Authentication Bypass by Spoofing vulnerability by replacing to exsiting notes in Apache Zeppelin. This issue affects Apache Zeppelin: from 0.10.1 before 0.11.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.11.0, which fixes the issue.



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1.  GitHub Advisory Database
2.  GitHub Reviewed
3.  CVE-2024-31863

**Apache Zeppelin: Replacing other users notebook, bypassing any permissions**

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 9, 2024 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Apr 9, 2024

**Package**

maven org.apache.zeppelin:zeppelin-server (Maven)

**Affected versions**

\>= 0.10.1, < 0.11.0

**Description**

Published to the GitHub Advisory Database

Apr 9, 2024

GHSA-m65c-wmw9-vmpp: Apache Zeppelin: Replacing other users notebook, bypassing any permissions

In Eclipse Kura LogServlet component included in versions 5.0.0 to 5.4.1, a specifically crafted request to the servlet can allow an unauthenticated user to retrieve the device logs. Also, downloaded logs may be used by an attacker to perform privilege escalation by using the session id of an authenticated user reported in logs.




This issue affects org.eclipse.kura:org.eclipse.kura.web2 version range [2.0.600, 2.4.0], which is included in Eclipse Kura version range [5.0.0, 5.4.1]




1.  GitHub Advisory Database
2.  GitHub Reviewed
3.  CVE-2024-3046

**Eclipse Kura LogServlet vulnerability**

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 9, 2024 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Apr 9, 2024

**Package**

maven org.eclipse.kura:org.eclipse.kura.web2 (Maven)

**Affected versions**

\>= 2.0.600, <= 2.4.0

In Eclipse Kura LogServlet component included in versions 5.0.0 to 5.4.1, a specifically crafted request to the servlet can allow an unauthenticated user to retrieve the device logs. Also, downloaded logs may be used by an attacker to perform privilege escalation by using the session id of an authenticated user reported in logs.

This issue affects org.eclipse.kura:org.eclipse.kura.web2 version range \[2.0.600, 2.4.0\], which is included in Eclipse Kura version range \[5.0.0, 5.4.1\]

**References**

*   https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-3046
*   https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/vulnerability-reports/-/issues/188

Published to the GitHub Advisory Database

Apr 9, 2024

GHSA-frc2-w2cc-x794: Eclipse Kura LogServlet vulnerability

Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in Credential page of Apache Zeppelin allows an attacker to submit malicious request.  This issue affects Apache Zeppelin Apache Zeppelin version 0.9.0 and prior versions.

**Apache Zeppelin CSRF vulnerability in the Credentials page**

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 9, 2024 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Apr 9, 2024

GHSA-prvg-rh5h-74jr: Apache Zeppelin CSRF vulnerability in the Credentials page

Cisco Talos is disclosing a new threat actor we deemed “Starry Addax” targeting mostly human rights activists, associated with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) cause with a novel mobile malware.

*   Cisco Talos is disclosing a new threat actor we deemed “Starry Addax” targeting mostly human rights activists associated with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) cause with a novel mobile malware. 
*   Starry Addax conducts phishing attacks tricking their targets into installing malicious Android applications we’re calling “FlexStarling.” 
*   For Windows-based targets, Starry Addax will serve credential-harvesting pages masquerading as login pages from popular media websites. 

_Talos would like to thank the Yahoo! Paranoids Advanced Cyber Threats Team for their collaboration in this investigation._ 

**Starry Addax has a special interest in Western Sahara**

The malicious mobile application (APK), “FlexStarling,” analyzed by Talos recently masquerades as a variant of the Sahara Press Service (SPSRASD) App. The Sahara Press Service is a media agency associated with the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic. The malware will serve content in the Spanish language from the SPSRASD website to look legitimate to the victim. However, in actuality, FlexStarling is a highly versatile malware capable of deploying additional malware components and stealing information from the infected devices. 

 Splash screen for the malicious application.

Starry Addax’s infrastructure can be used to target Windows- and Android-based users. This campaign's infection chain begins with a spear-phishing email sent to targets, consisting of individuals of interest to the attackers, especially human rights activists in Morocco and the Western Sahara region. The email contains content that requests the target to install the Sahrawi News Agency’s Mobile App or include a topical theme related to the Western Sahara.  

