Headline
GHSA-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw: Rack: Multipart parser buffers large non‑file fields entirely in memory, enabling DoS (memory exhaustion)
Summary
Rack::Multipart::Parser
stores non-file form fields (parts without a filename
) entirely in memory as Ruby String
objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).
Details
During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:
body = String.new # non-file → in-RAM buffer
@mime_parts[mime_index].body << content
There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to params
.
Impact
Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.
Mitigation
- Upgrade: Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
- Workarounds:
- Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx
client_max_body_size
). - Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.
- Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx
Summary
Rack::Multipart::Parser stores non-file form fields (parts without a filename) entirely in memory as Ruby String objects. A single large text field in a multipart/form-data request (hundreds of megabytes or more) can consume equivalent process memory, potentially leading to out-of-memory (OOM) conditions and denial of service (DoS).
Details
During multipart parsing, file parts are streamed to temporary files, but non-file parts are buffered into memory:
body = String.new # non-file → in-RAM buffer @mime_parts[mime_index].body << content
There is no size limit on these in-memory buffers. As a result, any large text field—while technically valid—will be loaded fully into process memory before being added to params.
Impact
Attackers can send large non-file fields to trigger excessive memory usage. Impact scales with request size and concurrency, potentially leading to worker crashes or severe garbage-collection overhead. All Rack applications processing multipart form submissions are affected.
Mitigation
- Upgrade: Use a patched version of Rack that enforces a reasonable size cap for non-file fields (e.g., 2 MiB).
- Workarounds:
- Restrict maximum request body size at the web-server or proxy layer (e.g., Nginx client_max_body_size).
- Validate and reject unusually large form fields at the application level.
References
- GHSA-w9pc-fmgc-vxvw
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-61771
- rack/rack@589127f
- rack/rack@d869fed
- rack/rack@e08f78c