#nginx

## Summary A possible information disclosure vulnerability existed in `Rack::Sendfile` when running behind a proxy that supports `x-sendfile` headers (such as Nginx). Specially crafted headers could cause `Rack::Sendfile` to miscommunicate with the proxy and trigger unintended internal requests, potentially bypassing proxy-level access restrictions. ## Details When `Rack::Sendfile` received untrusted `x-sendfile-type` or `x-accel-mapping` headers from a client, it would interpret them as proxy configuration directives. This could cause the middleware to send a "redirect" response to the proxy, prompting it to reissue a new internal request that was **not subject to the proxy's access controls**. An attacker could exploit this by: 1. Setting a crafted `x-sendfile-type: x-accel-redirect` header. 2. Setting a crafted `x-accel-mapping` header. 3. Requesting a path that qualifies for proxy-based acceleration. ## Impact Attackers could bypass proxy-enforced restrictions and access inte...

## Summary `Rack::Multipart::Parser` can accumulate unbounded data when a multipart part’s header block never terminates with the required blank line (`CRLFCRLF`). The parser keeps appending incoming bytes to memory without a size cap, allowing a remote attacker to exhaust memory and cause a denial of service (DoS). ## Details While reading multipart headers, the parser waits for `CRLFCRLF` using: ```ruby @sbuf.scan_until(/(.*?\r\n)\r\n/m) ``` If the terminator never appears, it continues appending data (`@sbuf.concat(content)`) indefinitely. There is no limit on accumulated header bytes, so a single malformed part can consume memory proportional to the request body size. ## Impact Attackers can send incomplete multipart headers to trigger high memory use, leading to process termination (OOM) or severe slowdown. The effect scales with request size limits and concurrency. All applications handling multipart uploads may be affected. ## Mitigation * Upgrade to a patched Rack vers...

## Summary `Rack::Multipart::Parser` stores non-file form fields (parts without a `filename`) entirely in memory as Ruby `String` objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS). ## Details During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory: ```ruby body = String.new # non-file → in-RAM buffer @mime_parts[mime_index].body << content ``` There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to `params`. ## Impact Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications p...

## Summary `Rack::QueryParser` in version `< 2.2.18` enforces its `params_limit` only for parameters separated by `&`, while still splitting on both `&` and `;`. As a result, attackers could use `;` separators to bypass the parameter count limit and submit more parameters than intended. ## Details The issue arises because `Rack::QueryParser#check_query_string` counts only `&` characters when determining the number of parameters, but the default separator regex `DEFAULT_SEP = /[&;] */n` splits on both `&` and `;`. This mismatch means that queries using `;` separators were not included in the parameter count, allowing `params_limit` to be bypassed. Other safeguards (`bytesize_limit` and `key_space_limit`) still applied, but did not prevent this particular bypass. ## Impact Applications or middleware that directly invoke `Rack::QueryParser` with its default configuration (no explicit delimiter) could be exposed to increased CPU and memory consumption. This can be abused as a limited...

### Summary A flaw in the `getPath` utility function could allow path confusion and potential bypass of proxy-level ACLs (e.g. Nginx location blocks). ### Details The original implementation relied on fixed character offsets when parsing request URLs. Under certain malformed absolute-form Request-URIs, this could lead to incorrect path extraction. Most standards-compliant runtimes and reverse proxies reject such malformed requests with a 400 Bad Request, so the impact depends on the application and environment. ### Impact If proxy ACLs are used to protect sensitive endpoints such as `/admin`, this flaw could have allowed unauthorized access. The confidentiality impact depends on what data is exposed: if sensitive administrative data is exposed, the impact may be High (CVSS 7.5); otherwise it may be Medium (CVSS 5.3). ### Resolution The implementation has been updated to correctly locate the first slash after "://", preventing such path confusion.

