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Large scale Google Ads campaign targets utility software

Malicious Google sponsored results disguised as software downloads lead to malware.

Malwarebytes
#web#mac#windows#apple#google#git#php#sap
Malicious Chrome Extensions Skate Past Google's Updated Security

Google's Manifest V3 offers better privacy and security controls for browser extensions than the previous M2, but too many lax permissions and gaps remain.

GHSA-5gpr-w2p5-6m37: PhpSpreadsheet allows absolute path traversal and Server-Side Request Forgery when opening XLSX file

### Summary It's possible for an attacker to construct an XLSX file which links media from external URLs. When opening the XLSX file, PhpSpreadsheet retrieves the image size and type by reading the file contents, if the provided path is a URL. By using specially crafted `php://filter` URLs an attacker can leak the contents of any file or URL. Note that this vulnerability is different from [GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4](https://github.com/PHPOffice/PhpSpreadsheet/security/advisories/GHSA-w9xv-qf98-ccq4), and resides in a different component. ### Details When an XLSX file is opened, the XLSX reader calls `setPath()` with the path provided in the `xl/drawings/_rels/drawing1.xml.rels` file in the XLSX archive: ```php if (isset($images[$embedImageKey])) { // ...omit irrelevant code... } else { $linkImageKey = (string) self::getArrayItem( $blip->attributes('http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships'), 'link' ); if (isset($images[$linkImag...

Stealthy Malware Has Infected Thousands of Linux Systems for Years

Perfctl malware is hard to detect, persists after reboots, and can perform a breadth of malicious activities.

Insider Threat Damage Balloons as Visibility Gaps Widen

A growing number of organizations are taking longer to get back on their feet after an attack, and they're paying high price tags to do so — up to $2M or more.

How This Video Game Controller Became the US Military’s Weapon of Choice

After decades of relying on buttons, switches, and toggles, the Pentagon has embraced simple, ergonomic video-game-style controllers already familiar to millions of potential recruits.

GHSA-xwgj-vpm9-q2rq: Vulnerable juju introspection abstract UNIX domain socket

### Impact An abstract UNIX domain socket responsible for introspection is available without authentication locally to any user with access to the network namespace where the local juju agent is running. On a juju controller agent, denial of service can be performed by using the `/leases/revoke` endpoint. Revoking leases in juju can cause availability issues. On a juju machine agent that is hosting units, disabling the unit component can be performed using the `/units` endpoint with a "stop" action. ### Patches Patch: https://github.com/juju/juju/commit/43f0fc59790d220a457d4d305f484f62be556d3b Patched in: - 3.5.4 - 3.4.6 - 3.3.7 - 3.1.10 - 2.9.51 ### Workarounds No workaround. ### References https://github.com/juju/juju/blob/725800953aaa29dbeda4f806097bf838e61644dd/worker/introspection/worker.go#L125

GHSA-mh98-763h-m9v4: JUJU_CONTEXT_ID is a predictable authentication secret

`JUJU_CONTEXT_ID` is the authentication measure on the unit hook tool abstract domain socket. It looks like `JUJU_CONTEXT_ID=appname/0-update-status-6073989428498739633`. This value looks fairly unpredictable, but due to the random source used, it is highly predictable. `JUJU_CONTEXT_ID` has the following components: - the application name - the unit number - the hook being currently run - a uint63 decimal number On a system the application name and unit number can be deduced by reading the structure of the filesystem. The current hook being run is not easily deduce-able, but is a limited set of possible values, so one could try them all. Finally the random number, this is generated from a non cryptographically secure random source. Specifically the random number generator built into the go standard library, using the current unix time in seconds (at startup) as the seed. There is no rate limiting on the abstract domain socket, the only limiting factor is time (window of time the h...

The Secret Weakness Execs Are Overlooking: Non-Human Identities

For years, securing a company’s systems was synonymous with securing its “perimeter.” There was what was safe “inside” and the unsafe outside world. We built sturdy firewalls and deployed sophisticated detection systems, confident that keeping the barbarians outside the walls kept our data and systems safe. The problem is that we no longer operate within the confines of physical on-prem