ghsa

A vulnerability has been found in ExpressGateway express-gateway up to 1.16.10. Affected is an unknown function in the library lib/rest/routes/apps.js of the component REST Endpoint. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. It is possible to launch the attack remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

A flaw has been found in ExpressGateway express-gateway up to 1.16.10. This issue affects some unknown processing in the library lib/rest/routes/users.js of the component REST Endpoint. The manipulation leads to cross site scripting. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The vendor was contacted early about this disclosure but did not respond in any way.

Uncontrolled Resource Consumption vulnerability in Legion of the Bouncy Castle Inc. Bouncy Castle for Java - BC-FJA 2.1.0 bc-fips (API modules) allows Excessive Allocation. This vulnerability is associated with program files org.Bouncycastle.Crypto.Fips.NativeLoader. This issue affects Bouncy Castle for Java - BC-FJA 2.1.0: from BC-FJA 2.1.0 through 2.1.0.

HashiCorp's go-getter library subdirectory download feature is vulnerable to symlink attacks leading to unauthorized read access beyond the designated directory boundaries. This vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-8959, is fixed in go-getter 1.7.9.

### Impact Duplicate logging of the input values in the `fetch:template` action in the Scaffolder meant that some of the secrets were not properly redacted. If you're not passing through `${{ secrets.x }}` to `fetch:template` there is no impact. ### Patches This issue has been resolved in `2.1.1` of the `scaffolder-backend` plugin. ### Workarounds Template Authors can remove the use of `${{ secrets }}` being used as an argument to `fetch:template`. ### References If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: Open an issue in the [Backstage repository](https://github.com/backstage/backstage) Visit our Discord, linked to in [Backstage README](https://github.com/backstage/backstage)

### Summary Following https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-cq8c-xv66-36gw, there's still an Open Redirect vulnerability in a subset of Astro deployment scenarios. ### Details Astro 5.12.8 fixed a case where `https://example.com//astro.build/press` would redirect to the external origin `//astro.build/press`. However, with the Node deployment adapter in standalone mode and `trailingSlash` set to `"always"` in the Astro configuration, `https://example.com//astro.build/press` still redirects to `//astro.build/press`. ### Proof of Concept 1. Create a new minimal Astro project (`astro@5.12.8`) 2. Configure it to use the Node adapter (`@astrojs/node@9.4.0`) and force trailing slashes: ```js // astro.config.mjs import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config'; import node from '@astrojs/node'; export default defineConfig({ trailingSlash: 'always', adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }), }); ``` 3. Build the site by running `astro build`....

The `get` and `set` methods of the public trait `scratchpad::Tracking` interact with unsafe code regions in the crate, and they influence the computation of addresses returned as raw pointers. However, the trait itself is not marked as unsafe, meaning users may provide custom implementations under the assumption that the crate upholds all safety guarantees. This becomes problematic because even safe implementations of `get` and `set`-written without using any unsafe code-can still result in ill-formed raw pointers. These pointers may later be dereferenced within safe APIs of the crate (e.g., `marker::MarkerBack::allocate_slice_copy`), potentially leading to arbitrary memory access or heap buffer overflows. According to the [penultimate commit](https://github.com/okready/scratchpad/commit/957dee1a3902f48600b06910e8e0b1d5ee7dab83), the crate is in maintenance mode awaiting a cleanup that will reduce the area of unsafe code. Note that the last commits to the repository are from 4 years ...

A vulnerability in the Python-Future 1.0.0 module allows for arbitrary code execution via the unintended import of a file named test.py. When the module is loaded, it automatically imports test.py, if present in the same directory or in the sys.path. This behavior can be exploited by an attacker who has the ability to write files to the server, allowing the execution of arbitrary code.

**Summary** [Amazon Elastic Container Service (Amazon ECS)](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/Welcome.html) is a fully managed container orchestration service that enables customers to deploy, manage, and scale containerized applications. Amazon ECS container agent provides an [introspection API](https://docs.aws.amazon.com/AmazonECS/latest/developerguide/introspection-diag.html) that provides information about the overall state of the Amazon ECS agent and the container instances. We identified CVE-2025-9039, an issue in the Amazon ECS agent. **Impact** Under certain conditions, this issue could allow an introspection server to be accessed off-host by another instance if the instances are in the same security group or if their security groups allow incoming connections that include the port where the server is hosted. This issue does not affect instances where the option to allow off-host access to the introspection server is set to 'false'. Impacted vers...

### Summary If `/proc` and `/sys` in the rootfs are symbolic links, they can potentially be exploited to gain access to the host root filesystem. ### Details For security reasons, container creation should be prohibited if `/proc` or `/sys` in the rootfs is a symbolic link. I verified this behavior with `youki`. When `/proc` or `/sys` is a symbolic link, `runc` fails to create the container, whereas `youki` successfully creates it. This is the fix related to this issue in `runc`. * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3756 * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/pull/3773 * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/main/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go#L590 * https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/main/tests/integration/mask.bats#L60 ### Impact The following advisory appears to be related to this vulnerability: * https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-vpvm-3wq2-2wvm * https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fh74-hm69-rqjw