Some examples of the subject lines of the phishing emails consist of: 

طلب تثبيت التطبيق على هواتف متابعي وكالة الأنباء الصحراوية 

Request to install the application on the phones of Sahrawi News Agency followers 

الوفد برلماني الأوروبي يدلي بتصريحات 

The European Parliament delegation makes statements 

الوفد برلماني يدلي بتصريحات 

A parliamentary delegation makes statements 

عاجل وبالفيديو ونقلاً عن جريدة إلبايس 

Urgent, video, and quoted from El Pais newspaper 

The email originating from an attacker-owned domain, ondroid\[.\]site, consists of a shortened link to an attacker-controlled website and domain. Depending on the requestor’s operating system, the website will either serve the FlexStarling APK for Android devices or redirect the victim to a social media login page to harvest their credentials. The links observed by Talos so far are:  

www\[.\]ondroid\[.\]store/aL2mohh1 

www\[.\]ondroid\[.\]store/ties5shizooQu1ei/ 

**Starry Addax likely to escalate momentum **

Campaigns like this that target high-value individuals usually intend to sit quietly on the device for an extended period. All components from the malware to the operating infrastructure seem to be bespoke/custom-made for this specific campaign indicating a heavy focus on stealth and conducting activities under the radar. The use of FlexStarling with a Firebase-based C2 instead of commodity malware or commercially available spyware indicates the threat actor is making a conscious effort to evade detections and operate without being detected. 

The timelines connected to various artifacts used in the attacks indicate that this campaign is just starting and may be in its nascent stages with more infrastructure and Starry Addax working on additional malware variants. 

**FlexStarling – A highly capable implant **

The FlexStarling malware app requests a plethora of permissions from the Android OS to extract valuable information from the infected mobile device. The following list contains the permissions acquired by FlexStarling via its AndroidManifest\[.\]xml: 

Some of these permissions are dynamically requested at runtime: READ\_CALL\_LOG, READ\_EXTERNAL\_STORAGE, READ\_SMS, READ\_CONTACTS, WRITE\_EXTERNAL\_STORAGE, INTERNET, ACCESS\_NETWORK\_STATE, RECORD\_AUDIO, READ\_PHONE\_STATE. 

**Anti-emulation checks **

When the implant runs, it checks the BUILD information for keywords or phrases that indicate that it is running on an emulator or analysis tool. The implant checks for the following keywords: 

*   BUILD\[MANUFACTURER\] does not contain: “Genymotion”. 
*   BUILD\[MODEL\] does not contain any of: “google\_sdk”, “droid4x”, “Emulator”, "Android SDK built for x86" 
*   BUILD\[HARDWARE\] does not contains any of: “goldfish”, “vbox86”, “nox”. 
*   BUILD\[FingerPrint\] does not start with “generic”. 
*   BUILD\[Product\] does not consist of any of: “sdk”, “google\_sdk”, “sdk\_x86”, “vbox86p”, “nox”. 
*   BUILD\[Board\] does not contain: “nox”. 
*   BUILD\[Brand\] or Device does not start with “generic”.  

The implant also checks for the presence of the following emulation/virtualization-related files in the filesystem: 

*   /dev/socket/genyd 
*   /dev/socket/baseband\_genyd 
*   /dev/socket/qemud 
*   /dev/qemu\_pipe 
*   ueventd.android\_x86.rc 
*   X86.prop 
*   ueventd.ttVM\_x86.rc 
*   init.ttVM\_x86.rc 
*   fstab.ttVM\_x86 
*   fstab.vbox86 
*   init.vbox86.rc 
*   ueventd.vbox86.rc 
*   fstab.andy 
*   ueventd.andy.rc 
*   fstab.nox 
*   init.nox.rc 
*   Ueventd.nox.rc 

If none of the keywords or files are found or all checks are passed, the malicious app tries to gain permissions for managing external storage areas (shared storage space) on the device using the permission “MANAGE\_EXTERNAL\_STORAGE”.  The actor wants to gain the ability to read, write, modify, delete and manage files on external storage locations.  

**Stealing information and executing arbitrary code **

The malware obtains command codes and accompanying information from the C2 server. It then generates the MD5 hash string of the command code and compares its list of hardcoded hashes. The corresponding activity is carried out by the implant once a match is found. 

