#docker

Confidential Containers (CoCo) are containers deployed within an isolated hardware enclave protecting data and code (data in use) from privileged users such as cloud administrators. Red Hat OpenShift confidential containers are available from OpenShift sandboxed containers 1.7.0 as a tech-preview on Azure cloud and as a tech-preview on Azure Red Hat OpenShift.In this article we introduce confidential containers on bare metal which is now available as a preview using Assisted Installer for OpenShift. We cover a number of use cases for CoCo bare metal, explain how it works with different trusted

Hacker IntelBroker claims to have breached Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE), exposing sensitive data like source code, certificates, and…

### Impact If SVG or JPEGXL thumbnailers are enabled (they are disabled by default), a user may upload a file which claims to be either of these types and request a thumbnail to invoke a different decoder in ImageMagick. In some ImageMagick installations, this includes the capability to run Ghostscript to decode the image/file. If MP4 thumbnailers are enabled (also disabled by default), the same issue as above may occur with the ffmpeg installation instead. MMR uses a number of other decoders for all other file types when preparing thumbnails. Theoretical issues are possible with these decoders, however in testing they were not possible to exploit. ### Patches This is fixed in [MMR v1.3.8](https://github.com/t2bot/matrix-media-repo/releases/tag/v1.3.8). MMR now inspects the mimetype of media prior to thumbnailing, and picks a thumbnailer based on those results instead of relying on user-supplied values. This may lead to fewer thumbnails when obscure file shapes are used. This also...

A critical security breach in the software supply chain has been detected. An attacker accessed Kong’s DockerHub account…

### Overview OpenFGA v1.3.8 to v1.8.2 (Helm chart openfga-0.1.38 to openfga-0.2.19, docker v1.3.8 to v.1.8.2) are vulnerable to authorization bypass when certain Check and ListObject calls are executed. ### Am I Affected? You are affected by this authorization bypass vulnerability if you are using OpenFGA v1.3.8 to v1.8.2, specifically under the following conditions: 1. Calling Check API or ListObjects with a model that uses [conditions](https://openfga.dev/docs/modeling/conditions), and 2. OpenFGA is configured with caching enabled (`OPENFGA_CHECK_QUERY_CACHE_ENABLED`), and 3. Check API call or ListObjects API calls contain [contextual tuples](https://openfga.dev/docs/concepts#what-are-contextual-tuples) that include conditions. ### Fix Upgrade to v1.8.3. This upgrade is backwards compatible.

### Impact Users of WireGuard Portal v2 who have OAuth (or OIDC) authentication backends enabled can be affected by an Account Takeover vulnerability if they visit a malicious website. ### Patches The problem was fixed in the latest alpha release, v2.0.0-alpha.3. The [docker images](https://hub.docker.com/r/wgportal/wg-portal) for the tag 'latest' built from the master branch also include the fix.

Mirai and Keksec botnet variants are exploiting critical vulnerabilities in D-Link routers. Learn about the impact, affected devices, and how to protect yourself from these attacks.

The software development industry is expanding tremendously. It drives up the need for technical people and new solutions.…

### Summary A Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability in the authentication middleware allows any client to cause memory exhaustion by sending large request bodies. The server reads the entire request body into memory without size limits, creating multiple copies during processing, which can lead to Out of Memory conditions. Affects all versions up to the latest one (v0.43.0). ### Details The vulnerability exists in the AuthMiddleware function in `core/src/auth/auth.go`. The middleware processes all API requests (`/api/*`) and reads the entire request body using `io.ReadAll` without any size limits: ```go func AuthMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler { return http.HandlerFunc(func(w http.ResponseWriter, r http.Request) { // No size limit on body reading body, err := io.ReadAll(r.Body) // ... // Creates another copy of the body r.Body = io.NopCloser(bytes.NewReader(body)) // ... // Unmarshals the body again, creating more copies if err := j...

Open source Prometheus servers and exporters are leaking plaintext passwords and tokens, along with API addresses of internal locations.