to implement the appropriate defenses and protect everything from voting machines to online vote-tallying systems and social media disinformation campaigns.  

Arizona Secretary of State Adrian Fontes used his time in front of Congress to ask for additional funding, because his state has been unable to execute all their election security goals.  

“None of this is free and none of it is cheap,” he said. “Our operations, administration and security depend on intermittent, rare and never enough funding for the Help America Vote Act grants that we are occasionally given by Congress.” 

Additional federal funds became available for U.S. elections in 2017 after the Department of Homeland Security deemed election systems to be critical infrastructure. But this year, Congress only allocated $55 million in federal grant dollars to states for security and other improvements to elections. For comparison’s sake, presidential and Congressional candidates in the U.S. spent $14 billion on their election campaigns, more than double the amount from 2016. 

At the time, Republican lawmakers in the House voted to totally zero out the fund for the Help America Vote Act, or HAVA, grants, which have existed since 2002. 

One lobbyist even told the Stateline outlet earlier this year that many states were trying to stretch the money they do get from the HAVA program across multiple years for fear of a lack of funding in the coming election cycles.  

JP Martin, deputy communications director for the Arizona secretary of state, said in that same article that Arizona (a crucial swing state in most presidential elections) has had to put a hiring freeze in place because a lack of federal funding. 

So, talk, awareness and planning to secure elections are all positive things. But at the end of the day, all these technologies and solutions, and the people that provide them, cost money. 

**The one big thing **

Cisco Talos’ Vulnerability Research team discovered two vulnerabilities have been disclosed and fixed over the past few weeks. Talos discovered a time-of-check time-of-use vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat Reader, one of the most popular PDF readers currently available, and an information disclosure vulnerability in the Microsoft Windows AllJoyn API. 

**Why do I care? **

AllJoyn is a DCOM-like framework for creating method calls or sending one-way signals between applications on a distributed bus. It primarily is used in internet-of-things (IoT) devices to tell the devices to perform certain tasks, like turning lights on or off or reading the temperature of a space. TALOS-2024-1980 (CVE-2024-38257) could allow an adversary to view uninitialized memory on the targeted machine. Adobe Acrobat Reader, one of the most popular pieces of PDF reading software currently available, contains a time-of-check, use-after-free vulnerability that could trigger memory corruption, and eventually, arbitrary code execution. 

**So now what? **

For Snort coverage that can detect the exploitation of these vulnerabilities, download the latest rule sets from Snort.org, and our latest Vulnerability Advisories are always posted on Talos Intelligence’s website.  

**Top security headlines of the week **

**Experts and governments are still unpacking a wave of pager and handheld radio explosions in the Middle East.** The attacks appeared to target members of the armed group Hezbollah in Lebanon when hundreds of devices exploded simultaneously on Tuesday, killing multiple people. The international community has been left wondering if this was some type of cyber attack or intentional physical implants in the devices. Messages sent at the time of the attack appeared to come from Hezbollah leadership but instead triggered the explosions. Most analysts are assuming that this was a hardware supply chain attack, in which the pagers were tampered with somehow during manufacturing or while they were in transit. Supply chain attacks are normally carried out at the software level. So far, no one has taken credit for the attacks, though Hezbollah is blaming Israel, one of its chief antagonists. (Reuters, BBC) 

**Ransomware gangs are increasingly leveraging Microsoft Azure to steal victims’ information and store it.** New research findings indicate that groups like BianLian and Rhysida use Microsoft's Azure Storage Explorer and AzCopy to steal data from infiltrated networks, then store it in Azure Blob storage until it can be transferred to an attacker-controlled network. Because Azure is a popular and trusted service, corporate firewalls and security tools are unlikely to block it, making the data transfers more likely to pass undetected. Potential targets that use Azure are recommended to log out of the application after each use to prevent attackers from using the active session for file theft. (Bleeping Computer, modePUSH) 

**Health care facilities and medical devices continue to be top targets for ransomware actors, and industry leaders are calling on the U.S. federal government to do more to assist them.** This year, several massive health care providers across the globe have been affected by cyber attacks, forcing countless surgeries and appointments to be rescheduled and putting sensitive medical records at risk. Past victims include Change Healthcare, Kaiser Permanente and Ascension. One health care executive told NPR that their company was still trying to calculate the financial impact of the Change attack, which paused payments from insurance for months. They are only just now being paid out for services rendered in July. U.S. Sen. Ron Wyden, the chair of the Senate Finance Committee, recently publicly called on the Health and Human Services Department to revise its current approach to cybersecurity, because the current system “is woefully inadequate and has left the health care system vulnerable to criminals and foreign government hackers.” Other experts have said that HHS has traditionally focused on physical disasters like earthquakes, storms and power outages, and not enough on cyberspace. (NPR, Security Intelligence) 