The various commands supported by the sample are: 

Command code MD5 hash 

Decode command code 

Intent 

801ab24683a4a8c433c6eb40c48bcd9d 

Download 

Download a file specified by a URL to the Downloads directory. 

e8606d021da140a92c7eba8d9b8af84f 

unknown 

Copy files from the download's directory to the application package directory 

725888549d44eb5a3a676c018df55943 

unknown 

Decrypt a dex file located in the application package directory and reflectively load it. 

3a884d7285b2caa1cb2b60f887571d6c 

unknown 

Cleanup directories – remove all files: 

*   Cache directory. 
    
*   Application package directory (including “/oat/”). 
    
*   External Cache Directory. 
    

f2a6c498fb90ee345d997f888fce3b18 

Delete 

Delete a specified filepath. 

3e679cff5b3a6f6f8f32aead541a0a12 

Drop 

Upload a local file to the attacker’s dropbox folders using the Dropbox API. 

The ACCESS TOKEN, local filepath and remote upload path is specified by the C2. 

fb84708d32d00fca5d352e460776584c 

DECRYPT 

AES Decrypt a file from the application package directory using the secret key and IV specified and write it to a file named “.EXEC.dex” 

0ba4439ee9a46d9d9f14c60f88f45f87 

check 

Check if a file inside the application package directory exists. 

These commands are supported by accompanying information and consist of the following variables being sent across by the C2: 

**DURL:** Indicates the download URL used by the “Download” command above. 

**APPNAME:** Indicates the filename to use for the destination file during the “Download” command. 

**DEX:** Contains the source file name to be used during the Decrypt (and reflectively load) commands. 

**ky1:** Indicates a value to be used in the context of specific command codes: 

*   Delete = File to be deleted. 
*   Drop = File to be read and uploaded to Dropbox. 
*   DECRYPT = Secret key used for AES decryption. 
*   Check = Filename to be whose presence is to be checked in the application package directory. 

 **ky2:** Indicates a value to be used in the context of specific command codes: 

*   Drop = Remote file location where the local file needs to be uploaded on Dropbox. 
*   DECRYPT = IV used for AES decryption. 

 **ky3:** Indicates a value to be used in the context of specific command codes: 

*   Drop = Dropbox ACCESS TOKEN value to be used during file upload. 
*   DECRYPT = IV used for AES decryption. 

 **fl:** Filename used during the DEX reflective load process.  

**ky4:** Used as a parameter during reflective loading of the DEX file. 

**ky5:** Secret key used for AES decryption as part of the implant’s DEX decrypt and reflective load. 

**ky6:** IV used for AES decryption as part of the implant’s DEX decrypt and reflective load. 

**ky7**: Contains the source file name to be used during the AES decryption as part of the implant’s DEX decrypt and reflective load. 

**Coverage **

Ways our customers can detect and block this threat are listed below. 

Cisco Secure Endpoint (formerly AMP for Endpoints) is ideally suited to prevent the execution of the malware detailed in this post. Try Secure Endpoint for free here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance web scanning prevents access to malicious websites and detects malware used in these attacks. 

Cisco Secure Email (formerly Cisco Email Security) can block malicious emails sent by threat actors as part of their campaign. You can try Secure Email for free here. 

Cisco Secure Firewall (formerly Next-Generation Firewall and Firepower NGFW) appliances such as Threat Defense Virtual, Adaptive Security Appliance and Meraki MX can detect malicious activity associated with this threat. 

Cisco Secure Malware Analytics (Threat Grid) identifies malicious binaries and builds protection into all Cisco Secure products. 

Umbrella, Cisco's secure internet gateway (SIG), blocks users from connecting to malicious domains, IPs and URLs, whether users are on or off the corporate network. Sign up for a free trial of Umbrella here. 

Cisco Secure Web Appliance (formerly Web Security Appliance) automatically blocks potentially dangerous sites and tests suspicious sites before users access them. 

Additional protections with context to your specific environment and threat data are available from the Firewall Management Center. 

 Cisco Duo provides multi-factor authentication for users to ensure only those authorized are accessing your network. 

 Open-source Snort Subscriber Rule Set customers can stay up to date by downloading the latest rule pack available for purchase on Snort.org. 

