Headline

GHSA-r657-rxjc-j557: Rack has a Possible Information Disclosure Vulnerability

Summary

A possible information disclosure vulnerability existed in Rack::Sendfile when running behind a proxy that supports x-sendfile headers (such as Nginx). Specially crafted headers could cause Rack::Sendfile to miscommunicate with the proxy and trigger unintended internal requests, potentially bypassing proxy-level access restrictions.

Details

When Rack::Sendfile received untrusted x-sendfile-type or x-accel-mapping headers from a client, it would interpret them as proxy configuration directives. This could cause the middleware to send a “redirect” response to the proxy, prompting it to reissue a new internal request that was not subject to the proxy’s access controls.

An attacker could exploit this by:

Setting a crafted x-sendfile-type: x-accel-redirect header.
Setting a crafted x-accel-mapping header.
Requesting a path that qualifies for proxy-based acceleration.

Impact

Attackers could bypass proxy-enforced restrictions and access internal endpoints intended to be protected (such as administrative pages). The vulnerability did not allow arbitrary file reads but could expose sensitive application routes.

This issue only affected systems meeting all of the following conditions:

The application used Rack::Sendfile with a proxy that supports x-accel-redirect (e.g., Nginx).
The proxy did not always set or remove the x-sendfile-type and x-accel-mapping headers.
The application exposed an endpoint that returned a body responding to .to_path.

Mitigation

Upgrade to a fixed version of Rack which requires explicit configuration to enable x-accel-redirect:
```
use Rack::Sendfile, "x-accel-redirect"
```

Alternatively, configure the proxy to always set or strip the headers (you should be doing this!):

proxy_set_header x-sendfile-type x-accel-redirect;
proxy_set_header x-accel-mapping /var/www/=/files/;

Or in Rails applications, disable sendfile completely:
```
config.action_dispatch.x_sendfile_header = nil
```

3 days ago

ghsa

Open in Source

#vulnerability #nginx #ruby

Summary

A possible information disclosure vulnerability existed in Rack::Sendfile when running behind a proxy that supports x-sendfile headers (such as Nginx). Specially crafted headers could cause Rack::Sendfile to miscommunicate with the proxy and trigger unintended internal requests, potentially bypassing proxy-level access restrictions.

Details

When Rack::Sendfile received untrusted x-sendfile-type or x-accel-mapping headers from a client, it would interpret them as proxy configuration directives. This could cause the middleware to send a “redirect” response to the proxy, prompting it to reissue a new internal request that was not subject to the proxy’s access controls.

An attacker could exploit this by:

Setting a crafted x-sendfile-type: x-accel-redirect header.
Setting a crafted x-accel-mapping header.
Requesting a path that qualifies for proxy-based acceleration.

Impact

This issue only affected systems meeting all of the following conditions:

The application used Rack::Sendfile with a proxy that supports x-accel-redirect (e.g., Nginx).
The proxy did not always set or remove the x-sendfile-type and x-accel-mapping headers.
The application exposed an endpoint that returned a body responding to .to_path.

Mitigation

Upgrade to a fixed version of Rack which requires explicit configuration to enable x-accel-redirect:

use Rack::Sendfile, “x-accel-redirect”
Alternatively, configure the proxy to always set or strip the headers (you should be doing this!):

proxy_set_header x-sendfile-type x-accel-redirect; proxy_set_header x-accel-mapping /var/www/=/files/;
Or in Rails applications, disable sendfile completely:

config.action_dispatch.x_sendfile_header = nil

References