#git

At least eight ongoing lawsuits related to the so-called Department of Government Efficiency’s alleged access to sensitive data hinge on the Watergate-inspired Privacy Act of 1974. But it’s not airtight.

A flea market buyer found medical information about hundreds of patients on second hand decommissioned hard drives.

## Summary Problem: Potential man-in-the-middle attacks due to missing SSL certificate verification in the project codebase and used third-party libraries. ## Details In the past, `aiohttp-session`/`request` had the parameter `verify_ssl` to control SSL certificate verification. This was a boolean value. In `aiohttp` 3.0, this parameter was deprecated in favor of the `ssl` parameter. Only when `ssl` is set to `None` or provided with a correct configured SSL context the standard SSL certificate verification will happen. When migrating integrations in Home Assistant and libraries used by Home Assistant, in some cases the `verify_ssl` parameter value was just moved to the new `ssl` parameter. This resulted in these integrations and 3rd party libraries using `request.ssl = True`, which unintentionally turned off SSL certificate verification and opened up a man-in-the-middle attack vector. Example: https://github.com/home-assistant/core/blob/c4411914c2e906105b765c00af5740bd0880e946/hom...

### Description Authentication using Spid and CIE is based on the SAML2 standard which provides for two entities: Identity Provider (IdP): the system that authenticates users and provides identity information ( SAML assertions ) to the Service Provider, essentially, it is responsible for managing user credentials and identity; Service Provider (SP): The system that provides a service to the user and relies on the Identity Provider to authenticate the user, receives SAML assertions from the IdP to grant access to resources. The library `cie-aspnetcorerefers` to the second entity, i.e. the SP, and implements the validation logic of the SAML assertions present within the SAML response . The following is a summary diagram of an authentication flow via SAML:  As shown in the diagram, the IdP, after verifying the user's credentials, generates a signed SAML response, this is propagated to the SP by the use...

### Description Authentication using Spid and CIE is based on the SAML2 standard which provides for two entities: Identity Provider (IdP): the system that authenticates users and provides identity information ( SAML assertions ) to the Service Provider, essentially, it is responsible for managing user credentials and identity; Service Provider (SP): The system that provides a service to the user and relies on the Identity Provider to authenticate the user, receives SAML assertions from the IdP to grant access to resources. The library `spid-aspnetcorerefers` to the second entity, i.e. the SP, and implements the validation logic of the SAML assertions present within the SAML response . The following is a summary diagram of an authentication flow via SAML:  As shown in the diagram, the IdP, after verifying the user's credentials, generates a signed SAML response, this is propagated to the SP by the us...

Microsoft is warning the modular and potentially wormable Apple-focused infostealer boasts new capabilities for obfuscation, persistence, and infection, and could lead to a supply chain attack.

Carding -- the underground business of stealing, selling and swiping stolen payment card data -- has long been the dominion of Russia-based hackers. Happily, the broad deployment of more secure chip-based payment cards in the United States has weakened the carding market. But a flurry of innovation from cybercrime groups in China is breathing new life into the carding industry, by turning phished card data into mobile wallets that can be used online and at main street stores.

Two critical OpenSSH vulnerabilities discovered! Qualys TRU finds client and server flaws (CVE-2025-26465 & CVE-2025-26466) enabling MITM and…

The New Snake Keylogger variant targets Windows users via phishing emails, using AutoIt for stealth. Learn how it…

The Chinese state-sponsored threat actor known as Mustang Panda has been observed employing a novel technique to evade detection and maintain control over infected systems. This involves the use of a legitimate Microsoft Windows utility called Microsoft Application Virtualization Injector (MAVInject.exe) to inject the threat actor's malicious payload into an external process, waitfor.exe,