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Despite Russia warnings, Western critical infrastructure remains unprepared 
*   The Cybersecurity Cat-And-Mouse Game 
*   DragonRank Manipulates SEO Rankings To Direct Users To Malicious Sites 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos**

**VB2024** **(Oct. 2 - 4)** 

_Dublin, Ireland_ 

**MITRE ATT&CKcon 5.0** **(Oct. 22 - 23)** 

_McLean, Virginia and Virtual_

Nicole Hoffman and James Nutland will provide a brief history of Akira ransomware and an overview of the Linux ransomware landscape. Then, morph into action as they take a technical deep dive into the latest Linux variant using the ATT&CK framework to uncover its techniques, tactics and procedures.

**misecCON** **(Nov. 22)** 

_Lansing, Michigan_

Terryn Valikodath from Cisco Talos Incident Response will explore the core of DFIR, where digital forensics becomes detective work and incident response turns into firefighting.

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week **

**SHA 256:** b9ddbd1a4cec61e6b022a275d66312b5b676f9a0a9537a7708de9aa8ce34de59   
**MD5:** 3b100bdcd61bb1da816cd7eaf9ef13ba   
**Typical Filename:** vt-upload-C6In1   
**Claimed Product:** N/A    
**Detection Name:** Backdoor:KillAV-tpd  

**SHA 256:** 47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca   
**MD5:** 71fea034b422e4a17ebb06022532fdde   
**Typical Filename:** VID001.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** RF.Talos.80 

**SHA 256:** 70ff63cd695033f624a456a5c8511ce8312cffd8ac40492ffe5dc7ae18548668   
**MD5:** 49d35332a1c6fefae1d31a581a66ab46   
**Typical Filename:** 49d35332a1c6fefae1d31a581a66ab46.virus   
**Claimed Product:** N/A     
**Detection Name:** W32.Auto:70ff63.in03.Talos 

**SHA 256:** 3a2ea65faefdc64d83dd4c06ef617d6ac683f781c093008c8996277732d9bd66   
**MD5:** 8b84d61bf3ffec822e2daf4a3665308c   
**Typical Filename:** RemComSvc.exe   
**Claimed Product:** N/A   
**Detection Name:** W32.3A2EA65FAE-95.SBX.TG 

**SHA 256:** 35dcf857f0bb2ea75bf4582b67a2a72d7e21d96562b4c8a61b5d598bd2327c2c   
**MD5:** fab8aabfdabe44c9a1ffa779fda207db   
**Typical Filename:** ACenter.exe   
**Claimed Product:** Aranda AGENT   
**Detection Name:** Win.Trojan.Generic::tg.talos

Talk of election security is good, but we still need more money to solve the problem

What happened to KnowBe4 also has happened to many other organizations, and it's still a risk for companies of all sizes due to a sophisticated network of government-sponsored fake employees.

Source: DD Images via Shutterstock

A postmortem on the accidental hiring of a North Korean threat actor at a security firm reveals a sophisticated, industrial-like network of fake IT workers carefully groomed to fool US companies into giving them employment for the financial gain of the North Korean government.

In July, security awareness training firm KnowBe4 was transparent in revealing how a software engineer the company hired turned out to be a North Korean threat actor who immediately began loading malware onto his company-issued workstation.

Though administrators managed to detect and shut down the malicious operation before any harm was done, the incident served as a wake-up call about the sophistication of a North Korean state-sponsored program that sends operatives posing as credible IT workers out into the workforce.

Within weeks of the company's public revelation, KnowBe4 heard from more than a dozen other organizations that had similar stories of either hiring or being solicited for work by North Korean actors, the company revealed in a white paper (PDF) released this week.

Companies from the size of Fortune 500 organizations to small businesses with only 12 employees accidentally hired North Korean fake employees, with organizations with largely remote workforces being at the highest risk.

Related:Dark Reading Confidential: Pen Test Arrests, Five Years Later

"It turns out that the North Korean fake employee problem is a complex, industrial, scaled nation-state operation, and it is likely that thousands of organizations around the world have or are now involved in accidentally hiring North Korean fake employees," Roger Grimes, KnowBe4 data-driven defense evangelist, wrote in the report.

**Anatomy of a State-Sponsored Fake Employee Program**

The fact that the fake worker scheme is much more widespread than initially believed and that the people taking part in them are "exceptionally skilled" are the greatest lessons learned from KnowBe4's experience, Erich Kron, security awareness advocate at KnowBe4, tells Dark Reading.

"The ability to pass background checks, combined with the willingness and ability to interview on several Zoom calls is indicative of just how polished their program is," he says. "They seem to have processes in place that work exceptionally well on organizations both large and small."

