#git

### Summary _Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._ There is a potential XXE(XML External Entity Injection) vulnerability when http4k handling malicious XML contents within requests, which might allow attackers to read local sensitive information on server, trigger Server-side Request Forgery and even execute code under some circumstances. ### Details _Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._ https://github.com/http4k/http4k/blob/25696dff2d90206cc1da42f42a1a8dbcdbcdf18c/core/format/xml/src/main/kotlin/org/http4k/format/Xml.kt#L42-L46 XML contents is parsed with DocumentBuilder without security settings on or external entity enabled ### PoC _Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._ #### ...

### Impact Any user with an account on the main wiki could run scheduling operations on subwikis. To reproduce, as a user on the main wiki without any special right, view the document `Scheduler.WebHome` in a subwiki. Then, click on any operation (*e.g.,* Trigger) on any job. If the operation is successful, then the instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0. ### Workarounds If you have subwikis where the Job Scheduler is enabled, you can edit the objects on `Scheduler.WebPreferences` to match https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/54bcc5a7a2e440cc591b91eece9c13dc0c487331#diff-8e274bd0065e319a34090339de6dfe56193144d15fd71c52c1be7272254728b4. ### References * https://jira.xwiki.org/browse/XWIKI-21663 * https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/54bcc5a7a2e440cc591b91eece9c13dc0c487331 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Jira XWiki.org](https://jira.xwiki.org/) *...

### Impact Any user with an account can perform arbitrary remote code execution by adding instances of `XWiki.WikiMacroClass` to any page. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. To reproduce on a instance, as a connected user without script nor programming rights, go to your user profile and add an object of type `XWiki.WikiMacroClass`. Set "Macro Id", "Macro Name" and "Macro Code" to any value, "Macro Visibility" to `Current User` and "Macro Description" to `{{async}}{{groovy}}println("Hello from User macro!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}`. Save the page, then go to `<host>/xwiki/bin/view/XWiki/XWikiSyntaxMacrosList`. If the description of your new macro reads "Hello from User macro!", then your instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This vulnerability has been fixed in XWiki 15.10.11, 16.4.1 and 16.5.0. ### Workarounds It is possible to manually apply [this patch](https://github.com/xwiki/xwiki-platform/commit/40e1afe001d61eafdf13f36...

### Impact Any user with script rights can perform arbitrary remote code execution by adding instances of `XWiki.ConfigurableClass` to any page. This compromises the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the whole XWiki installation. To reproduce on a instance, as a user with script rights, edit your user profile and add an object of type `XWiki.ConfigurableClass` ("Custom configurable sections"). Set "Display in section" and "Display in category" to `other`, "Scope" to `Wiki and all spaces` and "Heading" to: ``` #set($codeToExecute = 'Test') #set($codeToExecuteResult = '{{async}}{{groovy}}services.logging.getLogger("attacker").error("Attack from Heading succeeded!"){{/groovy}}{{/async}}') ``` Save the page and view it, then add `?sheet=XWiki.AdminSheet&viewer=content&section=other` to the URL. If the logs contain "attacker - Attack from Heading succeeded!", then the instance is vulnerable. ### Patches This has been patched in XWiki 15.10.9 and 16.3.0. ### Workarounds We're...

Its mid-December, if you’re on-call or working to defend networks, this newsletter is for you. Martin discusses the widening gap between threat and defences as well as the growing problem of home devices being recruited to act as proxy servers for criminals.

Security isn't just about tools — it's about understanding how the enemy thinks and why they make certain choices.

BforeAI has discovered a surge in phishing attacks targeting the Dubai Police, a government-run entity. Learn how cybercriminals are exploiting the Dubai Police name to steal personal information and money.

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, see Siemens' ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 8.6 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity Vendor: Siemens Equipment: RUGGEDCOM ROX II Vulnerability: Cross-Site Request Forgery 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of this vulnerability could allow an attacker to perform administrative actions if an authenticated user is tricked into accessing a malicious link. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS Siemens that the following products are affected: Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1500: All versions prior to V2.16.0 Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1512: All versions prior to V2.16.0 Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX RX1501: All versions prior to V2.16.0 Siemens RUGGEDCOM ROX MX5000RE: All versions...

Proxy and anonymization networks have been dominating the headlines, this piece discusses its origins and evolution on the threat landscape with specific focus on state sponsored abuse.

# Duplicate Advisory This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-r4pg-vg54-wxx4. This link is maintained to preserve external references. # Original Description A flaw was found in the cert-manager package. This flaw allows an attacker who can modify PEM data that the cert-manager reads, for example, in a Secret resource, to use large amounts of CPU in the cert-manager controller pod to effectively create a denial-of-service (DoS) vector for the cert-manager in the cluster.