ghsa

### Summary A Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) vulnerability exists in Grav that allows authenticated attackers with editor permissions to execute arbitrary commands on the server and, under certain conditions, may also be exploited by unauthenticated attackers. This vulnerability stems from weak regex validation in the `cleanDangerousTwig` method. ### Important - First of all this vulnerability is due to weak sanitization in the method `clearDangerousTwig`, so any other class that calls it indirectly through for example `$twig->processString` to sanitize code is also vulnerable. - For this report, we will need the official Form and Admin plugin installed, also I will be chaining this with another vulnerability to allow an editor which is a user with only pages permissions to edit the process section of a form. - I made another report for the other vulnerability which is a Broken Access Control which allows a user with full permission for pages to change the process section by ...

## Summary A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the `/admin/pages/[page]` endpoint of the _Grav_ application. This vulnerability allows attackers to inject malicious scripts into the `data[header][template]` parameter. The script is saved within the page's frontmatter and executed automatically whenever the affected content is rendered in the administrative interface or frontend view. --- ## Details **Vulnerable Endpoint:** `POST /admin/pages/[page]` **Parameter:** `data[header][template]` The application fails to properly sanitize user input in the `data[header][template]` field, which is stored in the YAML frontmatter of the page. An attacker can inject JavaScript code using this field, and the payload is rendered and executed when the page is accessed, especially within the Admin Panel interface. --- ## PoC **Payload:** `<script>alert('PoC-XXS73')</script>` ### Steps to Reproduce: 1. Log in to the _Grav_ Admin Panel and navigate to **Pages...

## Summary A Reflected Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the `/admin/pages/[page]` endpoint of the _Grav_ application. This vulnerability allows attackers to inject malicious scripts into the `data[header][content][items]` parameter. --- ## Details **Vulnerable Endpoint:** `GET /admin/pages/[page]` **Parameter:** `data[header][content][items]` The application fails to properly validate and sanitize user input in the `data[header][content][items]` parameter. As a result, attackers can craft a malicious URL with an XSS payload. When this URL is accessed, the injected script is reflected back in the HTTP response and executed within the context of the victim's browser session. --- ## PoC **Payload:** `"><ImG sRc=x OnErRoR=alert('XSS-PoC3')>` 1. Log in to the _Grav_ Admin Panel and navigate to **Pages**. 2. Create a new page or edit an existing one. 3. In the **Advanced > Blog Config > Items** field (which maps to `data[header][content][items]...

### Summary A user with admin panel access and permissions to create or edit pages in Grav CMS can enable Twig processing in the page frontmatter. By injecting malicious Twig expressions, the user can escalate their privileges to admin or execute arbitrary system commands via the scheduler API. This results in both Privilege Escalation (PE) and Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerabilities. ### Details Grav CMS allows Twig to be executed in page templates if enabled in admin panel (process: twig: true). A user with publisher/editor privileges, that can create or edit pages and enable twig processing, can thereby inject arbitrary code that will execute in the context of the page render. This enables exploitation of Grav internal APIs such as: - `grav.user.update()` and `grav.user.save()` for escalating the current user to super admin or admin - `grav.scheduler.addCommand()`, `grav.scheduler.save()` and `grav.scheduler.run()` for code execution The Twig sandbox is not enforced in this c...

## Summary A Stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability was identified in the `/admin/config/site` endpoint of the _Grav_ application. This vulnerability allows attackers to inject malicious scripts into the `data[taxonomies]` parameter. The injected payload is stored on the server and automatically executed in the browser of any user who accesses the affected site configuration, resulting in a persistent attack vector. --- ## Details **Vulnerable Endpoint:** `POST /admin/config/site` **Parameter:** `data[taxonomies]` The application does not properly validate or sanitize input in the `data[taxonomies]` field. As a result, an attacker can inject JavaScript code, which is stored in the site configuration and later rendered in the administrative interface or site output, causing automatic execution in the user's browser. --- ## PoC **Payload:** `"><script>alert('XSS-PoC')</script>` ### Steps to Reproduce: 1. Log in to the _Grav_ Admin Panel with sufficient permissions t...