**IOCs **

IOCs for this research can also be found at our GitHub repository here. 

**Hashes **

f7d9c4c7da6082f1498d41958b54d7aeffd0c674aab26db93309e88ca17c826c 

ec2f2944f29b19ffd7a1bb80ec3a98889ddf1c097130db6f30ad28c8bf9501b3 

**Network IOCs **

hxxps\[://\]runningapplications-b7dae-default-rtdb\[.\]firebaseio\[.\]com 

ondroid\[.\]site 

ondroid\[.\]store 

bit\[.\]ly/48wdj1m 

www\[.\]ondroid\[.\]store/aL2mohh1 

bit\[.\]ly/48E4W3N 

www\[.\]ondroid\[.\]store/ties5shizooQu1ei/

Starry Addax targets human rights defenders in North Africa with new malware

A man has pleaded guilty to assuming someone else's identity for 35 years.

Sometimes the consequences of a stolen identity exceed anything you could have imagined.

Matthew David Keirans, a 58-year-old former hospital employee has pleaded guilty to assuming another man’s identity since 1988. He was convicted of one count of making a false statement to a National Credit Union Administration insured institution and one count of aggravated identity theft.

The man whose identity he assumed—William Donald Woods—and Keirans worked together in 1988 at a hot dog cart in Albuquerque.

Keirans was wanted for theft, so he used Woods’ identity “in every aspect of his life,” including obtaining employment, insurance and official documents, and even paying taxes under Wood’s name, according to a plea agreement signed by Keirans. He even fathered a child, whose last name is Woods.

In 1990, Keirans obtained a fraudulent Colorado identification card with Woods’ name and birthday. He used the ID to get a job at a fast-food restaurant and to get a Colorado bank account. He bought a car for $600 in 1991, using Wood’s name, with two $300 checks that bounced.

It wasn’t the first time Keirans had committed car theft. When he was 16, he stole a car after running away from his adoptive parents’ home in San Francisco.

In 2012, Keirans fraudulently acquired a copy of Woods’ birth certificate from the state of Kentucky using information he found about Woods’ family on Ancestry.com.

Under the assumed identity, Keirans also worked as a systems architect for the University of Iowa Hospital where he was fired for misconduct related to the identity theft investigation.

Meanwhile, the real William Woods was homeless and living in Los Angeles, when he discovered that someone was using his credit and had accumulated a lot of debt. Woods didn’t want to pay the debt and so went after the account numbers for any accounts he had open so he could close them. He handed a bank employee his real Social Security card and an authentic California Identification card, which matched the information the bank had on file. But because there was a large amount of money in the accounts, the bank employee asked Woods a series of security questions that he was unable to answer.

At that point, the bank employee called Keirans, whose phone number was associated with the accounts. He was able to answer the security questions correctly and stated that no one in California should have access to the accounts.

So, the bank employee called the police and after an investigation, the real Woods was arrested and charged with identity theft and false impersonation, under a misspelling of Keirans’ name: Matthew Kierans.

Because Woods refused to give up his own identity, a judge ruled in February 2020 that he was not mentally competent to stand trial and he was sent to a mental hospital in California, where he received psychotropic medication and other mental health treatment.

For legal reasons, Woods pleaded no contest to the identity theft charges—meaning he accepted the conviction but did not admit guilt—and was sentenced to two years imprisonment with credit for the two years he already served in the county jail and the hospital and was released.

But he didn’t give up his fight for his identity even though the judge ordered him to stop using the name William Woods. He attempted to regain his identity by filing customer disputes with financial organizations to clear his credit report.

It wasn’t until a police detective tested Woods’ biological father’s DNA against Woods’ DNA. Both men had the same birth certificate with the father’s name on it. The DNA test proved Woods was the man’s son. During a follow-up interview Keirans made a mistake and eventually confessed to the prolonged identity theft, according to court documents.

Keirans was indicted on five counts of making a false statement to a National Credit Union Administration insured institution and two counts of aggravated identity theft. He pleaded guilty to one count of each charge, and the other counts were dropped.

A sentence ruling has not yet been scheduled. Keirans is currently in the custody of the US Marshals Service, according to a news release about his plea.

