ghsa

The latest version of utils-extend (1.0.8) is vulnerable to Prototype Pollution through the entry function(s) lib.extend. An attacker can supply a payload with Object.prototype setter to introduce or modify properties within the global prototype chain, causing denial of service (DoS) a the minimum consequence.

A prototype pollution in the lib.createUploader function of @rpldy/uploader v1.8.1 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted payload.

A prototype pollution in the lib.deepMerge function of @zag-js/core v0.50.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted payload.

A prototype pollution in the lib.Logger function of eazy-logger v4.0.1 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted payload.

A prototype pollution in the lib.requireFromString function of module-from-string v3.3.1 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted payload.

A prototype pollution in the lib.mutateMergeDeep function of @tanstack/form-core v0.35.0 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted payload.

A prototype pollution in the lib.deep function of @ndhoule/defaults v2.0.1 allows attackers to cause a Denial of Service (DoS) via supplying a crafted payload.

### Summary The better-auth `/api/auth/error` page was vulnerable to HTML injection, resulting in a reflected cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. ### Details The value of `error` URL parameter was reflected as HTML on the error page: https://github.com/better-auth/better-auth/blob/05ada0b79dbcac93cc04ceb79b23ca598d07830c/packages/better-auth/src/api/routes/error.ts#L81 ### PoC https://demo.better-auth.com/api/auth/error?error=%3Cscript%3Ealert(1)%3C/script%3E  ### Impact An attacker who exploited this vulnerability by coercing a user to visit a specially-crafted URL could execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the user's browser. Because better-auth is a dependency of web applications, the impact of such a vulnerability is unknowable; it depends on the functionality of the application/site using better-auth. I have calculated the CVSS score assuming the hypothetical victim is an...

### Summary While pushing a file via postLocal method if user add javascript code in file parameter that codes can exe in v8go context. ### Details While posting a file via postLocal, any attacker will add javascript codes to file parameter. That parameter content pass to componentSignature method after some validation. After that componentSignature parameter concat with ssrStr parameter. <img width="1145" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a08a3fe5-2fbd-4a05-b93c-2ad127e6ee81" /> Last part of compileSvelte function ssrStr parameter executed in v8go engine. <img width="754" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4e622761-3324-48d6-8264-6dd6e09055af" /> This cause to any one who can post a file also can push javascript code and run it. Thanks to v8go we can't use all javascript metod, if there is no any vulnerability in v8go we can't escape sandbox and can't run dangerous command like opening socket etc. But we can create infinite loop ...

### Impact Recovering coordinators do not verify the seed provided by the recovering party. This allows an attacker to set up a coordinator with a manifest that passes validation, but with a secret seed controlled by the attacker. If network traffic is redirected from the legitimate coordinator to the attacker's coordinator, a workload owner is susceptible to impersonation if either * they `set` a new manifest and don't compare the root CA cert with the existing one (this is the default of the `contrast` CLI) or * they `verify` the coordinator and don't compare the root CA cert with a trusted reference. Under these circumstances, the attacker can: * Issue certificates that chain back to the attacker coordinator's root CA. * Recover arbitrary workload secrets of workloads deployed after the attack. This issue does **not** affect the following: * secrets of the legitimate coordinator (seed, workload secrets, CA) * integrity of workloads, even when used with the rogue coordinator...