Latest News
# Command Injection in adb-mcp MCP Server The MCP Server at https://github.com/srmorete/adb-mcp is written in a way that is vulnerable to command injection vulnerability attacks as part of some of its MCP Server tool definition and implementation. The MCP Server is also published publicly to npm at www.npmjs.com/package/adb-mcp and allows users to install it. ## Vulnerable tool The MCP Server defines the function `executeAdbCommand()` which executes commands via string as a parameter and wraps the promise-based `exec` function. The MCP Server then exposes the tool `inspect_ui` which relies on Node.js child process API `exec` (through the function wrapper) to execute the Android debugging command (`adb`). Relying on `exec` is an unsafe and vulnerable API if concatenated with untrusted user input. Data flows from the tool definition [here](https://github.com/srmorete/adb-mcp/blob/master/src/index.ts#L334-L343) which takes in `args.device` and calls `execPromise()` in [this definiti...
When using Claude Code with Yarn versions 2.0+, Yarn plugins are auto-executed when running `yarn --version`. This could lead to a bypass of the directory trust dialog in Claude Code, as plugins would be executed prior to the user accepting the risks of working in an untrusted directory. Users running Yarn Classic were unaffected by this issue. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update will have received this fix automatically. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to https://hackerone.com/michel_ for reporting this issue!
## Overview Omni and each Talos machine establish a peer-to-peer (P2P) SideroLink connection using WireGuard to mutually authenticate and authorize access. In this setup, Omni assigns a random IPv6 address to each Talos machine from a `/64` network block. Omni itself uses the fixed `::1` address within that same block. From Omni's perspective, this is a WireGuard interface with multiple peers, where each peer corresponds to a Talos machine. The WireGuard interface on Omni is configured to ensure that the **source IP address** of an incoming packet matches the IPv6 address assigned to the Talos peer. However, it **performs no validation on the packet's destination address**. The Talos end of the SideroLink connection cannot be considered a trusted environment. Workloads running on Kubernetes, especially those configured with host networking, could gain direct access to this link. Therefore, a malicious workload could theoretically send arbitrary packets over the SideroLink interface...
### Impact v3.1.0, v2.1.3, v1.16.5 and below ### Patches Has been patched in 3.1.1, 2.1.4, and 1.16.6 ### Workarounds You can use the ignore option to ignore non files/directories. ```js ignore (_, header) { // pass files & directories, ignore e.g. symlinks return header.type !== 'file' && header.type !== 'directory' } ``` ### Credit Reported by: Mapta / BugBunny_ai
A security flaw has been discovered in Mangati NovoSGA up to 2.2.9. The impacted element is an unknown function of the file /admin of the component SVG File Handler. Performing manipulation of the argument logoNavbar/logoLogin results in cross site scripting. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The exploit has been released to the public and may be exploited. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.
The csvtojson package, a tool for converting CSV data to JSON with customizable parsing capabilities, contains a prototype pollution vulnerability in versions prior to 2.0.10. This issue arises due to insufficient sanitization of nested header names during the parsing process in the parser_jsonarray component. When processing CSV input containing specially crafted header fields that reference prototype chains (e.g., using __proto__ syntax), the application may unintentionally modify properties of the base Object prototype. This vulnerability can lead to denial of service conditions or unexpected behavior in applications relying on unmodified prototype chains, particularly when untrusted CSV data is processed. The flaw does not require user interaction beyond providing a maliciously constructed CSV file.
The Runtime components of messageformat package for Node.js prior to version 3.0.1 contain a prototype pollution vulnerability. Due to insufficient validation of nested message keys during the processing of message data, an attacker can manipulate the prototype chain of JavaScript objects by providing specially crafted input. This can result in the injection of arbitrary properties into the Object.prototype, potentially leading to denial of service conditions or unexpected application behavior. The vulnerability allows attackers to alter the prototype of base objects, impacting all subsequent object instances throughout the application's lifecycle. This issue remains unaddressed in the latest available version.
The Python Software Foundation (PSF) warns developers of phishing emails leading to a fake PyPI login site designed to steal account credentials.
A suspected cyber espionage activity cluster that was previously found targeting global government and private sector organizations spanning Africa, Asia, North America, South America, and Oceania has been assessed to be a Chinese state-sponsored threat actor. Recorded Future, which was tracking the activity under the moniker TAG-100, has now graduated it to a hacking group dubbed RedNovember.
When extracting a tar archive pip may not check symbolic links point into the extraction directory if the tarfile module doesn't implement PEP 706. Note that upgrading pip to a "fixed" version for this vulnerability doesn't fix all known vulnerabilities that are remediated by using a Python version that implements PEP 706. Note that this is a vulnerability in pip's fallback implementation of tar extraction for Python versions that don't implement PEP 706 and therefore are not secure to all vulnerabilities in the Python 'tarfile' module. If you're using a Python version that implements PEP 706 then pip doesn't use the "vulnerable" fallback code. Mitigations include upgrading to a version of pip that includes the fix, upgrading to a Python version that implements PEP 706 (Python >=3.9.17, >=3.10.12, >=3.11.4, or >=3.12), applying the linked patch, or inspecting source distributions (sdists) before installation as is already a best-practice.