# Duplicate Advisory
This advisory has been withdrawn because it is a duplicate of GHSA-mj4v-hp69-27x5. This link is maintained to preserve external references.

# Original Description
Plenti <= 0.7.16 is vulnerable to code execution. Users uploading '.svelte' files with the /postLocal endpoint can define the file name as javascript codes. The server executes the uploaded file name in host, and cause code execution.

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1.  GitHub Advisory Database
2.  GitHub Reviewed
3.  GHSA-323w-6p85-26fr

**Duplicate Advisory: Plenti - Code Injection - Denial of Services**

Moderate severity GitHub Reviewed Published Mar 12, 2025 to the GitHub Advisory Database • Updated Mar 12, 2025

Withdrawn This advisory was withdrawn on Mar 12, 2025

**Package**

gomod github.com/plentico/plenti (Go)

**Affected versions**

< 0.7.17

**Description**

Published by the National Vulnerability Database

Mar 12, 2025

Published to the GitHub Advisory Database

Mar 12, 2025

Last updated

Mar 12, 2025

**EPSS score**

GHSA-323w-6p85-26fr: Duplicate Advisory: Plenti  - Code Injection - Denial of Services

Sonatype researchers uncover critical vulnerabilities in picklescan. Learn how these flaws impact AI model security, Hugging Face, and…

Sonatype researchers uncover critical vulnerabilities in picklescan. Learn how these flaws impact AI model security, Hugging Face, and best practices for developers.

Cybersecurity researchers at Sonatype have identified several vulnerabilities within picklescan, a tool used for examining Python pickle files for malicious code. These files, commonly used for storing and retrieving machine learning models, pose a security risk due to their ability to execute arbitrary code during the process of retrieving the stored data.

According to Sonatype’s analysis, shared with Hackread.com, in total four vulnerabilities were found:

*   **CVE-2025-1716**– allows attackers to bypass the tool’s checks and execute harmful code;

*   **CVE-2025-1889**– failure to detect hidden malicious files due to its reliance on file extensions;

*   **CVE-2025-1944**– can be exploited by manipulating ZIP archive filenames to cause the tool to malfunction;

*   **CVE-2025-1945**– failure to detect malicious files when certain bits within ZIP archives are altered.

It is worth noting that platforms such as Hugging Face utilize picklescan as part of their security measures to identify malicious AI models. The discovered vulnerabilities could allow malicious actors to bypass these security checks, thereby posing a threat to developers who rely on open-source AI models, as they can lead to “arbitrary code execution,” researchers noted. This means, an attacker could possibly take complete control of a system.

“Given the role of picklescan within the wider AI/ML hygiene posture (e.g. when used with PyTorch), the vulnerabilities discovered by Sonatype could be leveraged by threat actors to bypass malware scanning (at least in part) and target devs leveraging open source AI,” researchers explained in the blog post.

Good news is that picklescan maintainer showed a strong commitment to security by promptly addressing vulnerabilities, releasing version 0.0.23, which patched flaws, minimizing the opportunity for malicious actors to exploit them.

Sonatype’s chief product officer, Mitchell Johnson, urges developers to avoid using pickle files from untrusted sources whenever possible, and instead utilize safer file formats. If pickle files must be used, they should only be loaded in secure, controlled environments. Moreover, it is important to verify the integrity of AI models through cryptographic signatures and checksums, and implementing multi-layered security scanning.

The findings highlight the growing need for advanced, reliable security measures in AI/ML pipelines. To mitigate the risks, organizations should adopt practices such as utilizing safer file formats, employing multiple security scanning tools, and monitoring for suspicious behaviour when loading pickle files.

Picklescan Vulnerabilities Could Let Hackers Bypass AI Security Checks

Apple has patched a vulnerability in iOS and iPadOS that was under active exploitation in extremely sophisticated attacks.

Apple has patched a vulnerability in iPhone and iPad that was under active exploitation by cybercriminals.

The update is available for: iPhone XS and later, iPad Pro 13-inch, iPad Pro 12.9-inch 3rd generation and later, iPad Pro 11-inch 1st generation and later, iPad Air 3rd generation and later, iPad 7th generation and later, and iPad mini 5th generation and later.

If you use any of these then you should install updates as soon as you can. To check if you’re using the latest software version, go to **Settings** (or **System Settings**) > **General** > **Software Update**. It’s also worth turning on Automatic Updates if you haven’t already, which you can do on the same screen.