The program takes advantage of a cultural shift in employment among US organizations over the past several years that has made companies more susceptible to placing workers with malicious intent in legitimate positions, Kron says.

This shift is a combination of organizations embracing the remote-work model, and the modern interest in hiring people from around the globe based on their knowledge and abilities rather than geographical location, he says.

Related:FBI Leads Takedown of Chinese Botnet Impacting 200K Devices

"This is extremely challenging when many of the best candidates and people knowledgeable with cutting-edge technology are not US-born and may have strong accents that may have been a barrier to hiring in the past," Kron says. "Multicultural workforces are not only common in the modern business world but are critical if organizations wish to hire the top talent in their fields."

**A Look Behind the Curtain**

KnowBe4 learned much about how the various aspects of the North Korean program operate in the wake of the company's own incident. The company discovered that the chief goal of this program is financial gain, though operatives also to a lesser extent engage in cyber espionage and even corporate sabotage activities, once joining an organization.

Overall, there are four parts that are integral to making the fake employee scheme work: North Korean-based program leaders; North Korean employees and managers based in other countries; non-Korean scheme assisters that are usually based in the country where the job is located; and infrastructure to assist with accepting payments, generating fake identities or stealing real identities, creating fake employee websites and projects, giving references, money laundering, document forgery services, and other supporting activities.

Related:Zero-Click RCE Bug in macOS Calendar Exposes iCloud Data

The employees are often skilled IT workers and developers trained at North Korean universities, and are usually located in foreign countries, such as China, in shared living spaces and workspaces. They usually work in busy call-center-like spaces; in fact, organizations that interviewed or hired these fake employees often noted the noisy background, Grimes observed.

KnowBe4 described the employees ensnared in the program as themselves unfortunate victims of a type of human trafficking. They receive very little of the earned revenue, with most of it benefiting the North Korean government. Moreover, close family members stay back in North Korea "to be used as personal leverage to force the employee to toil long hours for very little wages," Grimes wrote.

**How to Spot a North Korean Fake Employee**

KnowBe4 offered substantial guidance for organizations during the hiring process to help them spot a North Korean threat actor before taking that person on board, as well offered after-hiring advice in case an operative makes it onto an IT team.

Some characteristics and behaviors in a candidate to look out for include the person being of Asian decent who is not highly skilled in English, though he or she claims to have always lived in the US. The person will be using a fake identity, a fake ID credential, and a fake work history that will all fail an secondary verification.

The candidate also will supply personal websites, profiles, or GitHub sites that seem overly basic, "often saying something and nothing at the same time, or you can find very similar sites and profiles," Grimes wrote. These sites and profiles also will have been posted only very recently and will have no Internet presence outside of the properties supplied by the candidate.

After hiring, organizations may detect unnecessary logins by the employee on the remote device provided by the company, from an IP address that doesn't match the claimed geographical location, or other unusual behavior. Employees also may work hours inconsistent with the time zone where they claim to be located.

Because the motivation for the threat actors is financial, another red flag after hiring is a request to be paid in unusual or strange payment schemes, including the demand for virtual currency.

**Protecting Your Organization**

If an organization suspects a person is a threat actor during the hiring process, it should be reported immediately to senior management for support in vetting the person's legitimacy. KnowBe4 also advised that organizations "threat model" their hiring process and make updates to mitigate the risk of hiring fake employees, such as sharing the warning signs for these actors with those in the direct hiring process.

Indeed, "reviewing hiring processes and reworking them around lessons learned from the experience has been critical" to KnowBe4's incident recovery, and "well worth the investment" to ensure the scenario doesn't repeat itself, Kron says.

If a company does suspect that one of its employees is a North Korean actor, KnowBe4 advised that any device supplied to the person by the company is immediately locked down to the bare minimum access, and monitored for unusual activity, malware, log modifications, or unexpected language changes. The company also should take further steps to monitor employee activity and, of course, remove the person from the job if suspicions prove true.

In retrospect, KnowBe4 has learned that even though it already had a strong security culture with many controls in place that allowed the company to mitigate the situation quickly, "there is always room for improvement," Kron says.

"Having been through this has allowed us to become even more secure than we were previously," he says, "and by sharing the lessons we learned, we hope it will help others."

**About the Author**

Elizabeth Montalbano is a freelance writer, journalist, and therapeutic writing mentor with more than 25 years of professional experience. Her areas of expertise include technology, business, and culture. Elizabeth previously lived and worked as a full-time journalist in Phoenix, San Francisco, and New York City; she currently resides in a village on the southwest coast of Portugal. In her free time, she enjoys surfing, hiking with her dogs, traveling, playing music, yoga, and cooking.

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