Sending AWS chunk data with no Content-Length HTTP header causes the panic, every time. ### Reproduction Setup versity server running on port 7071, no SSL (for ease of packet tracing with tshark). Problem can be reproduced with or without SSL on the versity end. Use nginx to reverse proxy on port 7070. This does have to be SSL enabled for the repro to occur. nginx config: ``` upstream tony_versity { server 127.0.0.1:7071; keepalive 15; } server { listen 7070 ssl ; access_log /var/log/nginx/tony_versity_proxy.access.log; error_log /var/log/nginx/tony_versity_proxy.error.log; # Allow any size file to be uploaded. client_max_body_size 0; # Allow special characters in headers ignore_invalid_headers off; # Disable buffering proxy_buffering off; proxy_request_buffering off; # Load configuration files for the default server block. include /etc/nginx/default.d/*.conf; ssl_certificate "/WS/TEMP/lh.crt"; ss...

### Impact A vulnerability has been identified within Rancher Manager in which it did not enforce request body size limits on certain public (unauthenticated) and authenticated API endpoints. This allows a malicious user to exploit this by sending excessively large payloads, which are fully loaded into memory during processing. This could result in: - Denial of Service (DoS): The server process may crash or become unresponsive when memory consumption exceeds available resources. - Unauthenticated and authenticated exploitation: While the issue was initially observed in unauthenticated `/v3-public/*` endpoints, the absence of request body size limits also affected several authenticated APIs, broadening the potential attack surface. It's worth noting that other areas in Rancher do implement safeguards: requests proxied to Kubernetes APIs are subject to built-in size limits enforced by the [Kubernetes API server itself](https://github.com/kubernetes/kubernetes/blob/v1.33.4/staging/src/k8s...

## Summary A vulnerability exists in the file update mechanism which allows an unauthenticated actor to modify existing files with arbitrary contents (without changes being applied to the files' database-resident metadata) and / or upload new files, with arbitrary content and extensions, which won't show up in the Directus UI. ## Details Directus exposes the CRUD operations for uploading or handling files under the `/files` route. The endpoint handler is responsible for updating an existing file identified by the provided primary key specified through the `pk` parameter. Primary keys are UUID values such as `/files/927b3abf-fb4b-4c66-bdaa-eb7dc48a51cb`. Here the `filename_disk` value is never sanitized, it's possible to pass a path containing traversal sequences (`../`) through it, but a fully arbitrary file write is not possible in case the "local" storage handler is used. (Other storage implementations haven't been checked during the research process). The `packages/storage-drive...

### Impact This is a configuration vulnerability affecting nginx-defender deployments. Example configuration files [config.yaml](https://github.com/Anipaleja/nginx-defender/blob/main/config.yaml), [docker-compose.yml](https://github.com/Anipaleja/nginx-defender/blob/main/docker-compose.yml) contain default credentials (`default_password: "change_me_please"`, `GF_SECURITY_ADMIN_PASSWORD=admin123`). If users deploy nginx-defender without changing these defaults, attackers with network access could gain administrative control, bypassing security protections. **Who is impacted?** All users who deploy nginx-defender with default credentials and expose the admin interface to untrusted networks. ### Patches The issue is addressed in v1.5.0 and later. Startup warnings are added if default credentials are detected. Documentation now strongly recommends changing all default passwords before deployment. Patched versions: 1.5.0 and later **Will be fully patched in v1.7.0 and later** ### Worka...

As of January 10, 2023, CISA will no longer be updating ICS security advisories for Siemens product vulnerabilities beyond the initial advisory. For the most up-to-date information on vulnerabilities in this advisory, please see Siemens' ProductCERT Security Advisories (CERT Services | Services | Siemens Global). View CSAF 1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY CVSS v4 8.8 ATTENTION: Exploitable remotely/low attack complexity Vendor: Siemens Equipment: SINEC Traffic Analyzer Vulnerabilities: NULL Pointer Dereference, Use After Free, Uncontrolled Resource Consumption, Execution with Unnecessary Privileges, Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor, Irrelevant Code, Channel Accessible by Non-Endpoint 2. RISK EVALUATION Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow an attacker to cause a denial-of-service condition or gain elevated access and access to sensitive resources. 3. TECHNICAL DETAILS 3.1 AFFECTED PRODUCTS Siemens reports the following products are affected: Siemens...