Update Now

Overall, security updates were issued for:

If you use Malwarebytes for iOS, you can use the app to check if you need to update, and be guided through the update process.

Malwarebytes for iOS Trusted Advisor

**Technical details**

WebKit is the browser engine developed by Apple that helps display web content in applications. It allows apps to show web pages without the need for a full web browser. WebKit is used in many Apple products, such as Safari, Mail, and the App Store, as well as in other devices like PlayStation consoles and Amazon Kindle e-readers.

The actively exploited vulnerability is tracked as CVE-2025-24201.

> “An out-of-bounds write issue was addressed with improved checks to prevent unauthorized actions. This issue is fixed in visionOS 2.3.2, iOS 18.3.2 and iPadOS 18.3.2, macOS Sequoia 15.3.2, Safari 18.3.1. Maliciously crafted web content may be able to break out of Web Content sandbox. This is a supplementary fix for an attack that was blocked in iOS 17.2. (Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been exploited in an extremely sophisticated attack against specific targeted individuals on versions of iOS before iOS 17.2.).”

Simply put, that means an attacker could send or lure a target to open a web page which would cause an overflow in the allocated memory for WebKit. The overflow would then enable the attacker to escape from the Web Content Sandbox, which is a security feature used in web browsers to isolate web content, such as web pages and scripts, from the rest of the system. It’s designed to stop malicious code from accessing sensitive system resources or user data outside of the browser.

About a month ago, we reported how Apple fixed another extremely sophisticated attack, that was used against targeted individuals. This one is much more likely to be used against more users so should you prioritise updating your phone as soon as you can.

**We don’t just report on phone security—we provide it**

Cybersecurity risks should never spread beyond a headline. Keep threats off your mobile devices by downloading Malwarebytes for iOS, and Malwarebytes for Android today.

 Update your iPhone now: Apple patches vulnerability used in “extremely sophisticated attacks” 

“No Lives Matter” has emerged in recent months as a particularly violent splinter group within the extremist crime network known as Com and 764, and experts are at a loss for how to stop its spread.

The kids are all grown up. In the face of international law enforcement pressure, dozens of prosecutions, and worldwide disrepute, the network of young sadists, misanthropes, child predators, and extortionists known as Com and 764 has not shrunk away into obscurity.

Rather, its members have progressed from online extortion and crimes related to child sexual abuse material, to real-world violence, a trajectory that alarms extremism researchers and government officials alike. Knifings, killings, firebombings, drive-by shootings, school shootings, and murder-for-hire plots in North America and Europe have all been connected to a splinter group called “No Lives Matter” that, per the group’s own manifesto, “idolizes death” and “seeks the purification of all mankind through endless attacks.” The group has released at least two “kill guides” that have been connected to violent attacks and plots in Europe and the United States.

The US Department of Justice classifies Com and 764 as a “Tier One” terrorism threat, the highest priority afforded to an extremist group, ideology, or tendency in American law enforcement’s internal rubric. Intelligence documents reviewed by WIRED show a stream of concern from analysts about the group’s harm to juvenile exploitation victims and the growing exhortations to physical violence that embody the No Lives Matter ethos.

However, the phenomenon has proved incredibly hard to combat due to a lack of coherent structure or ideology. Along with the insidious neo-Nazi propaganda group the Terrorgram Collective, over the past four years, Com/764 has morphed into a twisted amalgam of the Columbine Effect and older domestic terror groups like the Atomwaffen Division: Young extortionists and assailants egg each other on to progressively more lurid and debased acts of violence for the sake of internet notoriety and status.

In response, Western governments have employed terrorism charges against young people accused of conspiring to kill homeless people or phoning in bomb threats to schools and religious institutions beyond their own borders. In the United Kingdom, the Crown Prosecution Service recently secured a six-year prison term for 19-year-old Cameron Finnegan, who went by the handle “Acid,” for a raft of 764-related offenses, including possessing CSAM, urging young people to kill themselves, and possessing a “kill manual” authored by No Lives Matter adherents, replete with viable instructions for carrying out lethal attacks with knives, firearms, and vehicles.

"We want to make the public aware of \[Com/764\]," Detective Chief Superintendent Claire Finlay, the head of Counter Terrorism Policing Southeast, told the BBC following Finnegan’s guilty plea in January. "The threat that they pose, not just within the United Kingdom but globally, is immense."

