#vulnerability

### Impact In distributed service mode, Pomerium's Authenticate service exposes pprof debug and prometheus metrics handlers to untrusted traffic. This can leak potentially sensitive environmental information or lead to limited denial of service conditions. ### Patches v0.17.1 ### Workarounds Block access to `/debug` and `/metrics` paths on the authenticate service. This can be done with any L7 proxy, including Pomerium's own proxy service. ### References https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium/pull/3212 ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in [Pomerium](https://github.com/pomerium/pomerium) * Email us at [security@pomerium.com](mailto:security@pomerium.com)

### Summary `gix-path` runs `git` to find the path of a configuration file associated with the `git` installation, but improperly resolves paths containing unusual or non-ASCII characters, in rare cases enabling a local attacker to inject configuration leading to code execution. ### Details In `gix_path::env`, the underlying implementation of the `installation_config` and `installation_config_prefix` functions calls `git config -l --show-origin` to find the path of a file to treat as belonging to the `git` installation. Affected versions of `gix-path` do not pass `-z`/`--null` to cause `git` to report literal paths (650a1b5cf25e086197cc55a68525a411e1c28031). Instead, to cover the occasional case that `git` outputs a quoted path, they attempt to parse the path by stripping the quotation marks: https://github.com/Byron/gitoxide/blob/1cfe577d461293879e91538dbc4bbfe01722e1e8/gix-path/src/env/git/mod.rs#L138-L142 The problem is that, when a path is quoted, it may change in substantial...

### Impact The vulnerability depends on user interaction by opening a malicious notebook with Markdown cells, or Markdown file using JupyterLab preview feature. A malicious user can access any data accessible from JupyterLite and perform arbitrary actions in JupyterLite environment. ### Patches JupyterLite 0.4.1 was patched. ### Workarounds There is no workaround for the underlying DOM Clobbering susceptibility. However, select plugins can be disabled on deployments which cannot update in a timely fashion to minimise the risk. These are: - `@jupyterlab/mathjax-extension:plugin` - users will loose ability to preview mathematical equations - `@jupyterlab/markdownviewer-extension:plugin` - users will loose ability to open Markdown previews - `@jupyterlab/mathjax2-extension:plugin` (if installed with optional `jupyterlab-mathjax2` package) - an older version of the mathjax plugin for JupyterLab 4.x To disable these extensions populate the `disabledExtensions` key in `jupyter-config...

In the past, Putin's Unit 29155 has utilized malware like WhisperGate to target organizations, particularly those in Ukraine.

### Impact XSLT transforms performed by various components are vulnerable to XML external entity injections. A processed XML file with a malicious DTD tag ( `<!DOCTYPE foo [<!ENTITY example SYSTEM "/etc/passwd"> ]>` could produce XML containing data from the host system. This impacts use cases where org.hl7.fhir.core is being used to within a host where external clients can submit XML. ### Patches This issue has been patched in release 6.3.23 ### Workarounds None. ### References [MITRE CWE](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/611.html) [OWASP XML External Entity Prevention Cheat Sheet](https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/XML_External_Entity_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html#transformerfactory)

The vulnerabilities affect industrial control tech used across the healthcare and critical manufacturing sectors.

This report concerns the Groth16 prover when used with commitments (as in `frontend.Committer`). To simplify exposition of the issue, I will focus on the case of a single commitment, to only private witnesses. But the issue should be present whenever commitments are used that include private witnesses. > The commitment to private witnesses `w_i` is computed as ``` c = sum_i w_i * b_i ``` where `b_i` would be `ProvingKey.CommitmentKeys[0].Basis[i]` in the code. While this is a binding commitment, it is not hiding. In practice, an adversary will know the points `b_i`, as they are part of the proving key, and can verify correctness of a guess for the values of `w_i` by computing `c'` as the right hand side of the above formula, and checking whether `c'` is equal to `c`. I attach a proof of concept that demonstrates this. This breaks the perfect zero-knowledge property of Groth16, so the Groth16 scheme using commitments to private witnesses as implemented by gnark fails to be a zk-SNARK...

C-MOR Video Surveillance versions 5.2401 and 6.00PL01 suffer from a command injection vulnerability.

C-MOR Video Surveillance version 5.2401 makes use of unmaintained vulnerability third-party components.

C-MOR Video Surveillance versions 5.2401 and 6.00PL01 stores sensitive information, such as credentials, in clear text.