**We don’t just report on threats – we help safeguard your entire digital identit**y

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Protect your—and your family’s—personal information by using identity protection.

 35-year long identity theft leads to imprisonment for victim 

Improper Input Validation vulnerability in Apache Zeppelin.

By adding relative path indicators (e.g `..`), attackers can see the contents for any files in the filesystem that the server account can access. 
This issue affects Apache Zeppelin from 0.9.0 before 0.11.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 0.11.0, which fixes the issue.

**Apache Zeppelin Path Traversal vulnerability**

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 9, 2024 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Apr 9, 2024

GHSA-g64r-xf39-q4p5: Apache Zeppelin Path Traversal vulnerability

A flaw was found in` JwtValidator.resolvePublicKey` in JBoss EAP, where the validator checks jku and sends a HTTP request. During this process, no whitelisting or other filtering behavior is performed on the destination URL address, which may result in a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability.

**WildFly Elytron: SSRF security issue**

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 9, 2024 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Apr 9, 2024

GHSA-v4mm-q8fv-r2w5: WildFly Elytron: SSRF security issue

With a complex attack chain and using Telegram for its command and control, CoralRaider targets victims in Asian countries — and appears to have accidentally infected itself as well.

Source: incamerastock via Alamy Stock Photo

A newcomer cybercrime group linked to Vietnam has targeted individuals and organizations in Asia, attempting to steal social media account information and user data.

CoralRaider, which first appeared in late 2023, relies heavily on social engineering and legitimate services for data exfiltration, and it develops custom tools for loading malware onto victim systems. Yet the group has also made some rookie mistakes, such as inadvertently infecting their own systems, which exposed their activities, threat researchers with Cisco's Talos threat intelligence group stated in a new analysis on CoralRaider.

While Vietnam has become increasingly active in cyber operations, this group does not appear to be working with the government, says Chetan Raghuprasad, security research technical leader for Cisco's Talos group.

"The main priority is financial gain, and the actor is attempting to hijack the victim’s social media business and advertis\[ing\] accounts," he says. "The potential exposure for follow-on attacks, including delivering other malware, is also possible. Our research has not seen any examples of other payloads being delivered."

Vietnam threat actors frequently focus on social media. The infamous OceanLotus group — also known as APT32 — has attacked other governments, dissidents, and journalists in Southeast Asian countries, including in Vietnam. A military-associated group, Force 47 — linked to the Vietnamese army's official television station — regularly attempts to influence social media groups.

CoralRaider, however, appears to be connected to profit motives rather than nationalist agendas.

"At this moment, we do not have any evidence or information on signs of CoralRaider working with the Vietnamese government," Raghuprasad says.

**Multistage Infection Chain**

A CoralRaider campaign typically starts with a Windows shortcut (.LNK) file, often using a .PDF extension in an attempt to fool the victim into opening the files, according to the Cisco analysis. Following that, the attackers move through a series of stages in their attack:

1.  Windows shortcut downloads and executes an HTML application (HTA) file from an attacker-controlled server
    
2.  HTA file executes an embedded Visual Basic script
    
3.  VB script executes a PowerShell script, which then runs three more PowerShell scripts, including a series of anti-analysis checks to detect if the tool is running in a virtual machine, a bypass for the system's User Access Controls, and code that disables any notifications to the user
    
4.  Final script runs RotBot, a loader that performs detection evasion, conducts reconnaissance on the system, and downloads a configuration file
    
5.  RotBot then typically downloads XClient, which collects a variety of user data from the system, including social media account credentials
    

In addition to credentials, XClient also steals browser data, credit card account information, and other financial data. And lastly, XClient takes a screenshot of the victim's desktop and uploads it.

Meanwhile, the researchers say there are indications that the attackers had targeted individuals in Vietnam as well.

"The \[XClient\] stealer function maps the stolen victim's information to hardcoded Vietnamese words and writes them to a text file on the victim machine's temporary folder before exfiltration," the analysis stated. "One example function we observed is used to steal the victim's Facebook Ads account that has hardcoded with Vietnamese words for Account rights, Threshold, Spent, Time Zone, and Date Created."