According to senior DOJ officials who were granted anonymity to speak about internal law enforcement matters, the feds have come across related cases in every field office in the US. US authorities are so hell-bent on pursuing this trend that they are trying to extradite a 17-year-old Romanian boy who prosecutors at the Southern District of New York claim took part in exploiting minors and soliciting and distributing CSAM. The teenager also faces US terrorism charges for allegedly phoning in several hundred bomb threats to dozens of schools and institutions in the US as part of 764 and its splinter groups, according to information obtained by this reporter.

"We’ve seen a lot of hybrid movements and ideologies, new trends that we can’t categorize under the traditional categories,” says Bàrbara Molas, a senior analyst at RAND Europe who specializes in far-right extremism and who testified as an expert witness for the prosecution in Finnegan’s recent Com/764-related case.

For Molas, Com/764 represents that type of hybridity, where participants in the network will pick and choose elements from a series of discrete ideologies—neo-Nazism; the satanist group Order of Nine Angles, which has become prevalent throughout the most transgressive spheres of the transnational far right; Ted-Kaczynski-inspired neo-Luddism—and assemble their own belief pantheon.

“When 764 was only about CSAM, their targets tended to be women—but specifically women from diminished social groups, who were seen as the weak party of society,” Molas says. “That ideal of imposing violence on this part of society has carried on and become more violent.” When members of the network commit violence in the name of the group, Molas says, it “helps them rise within the group and advance the larger cause, which is to change society through violence and chaos.”

The lodestar for this transition towards wanton violence is a German teenager named Nino Luciano, who went by the handle “Tobbz” within 764. Sent to live in a foster home in Romania because his mental illnesses overwhelmed the capacity of institutions in his home country, Tobbz was drawn into 764 during the Covid-19 pandemic and quickly became enthralled with the group, daubing its name on a wall in his room and tattooing himself with “764” and a septagram from the Order of Nine Angles. In March 2022, he committed and livestreamed a series of knife attacks, stabbing an elderly woman to death and severely wounding an old man. He was convicted in August 2023 and is serving 14 years in prison.

Tobbz’s behavior inspired other young extremists in the Com/764 network, who have since either tried to emulate his livestreamed attacks or commit similar acts of violence to boost their notoriety and status within their extremist peer group. No Lives Matter’s exhortations to commit mass casualty events and distribution of detailed guides to violence are patterned off Tobbz’s example, according to experts who’ve studied the network.

Baron Martin, a resident of Tucson, Arizona, was charged in federal court with cyberstalking and sexual exploitation of a child that included the production of CSAM. According to court records, the government also accused Martin of soliciting the murder of the grandmother of one of his victims under the handle “Convict.” He allegedly sent the following message to a Discord server, court records show: “know anyone in \[state\] thats willing to do kidnappings or shootings...i need someone to tobbz a grandma. Somebody wanted to dox one of my egirls. now I’m getting their grandma merked.” The use of “Tobbz” as a synonym for murder was not casual: Martin allegedly offered to pay another user to carry out the hit, which was never realized.

According to court documents, Martin, through his handle, was connected to authoring a detailed guide widely distributed in 764’s channels on how to groom victims for extortion, which the FBI claims Martin bragged online was “the catalyst for thousands of extortions.” (Martin has pleaded not guilty.)

Molas, of RAND Europe, says Martin’s alleged path from extortion to soliciting a homicide traces a familiar path of transgressive behavior often seen in Com/764’s online world. “They’ll start with little acts of sin—shoplifting, then robberies, abuse of minors, weapons violations, then all the way up to kidnapping and murder,” Molas says.

In mid-February, Jairo Tinajero, a 25-year-old Arkansas man who took part in the 764 splinter group 8884, pleaded guilty to CSAM and conspiracy charges for extorting an underage girl in Louisville, Kentucky. According to his plea agreement, Tinajero confessed to plotting to kill the girl once she stopped complying with him, posting her address and personal information about her and her family family in 764’s servers, unsuccessfully trying to buy an assault rifle, and talking through a murder plot with other 764 members.

Tinajero also admitted taking part in 764 online chats where prior mass casualty attacks were discussed along with “future attacks on heavily populated areas such as malls or other large gatherings, LGBTQ+ events and gatherings, schools, public places, government buildings and police stations” with the intent to “destabilize society and cause the collapse of governments and rule of law.”

