Headline
GHSA-vf84-mxrq-crqc: OpenBao Root Namespace Operator May Elevate Token Privileges
Impact
Accounts with access to the highly-privileged identity entity system in the root namespace may increase their scope directly to the root policy. While the identity system always allowed adding arbitrary policies, which in turn could contain capability grants on arbitrary paths, the root policy is restricted to manual generation using unseal or recovery key shares. The global root policy is not accessible from child namespaces.
Patches
OpenBao v2.3.2 will patch this issue.
Workarounds
Use of denied_parameters in any policy which has access to the affected identity endpoints (on identity entities) may be sufficient to prohibit this type of attack.
References
This issue was disclosed to HashiCorp and is the OpenBao equivalent of the following tickets:
- https://discuss.hashicorp.com/t/hcsec-2025-13-vault-root-namespace-operator-may-elevate-token-privileges/76032
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/cve-2025-5999
Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.
Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.
Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.
User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.
Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.
Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.
Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.
Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.