**Shooting Themselves in the Foot**

The CoralRaider group used an automated bot on the Telegram service as a command-and-control channel and as well as to exfiltrate data from victims' systems. However, the cybercriminal group appears to have infected one of their own machines, because the Cisco researchers discovered screenshots of the information posted to the channel.

"Analyzing the images of the actor's Desktop on the Telegram bot, we found a few Telegram groups in Vietnamese named 'Kiém tien tử Facebook, 'Mua Bán Scan MINI,' and 'Mua Bán Scan Meta,'" Cisco Talos stated in the analysis. "Monitoring these groups revealed that they were underground markets where, among other activities, victim data was traded."

CoralRaider's arrival on the cyber threat scene is not surprising: Vietnam is currently facing an increase in threats from account-stealing malware, says Sakshi Grover, research manager in IDC's Cybersecurity Services group for the Asia/Pacific region.

"While historically less associated with cybercrime compared to other Asian nations, Vietnam's rapid adoption of digital technologies has made it more susceptible to cyber threats," she says. "Advanced persistent threats (APTs) are increasingly targeting government entities, critical infrastructure, and businesses, utilizing sophisticated techniques like custom malware and social engineering to infiltrate systems and steal sensitive data."

Because economic conditions vary across Vietnam — with some areas experiencing limited job opportunities, resulting in low wages for highly skilled roles — individuals can be incentivized to engage in cybercrime to make money, Grover says.

**About the Author(s)**

Veteran technology journalist of more than 20 years. Former research engineer. Written for more than two dozen publications, including CNET News.com, Dark Reading, MIT's Technology Review, Popular Science, and Wired News. Five awards for journalism, including Best Deadline Journalism (Online) in 2003 for coverage of the Blaster worm. Crunches numbers on various trends using Python and R. Recent reports include analyses of the shortage in cybersecurity workers and annual vulnerability trends.

Vietnamese Cybercrime Group CoralRaider Nets Financial Data

Industry experts share how to implement comprehensive security strategies necessary to secure the software supply chain in Dark Reading's latest Tech Insights report.

Software supply chain attacks are relatively easy to conduct and have a significant payoff for attackers, so it's little wonder why they're top-of-mind for CISOs.

"This is especially the case if the vulnerable hardware or software has a high adoption across enterprise organizations," says ReliaQuest CISO Jeff Music.

While some software supply chain attacks, such as the ones involving MOVEit and SolarWinds, garner considerable attention, there are many software supply chain attacks occurring every day that don't get their moment in the spotlight. And no one beyond their victims ever hear about what happened.

But whether well-known or obscure, they create considerable risk for organizations.

For Dark Reading's latest Tech Insights report, "How Supply Chain Attacks Work and How to Secure Them," we interviewed experts who shared how to implement the comprehensive security strategies necessary to defend against these attacks. They include managing vendor risk, implementing security frameworks, conducting software composition analysis, and ensuring adequate DevSecOps practices are in place.

**Can't Blindly Trust Software**

In software supply chain attacks, malicious code or components are inserted into legitimate software applications or dependencies. The malicious software then enables attackers to infiltrate organizations that use those compromised systems.

Unfortunately, enterprises can't blindly trust their technology environments — from their end-user endpoints to third-party suppliers or the open-source components they rely on. These software supply chain attacks are insidious and have the power to compromise vast amounts of enterprise data and disrupt essential services across all business sectors.

In the case of MOVEit, for example, the attacks compromised the personal data of millions of people and affected more than 1,050 organizations, including those in the federal government, healthcare, education, finance, and insurance.

The stakes are high, and CISOs and security teams are grappling with these risks. Download a copy of our new report to learn from industry experts about how to implement the comprehensive security strategies necessary to defend against supply chain attacks.

**About the Author(s)**

An award winning writer and journalist, for more than 20 years George Hulme has written about business, technology, and IT security topics. He currently freelances for a wide range of publications, and is security blogger at InformationWeek.com.

Tips for Securing the Software Supply Chain

Ollama before 0.1.29 has a DNS rebinding vulnerability that can inadvertently allow remote access to the full API, thereby letting an unauthorized user chat with a large language model, delete a model, or cause a denial of service (resource exhaustion).

**Ollama DNS rebinding vulnerability**

High severity GitHub Reviewed Published Apr 8, 2024 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Apr 8, 2024

Tag

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