Most recently, neo-Nazi Aidan Harding’s inspiration from 764 was brought up during a mid-February federal court hearing for CSAM possession charges. In addition to participating in public actions with a number of Pittsburgh-area extremist groups, prosecutors claimed that Harding and another man were deeply interested in the Columbine massacre, visiting the memorial in Littleton, Colorado, and posing for a photo in front of a swastika flag while dressed as Dylan Klebold and Eric Harris. “Eric and Dylan were kickstarting a revolution,” Harding wrote in a message, which prosecutors showed in court. Harding and the other man, who hasn’t been charged, also discussed carrying out mass shootings through Instagram direct messages, which were presented in court. “The only thing holding me back is a partner … I don’t want to do it alone or die alone,” Harding wrote.

According to two researchers who attended Harding’s three-and-a-half-hour court appearance related to probable cause on February 12, an FBI agent claimed during questioning that investigators found reams of videos depicting children being raped, ultraviolent videos of executions, and the extremist mass shootings in Buffalo, Nashville, and Columbine, along with a photo on Harding’s phone of a phrase daubed in blood: “I sold my soul to 764,” above a swastika and a Lviathan cross often used by 764. Another photo, handed up to the judge and not shown in court, depicted the naked chest of a young girl wearing a cross, with the words “No Lives Matter” carved into her body with a sharp instrument.” Harding has pleaded not guilty.

The crimes described in court cases this year follow a months-long surge in No Lives Matter–related violence. In October, authorities claim, a 14-year-old Swede committed eight attacks on unsuspecting passersby in Stockholm. The attacker, per national broadcaster SVT, took part in 764 and went by the handle “Slain” in the group. Documents circulated by 764 participants on Telegram and elsewhere claim “Slain764” as one of their own, and identify Sweden, the UK, and Bulgaria as countries where their group has a presence.

In mid-February, Italian police arrested a 15-year-old boy on suspicion of planning to murder a homeless man and livestream the act. Police said the teenager was reportedly involved in 764 and faces charges for explosives possession and possession of CSAM material. Italian authorities claim he planned his actions as part of a “week of terror” along with unspecified colleagues.

There is also evidence of 764’s praxis and imagery merging with that of the Terrorgram Collective, a neo-Nazi propaganda network that aims to radicalize young people and inspire solo acts of sabotage and mass murder.

Solomon Henderson, a Tennessee teenager whom police said shot up his high school last month, posted a sprawling manifesto that referenced both mass shooters inspired by Terrorgram as well as homicidal 764 members, including Tobbz. Henderson’s social media accounts also show extensive imagery from 764’s channels as well as the Order of Nine Angles “The influence I see most heavily in that agenda is the Order of Nine Angles,” Molas says.

That confluence of extremist inspirations is highly unpredictable, and may prove influential: There is reportedly evidence that social media accounts connected to Henderson may have communicated with accounts linked to Natalie “Samantha” Rupnow, a young Wisconsin woman who killed two and wounded classmates in a mid-December shooting at her school before dying by suicide. Earlier in December, a high school student in Guadalajara, Mexico, livestreamed an axe attack on his classmates before they were able to subdue him. The young man’s social media posts were rife with O9A influence, including photos of himself with butchered animals and another with a blood pact, a common O9A practice.

The Violent Rise of ‘No Lives Matter’

UNC3886 hackers target Juniper routers with custom backdoor malware, exploiting outdated systems for stealthy access and espionage. Learn how to stay protected.

Cybersecurity researchers at Google’s Mandiant have exposed a series of attacks which took place in mid-2024 targeting Juniper routers running the Junos OS operating system. These attacks, linked to a Chinese hacking group known as UNC3886, involved planting custom-built malware designed to secretly control the devices while evading detection.

****What Happened?****

Mandiant’s investigation revealed that UNC3886 deployed backdoors disguised as legitimate system processes on Juniper MX routers running outdated hardware and software. These routers, using end-of-life (EOL) configurations, were easier targets due to vulnerabilities in their security systems. The malware leveraged Junos OS’s Veriexec, a file integrity monitor, to avoid detection. Instead of disabling Veriexec, the attackers injected malicious code into legitimate processes

According to the company’s blog post shared with Hackread.com ahead of publishing on Wednesday, these backdoors were built on the foundation of a publicly available hacking tool called TINYSHELL.

