#linux

When OpenTofu is acting as a TLS client authenticating a certificate chain provided by a TLS server, an excluded subdomain constraint in a certificate chain does not restrict the usage of wildcard [SANs](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_key_certificate#Subject_Alternative_Name_certificate) in the leaf certificate. For example a constraint that excludes the subdomain test.example.com does not prevent a leaf certificate from claiming the SAN *.example.com. ### Details When acting as a TLS client, OpenTofu relies on the implementation of TLS certificate verification from the standard library of the Go programming language. The Go project has recently published the following advisory for that which indirectly affects OpenTofu's behavior: - [CVE-2025-61727](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-61727): Improper application of excluded DNS name constraints when verifying wildcard names in crypto/x509 OpenTofu acts as a TLS client when calling a module or provider registry to re...

Threat actors with ties to North Korea have likely become the latest to exploit the recently disclosed critical security React2Shell flaw in React Server Components (RSC) to deliver a previously undocumented remote access trojan dubbed EtherRAT. "EtherRAT leverages Ethereum smart contracts for command-and-control (C2) resolution, deploys five independent Linux persistence mechanisms, and

## Summary Critical security vulnerabilities exist in both the `UUIDv4()` and `UUID()` functions of the `github.com/gofiber/utils` package. When the system's cryptographic random number generator (`crypto/rand`) fails, both functions silently fall back to returning predictable UUID values, including the zero UUID `"00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000"`. This compromises the security of all Fiber applications using these functions for security-critical operations. **Both functions are vulnerable to the same root cause (`crypto/rand` failure):** - `UUIDv4()`: Indirect vulnerability through `uuid.NewRandom()` → `crypto/rand.Read()` → fallback to `UUID()` - `UUID()`: Direct vulnerability through `crypto/rand.Read(uuidSeed[:])` → silent zero UUID return ## Vulnerability Details ### Affected Functions - **Package**: `github.com/gofiber/utils` - **Functions**: `UUIDv4()` and `UUID()` - **Return Type**: `string` (both functions) - **Locations**: `common.go:93-99` (UUIDv4), `common.go:60-8...

### Impact This vulnerability affects all Emby Server versions - beta and stable up to the specified versions. It allows an attacker to gain full administrative access to an Emby Server (for Emby Server administration, **not at the OS level**,). Other than network access, no specific preconditions need to be fulfilled for a server to be vulnerable. ### Patches #### Quick Fix A quick fix will be rolled out via an update to one of the default-included Emby Server plugins. This way is chosen because many users are updating their servers manually while plugin updates are typically configured to be applied automatically. This allows to get a patch deployed to a large amount of servers within a single day. #### Server Patches Patched versions for both, Emby Server stable and Emby Server beta are available now. **All Emby Server owners are strongly encouraged to apply those updates as soon as possible.** ### Workarounds > [!NOTE] > These workarounds are OBSOLETE now. Please update E...

It’s been a week of chaos in code and calm in headlines. A bug that broke the internet’s favorite framework, hackers chasing AI tools, fake apps stealing cash, and record-breaking cyberattacks — all within days. If you blink, you’ll miss how fast the threat map is changing. New flaws are being found, published, and exploited in hours instead of weeks. AI-powered tools meant to help developers

CISA, NSA, and Canadian Cyber Centre warn that PRC state-sponsored hackers are using BRICKSTORM, a stealthy Go-based backdoor, for long-term espionage in Government and IT networks.

## Summary Adding default PCR12 validation to ensure that account operators can not modify kernel command line parameters, potentially bypassing root filesystem integrity validation. Attestable AMIs are based on the systemd Unified Kernel Image (UKI) concept which uses systemd-boot to create a single measured UEFI binary from a Linux kernel, its initramfs, and kernel command line. The embedded kernel command line contains a dm-verity hash value that establishes trust in the root file system. When UEFI Secure Boot is disabled, systemd-boot appends any command line it receives to the kernel command line. Account operators with the ability to modify UefiData can install a boot variable with a command line that deactivates root file system integrity validation, while preserving the original PCR4 value. Systemd-boot provides separate measurement of command line modifications in PCR12. ## Impact In line with the TPM 2.0 specification and systemd-stub logic, KMS policies that do not inc...

Google has pushed out a Chrome update with 13 security fixes, including a high-severity flaw in Digital Credentials.

Think your Wi-Fi is safe? Your coding tools? Or even your favorite financial apps? This week proves again how hackers, companies, and governments are all locked in a nonstop race to outsmart each other. Here’s a quick rundown of the latest cyber stories that show how fast the game keeps changing. DeFi exploit drains funds Critical yETH Exploit Used to Steal $9M

IT teams are stuck between wanting to implement AI solutions across their organizations and dealing with the messy reality of increasingly complex infrastructure. Many are attempting to build their own automation solutions, cobbling together a patchwork of tools that, while well-intentioned, can actually make things worse. Red Hat dug into this with SP Global Market Intelligence 451 Research, and their findings point to a simpler alternative: use a unified platform instead of patchworking tools together.The DIY dilemma: More tools, more problemsMost teams are drowning in tools, often ending up