#ruby

## Summary `Rack::QueryParser` parses query strings and `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` bodies into Ruby data structures without imposing any limit on the number of parameters, allowing attackers to send requests with extremely large numbers of parameters. ## Details The vulnerability arises because `Rack::QueryParser` iterates over each `&`-separated key-value pair and adds it to a Hash without enforcing an upper bound on the total number of parameters. This allows an attacker to send a single request containing hundreds of thousands (or more) of parameters, which consumes excessive memory and CPU during parsing. ## Impact An attacker can trigger denial of service by sending specifically crafted HTTP requests, which can cause memory exhaustion or pin CPU resources, stalling or crashing the Rack server. This results in full service disruption until the affected worker is restarted. ## Mitigation - Update to a version of Rack that limits the number of parameters parsed, or - ...

### Summary When verifying SSL certificates, jruby-openssl is not verifying that the hostname presented in the certificate matches the one we are trying to connect to, meaning a MITM could just present _any_ valid cert for a completely different domain they own, and JRuby wouldn't complain. ### Details n/a ### PoC An example domain bad.substitutealert.com was created to present the a certificate for the domain s8a.me. The following script run in IRB in CRuby 3.4.3 will fail with `certificate verify failed (hostname mismatch)`, but will work just fine in JRuby 10.0.0.0 and JRuby 9.4.2.0, both of which use jruby-openssl version 0.15.3 ```ruby require "net/http" require "openssl" uri = URI("https://bad.substitutealert.com/") https = Net::HTTP.new(uri.host, uri.port) https.use_ssl = true https.verify_mode = OpenSSL::SSL::VERIFY_PEER body = https.start { https.get(uri.request_uri).body } puts body ``` ### Impact Anybody using JRuby to make requests of external APIs, or scrapi...

### Summary There is a possibility for denial of service by memory exhaustion when `net-imap` reads server responses. At any time while the client is connected, a malicious server can send can send a "literal" byte count, which is automatically read by the client's receiver thread. The response reader immediately allocates memory for the number of bytes indicated by the server response. This should not be an issue when securely connecting to trusted IMAP servers that are well-behaved. It can affect insecure connections and buggy, untrusted, or compromised servers (for example, connecting to a user supplied hostname). ### Details The IMAP protocol allows "literal" strings to be sent in responses, prefixed with their size in curly braces (e.g. `{1234567890}\r\n`). When `Net::IMAP` receives a response containing a literal string, it calls `IO#read` with that size. When called with a size, `IO#read` immediately allocates memory to buffer the entire string before processing continu...

Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed three security flaws in the Rack Ruby web server interface that, if successfully exploited, could enable attackers to gain unauthorized access to files, inject malicious data, and tamper with logs under certain conditions. The vulnerabilities, flagged by cybersecurity vendor OPSWAT, are listed below - CVE-2025-27610 (CVSS score: 7.5) - A path traversal

Two high-severity security flaws have been disclosed in the open-source ruby-saml library that could allow malicious actors to bypass Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) authentication protections. SAML is an XML-based markup language and open-standard used for exchanging authentication and authorization data between parties, enabling features like single sign-on (SSO), which allows

### Summary An authentication bypass vulnerability was found in ruby-saml due to a parser differential. ReXML and Nokogiri parse XML differently, the parsers can generate entirely different document structures from the same XML input. That allows an attacker to be able to execute a Signature Wrapping attack. ### Impact This issue may lead to authentication bypass.

### Summary An authentication bypass vulnerability was found in ruby-saml due to a parser differential. ReXML and Nokogiri parse XML differently, the parsers can generate entirely different document structures from the same XML input. That allows an attacker to be able to execute a Signature Wrapping attack. ### Impact This issue may lead to authentication bypass.

### Summary ruby-saml is susceptible to remote Denial of Service (DoS) with compressed SAML responses. Ruby-saml uses zlib to decompress SAML responses in case they're compressed. It is possible to bypass the message size check with a compressed assertion since the message size is checked before inflation and not after. ### Impact This issue may lead to remote Denial of Service (DoS).

### Summary There are 2 new Critical Signature Wrapping Vulnerabilities (CVE-2025-25292, CVE-2025-25291) and a potential DDOS Moderated Vulneratiblity (CVE-2025-25293) affecting ruby-saml, a dependency of omniauth-saml. The fix will be applied to ruby-saml and released 12 March 2025, under version 1.18.0. Please [upgrade](https://github.com/omniauth/omniauth-saml/blob/master/omniauth-saml.gemspec#L16) the ruby-saml requirement to v1.18.0. ### Impact Signature Wrapping Vulnerabilities allows an attacker to impersonate a user.

# Summary Loading a malicious schema definition in `GraphQL::Schema.from_introspection` (or `GraphQL::Schema::Loader.load`) can result in remote code execution. Any system which loads a schema by JSON from an untrusted source is vulnerable, including those that use [GraphQL::Client](https://github.com/github-community-projects/graphql-client) to load external schemas via GraphQL introspection.