What makes these attacks particularly alarming is how the hackers customized their malware to integrate into the Juniper environment. The malicious programs were disguised as legitimate system processes, mimicking names like “appid” (a play on a real Juniper process) to avoid raising suspicion. Beyond stealth, the malware included features to disable logging on the routers, effectively erasing traces of the attackers’ activities and making it harder for security teams to spot the intrusion.

To carry out their attacks, the hackers exploited the inner workings of Junos OS, the operating system powering Juniper’s routers and other networking gear. Junos OS is built on a modified version of FreeBSD, a Unix-like system, and offers two ways to interact with it: a command-line interface (CLI) for standard operations and a shell mode that provides deeper access to the underlying system. The attackers used this shell mode to execute their malicious commands.

****How Did the Hackers Make This Happen?****

The attackers gained access by using stolen credentials to infiltrate router management interfaces. Once inside, they injected malware into legitimate processes, such as the cat command, leveraging named pipes and memory manipulation to **evade detection**.

To cover their tracks, some backdoors disabled logging functions, effectively erasing evidence of their presence. For instance, the lmpad backdoor altered system logs and disabled SNMP alerts, making it significantly harder for defenders to spot unauthorized access.

****The Malware Toolkit****

UNC3886 deployed six customized backdoors, all derived from the open-source TINYSHELL framework but specifically adapted for Junos OS. Each variant had unique functionalities:

*   **appid** and **to**: These were active backdoors with hardcoded command-and-control (C2) servers, allowing attackers to upload/download files, execute shell commands, and route traffic through proxies.

*   **irad**: A passive backdoor that remained dormant until triggered by specific “magic strings” in network traffic. Once activated, it could launch remote shells or relay connections.

*   **lmpad**: This hybrid backdoor acted as both a backdoor and a stealth tool. It disabled logging, modified system files, and patched memory to prevent audit logs from recording malicious activity.

*   **jdosd** and **oemd**: These passive backdoors used encrypted **UDP/TCP channels** for covert file transfers and remote command execution, making detection even more challenging.

****About UNC3886****

UNC3886 is a well-known hacking group with a track record of targeting network devices and virtualization technologies, often using previously unknown vulnerabilities (known as **zero-day exploits**). The group’s main focus is on espionage against industries like defence, technology, and telecommunications, particularly in the US and Asia.

While other Chinese hacking campaigns, such as those attributed to groups like **Volt Typhoon** or **Salt Typhoon**, have made headlines, Mandiant found no direct technical connections between UNC3886’s activities and those operations. This suggests that UNC3886 is a distinct threat, operating with its own tools and strategies.

****Why Does This Matter?****

Routers and other network devices are the backbone of modern IT infrastructure, directing traffic and connecting systems across organizations. But unlike laptops or servers, these devices often lack proper security monitoring tools, making them attractive targets for attackers. Once compromised, a router can provide a gateway to an entire network, allowing hackers to spy on communications, steal data, or launch further attacks.

The fact that UNC3886 targeted older, unsupported Juniper devices highlights another issue such as how many organizations continue to rely on outdated equipment, either due to budget restrictions or oversight. These systems are **sitting ducks** for skilled attackers, as they no longer receive patches for newly discovered vulnerabilities.

****What Should Organizations Do?****

Mandiant and Juniper Networks have worked together to address the issue, and they’ve outlined steps organizations can take to protect themselves:

*   **Upgrade Devices**: Replace end-of-life Juniper hardware and software with supported versions. Juniper has released updated software images that include fixes and improved detection capabilities.

*   **Run Security Scans**: Use Juniper’s Malware Removal Tool (JMRT) to perform a Quick Scan and Integrity Check on your devices after upgrading. This can help identify and remove any malicious programs.

*   **Monitor and Harden Networks**: Strengthen security around network devices by limiting access, using strong authentication, and regularly reviewing logs for unusual activity, even though attackers may try to disable logging.

*   **Stay Informed**: Keep up with security advisories from vendors like Juniper and reports from cybersecurity firms like Mandiant to stay ahead of emerging threats.