### Summary When a user with privilege of user creation creates a new user through the Admin UI and supplies a username containing path traversal sequences (for example ..\Nijat or ../Nijat), Grav writes the account YAML file to an unintended path outside user/accounts/. The written YAML can contain account fields such as email, fullname, twofa_secret, and hashed_password. In my tests, I was able to cause the Admin UI to write the following content into arbitrary .yaml files (including files like email.yaml, system.yaml, or other site YAML files like admin.yaml) — demonstrating arbitrary YAML write / overwrite via the Admin UI. Example observed content written by the Admin UI (test data): username: ..\Nijat state: enabled email: [EMAIL@gmail.com](mailto:EMAIL@gmail.com) fullname: 'Nijat Alizada' language: en content_editor: default twofa_enabled: false twofa_secret: RWVEIHC2AFVD6FCR6UHCO3DS4HWXKKDT avatar: { } hashed_password: $2y$10$wl9Ktv3vUmDKCt8o6u2oOuRZr1I04OE0YZf2sJ1QcAherbNnk1...

A flaw was found in Keycloak. The Keycloak guides recommend to not expose /admin path to the outside in case the installation is using a proxy. The issue occurs at least via ha-proxy, as it can be tricked to using relative/non-normalized paths to access the /admin application path relative to /realms which is expected to be exposed.

A **Stored Cross-Site Scripting ([XSS](https://angular.dev/best-practices/security#preventing-cross-site-scripting-xss))** vulnerability has been identified in the **Angular Template Compiler**. It occurs because the compiler's internal security schema is incomplete, allowing attackers to bypass Angular's built-in security sanitization. Specifically, the schema fails to classify certain URL-holding attributes (e.g., those that could contain [`javascript:` URLs](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/Web/URI/Reference/Schemes/javascript)) as requiring strict URL security, enabling the injection of malicious scripts. Additionally, a related vulnerability exists involving SVG animation elements (`<animate>`, `<set>`, `<animateMotion>`, `<animateTransform>`). The `attributeName` attribute on these elements was not properly validated, allowing attackers to dynamically target security-sensitive attributes like `href` or `xlink:href` on other elements. By binding `attributeName` to "href" and p...

### Impact Attackers can delete any file on the server at will, causing damage or unavailability of server resources. Attackers can control the 'FileMd5' parameter to delete any file and folder The affected code:  Affected interfaces: /api/fileUploadAndDownload/removeChunk POC: You can specify the FileMd5 value as the directory or file you want to delete ```POST /api/fileUploadAndDownload/removeChunk HTTP/1.1 Host: 127.0.0.1:8080 Content-Length: 78 sec-ch-ua: "Not=A?Brand";v="99", "Chromium";v="118" x-token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJVVUlEIjoiOGYzYTdjMmMtYjAwMC00ODFmLWEyNGYtYzQyMDc2NTFjNWRmIiwiSUQiOjEsIlVzZXJuYW1lIjoiYWRtaW4iLCJOaWNrTmFtZSI6Ik1yLuWlh-a3vCIsIkF1dGhvcml0eUlkIjo4ODgsIkJ1ZmZlclRpbWUiOjg2NDAwLCJpc3MiOiJxbVBsdXMiLCJhdWQiOlsiR1ZBIl0sImV4cCI6MTc2MzIxNDQzMywibmJmIjoxNzYyNjA5NjMzfQ.7BTnRq65JDiPdlb0gJuAUa2nifIDTtePsnDnAtZoFJQ sec-ch-ua-mobile: ?0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5....

### Summary The gateway determines the destination baseURL by prioritizing the value in the x-portkey-custom-host request header. The proxy route then appends the client-specified path to perform an external fetch. This can be maliciously used by users for SSRF (CWE-918) attack ### Impact This vulnerability can be exploited to force the server to make requests to arbitrary hosts on the internal network. This could allow an attacker to exfiltrate sensitive data, for instance, by accessing the AWS metadata service. ### Patches The issue is patched in 1.14.0 (https://github.com/Portkey-AI/gateway/pull/1372) The vulnerability resides within the gateway's request processing function which handles the `x-portkey-custom-host` header. This parameter was passed directly or with insufficient validation/sanitization to an internal HTTP request function. **The fix (v1.14.0) implements a robust allow-list policy:** 1. All custom host inputs are now strictly validated to ensure the resulting UR...