#js

### Summary A malicious JSON-stringifyable message can be made passing on `verify()`, when global Buffer is [`buffer` package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/buffer) ### Details This affects only environments where `require('buffer')` is <https://npmjs.com/buffer> E.g.: browser bundles, React Native apps, etc. `Buffer.isBuffer` check can be bypassed, resulting in strange objects being accepted as `message`, and those messages could trick `verify()` into returning false-positive `true` values v2.x is unaffected as it verifies input to be an actual `Uint8Array` instance Such a message can be constructed for any already known message/signature pair There are some restrictions though (also depending on the known message/signature), but not very limiting, see PoC for example https://github.com/bitcoinjs/tiny-secp256k1/pull/140 is a subtle fix for this ### PoC This code deliberately doesn't provide `reencode` for now, could be updated later ```js import { randomBytes } from 'crypto'...

### Summary Private key can be extracted on signing a malicious JSON-stringifiable object, when global Buffer is [`buffer` package](https://www.npmjs.com/package/buffer) ### Details This affects only environments where `require('buffer')` is <https://npmjs.com/buffer> E.g.: browser bundles, React Native apps, etc. `Buffer.isBuffer` check can be bypassed, resulting in `k` reuse for different messages, leading to private key extraction over a single invalid message (and a second one for which any message/signature could be taken, e.g. previously known valid one) v2.x is unaffected as it verifies input to be an actual `Uint8Array` instance Such a message can be constructed for any already known message/signature pair, meaning that the attack needs only a single malicious message being signed for a full key extraction While signing unverified attacker-controlled messages would be problematic itself (and exploitation of this needs such a scenario), signing a single message still shou...

### Summary The /get-patch endpoint processes a purchase in two separate database queries: a SELECT that verifies the token is unused, followed by an UPDATE that marks the token as used. Because SQLite only guards each statement, a malicious actor can issue two requests at the exact same moment and have both SELECT statements succeed before either UPDATE runs. ### Details The handler executes (step 1): ``` SELECT id, token_used_at FROM purchases WHERE patch_id = ? AND purchase_token = ? AND status = 'COMPLETED' ``` If token_used_at IS NULL, the request passes the check (step 2): ``` if (row.token_used_at) { return res.status(403).json({ error: "Purchase token has already been used." }); } ``` The handler finally runs (step 3): ``` UPDATE purchases SET token_used_at = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP WHERE id = ? ``` When two requests arrive at the same time, they both finish step 1 while the row is still unused. SQLite serializes writers only per statement, so ea...

### Summary The fix for the "SSRF Vulnerability on assetlinks_check(act_name, well_knowns)" vulnerability could potentially be bypassed. ### Details Since the requests.get() request in the _check_url method is specified as allow_redirects=True, if "https://mydomain.com/.well-known/assetlinks.json" returns a 302 redirect, subsequent requests will be sent automatically. If the redirect location is "http://192.168.1.102/user/delete/1", a request will be sent here as well. <img width="610" alt="image" src="https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF/assets/150332295/a8c9630e-3d12-441a-816c-8f5e427a5194"> It will be safer to use allow_redirects=False. ### Impact The attacker can cause the server to make a connection to internal-only services within the organization's infrastructure.

### Impact With older versions of jackson-core, if you parse an input file and it has deeply nested data, Jackson could end up throwing a StackoverflowError if the depth is particularly large. ### Patches jackson-core 2.15.0 contains a configurable limit for how deep Jackson will traverse in an input document, defaulting to an allowable depth of 1000. Change is in https://github.com/FasterXML/jackson-core/pull/943. jackson-core will throw a StreamConstraintsException if the limit is reached. jackson-databind also benefits from this change because it uses jackson-core to parse JSON inputs. ### Workarounds Users should avoid parsing input files from untrusted sources.

# Command Injection in MCP Server The MCP Server at https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/ is written in a way that is vulnerable to command injection vulnerability attacks as part of some of its MCP Server tool definition and implementation. ## Vulnerable tool The MCP Server exposes the tool `ui_tap` which relies on Node.js child process API `exec` which is an unsafe and vulnerable API if concatenated with untrusted user input. LLM exposed user input for `duration`, `udid`, and `x` and `y` args can be replaced with shell meta-characters like `;` or `&&` or others to change the behavior from running the expected command `idb` to another command. Vulnerable line of code: https://github.com/joshuayoes/ios-simulator-mcp/blob/main/src/index.ts#L166-L207 ```js server.tool( "ui_tap", "Tap on the screen in the iOS Simulator", { duration: z.string().optional().describe("Press duration"), udid: z .string() .optional() .describe("...

### Summary A stored XSS is present in Gogs which allows client-side Javascript code execution. ### Details Gogs Version: ``` docker images REPOSITORY TAG IMAGE ID CREATED SIZE gogs/gogs latest fe92583bc4fe 10 hours ago 99.3MB ``` Application version: `0.14.0+dev` Local setup using: ```bash # Pull image from Docker Hub. docker pull gogs/gogs # Create local directory for volume. sudo mkdir -p /var/gogs # Use `docker run` for the first time. docker run --name=gogs -p 10022:22 -p 10880:3000 -v /var/gogs:/data gogs/gogs ``` The vulnerability is caused by the usage of a vulnerable and outdated component: `pdfjs-1.4.20` under public/plugins/. Read more about this vulnerability at [codeanlabs - CVE-2024-4367](https://codeanlabs.com/blog/research/cve-2024-4367-arbitrary-js-execution-in-pdf-js/). ### PoC 1. Upload the Proof of Concept file hosted at https://codeanlabs.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/05/poc_generalized_CVE-2024-4367.pdf in a repository. 2. ...

View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 5.3 ATTENTION: Low attack complexity Vendor: TrendMakers Equipment: Sight Bulb Pro Vulnerabilities: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm, Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to capture sensitive information and execute arbitrary shell commands on the target device as root if connected to the local network segment. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS The following versions of the Sight Bulb Pro Firmware are affected: Sight Bulb Pro Firmware ZJ_CG32-2201: Version 8.57.83 and prior 3.2 VULNERABILITY OVERVIEW 3.2.1 USE OF A BROKEN OR RISKY CRYPTOGRAPHIC ALGORITHM CWE-327 During the initial setup of the device the user connects to an access point broadcast by the Sight Bulb Pro. During the negotiation, AES Encryption keys are passed in cleartext. If captured, an attacker may be able to decrypt co...

Versions of the package snyk before 1.1297.3 are vulnerable to Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File through local Snyk CLI debug logs. Container Registry credentials provided via environment variables or command line arguments can be exposed when executing Snyk CLI in DEBUG or DEBUG/TRACE mode. The issue affects the following Snyk commands: 1. When snyk container test or snyk container monitor commands are run against a container registry, with debug mode enabled, the container registry credentials may be written into the local Snyk CLI debug log. This only happens with credentials specified in environment variables (SNYK_REGISTRY_USERNAME and SNYK_REGISTRY_PASSWORD), or in the CLI (--password/-p and --username/-u). 2. When snyk auth command is executed with debug mode enabled AND the log level is set to TRACE, the Snyk access / refresh credential tokens used to connect the CLI to Snyk may be written into the local CLI debug logs. 3. When snyk iac test is executed with...

New CloudSEK findings show Androxgh0st botnet evolving. Academic institutions, including UC San Diego, hit. Discover how this sophisticated…