Chinese Cyber Espionage Group UNC3886 Backdoored Juniper Routers

### Impact
Medium

### Patches
Version 3.4.17 fixes illuminate/validation v 8.0.0 to 11.44.0

### Workarounds
Register \MacropaySolutions\LaravelCrudWizard\Providers\ValidationServiceProvider instead of Illuminate\Validation\ValidationServiceProvider::class if you are using illuminate/validation < 11.44.1

### References
https://github.com/laravel/framework/security/advisories/GHSA-78fx-h6xr-vch4

**Exploitability Metrics**

Attack Vector: This metric reflects the context by which vulnerability exploitation is possible. This metric value (and consequently the resulting severity) will be larger the more remote (logically, and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerable system. The assumption is that the number of potential attackers for a vulnerability that could be exploited from across a network is larger than the number of potential attackers that could exploit a vulnerability requiring physical access to a device, and therefore warrants a greater severity.

Attack Complexity: This metric captures measurable actions that must be taken by the attacker to actively evade or circumvent existing built-in security-enhancing conditions in order to obtain a working exploit. These are conditions whose primary purpose is to increase security and/or increase exploit engineering complexity. A vulnerability exploitable without a target-specific variable has a lower complexity than a vulnerability that would require non-trivial customization. This metric is meant to capture security mechanisms utilized by the vulnerable system.

Attack Requirements: This metric captures the prerequisite deployment and execution conditions or variables of the vulnerable system that enable the attack. These differ from security-enhancing techniques/technologies (ref Attack Complexity) as the primary purpose of these conditions is not to explicitly mitigate attacks, but rather, emerge naturally as a consequence of the deployment and execution of the vulnerable system.

Privileges Required: This metric describes the level of privileges an attacker must possess prior to successfully exploiting the vulnerability. The method by which the attacker obtains privileged credentials prior to the attack (e.g., free trial accounts), is outside the scope of this metric. Generally, self-service provisioned accounts do not constitute a privilege requirement if the attacker can grant themselves privileges as part of the attack.

User interaction: This metric captures the requirement for a human user, other than the attacker, to participate in the successful compromise of the vulnerable system. This metric determines whether the vulnerability can be exploited solely at the will of the attacker, or whether a separate user (or user-initiated process) must participate in some manner.

**Vulnerable System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the VULNERABLE SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the VULNERABLE SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

**Subsequent System Impact Metrics**

Confidentiality: This metric measures the impact to the confidentiality of the information managed by the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM due to a successfully exploited vulnerability. Confidentiality refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.

Integrity: This metric measures the impact to integrity of a successfully exploited vulnerability. Integrity refers to the trustworthiness and veracity of information. Integrity of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM is impacted when an attacker makes unauthorized modification of system data. Integrity is also impacted when a system user can repudiate critical actions taken in the context of the system (e.g. due to insufficient logging).

Availability: This metric measures the impact to the availability of the SUBSEQUENT SYSTEM resulting from a successfully exploited vulnerability. While the Confidentiality and Integrity impact metrics apply to the loss of confidentiality or integrity of data (e.g., information, files) used by the system, this metric refers to the loss of availability of the impacted system itself, such as a networked service (e.g., web, database, email). Since availability refers to the accessibility of information resources, attacks that consume network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space all impact the availability of a system.

GHSA-3wgq-h4fr-cwg5: laravel-crud-wizard-free has File Validation Bypass 

### Impact

A specially crafted document could cause an out of bound read, most likely resulting in a crash.

Versions 2.10.0 and 2.10.1 are impacted. Older versions are not.

### Patches

Version 2.10.2 fixes the problem.

### Workarounds

None.

Attack vector: More severe the more the remote (logically and physically) an attacker can be in order to exploit the vulnerability.

Attack complexity: More severe for the least complex attacks.

Privileges required: More severe if no privileges are required.

User interaction: More severe when no user interaction is required.

Scope: More severe when a scope change occurs, e.g. one vulnerable component impacts resources in components beyond its security scope.

Confidentiality: More severe when loss of data confidentiality is highest, measuring the level of data access available to an unauthorized user.

Integrity: More severe when loss of data integrity is the highest, measuring the consequence of data modification possible by an unauthorized user.

Availability: More severe when the loss of impacted component availability is highest.

GHSA-9m3q-rhmv-5q44: Out-of-bounds Read in Ruby JSON Parser 

**What is the version information for this release?**

Microsoft Edge Version

Date Released

Based on Chromium Version

134.0.3124.62

3/12//2025

134.0.6998.89

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